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Abstract 
 
 
 
While it is not new to claim that the news media form an important 
part of the contemporary political systems, the role of the media is usually 
neglected in traditional study of public policy. At the same time, previous 
studies of media-policy relations do not take traditional policy theories into 
account. The objective of my thesis is to examine the possible role of the 
media in the policy process in order to establish the link between traditional 
policy theories and existing media-policy models.  
 
Following previous studies of media-policy relations, in particular 
Robinson’s (2002) study of the ‘CNN effects’ on US humanitarian 
interventions, this thesis uses data derived from framing analysis, process 
tracing and in-depth interviews to examine the influence of news coverage 
in four cases of domestic policy making in Hong Kong with particular 
reference to several factors, namely media consensus over framing and 
policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage. 
 
Comparison across the selected cases demonstrates that the influence 
of news coverage is specific to policymakers’ institutional positions and 
policy stage. Media effects on policy are also enhanced by unfavourable 
long-term and short-term public attitudes towards the Government and its 
policy. However, news coverage does not exert an influence on policy all by 
itself. Rather, the media’s influence on policy is created by the interactions 
between news coverage and a series of factors, including public views, 
institutions, and political actors’ beliefs and strategies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. Research Questions 
Whilst it is not new to claim that the news media can influence 
policy making, traditional theories of public policy usually play down or 
neglect the role of the media. There are other studies focusing on media-
policy relations but these seldom take traditional policy theories into 
account. It seems that neither type of study provides a satisfactory 
explanation of the role of the media in the policy process. 
 
In order to address these issues, this thesis asks a research question: 
‘To what extent do the news media influence policy making?’ The main 
objective of this thesis is to verify the media’s influence on the policy 
process. If such an influence is verified, I will try to specify the nature of 
this influence and how it is related to other factors. At the same time, I will 
try to incorporate some elements of traditional policy theories into account 
in order to properly assess the role of the media in the policy process. 
 
Hong Kong, a former British Colony, is selected as a case study as 
there have been increasing concerns over the media’s influence on 
governance since Hong Kong’s sovereignty was returned to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in July 1997. Some senior officials have claimed 
that they spend more and more effort dealing with media pressure in policy 
debate. Some members of the business elite and pro-government politicians 
have described this situation as ‘mediocracy’, commenting that it is the 
media that rule Hong Kong1. Moreover, according to a survey of 2001, 35% 
of the public believed that the media had the greatest influence in setting the 
social agenda while only 28 % claimed that the Legislative Council (Legco) 
had such influence. Furthermore, 24% of the public perceived that the media 
had a greater influence on policy, although 61% took the view that the 
                                               
1 ADN, 21 January 2000, page B02; 8 June 2001, page A18; 28 November 2003 page E15; 
23 November 2003, page A18; MPDN 21 January 2000, page B04; the Hong Kong 
Economic Journal 11 April 2002, page 30; 8 May 2003, page 23; 24 October 2003, page 12; 
the Wen Wei Po 5 January 2004, page A10.    
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Legco had more influence on government policy making. Of the journalists, 
an even higher proportion (40%) believed in the media’s increasing 
influence on policy making while only 36% considered the Legco more 
influential (Chan and So, 2002: 265-7). From these perspectives, not only 
members of the social elite and the public, but also journalists themselves 
perceive the level of the media’s influence on policy making in Hong Kong. 
Thus, the case of Hong Kong helps examine the media’s influence on 
domestic policy making. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is based on the arguments 
contained in previous studies of media-policy relations, in particular on 
Robinson’s (2002) study of the ‘CNN effect’ on US military intervention in 
the humanitarian crisis. The thesis suggests that the news coverage of 
government policies or proposals can influence public opinion, putting 
pressure on policymakers. Consequently, government’s actions or policies 
are changed. However, the level of pressure created by the media is 
associated with several factors. First, the media’s pressure on policymakers 
is significant only if most of the media outlets criticise government policy 
simultaneously. In other words, the media is likely to influence policy only 
when there is consistency in negative framing among different media outlets. 
By contrast, policy is unlikely to change when news framing is supportive 
or divided among different media. 
 
Second, in line with Robinson’s (2002) arguments, when there is a 
high level of policy certainty measured by elite consensus over an issue, 
policymakers will try their best to promote their ideas. Thus, media 
coverage tends to follow official policy rather than criticise government’s 
decisions. In an elite debate, however, the media can pick up on and 
magnify the ideas of particular groups. Critical coverage of government 
policy is possible in this case. In other words, there is a two-way interaction 
in which the media and policymakers influence each other. The media’s 
influence is likely to come about only when there is a relatively high level 
of disagreement among policymakers. 
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Third, I hypothesise an inverse relation between the media’s 
influence on policy and policy certainty measured by policy stage. 
According to this hypothesis, it is relatively easy for critical coverage to 
exert an influence on early stage policy, including that which is under 
consultation, already in legislation or under evaluation. By contrast, policy 
at a later stage, including that which is already implemented, is unlikely to 
be changed by the media.      
 
In addition to these hypotheses, I assume that the media’s influence 
on policy is associated with a series of factors related to long-term and 
short-term public views on the government and its policy. According to this 
assumption, when these factors are favourable to the government and its 
policy, the administration and pro-government politicians can afford to 
ignore critical news coverage. Conversely, when these factors remain 
unfavourable, policymakers will not only become sensitive to, but also pro-
actively respond to, critical coverage in order to avoid being punished by 
their voters at elections. In other words, the media’s influence is enhanced 
by unfavourable public opinion.  
 
However, it is dangerous to take media coverage to be the only 
factor affecting policy change. In order to avoiding overstating the role of 
the media, I will examine several elements of traditional public policy 
theories, including institutions, which refer to the formal rules and 
organisational context of the policy process, and political actors’ beliefs and 
strategies. I suggest that such factors not only influence policy, but also 
interact with news coverage. Thus, policy change is the result of interactions 
between these factors and media coverage.   
 
The hypotheses of this study are tested by a triangulation of data 
derived from several approaches, namely framing analysis, process tracing, 
in-depth interviews, textual analysis and comparison across cases. Four 
cases with different levels of media consensus, elite consensus and policy 
stage are selected. After analysing the framing of news coverage on selected 
media outlets by means of article and keyword counts, I trace the time 
sequence of policy development. My assumption is that the media’s 
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influence is possible only if there is critical coverage followed by policy 
change. If news coverage follows policy change, the influence of the media 
can be excluded. 
 
However, process tracing, as a screening test, provides insufficient 
evidence of the media’s influence. Thus, the considerations of policymakers, 
including government officials and Executive Council (the Cabinet) 
members and legislators, were examined using in-depth interviews and 
textual analysis of official documents and news materials. Finally, several 
cases with different levels of policy certainty and media consensus are 
compared in order to examine the media’s influence under different 
conditions. 
 
3. Chapter Organisation 
The first part of this thesis reviews previous studies of public policy 
theories and media-policy relations. In Chapter 2, four major traditional 
public policy theories focusing on different aspects of analysis are reviewed. 
They are: Marxism with its economic perspective; institutionalism 
concentrating on structural influence; policy network, a sectoral level 
analysis; and rational choice theory, which emphasises the self-interest of 
individuals. Apart from these traditional policy theories, two synthetic 
models are studied, namely Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams model and 
Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated equilibrium model. I suggested 
that most traditional policy theories either play down the role of the media, 
or fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of interactions between the 
media and other factors. Kingdon (1984) recognises the two-way interaction 
between the media and policymakers. However, his interview-based study 
provides insufficient empirical evidence, such as process tracing data of 
coverage and policy change. Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) study is based 
on framing analysis of news coverage and process tracing of policy change. 
Nevertheless, their work mainly focuses on the long-term effects of media 
coverage. The short-term influence of the media is not examined.  
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Chapter 3 reviews the literature on theories of mass media, in 
particular those concerning media-policy relations, including Linsky’s 
(1986)’s interview-based study, the agenda-setting model (Cook et al., 
1983), Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) propaganda model and Robinson’s 
(2002) ‘CNN effect’ model. I suggest that some of these studies overstate 
the media’s influence on policy while some focus only on the government’s 
influence on the media. Robinson’s (2002) study recognises the two-way 
interactions between the media and government. However, since his model 
focuses on US foreign policy, its explanatory power needs to be tested in 
cases of domestic policy making.   
 
In Chapter 4, I provide an introduction to the political context and 
press system in Hong Kong. Drawing insights from previous studies, in 
Chapter 5, I propose a conceptual framework of media-policy relations 
according to the context of the political and press systems in Hong Kong. 
This chapter also provides definitions of hypothesised variables and 
approaches for measurement. Alongside this, I discuss methodology and the 
criteria for the selection of case studies and sample media outlets. 
 
Subsequent to this, four selected cases of policy debate are described 
and analysed in Chapters 6 to 13. These four cases include the legislation of 
Article 23 of the Basic Law, the debate on Central reclamation, the 
introduction of Goods and Services Tax and the demolition of the old Star 
Ferry Pier in Central. After analysing the data originating from in-depth 
interviews in Chapter 14, I compare these four cases in order to test the 
hypotheses of this study and examine the relations between the media and 
other factors. Finally, conclusions of this thesis are drawn in Chapter 16.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Role of the Media in Policy Approaches 
 
1. Introduction 
Although it is not new to suggest that the mass media may influence 
the policy process, most traditional theories concerning the policy process 
do not take the media into account, and research into policy analysis usually 
neglects its role. The objective of this chapter is to review various policy 
theories and identify better accounts of the media-policy relation.  
 
Among the numerous mainstream theories of the policy process, 
four are discussed in this chapter, namely Marxism, institutionalism, policy 
network approach and rational choice theory. These four approaches are 
selected because they represent different levels of policy analysis. Marxism 
takes an economic perspective; institutionalism concentrates on the 
influence of structures and rules; policy network is a group or sectoral level 
analysis and rational choice theory emphasises the self-interest of 
individuals. This chapter also discusses two synthetic models which 
integrate various elements from mainstream theories into a single policy 
model. These models include Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams model and 
Baumgartner and Jones’s (1994) punctuated equilibrium model. In 
discussing each theory, I go through the key arguments. The theory is then 
applied to examine the possible role of the media in the policy process. 
Subsequently, I comment on the limitations of the theory.  
 
The argument of this chapter is that all policy approaches provide 
important insights about the role of the media in the policy process. 
However, none of these traditional policy theories explain how the media 
influence policy. In addition, each of these synthetic models has its 
limitations. Kingdon’s (1984) argument concerning the role of the media 
lacks sufficient empirical evidence. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue 
that the changes in media framing are the result of the issues switching 
among various journalistic beats. However, they do not suggest reasons why 
the issues switch from one beat to another. 
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2. Marxist Approach 
The first traditional approach to policy study discussed is Marxism, 
which emphasises the power of the capitalist class and economic system. 
According to the Marxist account, politics, including state and policy, 
reflects the mode of capitalist production and the power of the capitalist 
class. From this perspective, the policy process is structured by the power of 
the capitalist class and the logic created by the capitalist mode of production 
(John 1998:93). 
 
In this chapter, three Marxist accounts focusing on different aspects 
are discussed. The first of these, instrumental Marxism, focuses on the 
power of the capitalist class, while the second one, functional Marxism, 
emphasises the state’s role in supporting the interests of capitalism. 
Gramscian hegemony, the third one, not only focuses on the relationship 
between the state and the capitalist class, but also emphasises the 
importance of politics, culture and ideology.  
 
2.1 Instrumental Marxism 
As Marx, in his Communist Manifesto states, ‘the executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the 
whole bourgeoisie’ (cited in Ham and Hill 1984:32-3). Following Marx’s 
argument, Miliband suggests that the state is not a neutral agent.  Rather, for 
three reasons, it is an instrument for class domination in capitalist society. 
First, both the bourgeoisie and state elites occupying senior positions in 
state institutions come from the upper and middle classes who have a vastly 
better prospect than the working class in gaining access to a better education. 
Thus, those people have a better chance of achieving elite positions in the 
state system. Studying the case of the US, Miliband found that most 
political decision makers, including senior civil servants, were born in the 
families of professionals, business owners and officials (Miliband 1969:59-
61).  
 
 8 
Second, through personal networks and business associations, the 
bourgeoisie is able to put pressure on social elites and influence their 
decisions. Third, since the state usually depends on a successful economic 
base for their survival, the economic interests of the private enterprise 
system should be taken into account when state officials make decisions on 
policies. Thus, the power of the government is constrained by the 
bourgeoisie (ibid: 75-8).  As Miliband argues, ‘it is the capitalist context of 
generalised inequality in which the state operates which basically 
determines its policies and actions’ (ibid: 265). Thus, Miliband’s approach 
has come to be known as ‘instrumentalist Marxism’ (Ham and Hill 1984:33). 
 
2.2 Functionalist Marxism 
The other Marxist approach, functionalist or structural Marxism, 
emphasises the state’s role in reproducing capitalism rather than the power 
of the bourgeoisie. For example, Poulantzas argues that the capitalist state 
‘does not directly represent the dominant classes’ economic interests, but 
their political interests: it is the dominant classes’ political power centre, as 
the organising agent of their political struggle’ (Poulantzas 1973:190). Thus, 
the class background of state officials is not important. Rather, it is the 
structural constraints on the state by the objective power, the objective 
relation between the bourgeoisie and the state, which explain the political 
supremacy of the economically dominant classes (ibid).      
 
In addition, Poulantzas argues that the state is not simply the 
instrument of the dominant classes, but has relative autonomy. Since the 
bourgeoisie, or capital, is divided into different interests or fractions, the 
state, as a political organiser, may act against the interests of a particular 
fraction of the bourgeoisie in order to maintain the long term interests of the 
dominant classes (ibid:285). From this functional perspective, the capitalist 
state’s main function is to create conditions to protect and reproduce 
capitalism. Thus, the state has to provide physical resources, such as 
industrial sites, for the business sector. At the same time, the state has to 
maintain order and control within society through repressive mechanisms 
such as the police and agencies like schools, which perform a legitimation 
function. In this view, state intervention in the provision of services such as 
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housing and health, is aimed at keeping the work force healthy in order to 
reduce labour costs for capital (Ham and Hill 1984:33). 
 
2.3 Gramscian Hegemony 
The other stream within Marxist accounts places its emphasis not 
only on relations between the state and the capitalist classes, but also on the 
importance of ideology in society. One of these accounts is Antonio 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony which refers to the capacity to create a high 
level of consensus within society. While recognising the importance of the 
economic basis of society, Gramsci emphasises the importance of politics, 
culture and ideology. As he states, ‘a social group can, and indeed must, 
already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning government power (this indeed 
is one of the principle conditions for the winning of such power); it 
subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it 
holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well’ (Gramsci 
1971:57-8). In other words, leadership cannot be based solely on coercion 
but also requires a large degree of consent. Those forces that hope to win 
state power must already play a leading role in civil society and must 
already be culturally, politically and ideologically dominant (Joseph 
2006:54). 
 
For Gramsci, hegemony is not predetermined by social or economic 
structures. Rather, hegemony is achieved by a ‘homogenous politico-
economic historical bloc, without internal contradictions’ (Gramsci 
1971:168). ‘Historical bloc’ is a way in which the dominant group allies 
itself with some groups to offer concessions and incentives to others. In this 
case, economic, social, and ideological forces are combined in a temporary 
unity to change society (Joseph 2006:53; McLellan 1998:202).   
 
Gramsci suggests that a historical bloc is formed by structures and 
superstructures (Gramsci 1971:336). The superstructure refers to two major 
levels of society: one is ‘civil society’ that is ‘the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’’; another is ‘political society’ or ‘the State’ (ibid: 
12). The dominant view of society is mediated by the dominant groups and 
social, political structures and the civil society. However, a historical bloc is 
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not a stable alliance. Rather, it is continuously developed through the 
interaction of political and economic forces, ideas and social structures (ibid: 
182). Thus, the dominant status of some groups may be replaced by others 
that successfully ally themselves with other interests.  
 
Comparing the revolutions in Russia and the West, Gramsci argues 
that hegemony is particularly important in countries where civil society is 
strong. In Russia where civil society was weak, it was easier to take state 
power by force, but it was more difficult to maintain it. In the West, by 
contrast, state power was difficult to obtain. Once won, however, it was 
easier to maintain social cohesion and consensus because of the influence of 
the institutions of civil society (Gramsci 1971:238; Joseph 2006:52). 
 
For Gramsci, bureaucratic and technological rationalism analysed by 
Weber was part of capitalist ideological hegemony (McLellan 1998:203). 
Since the dominant view or social reality is dominated by the ruling classes, 
the policy process is economically, structurally, culturally and ideologically 
influenced at all levels by the dominant groups. From this perspective, force 
and coercion are not the normal practices. Rather, how problems are defined, 
how agendas are set, how policies are implemented, how decisions are made 
are all owing to hegemony.  
 
Applying the concept of Gramscian hegemony, Gamble explains the 
rise and fall of the Thatcher government of the UK. His work was based on 
an analysis of the historical context and the structural constraints within 
which the Thatcherite project arose. For Gamble, hegemony means the 
exercise of political and moral leadership. The concept of Thatcherite 
hegemony has four main dimensions—electoral, ideological, economic and 
state (Gamble 1994:9, 207). 
 
According to Gamble, support for Thatcher’s Government was based 
on the achievement of a considerable degree of electoral and ideological 
hegemony. Electoral hegemony can be analysed in two perspectives, namely 
party management and vote winning. From the perspective of party 
management, Thatcher’s image as an exceptional dominant leader was 
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established not only as a result of Thatcher’s personal style, but also of her 
success in controlling personnel appointments in the party and the shadow 
cabinet. As a result, opponents were removed from the cabinet (ibid:212-4). 
From the perspective of vote winning, the Conservatives, through the sale of 
council houses and the promotion of wider share ownership of state owned 
enterprises, successfully defined the Conservative nation as a nation of 
property owners and consumers. This not only created a new identity, but 
also set up a mass of private-property interests willing to support market 
solutions for public policy problems (ibid:218-20). 
 
Ideological hegemony also played an important role in the control of 
policy agenda. Despite a majority against privatisation and other policy 
shifts in welfare and social policy, conservative ideological hegemony was 
marked at the elites, including business organisations and the national media, 
in particular the newspapers (ibid:221-3). More importantly, Thatcher’s 
ideological hegemony created irreversible change in national economic 
management and welfare programmes which Labour adopted as its own 
(ibid: 224-5). 
 
Despite her success in establishing electoral and ideological 
hegemony, Gamble argues that Thatcher’s economic and state hegemony 
was far from successful (ibid:254). The Thatcher government’s strategy to 
encourage companies to prove themselves internationally competitive only 
favoured those industrial sectors that were already dominated by 
transnational companies as well as financial and commercial companies 
based in the City. This short-term strategy worked in 1980s. However, 
during a severe period of recession, and large fiscal and trade deficits 
between 1990 and 1993, the Conservative hegemony was put at risk (ibid: 
247-9). From the perspective of state hegemony, Thatcher government’s 
strategy to establish the image of a strong state was also of little use in 
dealing with long-term problems such as the control of public expenditure 
or refashioning the education system. Neither was it able to reverse the 
decay of the inner cities and public services (ibid: 250-4).  
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In sum, Gamble demonstrates the importance of hegemony to the 
success and failure of the Thatcher government. In the process of 
establishing hegemony, political actors’ strategies, institutional context and 
economic and social factors were all crucial both to the success and failure 
of establishing hegemony.  
 
2.3 Possible Role of the Media in Marxism  
Within the Marxist account, the mass media in capitalist societies 
perform a highly ‘functional’ role in reinforcing the dominant political and 
ideological system. For example, Miliband argues that the media are both 
the expression of a system of domination, and a means of reinforcing it. 
Although values of freedom of expression are important, ‘freedom has to be 
set in the real economic and political context of these (capitalist) societies; 
and in this context the free expression of ideas and opinions which are 
helpful to the prevailing system of the power and privilege’ (Miliband 
1969:220-1).  
 
According to Miliband, regardless of their political tendency and 
market position, most newspapers in a capitalist society may be relied on to 
support the conservative side or at least to be deeply critical of the anti-
conservative one. Thus, the press has proved itself to be a deeply committed 
anti-trade union force (ibid: 223). Miliband also suggests that the 
conservative and conformist direction of the media is influenced by three 
pressures. First, media ownership is dominated by a steadily declining 
number of large-scale capitalist enterprises. Thus, a general sense of 
conformity assures that the editorial and political line is kept within a 
conservative ideological framework (ibid: 227-30). Second, financially 
relying on advertisers, the media usually show exceptional care in dealing 
with the interests of advertisers and the business community (ibid: 230-1). 
The third pressure upon mass media comes from government and various 
agencies of the state system. Miliband suggests that the government’s 
continuous and systematic supply of explanation of official policy to the 
media prevents a radical shift away from the opinions of the dominant 
interests (ibid: 233, 238). 
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A similar role of the media is suggested by Gramsci and Gamble. 
For Gramsci, the media are considered as ‘intellectuals’ which function as 
‘the dominant group’s ‘deputes’ exercising the subaltern functions of social 
hegemony and political government’ (Gramsci 1971:12, 60). In this sense, 
the role of the media is to diffuse dominant groups’ ideas. Consequently, 
these views form the ‘social reality’ or ‘consent’ while the dissenting voices 
are marginalised.  
 
Gamble also suggests that the role of the media was crucial in 
establishing ideological hegemony of the Thatcher government. Despite a 
majority of the public being against privatisation and other policy shifts in 
social policy, as the allies of the Thatcher government, the national media, 
in particular the newspapers, helped promote Thatcherite policies. On the 
other hand, the BBC which provided relatively objective and pluralist 
coverage was seen as the enemy of the Thatcher government. In order to 
deal with this enemy and eradicate dissent, Conservative chairman, Norman 
Tebbit, made strong efforts to influence the editorial and news criteria of the 
BBC (Gamble, 1994:222). 
 
2.4 Comments on the Marxist Account 
The Marxist account elaborates the relationship between the various 
sectors in capitalist society. Both the instrumental and functional Marxist 
schools not only explain the political, economic and ideological constraints 
on the media, but also specify how the media marginalise voices against the 
dominant interests. However, the Marxist account has at least two 
limitations. First, it presumes that all political actions are predetermined by 
the economic interests of the state and the capitalist classes. For example, 
Poulantzas (1973) argues that the state makes policy to assure the long-term 
interests of the capitalist economy. However, since the definition of ‘long-
term interest’ may be ambiguous, it is difficult to verify the causal link 
between policy and economic interests in the long run. Thus, Marxist 
accounts fail to specify the mechanism of the policy process. As John states, 
‘macro socio-economic approaches do not offer an all-encompassing theory 
of political action, they suggest sets of constraints on action that impact on 
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policy choice depending on the circumstances that decision-makers face 
(John 1998:115).’ 
 
Second, perhaps more importantly, focusing only on the functional 
role of the media, the Marxist account may oversimplify the relationship 
between the media and the dominant interests. The autonomy and diversity 
of the media are usually played down. Critical coverage of the government 
and other dominant interests are supposed to be ‘bogus’ (Miliband 
1969:223). Although Gamble mentions that the BBC provided some 
relatively pluralist coverage of Thatcher policy, he highlights the national 
press’s support for the Thatcher government. In other words, the possibility 
that the news coverage criticises and changes official policy is played down 
or eliminated. Thus, the Marxist account does not provide a proper 
explanation for the media effect on the policy process. 
 
3. Institutionalism 
Institutionalism was the dominant tradition of political analysis both 
in Britain and the US.  Traditionally, institutions are defined as formal rule 
and procedures and government organisations in which political behaviour 
takes place. Thus, the institutional approach focuses on the influence of 
institutions on political behaviour. As Rhodes states, the institutional 
approach ‘seeks to explain the relationship between structure and 
democracy and the ways in which rules, procedures and formal 
organisations succeed or fail in constraining political behaviour’ (Rhodes, 
1995:54-5).  
 
3.1 Old Institutionalism 
Within the traditional or old institutional account, there are two 
prescriptive explanations for political behaviour. First, rules and procedures 
are considered to be the basic independent variables while the functioning 
and fate of democracies are seen as dependent variables. Second, rules 
prescribe political behaviour; that is, behaviour occurs as a result of a 
particular rule (ibid: 46). 
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Rhodes (1995) identifies three forms of institutional approach. First, 
the descriptive-inductive method explores specific events, eras, people and 
institutions in order to systematically describe and analyse phenomena that 
have occurred in the past. Contemporary political phenomena are then 
explained with reference to those past events.  The second method is formal-
legal inquiry, which focuses on the influence of public law and formal 
governmental organisations (ibid: 43-4). Although this method focuses on 
the ‘constitutional’ structure, as Eckstein claims, this ‘includes not just 
written constitutions but their equivalents: anything that explicitly 
prescribes rules for processes and organisations of authority.’ (Eckstein, 
1979:2) The third approach is the historical-comparative method, which is 
used to examine the influence of institutions by means of a comparative, 
historical method. Using the example of Herman Finer’s work in 1932, 
Rhodes claims that the historical-comparative inquiry into institutions not 
only considers legal forms, but also an institution’s operations, and as it has 
evolved stage by stage (Rhodes, 1995:45).   
 
3.2 New Institutionalism 
The 1980s saw the rise of a new institutionalism which not only 
widened the definition of institutions, but also incorporated the insights of 
other political theories, while taking proper account of the role played by 
institutions. Two examples of new institutional studies are discussed in this 
chapter. One was carried out by March and Olsen (1984) while the other 
was a study by Peter Hall (1989).  
 
3.2.1 March and Olsen’s Study 
March and Olsen suggest that ‘it would probably be more accurate to 
describe recent thinking as blending elements of old institutionalism style 
with recent theories of politics’ (March and Olsen 1984:738). Thus, new 
institutional approaches have been able to contribute to modern political 
theory by extending the key notions of six political orders on which most 
modern political theories are based.    
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Firstly, March and Olsen argue that political history often 
overemphasises the unique significance of a particular sequence of events or 
choices, the impact of a particular campaign strategy or speech. However, 
history cannot be guaranteed to be efficient (ibid:737). Thus, March and 
Olsen suggest the examination of historical order. This involves studying 
the ways in which institutions learn from their experience, specifying the 
conditions under which the sequential branches of history turn back upon 
each other, characterising the role of standard operating procedures, 
professions and expertise in storing and recalling history (ibid:743). 
 
Secondly, questioning the assumption that things are ordered by 
their consequential connections, March and Olsen argue that things are 
connected by virtue of their simultaneous presence or arrival. Thus, 
temporal order provides an alternative in which linkages are less 
consequential than temporal (ibid: 743). Regarding endogenous order, new 
institutionalism argues that internal institutional processes affect the 
distribution of political resources and preferences, which in turn affects the 
power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions (ibid:739). 
 
Fourthly, March and Olsen argue that political behaviour is often 
constrained and dictated by culture and social norms. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the normative order which refers to ‘the relations among norms, 
significance of ambiguity and inconsistency in norms, and the time path of 
the transformation of normative structures’ (ibid: 744). Fifthly, March and 
Olsen suggest studying demographic order, that is, in order to examine the 
impact of individuals who make up political institutions, the importance of 
their career paths (ibid: 744). Finally, March and Olsen suggest the 
importance of an examination of symbolic order which is the consideration 
of myths, symbols and rituals with attention to ‘the dynamics of symbols, to 
the processes by which symbols shapes the behaviour not only of the 
innocent but of the society as a whole.’ (ibid) 
 
3.2.2 Hall’s work 
The other author, Peter Hall, further broadens the concept of 
institution. In his view, institution refers to an analysis of ‘the formal rules, 
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compliance procedures, and operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ 
(Hall, 1986:19). In Hall’s analysis, even markets are considered as 
institutions. As he states, ‘the market setting in which entrepreneurs and 
workers operate is a complex of interrelated institutions whose character is 
historically determined and whose configuration fundamentally affects the 
incentives the market actors face’ (ibid: 35) 
 
Hall suggests two fundamental roles of institutional factors. First, the 
organisation of policy making affects the degree of power that any one set 
of actors has over policy outcomes. Second, organisational position also 
influences an actor’s definition of his own interests, by establishing his 
institutional responsibility and relationship to other actors. From this 
perspective, ‘organisational factors affect both the degree of pressure an 
actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction to that pressure’  
(ibid:19). Hall also proposes the notion of the role of institutions located 
within society and the economy, as well as less formal organisational 
networks, in the determination of policy (ibid:20). In addition, Hall takes 
account of the influence of structural context on ideas. He argues that 
organisations not only structure actors’ rational actions within a particular 
social context, but also play an important role in the diffusion and 
magnification of ideologies among multiple social actors (ibid:277).  
 
Studying the economic policies of Britain and France since the 
eighteenth century, Hall argues that such policies were determined not 
simply according to prevailing economic conditions, but also by a political 
dynamic including the role of the organisation of capital, labour and the 
state as well as the position of the country within the international system 
(ibid: 20-21). He concludes four aspects to the structural setting that exert a 
significant   influence on British economic policy (ibid: 57). The first one is 
the British international position which was based on the experience of 
empire. This left Britain with financial institutions that were heavily 
oriented towards overseas lending, the financial institutions formed a lobby 
against devaluation and became proponents of deflation in the face of a 
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balance of payments crisis. This led to the rigidity of the exchange rate of 
pounds (ibid: 59). 
 
The second aspect is the organisational configuration of British 
society. Hall argues that the internal weakness of union and employer 
organisations prevented the state from using these associations to impose 
industrial reorganisation (ibid: 60-1). The third aspect is the state structure, 
which resulted in the decline of manufacturing sectors. These structural 
factors included the Bank of England’s dominant role in monetary policy, 
the Treasury officials’ lack of familiarity with the progress of British 
industry and the decision making process with a high level of secrecy in the 
civil service system (ibid: 61-2). The final aspect is the political system, 
including the British party organisations’ deeply rooted doctrines against 
state intervention and the closed ties between parties and particular interest 
groups. Hall claims that this aspect not only limited the parties’ range of 
action, but also inhabited innovative economic policies (ibid: 64-5).  
 
In short, new institutional approaches incorporate the insights of 
other political theories in order to examine the proper role of institutions. In 
the new institutional account, the concept of institutions includes both 
formal and informal rules and organisations. In some circumstances, even 
the market and international political and economic systems are considered 
to be institutions. Moreover, rules and procedures are not simply 
independent variables. Rather, relations between political actors and 
institutions may be dialectical. In addition, the influence of history and 
social and economic structures are specified. Problems, solutions and other 
elements within the policy process are not supposed to be ordered according 
to consequential connections. Rather, they can be linked by their 
simultaneous existence.  
 
3.3 Possible Role of the Media in Institutionalism 
Although most institutional analysis of policy making neglects the 
mass media, the institutional account offers some insights into the role of 
the media. First, media organisations operate within the legal framework. 
For example, in most western countries, broadcasting is licensed by the 
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government and its agencies. In some regions, such as Hong Kong, there is 
no specific law or regulations for print media. However, newspapers and 
magazines are constrained by laws against libel, obscenity or indecency. 
 
In addition to exogenous legal constraints, the media are bound by 
two important institutions, namely, internal organisational norms and cross 
organisational professional norms. As Sparrow argues, news making is 
highly hierarchical. The news media consist of large, multitiered 
organisations in which top editors and producers fashion, edit and release 
news stories as they see fit. Reporters have to learn to write compelling 
stories that get published or broadcast. Pictures of reality are systematically 
distorted by organisational requirements (Sparrow 1999:103-37). Moreover, 
cross-organisational professional norms not only provide the media with 
ethical guidelines, but also influence the culture and daily operation of the 
media. For example, a consideration of what is important and interesting 
enough to constitute news is usually down to the professional judgment of 
journalists. As Cook states, ‘news organisations are structures similarly to 
achieve similar goals, in part because of transorganisational norms of 
professionalism’ (Cook 2001:183). 
 
The other important insight provided by the institutional account is 
the influence of political context on the development of the media system. 
Comparing the media systems in Europe and North America, Hallin and 
Mancini argue that the characteristics of a media system are interrelated to 
the historical development and context of the political system. For example, 
the autonomy and professionalisation of the media is closely associated with 
rational-legal authority which refers to the political system with a form of 
rule based on adherence to formal and universalist rules of procedure. The 
characteristic institution representing rational-legal authority is a 
bureaucracy which is autonomous of particular parties, individuals, and 
social groups, acts according to established procedures and is conceived of 
as serving society as a whole. The other principal institutions of a rational-
legal order are the autonomous judicial system and cultural components 
such as the degree to which citizens, businesses, and other actors are willing 
to follow rules (Hallin and Mancini 2004:55-6).  
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Although all bureaucracies have some degree of influence on the 
media, Hallin and Mancini argue that in countries such as Britain and the 
USA where rational-legal authority is strongly developed, civil servants and 
journalists, including those in of public broadcasting institutes, are likely to 
act in relative autonomy of control by government, parties, and particular 
politicians, and to be governed by clear rules and procedures. By contrast, in 
countries such as those in Southern Europe where rational-legal authority is 
less developed, there is a tendency for party control and penetration of 
public broadcasting and regulatory institutions to be stronger and deeper 
(ibid:56).  
 
3.4 Comments on Institutionalism 
Although the institutional account explains how political systems 
both structure policy and constrain political actors, there are several 
limitations to this approach. For example, there is the charge that 
institutionalism overestimates the role of formal rules and organisations but 
plays down the importance of individual interests and the social contexts 
which shape the institutions. More importantly, the institutional approach 
tends not to account for policy changes (John, 1998:49-57). As John claims, 
‘institutionalism lacks a theory of human action as it tends to consider that 
rules and norms that constrain behaviour are reasons for action in 
themselves’ (ibid: 53). In my opinion, the same problem can be found in the 
institutional analysis of the media. Institutional arrangements explain 
whether relatively autonomous media and media influence on policy are 
possible. However, they do not explain how the media influence the policy 
process. 
 
New institutionalism incorporates the insights of other political 
theories in order to provide a proper account of institutions. However, 
widening the definitions of institutions, new institutional approaches 
‘include too many aspects of political life under one category. The resulting 
amalgam of processes appears to explain change under the rubric of 
institutions, but in reality it disguises the variety of interactions and causal 
mechanisms that occur between the contrasting elements of the political 
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system…Such an expansion robs institutions of their explanatory power.’ 
(ibid:64-5) 
 
4. Policy Network Approach 
The policy network approach is a variant of new institutional 
approaches which analyses organised social complexity, focusing on the 
organisational interdependence of public organisations and private interests 
(Rhodes 1997:11-2). The network approach originated in the analysis of 
some policy sectors in the US. A more explicit UK network approach was 
pioneered by Rhodes (1988), and extended by Marsh and Rhodes (1992). In 
the network account, the state is considered to be a set of institutions which 
provides the parameters for political conflicts between various interests over 
the use of resources and the direction of public policy (Smith 1993:2). Thus, 
a policy network may be defined as an arena for the mediation of the 
interests of governments and interests groups. 
 
4.1 Traditional British Policy Network Approach 
The traditional British policy network approach emphasises the need 
to disaggregate policy analysis and stresses that the relationship between 
groups and the government varies between policy areas. (Rhodes and Marsh 
1992:1-4). As Rhodes states, ‘power-dependence’ is the central feature of 
policy networks. From this perspective, two features of networks are 
particularly important. The first one is political resources, including 
authority, financial resources, political legitimacy, information, and 
organisational resources. As far as these are concerned, actors can bargain 
with each other within the network. Actors without resources are usually 
excluded from the network (Rhodes 1988:90-1). If the government wants to 
achieve a particular policy goal with minimum conflict, assistance to groups 
under development and implementation of policy are needed. In this case, 
resources are exchanged among the members within a network. The second 
important feature is structure, which not only limits the actions of actors, but 
also influences the distribution of resources (Rhodes 1988:77-8, 1997:11). 
Different networks have different patterns of resource distribution and 
resource exchange (Rhodes 1997:43-5). 
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According to Marsh and Rhodes’s model, policy network occurs at 
the sectoral or sub-sectoral level. For example, there may be a sectoral 
network in industrial policy and sub-sectoral networks which are concerned 
with policy in particular industrial sub-sectors. Thus, a network approach is 
a meso-level concept which deals with the pattern of interest group 
intermediation with particular attention to the structure of networks and the 
pattern of interaction within them (Marsh 1998:15; Daugbjerg and Marsh 
1998:53). 
 
In the network account, policy outcomes are affected by the 
existence, membership and characteristics of networks. For instance, 
distribution and type of resources within a network explain the power of its 
individual and organisational members. In this sense, the network is 
considered as an independent variable. 
 
However, Daugbjerg and Marsh argue that policy outcomes are not 
only influenced by the interaction between groups within networks, but are 
also strongly affected by the economic, political and ideological context 
within which the network operates as well as individual behaviour within 
the network. Thus, they suggest that the meso-level policy network model 
needs to be integrated with both micro-level and macro-level analysis in 
order to explain membership of the network and their policy outcomes. 
(Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998: 54).  
 
According to Daugbjerg and Marsh, macro-level analysis, dealing 
with the relationship between the state and civil society, helps explain both 
the membership of networks and how networks are constrained by the social, 
economic and political context within which they are located. The micro-
level of analysis deals with individual actions and the decisions of actors 
within networks, a rational choice theory should operate with a conception 
of bounded rationality and subjective expected utilities. At the same time, 
policy networks shape preferences while the actions of agents change 
networks, which, in turn, form the context within which agents act. From 
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this perspective, the relationship between structures and agents is dialectical 
when integrating meso- and micro-level analysis (ibid: 54, 67-70). 
 
Further developing the dialectical approach, Marsh and Smith 
suggest that the actors are not only constrained by the structural context of 
the network, but also learn strategically, in turn, to shape the agent’s future 
actions. When considering the case study of British agricultural policy since 
the 1930s, Marsh and Smith (2000) propose three interactive or dialectical 
relationships between the structure of the network and the agents operating 
within it; the network and the context within which it operates; and the 
network and policy outcome. First, Marsh and Smith argue that the structure 
of the network and the agents within it can affect each other. Thus, policy 
outcomes cannot be explained solely by reference to the structure of the 
network. Rather, agents can changes structures: ‘Network structures, and the 
resource dependencies which they entail, are not fixed’ (ibid: 6-7). 
 
Second, Marsh and Smith argue that there is a dialectical 
relationship between the network and the broader context within which it is 
located. Moreover, networks may be influenced by other networks because 
in a complex polity, the context within which networks operate is composed, 
in part, of other networks. From this perspective, the relationship between 
sectoral and sub-sectoral networks is particularly important as sectoral 
networks provide a crucial aspect of the context within which sub-sectoral 
networks operate. Since exogenous factors are not only mediated through an 
understanding of agents, but are also interpreted in the context of the 
structure, rule and interpersonal relationships within the network, Marsh and 
Smith argue that any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
factors is misleading. Finally, since policy outcomes may lead to changes in 
network membership, the pattern of resource dependency, the broader social 
structures and actors’ strategies, Marsh and Smith argue that policy outcome 
interacts with the network (ibid: 7-9).  
 
In short, Marsh and Smith argue that the link between policy 
networks and policy outcomes is much more complicated than many 
commentators have suggested. The relationships between the various factors, 
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including broader structural context, network structure, actors’ resources 
and strategies, policy outcomes are mostly interactive or dialectical.  
 
4.2 Possible Role of the Media in the Network Account 
Most research into policy networks does not take the mass media 
into account. Some authors even claim that the media’s influence on policy 
is unusual because policy making takes place in closed networks in most 
cases. For example, in their interview-based study of policy networks in the 
UK, Marsh et al. claim that the influence of the media on policy is 
exceptional. Having interviewed government officials, Marsh et al suggest 
that government departments are increasingly concerned with the demands 
of the media. The impact of the mass media on ministers and departments 
today has significantly increased compared to 25 years ago (Marsh et al. 
2001:202, 206). However, Marsh et al. do not suggest media influence on 
policy is usual because ‘most departments make policy in an environment 
marked by secrecy where there is little media interest.’ (ibid: 207) In this 
sense, although the media’s influence on policy is possible, it is the 
exception, rather than the rule.   
 
Marsh et al’s (2001) argument is, in my opinion, unfair. Actually, 
they did not examine the role of the media by using a network approach. 
Their interview-based study was merely based on the perceptions of 
government officials. Neither the political resources of the media, nor the 
relationship between the media and the network members was investigated. 
More importantly, there is no point arguing whether the influence of the 
media on policy is usual or not. When we study the possible influence of 
media on policy, the most important point is to verify the existence of a 
media effect and specify conditions in which such an effect arises.  
 
Although network theorists do not take the media into account, I 
argue that the media play an important role in the policy network account. 
The organised interdependence that is highlighted in the network account is 
found in the relationship between the media and political actors. As Franklin 
(1994:21) suggests, politicians need to promote their ideas and gain 
popularity. Meanwhile, the media needs regular contact to get information 
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for news production. Even politicians’ ability to perform well on television 
or their physical appearance are considered to be resources that can prove 
attractive to broadcasters and audience. 
 
A recent study by Aeron Davis further demonstrates the 
interdependent relations between the media and the political and economic 
elites within a closed network although Davis did not really apply the 
network approach in his study. Interviewing journalists and elite news 
sources, he found that the media acts as communicators within the closed 
business community in which elites try to influence each other through 
media coverage (Davis 2003: 673-6). A similar situation can be found both 
in the Labour and Conservative Parties. In these circumstances, the media 
and journalists are used by politicians to influence the decision making of 
other party members and the cabinet (ibid: 679-81). Meanwhile, journalists 
need regular source contacts within the closed community in order to secure 
their companies’ interests and their own careers (ibid: 682-3). From this 
perspective, there is an exchange of resources between the elites and the 
media. 
 
4.3 Comments on the Policy Network Account 
There are some criticisms of the explanatory power of the network 
approach. For example, in order to explain the network characteristics and 
membership, network researchers usually incorporate other factors in their 
study. Dowding argues that the policy network approach fails as a model 
‘because the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not 
network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components such 
as membership and pattern of interdependence within networks. These 
components explain both the nature of the network and the nature of policy 
process’ (Dowding, 1995: 137). Thus, the concept of the network itself does 
not make any contribution to an explanation of policy outcomes.  
 
Marsh and Smith claim that their dialectical approach tends to 
outline the complexities involved and identify the relationships which need 
to be considered if any causal model is to be developed (Marsh and Smith, 
2000:11). However, Dowding argues that the aim of scientific research is to 
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construct a model to discover the relative importance of different causal 
factors (Dowding, 2001:91). Marsh and Smith’s dialectical approach 
provides a detailed description of history but fails to specify a model.  
 
In my view, the network account provides insights into the media-
policymaker interaction in policy communities. The characteristics of a 
policy network can explain the structural conditions in which the media may 
place direct pressure on policy makers and influence their decisions. 
However, the network accounts, including the dialectical approach, integrate 
numerous conditions in order to explain network membership and policy 
outcomes. Consequently, the policy process is explained by all those 
conditions rather than by the network characteristics. Although I agree with 
Marsh and Smith that political science can be done in a realist way to infer 
the underlying structures of a particular social situation (Marsh and Smith 
2001:532), the explanatory power of the network idea per se is questionable.  
 
5. Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory has become an important theory in political 
science since the 1950s. The early work was carried out largely by 
economists, applying the methods of microeconomics to explain political 
decision making. The key argument within rational choice theory is that 
individuals always tend to maximise their chances of getting what they want. 
Thus, policy outcomes result from the collective actions of different actors’ 
strategies. 
 
5.1 Mainstream of Rational Choice Theory  
There are several core assumptions within the mainstream of rational 
choice theory. First, while recognising that human motivation is complex, 
mainstream rational choice theory assumes that individuals are self-
interested. From this perspective, people are instrumental rather than 
expressive. Second, rational choice theory assumes that individuals all have 
the rational capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to choose 
the best course of action, no matter how complex the choice is. Finally, 
individuals are assumed to be able to arrange the available options into a 
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coherent order of preference and make consistent choices among them 
(McLean, 1987:3, Ward, 1995:79). 
 
Under the rational choice account, policy outcomes are considered to 
be the interactions between the choices of political actors. In this case, game 
theory is used to explain actors’ strategies. In some circumstances, actors 
increase their level of utility by cooperating with other individuals. As a 
result, all actors gain. This is the assurance game. In other cases, however, 
actors choose not to cooperate as they worry that others will not cooperate, 
leading to inaction or policy disaster. This is what game theorists call the 
prisoner’s dilemma (John, 1998:119).     
 
 However, political actors do not make decisions in a totally free 
environment. The pay-offs to actors within games are usually determined by 
the political structure and the rules of game. In other words, actors can only 
try to maximise their advantage within the existing rules. Thus, the 
influence of institutions should be examined within rational choice theory. 
This approach is considered to be an institutional rational choice account 
(ibid: 125-6).   
 
5.2 Dunleavy’s Bureau Shaping Model 
One of the important studies of institutional rational choice theory is 
Dunleavy’s (1991) ‘bureau shaping model’. His work not only presents the 
structural influence on actors’ pay-offs and strategies, but also demonstrates 
that a precise definition of variables is necessary to rational choice analysis. 
According to Dunleavy, the structural contexts of bureaus create major 
differences between agency types in the extent to which officials associate 
their welfare with the growth of the programme budget. In addition, bureaus 
are rank-structured environments. The costs of advocating a budget 
increment are also rank-structured. Thus, bureaucrats do not simply expand 
budgets, patronage and financial rewards. Rather, individual bureaucrats 
positioned at different levels of different agencies face different utility pay-
offs, and follow different strategies to maximise their own utility. Budgetary 
change is the result of the collective action of those individuals located in 
different positions within different agencies.  
 28 
 
Dunleavy’s argument is also supported by the case of Next Step 
reform which consisted of two major administrative trends, privatisation and 
deinstitutionalisation in the late 1980s. Under the reform, routine 
government functions were transferred to various agencies while the high 
command of the civil service was retained. Despite the loss of direct control 
of large bureaucracies, senior officials supported and pushed through the 
reform. As Dunleavy claims, senior bureaucrats value individually 
innovative work with low exposure to public criticism, high-status and 
proximity to political power centres. Hence they support the reform which is 
consistent with reshaping their bureau into an optimum form for them 
(Dunleavy, 1991:237).  
 
In sum, Dunleavy’s bureau shaping model demonstrates the 
importance of the institutional context. Rational actors tend to maximise 
their personnel utility and minimise their cost within institutional constraints. 
In order to explain policy outputs, researchers have to precisely define 
individual actors’ pay-off utilities and institutional contexts. 
 
5.3 Possible Role of the Media in Rational Choice Theory 
Most rational choice theorists do not consider the role of the media 
in their studies. However, I argue that the rational choice account provides 
some possible explanations for the media’s influence on the policy from five 
perspectives. First, rational choice theory assumes that an actor can make 
the optimal choice based on available information. As Kingdon (1984:63) 
states, since actors inside and outside government are not always able to 
communicate effectively with each other, the use of the media is one way to 
spread information within the policy community. In this case, the media act 
as a communicator. 
 
Second, the media not only influence policymakers’ perceptions of 
public attitudes (Entman 2000:21-2; Kull and Ramsay 2000:105), but also 
affect public opinion (Cook et at 1983). When actors choose a strategy to 
maximise their utility or to minimise prospective damage, the impact of 
media coverage should be taken into account. Thus, actors may change their 
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agenda according to the quantity and the tone of news coverage. In this case, 
rational choice theory explains the agenda setting capacity of the media. 
Third, the tone of media coverage may influence public attitudes towards 
particular policy alternatives, consequently affecting the political cost and 
benefit of policy options. Thus, policymakers have to consider the tone of 
relevant coverage during decision making. In this case, rational choice 
theory explains the media influence on the choice of policy options. 
 
Fourth, the media are not independent from policymakers. Since 
media coverage may influence the decisions of policymakers and voters, 
most political actors make an effort influencing media content in order to 
promote the policy alternatives in their favour. Meanwhile, journalists seek 
story credibility and personal recognition in order to enhance their career 
prospects. Thus, they are concerned with obtaining official reactions to their 
news stories. Consequently, journalists and policy makers may operate to 
influence public opinion in order to bring about policy change in a particular 
way. In this case, rational choice theory explains the collaboration between 
policymakers and journalists. 
 
 Finally, as Dunleavy states, rational senior bureaucrats tend to avoid 
public criticism (Dunleavy, 1991:237). This provides the important insight 
that political actors in different positions have different levels of exposure to 
the public and to the media. Those with low public exposure are less likely 
to face direct pressure from the media. In other words, institutional rational 
choice theory may explain the fact that the media’s influence on political 
actors may vary according to different positions within the political system. 
 
5.4 Comments on Rational Choice Theory  
 Although rational choice theory is likely to explain some possible 
aspects of the influence of the media on the policy process, it is usually 
claimed that rational choice theory focuses on individual choice, but plays 
down the importance of institutional arrangement, socio economic factors 
and ideas. In addition to these comments, in my view, there are some other 
problems with rational choice theory. First, individuals frequently act 
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altruistically or emotionally in the real world. There is no reason to assume 
that individuals always act from rational self-interest.  
 
Second, rational choice theory assumes that political actors, with 
limited time and information, are always capable of arranging the available 
options into an order of preference and make optimal choices. The 
assumption may be problematic as sometimes even researchers find it is 
difficult to quantify pay-offs and decide the order of optimal choices. Third, 
because of the difficulty in quantifying pay-offs, measuring such pay-offs to 
actors may be extremely flexible and vague. In these circumstances, 
researchers can refine the measurement of payoffs according to their needs. 
The theory thus becomes implausible.  
 
In an attempt to consider the problems mentioned above, Dunleavy 
(1991) provides a satisfactory explanation of public budgetary change based 
on the notion of the importance of institutional influence on actors and a 
precise definition of utility pay-offs. However, in my view, his model 
succeeds because there is major difference in utility pay-offs from 
budgetary changes according to different ranks. When the difference in pay-
offs is minor or obscure, researchers may find it difficult to measure the 
difference.  
 
6. Policy Streams Approach  
The previous sections discuss mainstream theories through focusing 
only on one policy perspective. However, some researchers integrate several 
theories in order to develop a model for policy analysis. John (1998) refers 
to   this kind of approach as the synthesis or synthetic approach. The first 
synthetic approach discussed in this chapter is Kingdon’s (1984) policy 
streams model or policy windows model, which explains the governmental 
agenda setting and policy alternative selection.  
 
6.1 Key arguments of Policy Stream Approach 
According to Kingdon (1984), agenda setting and alternatives 
selection can be explained by interaction among three streams of processes: 
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problems, politics and policy. The first two are critical to governmental 
agenda setting, while the policy stream plays a major role in alternative 
selection. Policies can be changed only when all three streams are linked 
together by the opportunity for advocating policy proposals. In Kingdon’s 
term, the three streams are linked by the ‘opening of policy windows’.  
 
The distinction between ‘governmental agenda’ setting and 
‘alternative selection’ should be noted. Kingdon suggests that the former 
refers to a list of subjects to which officials, and people outside the 
government closely associated with those officials, are paying serious 
attention at any given time. Within the governmental agenda, there is also a 
‘decision agenda’, which refers to the list of subjects that are up for an 
active decision. Alternative selection, on the other hand, is the screening of 
possible governmental actions which are under serious consideration by 
government officials and those closely associated with them (Kingdon, 
1984:3-4). 
 
Moreover, participants can be classified into visible and hidden 
participants. The visible ones, including elected politicians and their high 
level appointees and the media, receive considerable public attention. The 
relatively hidden participants with lower publicity include academic 
specialists, career civil servants and congressional staffers (ibid:208). 
Among these participants, there are ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who consist of 
people willing to invest their resources in return for future policies that they 
favour. They may be elected officials, career civil servants, lobbyists, 
academics or journalists. Entrepreneurs are motivated by a combination of 
concern about certain problems, self-interest, promotion of their policy 
values and pleasure in participating (ibid:129, 214). 
 
6.1.1 Agenda Setting 
Conducting 247 lengthy interviews with members of staff of 
congress and executive branches, lobbyists, journalists, consultants, 
academics, Kingdon studied 23 cases of policy initiation and non-initiation, 
covering many policy changes in health and transportation of US federal 
government (ibid:5). According to Kingdon, government agenda setting is 
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determined by problem and political streams. The problem stream is the 
process of problem recognition. The attention of officials can be drawn to 
problems by their large scale and magnitude and change, events or feedback 
from existing programmes. The chance of a given proposal being taken up 
on an agenda is markedly enhanced if it is connected to an important 
problem. Thus, policy entrepreneurs invest considerable resources bringing 
their conception of problems to the notice of officials in the attempt to 
persuade them to see problems in their own particular ways (ibid: 206-7).     
 
The development of the political stream also creates new agendas. 
The political stream is made up of public mood, pressure group campaigns, 
elections results, partisan or ideological distribution in Congress or changes 
in the administration. In the political stream, participants build consensus by 
bargaining, trading provisions for support, adding elected officials to 
coalitions by giving them the concessions that they demand, or 
compromising from ideal positions that will gain wider acceptance (ibid:152, 
207-8). In addition, visible participants such as elected politicians, usually 
play an important role in agenda setting as they have to respond to public 
pressure although they do not need to get their way in specifying 
alternatives or implementing decisions (ibid:152, 207-9).  
 
6.1.2 Alternative Selection 
In policy stream, policy alternatives are generated and selected. 
Kingdon describes this process as ‘policy primeval soup’ in which many 
ideas float around, bump into one another, encounter new ideas, and form 
combinations and re-combinations. Although the origins of ideas are 
haphazard, ideas will be selected according to particular criteria including 
technical feasibility, congruence with the values of policy community 
members, budget constraints, public acceptability and politicians’ 
receptivity. Relatively hidden entrepreneurs such as specialists, consultants 
and civil servants in the policy stream also try to promote their ideas in 
many ways. As a result, some ideas will become respectable while others 
are ruled out (ibid: 209-10).  
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6.1.3 Policy Windows 
Although the separate streams of problems, policies and politics 
each have lives of their own, Kingdon argues that the three streams can be 
linked together when ‘policy windows’ are open. The policy window is an 
opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet proposals forward, 
or to draw attention to their special problems. Kingdon claims that windows 
are opened either by changes in the political stream (e.g., a change of 
administration, a shift in partisanship, or a move in public opinion) or by a 
new problem that captures the attention of officials. Thus, there are problem 
windows and political windows (ibid:176, 213).  
 
According to Kingdon, windows do not stay open long. When the 
relevant windows are closed, policy entrepreneurs in and around 
government keep their policy proposals and their problems close at hand, 
waiting for a re-opening of windows. During the short duration of open 
windows, entrepreneurs try their best to promote their proposals and 
problems. If entrepreneurs are willing to invest sufficient resources, their 
problems can be resolved and their proposals enacted. Other problems and 
proposals with insufficient resources will drift away (Kingdon, 1984:210-1). 
Thus, policy changes are brought about in a particular way.  
 
6.2 Possible Role of the Media in the Policy Streams 
Approach 
Although Kingdon recognises the media as visible participants, he 
found that only 4% of policymakers interviewed claimed that the media 
were very important (ibid: 61). Kingdon argues that media effect on policy 
agenda is limited for two reasons. First, the press tend to give prominent 
cover to a story only for a short period of time before turning their attention 
to the next story. Consequently, media effect on policy is weakened. Second, 
both policymakers and journalists claimed that the media reported what was 
going on in government rather than having an independent effect on 
governmental agenda (ibid: 62). In other words, the media usually follow 
the existing governmental agenda rather than affect that agenda. 
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Nevertheless, Kingdon suggests that the media may play an 
important role in the policy process in some ways. First, the media not only 
act as a communicator within a policy community, but also pick up on some 
policymakers’ ideas or movements, and then affect the agenda by 
magnifying these movements. Moreover, by affecting public opinion 
agendas, the media can re-direct the attention of policymakers, thus having 
an indirect effect on policy agendas (ibid: 63-4). 
 
Kingdon also suggests that the importance of the media may vary 
from one type of participant to another. Key government decision makers or 
those who have easy access to those decision makers might have less need 
for media coverage. By contrast, others have less access and hence need to 
make a special effort to gain the attention of important government officials 
and might need media coverage more in order to exert their influence on 
policy (ibid:64). In other words, the media effects on political actors vary 
among different positions within the political system. 
  
6.3 Comments on Policy Streams Approach 
Although Kingdon recognises the possible influence of the media on 
the policy process, he did not trace the process of media coverage and 
policy change. The only empirical data is the interview-based data 
according to which only 4% of officials claimed that the media were very 
important (ibid: 61). In other words, Kingdon’s argument about the media 
lacks empirical evidence. In addition, Kingdon argues that the media usually 
follow the exiting governmental agenda rather than affecting the agenda. 
Meanwhile, he claims that the media can pick up an idea put forward by 
some policymakers or some groups, and then affect the agenda by 
magnifying such ideas (ibid: 62-4). However, he did not specify either the 
conditions in which the media follow the official agenda, or those where the 
media influence it. 
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7. Punctuated Equilibrium Model  
7.1 Key arguments of Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
The other synthetic approach is the punctuated equilibrium model 
proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). They argue that the American 
political system is a mosaic of continually reshaping institutional systems. 
Those institutions not only limit participation but also shape the images of 
policies in their favour. When issues emerge, particular institutional 
structures of policy development are created and remain in place for a long 
period. Baumgartner and Jones term this equilibrium. However, equilibrium 
may be punctuated by short periods of volatile change when disadvantaged 
groups successfully redefine the dominant understanding of the issues to 
their advantage. Where this is the case, institutions and their policies are 
destroyed and replaced by others. In Baumgartner and Jones’s terms, 
equilibrium shifts from one point to another. The policy process is 
characterised as having long periods of stability, which are punctuated by 
periods of instability and major change. 
 
7.1.1 Policy Image 
Baumgartner and Jones suggest that punctuated equilibrium is driven 
by two interacting forces. The first force comes from policy image which 
refers to the public understanding of an issue or a policy problem. Since a 
single policy may affect groups of people in different ways, different people 
can hold different images of the policy. Proponents of a policy focus on one 
set of images, while opponents refer more often to another set of images. 
When the tone of stories in the mass media changes from positive to 
negative, opponents of the policy have an opportunity to attack existing 
policy arrangements. Thus, competing participants usually attempt to 
manipulate images to suit their own needs in order to attract the attention of 
government officials, the mass media and the public (ibid:25-9).   
 
7.1.2 Policy Venue 
The second force comes from institutional policy venues, which are 
the institutional locations where authoritative decisions concerning a given 
issue are made. Policy venues structure not only participation but also 
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mobilisation of bias towards the images of policy problems and policy 
alternatives that are favourable to venue members. Thus, policy image is 
generally better received among one group of people than another, image 
may be accepted or rejected depending on the institutional arena (ibid: 32).   
 
7.1.3 Interaction between Policy Image and Policy Venue 
According to Baumgartner and Jones, the equilibrium, i.e. the 
stability of policy and institutions is maintained over a long period of time 
by the existing policy venues and the policy image processed by the venues 
(ibid: 15). Since the members of existing venues tend to manipulate the 
policy image to their advantage, the interaction of image and venue may 
produce a self-reinforcing system characterised by positive feedback. Such a 
system can produce long periods of no change (ibid: 37).  
 
However, there is continuous competition among various groups. 
Institutions of policy development are continually being created and 
destroyed. Disadvantaged interests often propose new interpretations of 
events and attempt to attract the attention of allies in other areas of the 
political system. Meanwhile, the advantaged fight back, attempting to 
reinforce their original view of the situation. If existing advantaged groups 
succeed, the policy image and venue can be maintained. When ‘losers’ 
outside existing policy venues successfully redefine issues to their 
advantage, thereby attracting previously uninvolved citizens (ibid: 8-12), the 
equilibrium may be punctuated by short periods of volatile change. In this 
case, institutions are destroyed and replaced by others. Policies are also 
changed dramatically. New policy images and new venues are maintained as 
a result of positive feedback and challenged by new disadvantaged interests. 
Thus, the equilibrium shifts from one point of stability to another. 
 
It should be noted that stability of policy image is associated with the 
number and nature of institutions. A single issue may be simultaneously 
subject to the jurisdiction of several institutions, or it may be within the 
domain of only one set of institutions. Thus, some policies lie firmly within 
the jurisdiction of a single institution, while others face the competing 
influences of a number of jurisdictions (ibid: 32-3). 
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7.2 Possible Role of the Media in the Punctuated Equilibrium 
Model 
Baumgartner and Jones argue that the media play a crucial role in the 
policy process ‘by directing attention alternatively towards different aspects 
of the same issues over time, and by shifting attention from one issue to 
another’ (ibid: 103). They suggest that a major source of instability in 
politics is the shifting attention of the media for three reasons. First, due to 
market competition, the media imitate each other. When issues become 
news, virtually all media outlets focus on them. Thus, new ideas and new 
understanding of issues often spread quickly once they become a focus of 
news interest (ibid: 50, 103).  
 
Second, reporters are routinely divided into different ‘beats’ with 
different foci and interests. ‘When an issue is moved from one journalistic 
beat to another…the tone of the stories written on the topic may shift 
dramatically because the article are written by different journalists’ (ibid:50, 
103). Third, in order to maintain sales and readerships, reporters not only 
have to simplify complex arguments, but also need to make news stories 
interesting and controversial. For this reason, media coverage of issues is 
highly selective and temporary. This media fascination with risk and 
conflict leads to a bias against particular aspects of issues and places 
pressure on policymakers (ibid: 118-9).   
 
Tracing changes in policy image, policy venue’s agenda, and 
institutions, Baumgartner and Jones examined the long term development of 
numerous issues over decades, such as nuclear power, pesticides, smoking 
and tobacco and automobile safety. They studied the coverage in the New 
York Times, Readers’ Guides and a range of electronic media. The level of 
media attention paid to the issues was measured by article count while 
policy image was measured by counting positive and negative coverage. At 
the same time, changes in policy outputs are measured by alternations in the 
structure of policy making, expenditure patterns associated with agenda 
access and changes in the activities of government officials (ibid:48-54). 
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For example, nuclear power was considered to be a cheap fuel, a safe 
mechanism in 1940s and 1950s. The civilian use of nuclear power was 
controlled by a tight ‘subgovernment’ set up in the mid 1950s. Since science 
journalists were enthusiastic about the possibility of nuclear power, and 
their articles reflected the official optimism of this subgovernment, the 
positive image of nuclear power was reinforced. In the late 1960s and 1970s, 
however, there was an increasing dominance of negative news coverage 
over the positive, focusing on issues of waste and risk. This led to a series of 
change in congressional agenda, institutions and policy. Since 1969, the 
number of negative congressional hearings has exceeded the positive ones. 
Between 1974 and 1977, there was a series of structural reforms of the 
subgovernment relating to energy policy. Since then, no nuclear plants have 
been ordered in the US, and more than a hundred previously ordered plants 
have been abandoned or cancelled (ibid:59-81). 
 
7.3 Comments on the Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
One criticism levelled at Baumgartner and Jones is that they 
presume the ‘bottom up’ influence of the media on policy and institutional 
change. The policymakers’ influence on media coverage is neglected (John, 
1998:181). However, this criticism may be unfair. In their book, 
Baumgartner and Jones state that they do not imply any simple causation 
between news coverage and dramatic policy change. Rather, they found that 
media attention sometimes precedes and sometimes follows changes in 
attention on the part of government agencies. Thus, they argue that media 
coverage and policy institutions can affect each other, reinforcing the 
pattern of positive feedback and punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993:125).  
 
Nevertheless, I argue that there are problems with the punctuated 
equilibrium model. First, Baumgartner and Jones argue that the media 
imitate each other (ibid:50). In other words, they assume that different 
media tend to frame an issue in the same way. The possibility of mixed tone 
within the media is neglected. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004:208), 
however, many American newspapers have relatively consistent political 
orientation as reflected in their editorial stance. Previous studies also show 
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that American newspapers tend to spend more resources on news coverage 
that is consistent with their editorial policy (Nacos, 1990 cited in Hallin and 
Mancini 2004: 208). Thus, there is a possibility that different media are 
associated with different interests and different political tendencies frame 
the same issue in different ways. In this case, media pressure on existing 
policy and institutions may be weakened.    
 
Second, perhaps more importantly, the punctuated equilibrium 
model argues that policy image changes because the issue moves from one 
journalistic beat to another (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:103). However, 
Baumgartner and Jones did not specify the reason why issues move among 
different beats. Thus, the change in policy image is not explained.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, both mainstream theories and synthetic models provide 
some insights into media-policy relations. At the same time, each of those 
theories has its limitations. The key arguments and the strengths and 
limitations of these theories are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
The Marxist and institutional approaches specify economic and 
structural constraints on the media. However, Marxism explains the 
influence of dominant interests on the media rather than the media effect on 
policy. Institutionalism explains the development of the conditions in which 
the media enjoy autonomy and exert an influence on the policy process. 
Nevertheless, it does not explain how the media may influence the policy 
process. The policy network account explains the structural characteristics 
of the policy community in which the media and policymakers influence 
each other. However, the network itself cannot explain how the media 
influence the policy process. Focusing on the individual’s self interest, 
rational choice theory seems to provide some possible explanations of 
media influence on the pay-offs for actors, and on the choices of policy 
alternatives. However, because of the unrealistic assumptions of the theory 
and ambiguous measurement of pay-offs, the plausibility and explanatory 
power of the theory may be problematic. 
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The synthetic models provide relatively complete accounts for the 
relation between the media and policymakers. However, each of those 
models has its limitations. Kingdon (1984) argues that the media can 
influence the agenda setting and alternative selections by affecting public 
opinion and then placing pressure on policymakers. Kingdon also 
recognises the two-way interaction between media and policy makers. 
However, all these arguments about the media are based on interview-based 
research only. Other empirical evidence, such as data relating to process 
tracing of coverage and policy change, is provided. 
 
Tracing the long term development of media coverage and policy 
change, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) demonstrate not only a systematic 
way to study media-policy relations, but also the importance of media effect 
on policy image, which is crucial to institutional and policy changes. The 
key limitation of Baumgartner and Jones is that they explain the change in 
tone of news coverage in terms of the issue switching from one journalistic 
beat to another. However, they do not specify the reason why the issue 
moves between beats. In this case, Robinson’s (2002) model discussed in 
the following chapter provides an explanation by demonstrating the 
importance of policy certainty in terms of elite consensus.  
 
Table 2.1: Explanations of the media’s role in various theories 
Theories Key 
Arguments 
Possible roles 
of the media 
Strengths Limitations 
Marxism -Policy process 
is structured by 
the power of the 
capitalist class 
and the logic of 
capitalist mode 
of production 
-Media perform 
a functional role 
in reinforcing 
the dominant 
political and 
ideological 
system 
-Explains the 
political, 
economic and 
ideological 
constraints of 
dominant interests 
on the media  
-Autonomy of media 
is downplayed 
-The media’s  
influence on policy 
is eliminated 
Institutionalism -Policy outcomes 
are explained by 
the institutional 
influence on 
political 
behaviour 
-Media system is 
developed and 
operates under 
the institutional 
constraints 
-Explains the 
institutional 
constraints on the 
media ‘s 
operations 
-Explains the 
institutional 
influence on  
development of 
media system and 
the emergence of 
autonomous 
media 
-Old institutionalism 
may overestimate 
the role of formal 
institution but play 
down human action. 
-New institutionalism 
integrates too many 
aspects of political 
life and provides 
vague definition of 
institution 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 2.1 (Cont.) 
Theories Key 
Arguments 
Possible roles 
of the media 
Strengths Limitations 
Policy Network -Policies are 
affected by  
membership and 
characteristics 
of a set of 
sectoral and 
sub-sectoral 
institutions in 
which actors 
exchange their 
resources 
-Media and 
network 
members are 
interdependent 
on each other.  
-Network 
members can 
influence each 
other through  
media coverage 
-Explains the 
interdependent 
relations between 
political elites and 
the media 
-Too many 
conditions are 
taken into 
account, 
consequently, 
weakening 
explanatory power 
of network per se.  
Rational Choice -Policy outcome 
is the result of 
the collective 
action of 
different 
rational actors 
who tend to 
maximise their 
personal utilities 
within structural 
constraints. 
-Media may 
influence public 
opinion, 
consequently 
affecting pay-
off of particular 
actors and 
actions 
-Media and 
actors may 
collaborate to 
promote policy 
-Media influence 
on actors may 
vary from 
different 
positions of 
institutions 
-Provide some 
possible 
explanations for 
changes in agenda 
and actors’ actions 
-Assumption about 
actors’ rationality 
is problematic 
-Definition of pay-
offs to actors may 
be ambiguous  
Policy Streams -Policy can 
change 
dramatically 
only if the 
problem, policy 
and political 
streams are 
linked together 
by opportunity 
windows    
-Acts as 
communicator 
within policy 
community 
-Influences 
policy agenda 
by picking up 
and magnifying 
ideas 
-Affects public 
opinion, then 
influences 
policymakers 
indirectly 
-Recognises the 
different roles of the 
media in agenda 
setting and 
alternative selection 
-Insufficient 
empirical data is 
provided to 
support the 
argument on the 
role of the media.  
Punctuated 
Equilibrium 
-Various groups 
continuously 
compete for the 
definition of 
policy image. 
-Policy and 
institutions can 
be destroyed 
and replaced 
when the policy 
image is are 
refined 
-Media coverage 
is crucial to 
change in policy 
image 
-Media coverage 
and policy 
institutions can 
affect each 
other  
-Provides systematic 
ways to measure the 
possible media 
influences on the  
policy process 
-Two-way interaction 
between the media 
and policy is 
recognised.   
-The switch of 
issue among 
various journalist 
beats is not 
explained 
-The possibility 
that the media 
share divided 
framing is 
neglected.  
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Chapter 3 
Review of Media-Policy Relations Models 
 
1. Introduction 
Apart from studies on public policy, there is a huge literature 
relating to media-policy relations. This chapter will review these previous 
studies of media-policy relations from three perspectives. The first of these 
focuses on the possible influence of news coverage on the policy process. 
These studies cover early work on the influence of the media and the debate 
on the CNN effect which refers to the media’s influence on western 
governments’ foreign policies. The second perspective on media-policy 
relations highlights the influence of governments on media content. This 
view is represented by Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) ‘manufacturing 
consent theory’ which argues that the media are locked into the government 
and other dominant economic interests, and thus media content is 
constrained by the government and businesses. Thirdly, there are some 
studies which suggest an interaction between news media and government. 
Form this perspective, the media and government can influence each other. 
This argument is represented by Robinson’s (2002) study of the ‘CNN 
effect’.  
 
This chapter argues that each of these three types of study has its 
limitations. The early study of media effect on policy highlights the one way 
influence of the media on policy, and neglects the possible influence of the 
government on the media. On the other hand, manufacturing consent theory 
downplays the autonomy of the media. Robinson’s CNN effect model 
recognises the two-way interaction between the media and government. 
Robinson’s methodological framework also demonstrates a systematic way 
to study media-policy relations. However, focusing on the case of US 
foreign policy, Robinson’s model needs to be tested in other policy areas. In 
addition, in order to establish the linkage between media effect and existing 
theories of public policy, it is necessary to take account of elements in these 
theories, such as institutions, beliefs, political actors’ interests and strategies. 
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2. Literature concerning the media’s influence on policy  
2.1 The Media’s Influence on Domestic Policy 
2.1.1 Linsky’s Interview Based Study  
One of the early studies of media influence on policy was 
undertaken by Linsky. (1986). On the basis of a survey of senior federal 
policymakers and interviews with prominent policymakers and journalists, 
Linsky studied six cases in the U.S., namely, the 1969 reorganisation of the 
postal department, Vice President Spiro Agnew’s resignation, President 
Jimmy Carter’s decision to halt deployment of the neutron bomb, the 
relocation of 700 families from the polluted Love Canal area, President 
Ronald Reagan’s support of tax exemption for Bob Jones University and the 
1984 suspension of Social Security disability reviews. 
 
According to Linsky, five different types of media impact on policy 
can be identified. The first one is the influence on agenda setting. During 
interviews, officials claimed that their priorities are affected by news 
coverage (ibid:88). Secondly, the media can influence how issues are 
characterised. Thus, policymakers claimed that they found it difficult to 
control the framing of issues (ibid:107). Thirdly, news coverage can speed 
up the decision-making process. According to Linsky, 39% senior Federal 
officials responding to the survey said the positive press coverage 
accelerated their consideration or willingness to take action on an issue, and 
36% claimed that negative coverage did the same (ibid:109). Fourthly, 
Linsky suggests that news coverage can move issues up the ladder in the 
government. The more intense and the more critical the press coverage is, 
the higher the level of the government that deals with the issue (ibid:109-10).  
 
Finally, Linsky argues that the media can influence which proposals 
will lead to action. For example, in Post Office reorganisation, officials 
claimed that positive news coverage and favourable editorials were 
important, although not the only, elements contributing to the eventual 
passage of the administration’s proposals. In this case, news coverage 
increases the government’s chance of attaining policy goals. On the other 
hand, in the Bob Jones case and the neutron bomb deployment and 
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production case, negative coverage had the effect of stopping the process 
and providing the opportunity for, or forcing the officials to stand back and 
reconsider the policy. This argument is supported by the findings that 40% 
of the survey respondents said negative coverage caused them to reshape 
their policy options (ibid:114-6). 
 
2.1.2 Cook et al.’s Study of the Media’s Agenda Setting 
Capacity   
Among numerous studies of the media’s influence on policy, 
‘agenda settings capacity’ of the media usually seemed to have most direct 
influence on the policy process. One of the early researches of the media 
agenda setting function was carried out by an interdisciplinary team at 
Northwestern University. For the research team, ‘the ‘agenda-setting 
capacity’ of the mass media implies a causal connection between a temporal 
sequence of events: first, news media reporting occurs; second, these 
presentations influence perceptions of issue importance. The assumption is 
that these changed priorities will themselves influence policy choices.’ 
(Cook et al 1983:17)    
 
The study was carried out as a collaboration with investigative 
reporters from NBC in the US. The journalists conducted an extensive 
investigation into fraud and abuse in the federally funded Home Health Care 
Programme. The report was aired on a National television programme ‘NBC 
News Magazine’ on 7 May 1981. Six months before the airing of the 
investigative report, the research team was told the content of the report, and 
then started research work, including the sampling of respondents, and 
conducting interviews. The influence of the media on individuals was 
studied in non-laboratory experiments. Among 300 public respondents, half 
were asked to watch the ‘NBC News Magazine’ while the other half, the 
control respondents, were asked to watch another programme without an 
investigative report at the same time. After watching the programmes, the 
respondents were asked several questions related to Home Health Care 
Programmes in general, and several questions concerning fraud and abuse in 
such programmes. A similar experiment was conducted with policy elites, 
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including governmental officials and interest group leaders. They were 
randomly assigned to viewing either the NBC programme or the control 
programme. After the news media presentation, the elites were interviewed 
by researchers (ibid: 18-21).  
 
The study found that the investigative report influenced public 
perception of the issue. Compared with the control group which watched an 
alternative programme, those who viewed the target programme considered 
home health care to be a more important programme, saw government help 
for the programme as more important, and saw fraud and abuse as a larger 
problem within the programme. Thus, the idea of the agenda setting 
function of the media for the general public is supported (ibid: 22-5). 
 
However, the news media presentation did not significantly 
influence policy elites. The interest group leaders’ perceptions of the issue’s 
importance were not changed by the news programme. Although 
government elites watching the NBC programme believed that the issue 
became more important and policy action was needed, the issue of fraud and 
abuse in home health care remained last on the government elites’ list of 
issue priorities. In other words, the study did not identify any media effect 
on the policymakers’ agenda (ibid: 25-30).   
 
In the study of the media influence on policy making, the research 
team analysed the transcripts of hearings in order to trace the time of the 
news report preparation and policymakers’ actions. Conducting extensive 
interviews with officials and journalists to examine the working relations 
between them, the team found that the policy process was not simply 
influenced by the media. Rather, policy could be changed by active 
collaboration between journalists and policymakers. According to Cook et 
al., two months before the story was aired, the investigative journalists 
worked in collaboration with Senate staff members, planning a series of 
hearings on home health care fraud. When the news story was aired, the 
news programme concluded by announcing the forthcoming Senate hearings. 
Meanwhile, the newly elected Republican leadership of the Senate 
Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, headed by Senator William Roth, 
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wanted to utilise the news report to draw public attention to the issue of 
fraud and abuse in government programmes, and then promoted a new 
policy. During the hearing, some senators specifically cited the investigative 
report and gave the investigative journalists credit for their contribution. As 
a result of the hearings, the subcommittee proposed new laws to curb abuse 
in the Home Health Care Programme (ibid: 30-2). In other words, 
journalists cooperated with policymakers to promote particular ideas. 
 
2.1.3 Comments on the Work of Linsky and Cook et al.  
Although Linsky (1986) specifies how the news media influence the 
policy process in different ways, his work is based on surveys and 
interviews with policymakers and journalists. Thus, the data may be 
distorted by the incomplete or selective memory of the respondents as well 
as their inaccurate estimate of the media effect on policy. The reliability of 
his work may be problematic. Moreover, focusing on the one way influence 
of the media on policymakers, Linsky neglects the influence of 
policymakers on the media.  
 
On the other hand, Cook et al.’s (1983) study attempts to explore the 
complexity of media-policy relationships. Media coverage may neither 
change policymakers’ priorities, nor set up a one-way influence on policy 
choices. Rather, policymakers can at times neglect media coverage. 
Moreover, policy changes may not result either from policymakers’ 
initiatives or media pressure. Policy may be affected by collaboration 
between journalists and policy makers. 
 
However, Cook et al.’s work throws up at least two problems. First, 
their experimental study of the media’s influence on individuals was based 
on the short term and immediate effect of only one news programme. 
However, it is generally believed that the media often significantly influence 
individuals’ perceptions of issues only through intense and continuous 
coverage. The more intense the coverage is, the higher pressure placed on 
policymakers (Linsky 1986: 109-10; Robinson 2002: 37-9). Thus, it is not 
surprising that policymakers do not change their issue priorities after 
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watching a news programme. Second, like the study by Linsky, Cook et al., 
it does not integrate its findings into any existing theories of policy making, 
nor does it propose a model of media-policy relationships. In other words, 
both studies fail to establish the linkage between empirical findings and 
policy theories. Nor do they manage to develop a new theory of media-
policy. 
 
2.2 The CNN effect: the media effect on foreign policy 
2.2.1 The Genesis of the CNN Effect 
In the early 1990s, there was an increasing concern with the media’s 
influence on foreign policy when the term CNN effect (or CNN factor) 
emerged. The CNN effect refers to the increasing influence of a particular 
type of news coverage on western government foreign policy. This type of 
coverage not only sympathises with the victims of humanitarian crises, but 
also criticises governments’ policies of inaction. Some observers believe 
that such coverage can place pressure on governments and trigger US 
military actions. For example, in 1991, it was believed that sympathetic 
coverage of Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam Hussein’s forces and the 
critical coverage of US government non-intervention caused the ‘virtually 
unprecedented proposal for Kurdish safe havens’ (Shaw 1996:88). 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia quickly followed and, once again, it was 
believed that the ill-fated sorties into the Horn of Africa in 1992 were 
effectively forced upon the US by media pressure. The main concern of 
observers of international affairs is that elite control of foreign policy-
making has been lost to the media. Hoge (1994), for example, questioned to 
what extent this ‘media pervasiveness’ impacted upon government – 
particularly the process of foreign policy-making.  
 
Steven Livingston (1997:1) proposes two possible factors that bring 
about this media influence. First, since the 1980s, new technologies have 
enabled the news media to provide the public with a constant flow of global 
real-time news. This kind of real-time news creates pressure, forcing 
policymakers to accelerate their response to whatever journalists focus on. 
The second possible factor is the end of the Cold War which has caused the 
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collapse of the old anti-communist consensus and brought about change in 
media news framing. Framing, according to Entman (1993:52), is defined as 
selecting some aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in 
a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular definition of 
a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described. Entman (2000) suggests a ‘frame-
contestation model’ which highlights the interacting influence between the 
media, the public and the government in the post-Cold War era. According 
to Entman: 
the Cold War frame served to anchor the administration’s 
control over the problem domain. The demise of the Cold War 
created a void, an absence of associative links to threats against 
the United States that communism automatically 
provided…Without the dangerous direct enemies and 
certainties of the Cold War, foreign policy becomes more 
subjected than ever to the political gaming and strategising 
long dominant in domestic politics. Elites are emboldened, able 
to criticise problem definitions and policy options without 
seeming unpatriotic (Entman 2000:14).  
 
Entman also suggests that the absence of the Cold War makes the 
media become more independently powerful in defining problems for 
foreign policymakers. Since the established media frames of the Cold War 
do not seem to apply any more, a cognitive and emotional gap is created. 
The media fill this ‘vacuum’ with their own understanding of international 
relations. As Entman comments, ‘perhaps because they trade in narrative, 
journalists seem constantly in search of a coherent frame: problem 
definitions, causes, moral judgements and remedies that fall into a 
consistent pattern and yield consistent meaning’(ibid: 14). Thus, the US 
media impose a ‘double bind’ in their framing of policy choice: a 
simultaneous demand for assertive interventionist leadership by the ‘world’s 
only superpower’, and chastisement of U.S. leaders when intervention turns 
costly (ibid: 17-9).   
 
2.2.2 Debate on the CNN Effect 
Despite increasing concerns over the media effect on foreign policy, 
Livingston (1997) argues that the CNN effect may at times be problematic 
for three reasons. First, there are few empirical investigations showing that 
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news coverage leads to military intervention. A majority of humanitarian 
operations were conducted without media attention. Comparing the 
populations at humanitarian risk in various countries and the coverage of US 
major media in 1996, Livingston found that the coverage of humanitarian 
crises was not uniform and was closely associated with the presence of US 
troops in the region. For instance, Afghanistan and the Sudan had more 
people at risk than Bosnia, but together they received only 12 percent of the 
total media coverage devoted to Bosnia alone. In addition, when considering 
the timeline of the Somalia crisis in 1992, Livingston found that most 
Somalia coverage followed rather than preceded official action (Livingston, 
1997: 7-9).  
 
Second, some post-Cold War U.S. humanitarian interventions were 
likely to have resulted from geo-strategic factors rather than from 
humanitarian concerns upheld by the news media. For example, the Persian 
Gulf War in the spring of 1991 was a response to the refugee crises along 
the Iraqi border with Turkey. Third, before using force, a series of strict 
conditions must be met, including a clear statement of US interests at stake 
in the operation, the approval of Congress, the availability of funding for the 
operation, a fixed date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and an agreement 
on command and control structure. News coverage is unlikely to be able to 
influence all such formal policy requirements (ibid: 9-10).   
 
Nevertheless, Livingston does not completely deny the existence of 
the CNN effect. Instead, he criticises the imprecise use of this term and 
suggests that this has led to minimal success in clarifying the policy-media 
relation. He argues that ‘different foreign policy objectives will present 
different types and levels of sensitivity to different types of media’ (ibid:1). 
In order to develop the topology of the policy-media effect, Livingston 
suggests that the type of effect of news coverage and type of foreign policy 
should be specified with precision.   
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According to Livingston, three possible types of CNN effect can be 
found.   
 
Media as accelerant 
This is the potential effect of global, real-time media, which speeds 
up the decision making process. In Livingston’s words, ‘time for reaction is 
compressed’ as intelligence agencies must compete with news organisations 
(ibid:3).  
 
Media as impediment 
Livingston suggests two types of media-related policy impediments. 
First, the media function as an emotional inhibitor or Vietnam syndrome 
that media coverage taking casualties has the potential to undermine public 
support for military operations and erode troop morale on the ground. 
Second, the media function as a threat to operational security. In this case, 
the media have the technological capacity to hinder or threaten some 
sensitive operations by exposing them (ibid:4-5). 
 
Media as agenda setting agents 
Although issues are not created by media content, Livingston argues 
that news coverage can influence the priorities and selection of national 
interests (ibid:6).  
 
Livingston also puts forward eight types of military interventions 
and their relations with news media as shown in Table 3.1.  
 
2.2.3 Comments on Livingston’s Work on the CNN Effect 
In sum, Livingston criticises imprecise definitions of the media’s 
influence on policy. Since types of media effect may vary from case to case, 
when we suggest that the media influence policy, we have to specify which 
influence this is, and in what conditions this kind of media effect occurs.  
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Table 3.1: Military Intervention Types & Accompanying Media 
Considerations 
 Policy goals & 
Objectives 
Likely 
media 
interest 
Governmen
t policy 
Likely 
media 
effect 
Public 
Opinion 
Conventional 
warfare 
Destruction of 
enemy and his 
war-fighting 
capacity  
Extremely 
high 
High degree 
of attempted 
media control. 
‘Indexed’ 
news 
Accelerant, 
impediment 
(both types) 
High public 
interest and 
attentiveness 
to it 
Strategic 
deterrence 
Maintains status 
quo. 
e.g. Cold War, 
Korean 
Peninsula 
Moderate to 
high interest. 
Routinised 
coverage.  
Routine news 
operation. 
White House, 
DoD, State 
briefings, etc. 
During 
stability, 
little effect. 
Accelerates 
during 
periods of 
instability 
Scrutiny 
only by 
attentive 
public. 
Expansion of 
base during 
instability  
Tactical 
deterrence 
Meets challenge 
to status quo. 
e.g. Desert 
Shield, PRC-
Taiwan 
Moderate  to 
high interest 
but episodic 
Controlled but 
cooperative. 
Force 
multiplier 
All 3 effects, 
but 
necessarily 
injurious 
Attentive 
public 
scrutiny. 
Latent public 
opinion a 
concern to 
policymaker
s 
SOLIC Counterterrorism
, hostage rescue, 
specialised 
operations 
High interest, 
particularly 
hostage 
situation, 
some 
terrorism 
Secrecy. 
Barring of all 
access 
Impediment 
(operation 
security risk) 
Little to no 
public 
awareness in 
most cases 
Peacemaking Third party 
imposition of 
political solution 
by force of arms 
e.g. Late 
Somalia, 
Yugoslavia 
High interest 
at initial 
stages of 
operation. 
Variation 
afterward 
dependent on 
level of 
stability 
Volatile 
conditions 
Danger in 
reporting. 
Access with 
risk. 
Impediment 
(both types) 
Attentive 
public 
scrutiny. 
Latent public 
opinion a 
concern to 
policymaker
s 
 
Peacekeepin
g 
Bolsters and 
accepts  political 
solution by 
presence of third 
party 
Moderate 
interest unless 
accord is 
destabilised 
Generally 
unrestricted 
access to 
theater of 
operation 
Impediment 
(emotional 
impediment 
likely) 
Attentive 
public 
scrutiny. 
Latent public 
opinion a 
concern to 
policymaker
s 
Imposed 
humanitarian 
operations 
Forceful, 
apolitical aid 
policy 
Low/moderat
e interest 
unless 
violence 
ensues 
Volatile 
conditions. 
Reporting 
risky 
Impediment 
(emotional 
impediment 
likely) 
Attentive 
public 
scrutiny. 
Latent public 
opinion a 
concern to 
policymaker
s 
 
Consensual 
humanitarian 
operations 
Agrees 
humanitarian 
assistance 
Initial 
operation met 
by moderate 
to low interest 
Unrestricted, 
even 
encourage 
media 
coverage 
Media effect 
unlikely 
Attentive 
public 
scrutiny 
Source: Livingston 1997:11 
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In addition, Livingston’s study of the timeline of the Somalia crisis 
in 1992 provides two important insights. First, Livingston found that media 
coverage can either follow or precede official actions. Thus, there is the 
possibility that the government may influence media coverage. In other 
words, there is a two-way interaction between media and government. 
Second, Livingston demonstrates that media-policy relations should be 
studied in a systematic way. In this case, process tracing and quantitative 
analysis of the media coverage can be used. Media’s influence on policy is 
possible only if certain quantity of news coverage precedes government’s 
decisions. If news coverage follows official policy, the media effect can be 
eliminated. However, time sequence does not provide sufficient evidence 
for media effect as policy can be affected by numerous factors. Thus, 
process tracing is a screening test for eliminating the myth of the CNN 
effect. 
 
3. Government influence on the media 
In addition to the debate about the media’s influence on the policy 
process, there is a huge literature supporting the ‘manufacturing consent’ 
model which emphasises the government’s influence on media content 
rather than media effect on government policy. This section examines the 
‘manufacturing consent’ theory of Herman and Chomsky.  
 
3.1 Manufacturing Consent:  
The term ‘manufacturing consent1‘ was first used in Herman and 
Chomsky’s study published in 1988. In their book, Herman and Chomsky 
propose a ‘propaganda model’, which argues that the US media are 
interlocked with the government and dominant economic interests. Thus, the 
media ‘serve to and propagandise on behalf of, the powerful societal 
interests that control and finance them’ (Herman and Chomsky 2002: xi). 
According to the propaganda model, there are five successive filters or 
                                               
1 Herman and Chomsky take the title of their book Manufacturing Consent from the 
Lippmann (1922). In his book, Public Opinion, Lippmann argues that ‘public opinion must 
be organised for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today’ 
(1922:19). He also suggests that ‘manufacture of consensus is capable of great 
refinements…and opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the 
process are plain enough’ (Lippmann, 1922: 248).  
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essential ingredients that refer to a series of economic, political and 
ideological constraints on the US media. Herman and Chomsky argue that 
the ‘raw material of news’ must pass through these five filters, leaving only 
the ‘cleansed residue fit to print’. As a result, dissent is marginalised whilst 
the government and dominant private interests can get their messages across 
to the public (ibid: 2). The contexts of the five filters are specified as 
follows.  
 
3.1.1 Concentration of Media Ownership  
The first filter of the propaganda, according to Herman and 
Chomsky (2002), is the increasing concentration of media ownership and 
the decreasing diversity of the media These effects are the result of a rise in 
scale of media enterprises and associated increases in capital costs, based on 
technological improvements along with the owners’ increased stress on 
reaching large readerships and chasing profitability. Because of free market 
competition, the loosening of rules limiting media concentration, cross-
ownership, and control by non-media companies, small sized media are 
driven out or controlled by large enterprises (ibid:4-8).  
 
Herman and Chomsky claim that large media companies have close 
relationships with the mainstream of the corporate community and the 
government through boards of directors and social links. Media companies 
are thus interlocked with those investors and forced toward strictly market 
objectives (ibid:8-12). In addition, radio and television companies and 
networks require government licenses and franchises and general policy 
support. This technical legal dependency is used as a club to discipline the 
media. The media also protect themselves through the cultivation of 
political relationships. As a result, the revolving door flow of personnel 
between regulators and regulated firms is created (ibid:13-4). Consequently, 
the choice of news is influenced by dominant interests. (ibid:4-5). 
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3.1.2 Advertising as a Controlling Mechanism 
Second, advertising serves as a powerful mechanism weakening 
working-class press and controlling media content. Herman and Chomsky 
state:  
With the growth of advertising, papers that attracted ads could 
afford a copy price well below production costs. This put the 
papers lacking in advertising at a serious disadvantage: their 
prices would tend to be higher, curtailing sales, and they would 
have less surplus to invest in improving the salability of the 
paper (ibid: 14).  
 
In other words, advertisers’ choices influence media prosperity and survival. 
In addition, advertisers not only select the media which can reach large 
number of consumers, but also choose ideologically ‘right’ media 
companies and content. Thus, unfriendly media institutions suffer from 
political discrimination on the part of advertisers. Large corporate 
advertisers also tend towards favouring content that fits in with their sales 
message, avoiding programmes that interfere with consumers’ ‘buying 
mood’. (ibid: 16-8). As a result, the advertising system not only reduces the 
diversity of media organisations, but also constrains the ideology of such 
organisations and their content. The working-class and radical press that do 
not fit in with advertisers’ principles are eventually driven out or 
marginalised. 
 
3.1.3 Reliance on Information Sources 
Third, since only the administration and large corporations have 
resources to produce a steady, reliable flow of raw news material or news 
information, they become powerful and routine news sources have 
privileged access to the media. Although experts play the role of respectable 
unofficial news sources that give dissident views with great authority, those 
experts are ‘co-opted’ and funded by the government, business and their 
agents. In this way, bias may be structured, and the supply of experts may 
be skewed in the direction desired by the government and dominant 
businesses. Thus, the media not only rely on information provided by the 
government and businesses, but also follow the agenda of these powerful 
sources (ibid: 22-3). 
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3.1.4 Flak 
The fourth filter, ‘flak’, is the negative response to media statements 
or programmes. According to Herman and Chomsky, flak issued by the 
powerful can be either direct or indirect. Direct flak would include direct 
interference in the media such as government officials or advertisers’ threats 
of retaliation. Indirect flak would include funding right-wing monitoring or 
think-tank operations designed to attack the media. As a major producer of 
flak, the government regularly assails, threatens, and corrects the media, 
trying to contain any deviations from the established line. Thus, flak 
producers are given column space or air time while the position of dissent in 
the media is retrenched (ibid:26-8). 
 
3.1.5 Anticommunist Ideology 
The ideology of anticommunism, the final filter, serves as a national 
religion for ideological control of the media. Herman and Chomsky argue:  
this ideology helps mobilise the populace against an enemy, 
and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against 
anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or 
support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism. 
It therefore helps fragment the left and labor movements and 
serves as a political control mechanism(ibid: 29).  
 
Thus, opponents of dominant interests are usually identified as communists 
or radicals.    
 
3.1.6 Marginalising Dissent 
According to Herman and Chomsky (2002), the five filters in the 
propaganda model are not all controlling and do not always produce simple 
and homogenous results. However,  
dissent and inconvenient information are kept within bounds 
and at the margins, so that while their presence shows that the 
system is not monolithic, they are not large enough to interfere 
unduly with the domination of the official agenda (ibid: xii).  
 
Moreover, control of the media is not brought about by crude intervention. 
Rather, it is achieved ‘by selection of right-thinking personnel and by the 
editors’ and working journalists’ internalisation of priorities and definitions 
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of news worthiness that conform to the institution’s policy’ (ibid: xi). Thus, 
journalists believe that they choose and interpret news objectively. 
 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the authors argue that  weakened 
anticommunist ideology is easily offset by the greater ideological force 
represented by belief in free market. This is because economic elites with an 
interest in privatisation and market rule have strengthened the grip of market 
ideology. Journalists have also internalised this ideology. As a result, the 
steady advance and cultural power of marketing and advertising have 
strengthened the applicability of the propaganda model and weakened the 
public sphere2 (ibid:xvii-xviii). 
 
3.2 Evidence Supporting Manufacturing Consent Theory 
There is evidence to support the idea that governments influence 
media content. For example, Entman (1991) studied two cases of the 
destruction of civilian airliners, namely the shooting down of a Korean 
Airline plane by a Soviet fighter plane in 1983 and the shooting down of an 
Iran Air plane by a U.S. Navy ship in 1988. Although both cases involved 
the misapplication of military force and large loss of life, the U.S. media 
framed these two incidents in two different ways. The case of Iran Air was 
framed as a technical failure, while the Korean Airline incident was seen as 
a moral outage. Entman argues that in these two cases, the dominant news 
frames coincided closely with the US administration’s interests (Entman 
1991: 24). 
 
The other example that supports the government’s effect on the 
media is Bennett’s (1990) study of the press coverage between 1983 and 
1986. Measuring the frequency, direction, and source of all opinions voiced 
in the New York Times in all Nicaragua-related stories and editorials, 
Bennett found that news media coverage was consistent with the frame of 
reference of foreign policy elites. Thus, he argues that ‘journalists are more 
likely to ‘index’ the legitimate voices in the news according to the range of 
                                               
2 Herman and Chomsky define public sphere as the array of places and forums in which 
matters important to a democratic community are debated and information relevant to 
intelligent citizen participation is provided (Herman and Chomsky, 2002:xviii).  
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views expressed by prominent officials and members of institutional power 
blocs likely to influence the outcome of a situation’ (Bennett, 1990:106-7).  
 
However, Bennett suggests that the media are not always able to 
apply their ‘indexing norm’. For instance, in cases where official opinion is 
in disarray for any reason, the journalistic process may be relatively more 
chaotic (ibid: 107). In this case, news coverage may highlight executive 
policy problems or failures. This phenomenon is understood as journalists’ 
‘professional responsibility to highlight important conflicts and struggles 
within the centers of power’ (ibid: 110). In other words, critical coverage is 
likely to occur only if there is disagreement among elites.  
 
3.3 Procedural Criticism Versus Substantive Criticism 
Despite the evidence of manufacturing consent and indexing theories, 
some critical coverage was found in some cases. In order to provide a better 
account of this problem, some studies distinguish between procedural and 
substantive criticisms. As procedural criticism relates to the implementation 
of policy (Robinson 2008:171), this kind of criticism is relatively mild. By 
contrast, substantive criticism relates to the underlying justification and 
rationale for a particular policy (ibid). Thus, the pressure created by this 
kind of criticism is relatively high. Some researchers suggest that most 
critical coverage of government policy is procedural rather than substantive 
when there is a consensus among policymakers. In this case, pressure 
created by critical coverage remains low. Thus, indexing theory is supported.  
 
This argument is supported by Entman and Page (1994). Focusing 
on three media outlets, namely the New York Times, the Washington Post 
and ABC’s nightly ‘World News’ programme, the authors examined the 
news coverage of  US policy on Iraq in two nine-day periods prior to the 
beginning of the Persian Gulf War in 1990. The first period was between 8 
and 16 November when the opponents responded to Bush’s announcement 
of the massive increase in deployment of troops. The second period was 
between 27 November and 5 December when the Congress held hearings on 
Iraq policy.  
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In the first period, the number of critical articles in the two 
newspapers overwhelmingly outnumbered supportive coverage, whilst the 
opposite was true of ABC which ran more supportive than critical coverage. 
Nevertheless, most of the criticisms were procedural, focusing on Bush’s 
failure to explain the policy and his duty to consult Congress. At the same 
time, the supportive coverage was heavily substantive, justifying the war 
policy (ibid: 87).   
 
Although the procedural criticisms forced the administration to 
consult Congress, the policy opponents lost the basis from which to 
continue with their opposition when the administration followed the proper 
procedures and obtained the blessing of the UN and Congress. Consequently, 
the overall quantity of critical coverage declined in the second period. 
Moreover, throughout the two periods, nearly all the reported critics and 
supporters agreed that, if necessary, Iraq had to be unconditionally 
dislodged from Kuwait by force. There was very little coverage that 
challenged the fundamental aspects of the administration’s war policy (ibid: 
90). As the pressure created by the procedural criticisms was weak, the 
Administration could move on its plan to increase the deployment of troops.  
 
Moreover, Entman and Page found that critical coverage was 
crucially dependent on elite disagreement, especially among members of 
Congress. The frequency of elite names, either as subjects or sources of 
news, also showed that the administration was receiving the highest levels 
of media attention. The president and the administration also made use of 
this ability to generate newsworthy events in order to distract journalists 
from the controversy and reduce critical coverage (ibid: 91-4). Thus, the 
authors suggest that critical coverage was unlikely to appear frequently 
when there was elite consensus. In this sense, Bennett’s (1990) indexing 
theory is supported. 
 
Further evidence of this argument is found by Althaus (2003). Like 
Entman and Page, Althaus focused on the case of the Persian Gulf war in 
1990 and 1991. In his study, the full-text transcripts of three television news 
programmes of ABC, CBS and NBC were studied. Three types of discourse 
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were defined. The first is ‘means discourse’ which is in favour of or against 
a policy such as the use of military force against Iraq. The second is ‘ends 
discourse’ which relates to the justifications or intended outcomes of a 
policy, such as preventing the invasion of Kuwait. The final one, ‘context 
discourse’ defines the larger political context associated with a policy. In 
addition, debate on the Persian Gulf crisis was divided into three phases. 
The first one was the ‘establishing phase’ between the invasion of Kuwait 
on 2 August and November congressional elections in 1990. The second 
was the ‘debate phase’ between 9 November 1990 and 15 January 1991 in 
which officials debated Bush’s announcement of troop escalations. The 
third stage, the ‘war phase’, was between the start of the air offensive on 16 
January and the end of the ground campaign on 28 February 1991 (ibid: 
388-90). 
 
American officials were unified, divided and then unified again in 
the course of these stages. According to Bennett’s (1990) indexing 
hypothesis, Althaus assumes that critical coverage should be more 
prominent in the debate phase. However, throughout the three periods, the 
ends discourse was overwhelmingly dominated by supportive coverage 
(87%) while only 9% challenged the administration. On the other hand, 
critical coverage was given prominent exposure in context (28%) and means 
(36%) discourses, although these discourses favoured the government’s 
policy in general (ibid: 390). From these perspectives, although the media 
was relatively free to make procedural criticisms of the administration’s 
policy options and the larger political context, there was very little 
substantive critical coverage of the administration’s goals despite the debate 
among elites. 
 
In addition, only means discourses expressed by officials of the 
administration and Congress members followed the predicted pattern of 
indexing. When these government sources provided high levels of criticism 
of government policies in the debate phase, the media only ran more critical 
means discourse than in the other two phases. Apart from this, none of the 
three discourses, expressed either by the government or by non-government 
sources, followed this predicted pattern. This was because the non-
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government sources produced considerable levels of criticisms despite the 
elite consensus. Journalists themselves also contributed nearly half of the 
non-governmental context criticisms (ibid: 390-6). Nevertheless, nearly all 
the criticisms initiated by journalists criticised the Administration’s 
preferred contexts but left the fundamental rationale of the administration’s 
policies unquestioned (ibid: 396). In other words, although journalists 
themselves produced a high level of critical coverage independently, such 
criticisms were mainly procedural or tactical rather than substantive. In 
other words, the media did not make fundamental criticism of government 
policy. Thus, news coverage was unlikely to be able to influence policy, 
though the media did not completely follow the government. 
 
3.4 Comments on Manufacturing Consent Theory 
In sum, manufacturing consent theory highlights the political and 
economic elites’ constraints on the media. From this perspective, the news 
media are not simply independent actors. Rather, the media propagandise on 
behalf of the powerful societal interests. Policies proposed by those 
dominant interests are thus enabled by the consensus created by the media.  
 
However, the theory simply emphasises the media’s reliance on 
powerful news sources and downplays the autonomy of the media and 
journalists. More importantly, critical news coverage of the government 
cannot be explained from this perspective. As Cook (1998) argues, 
journalists are not the passive recipients of official information but are 
active participants functioning as a political institution in their own right. As 
he states, ‘political actors and journalists (and occasionally citizens) interact 
in a constant but implicit series of negotiations over who control the agenda, 
what can be asked, where and how, and what a suitable answer will be’ 
(ibid:12). Thus, there is a continuous interaction between the media and 
policymakers. 
 
In order to explain the occurrence of critical coverage, Entman and 
Page (1994) and Althaus (2003) suggest that most critical coverage, 
including that initiated by journalists, occurs as procedural discourse. In this 
case, fundamental policy goals and administration rationale remain 
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unquestioned. The media is thus unlikely to influence policy. However, 
Entman and Page and Althaus’s works were completely based on the 
content analysis of news coverage. Neither policymakers’ understanding of 
news coverage nor their considerations during the policy process was 
studied. Thus, the causal relation between policy outcomes and different 
types of critical coverage remains unknown. 
 
In addition, most studies on manufacturing consent and indexing 
theories are based on foreign policies. The situation may be much different 
from that of domestic policy. As Lang and Lang (2004:97) argue,  
when something happens in some faraway place, there is often 
no one with the requisite area knowledge, language skills, or 
even contacts to get an accurate sense of the situation. This 
deficiency increase the dependence of journalists on embassy 
personnel and on other experts, many of whom have 
connections, past or present, to be government. These 
constraints, consistent with the propaganda model, would be 
less limiting when it comes to covering events at home.  
 
Thus, the validity of manufacturing consent theory needs to be tested in the 
case of domestic policy making. 
 
Furthermore, during the debate on war, policy goals (peace-keeping 
or preventing invasion) are clear while policy options are usually the use of 
force or not. Thus, it is relatively easy to distinguish between substantive 
and procedural discourses. In the case of a domestic policy debate, however, 
the context and goals of policy are usually complex. The borderline between 
substantive and procedural discourses may be unclear. Thus, I argue that the 
substantive-procedural classification is not applicable to this study. This 
point will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4. Robinson’s CNN Effect Model 
4.1 Developing a Theory of Media Influence 
Recognising the limitations of previous studies of media-policy 
relations, Robinson suggests a ‘two-way understanding of the direction of 
influence between the news media and the state’ (Robinson, 2002:16). 
According to Robinson, overall news coverage is consistent with the 
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interests of the government when there is a consensus among the political 
elite3. However, during elite debate the news media, either consciously or 
unintentionally, can take sides and become promoters of particular elite 
groups. In this case, there is the possibility that news media coverage might 
be critical of executive policy and might place pressure on the government 
(ibid: 14-15).  
 
Robinson suggests two important factors of media-policy relations. 
The first one is policy certainty. News coverage can influence policy only 
when policy is uncertain. If there is certainty of policy, the media is unlikely 
to exert an influence. In other words, there is an inverse relationship 
between policy clarity and media influence (ibid: 26). The second factor is 
news framing. Robinson argues that the influence of the media is greatest 
when coverage is framed so as to criticise existing government policy and 
empathise with the plight of suffering people in a humanitarian crisis. 
Conversely, if coverage is framed so as to produce an emotional distance 
from the plight of suffering people, the media effect will be weakened (ibid: 
28). 
 
4.1.1 Defining Policy Certainty 
According to Robinson, three types of policy uncertainty can be 
identified: 
 ‘Inconsistent or undecided policy’ which occurs when sub-systems 
are in disagreement with each other. 
 ‘No policy’ which happens when unexpected events occur 
 ‘Wavering policy’ which refers to the situation that policy changes 
frequently when there is a lack of commitment among policy sub-
systems relevant to that policy.     
  
In Robinson’s model, policy uncertainty is defined as a function of 
the degree of consensus and co-ordination of the sub-systems of the 
executive with respect to an issue. The level of policy certainty is assessed 
by means of a consensus among policymakers and political elites. 
                                               
3 Robinson defines political elites as people in the executive, legislative or any other 
politically powerful position in society (Robinson, 2002:14).  
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Comparing the content of press briefings of policymaking institutions and 
conducting interviews with relevant officials, Robinson examined whether 
there was consensus or a consistent policy line among the three core sub-
systems of US foreign policy, namely the White House, Pentagon and State 
Department. (ibid: 27).  
 
4.1.2 Defining Media Framing 
Regarding media framing, Robinson argues that news coverage of 
humanitarian crises tends to fall in one of two distinct directions. The first 
one consists of two modes. One is a narrative template of distance which 
can be laid over the subject matter of diplomacy or politics; dispassionate 
documentation as a reporting style; a target audience of elites; there is an 
emphasis on what is complex or difficult. The other mode is a narrative 
supporting official policy. Robinson argues that if there is an elite consensus 
over an issue, there is unlikely to be a significant level of coverage that 
challenges or criticises official policy. Robinson thus labels these two 
modes of reporting:  
 Distance framing in that the style of coverage creates emotional 
distance between the audience and the people suffering in a conflict;  
 Support framing in that official policy is supported.    
Distance and support framing are implicitly supportive of a government 
policy opposed to military intervention and as such either implicitly or 
explicitly promote a policy of non-intervention (ibid:28). 
 
The second way of framing focuses on the victims of crises. There are 
two possible modes of reporting:   
 Empathetic framing in that coverage tends to focus on individual 
suffering, identifying individuals as victims in need of help. 
 Critical framing where existing government policy of inaction is 
criticised.   
Policymakers invoke this kind of framing when seeking to justify 
intervention during a humanitarian crisis. In the situation where no 
government action is forthcoming, empathising coverage will often be 
accompanied by strong criticisms of policymakers (ibid: 29). 
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In order to measure media frames, Robinson analysed a selection of 
CNN transcripts and CBS evening news segments as well as two daily 
newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times. He combined 
interpretative analysis and analysis of systematic keywords. Particular 
keywords relating to empathetic/distance framing and critical/support 
framing were quantified (ibid: 137-40).     
 
4.1.3 Assumptions of Robinson’s Model 
Robinson makes a series of assumptions of his policy-media 
interaction model. On the basis of manufacturing consent theory, Robinson 
assumes that when there is a high level of policy certainty within an 
executive department and there is elite consensus over an issue,  
government officials try their best to promote their ideas in order to 
influence media output. Thus, the news media are expected to follow the 
official policy line rather then challenge the elite consensus. Conversely, 
when there is elite disagreement, news coverage reflects this debate and a 
variety of critical and supportive framing in news reports is expected to 
occur. If the news media reflect the reference frames of one side of an elite 
debate, they can become promoters of the policy preferences of  particular 
elite groups and place pressure on official policy (ibid: 30). 
  
If policy uncertainty in the government combines with elite 
disagreement and critical and empathetic framed news coverage, the 
conditions exist where the CNN effect might emerge. The government is 
expected to take action to respond to news coverage as the government is 
confronted with the possibility that negative news coverage might influence 
public opinion and be detrimental to government image (ibid:31-32). 
 
4.1.4 Robinson’s Classification of the CNN effect 
Revising Livingston’s (1997) classification of the media’s influence, 
Robinson suggests five possibilities types of CNN effect as follows:      
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Strong CNN effect 
Strong CNN effect refers to the situation where news coverage helps 
drive or push policymakers down a particular path. In terms of the level of 
coverage necessary in order to exert pressure on policymakers to act, 
Robinson suggests that a reasonable benchmark would be at least one front-
page newspaper story per day and a major news segment in the evening 
news run within the opening ten minutes of the news. This level of coverage 
would have to be sustained over at least three or four days in order to force 
executive attention (ibid: 37-8).   
 
Robinson’s strong CNN effect overlaps with Livingston’s (1997:6) 
agenda-setting effect. However, Livingston’s agenda-setting effect occurs 
only during a ‘problem identification stage’ where news coverage helps put 
an issue on the policymaking agenda. Robinson’s strong CNN effect may 
also emerge after an issue enters the policy agenda. In other words, this may 
occur when policymakers are developing and sorting out possible responses 
and solutions (Robinson, 2002:38). 
 
Weak CNN effect 
In contrast to shocking events in the news headlines, the publication 
of a few news stories is unlikely to have any major effect on the policy 
process. Robinson describes this type of coverage as weak CNN effect 
whereby media coverage might incline policymakers to act rather than 
create a political imperative to act. In this case, news coverage plays only a 
marginal role in the policy process (ibid: 38-9). 
 
Impediment effect  
The impediment effect, also labeled the ‘body-bag effect’ and 
Vietnam syndrome, refers to policymakers’ fears that, once there are 
casualties in a campaign, public support for an intervention will rapidly 
wane. This type of effect urges caution against intervention in a 
humanitarian crisis. Robinson also argues that the impediment effect 
operates at two levels. The first relates to concerns over the effect of media 
coverage of US casualties on domestic opinion. The second relates to the 
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simple fact that US casualties undermine public support regardless of media 
attention (ibid: 39-40).  
 
Potential CNN effect 
The potential CNN effect is the possibility that policymakers might 
consider potential future news coverage when formulating policy. Robinson 
claims that the impediment effect may operate at a potential level, with 
policymakers being deterred from intervention owing to fears of potential 
negative news coverage of casualties. On the other hand, policymakers 
might decide to intervene because they believe that inaction will ultimately 
lead to negative media publicity and public reactions (ibid:40). 
 
Enabling Effect 
According to Robinson, the enabling effect is the possibility that 
news coverage enables policymakers to pursue a particular course of action. 
Unlike strong CNN effect, the enabling effect explains the case where 
policymakers can do a great deal to set the media agenda when they wish to 
act in particular crises and are not hostage to whether or not the media 
choose to cover a conflict. This type of effect is likely to occur when there is 
policy certainty in favour of intervention and empathetic framing in the 
absence of criticisms of government (ibid: 40-1). 
 
4.2 Testing the CNN effect 
4.2.1 Case Selection 
In order to test his media-policy interactive model, Robinson 
selected several cases for comparison. The core cases studies included ‘easy 
cases’ of media-driven crisis intervention, and ‘hard cases’ in which the 
media did not appear to influence policy. The easy case refers to the cases 
where intervention was widely believed to be triggered by the media. In 
hard cases, news coverage was unlikely to be a major influence. In addition, 
some secondary cases were selected according to their comparability with 
core case studies in order to identify the pattern across cases and test the 
inferences made in primary cases. In those secondary cases, both primary 
research and secondary sources were involved (ibid: 44).    
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As far as the easy case was concerned, Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia (involving ground troop) in 1992 was selected as a core case 
because of the absence of geo-strategic and national interest motivations 
that might otherwise have accounted for the intervention. In addition, 
Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq in 1991 was also chosen as a 
secondary easy case. (ibid: 143-5). Air power intervention in Bosnia 
(involving the threat to use air strikes) in 1995 was selected as a core hard 
case because factors concerning strategy and national interests were 
believed to have underpinned policy making in this case. The second hard 
case was the decision to defend Sarajevo (involving the threat of air strikes) 
following a mortar bombing of the market place in 1994 (ibid:145-6). 
 
Finally, two non-influence cases were selected to observe the 
variation of the level of policy uncertainty and media framing in the case of 
the media’s failure to influence policymakers. These cases showed non-
intervention in the  Rwandan genocide in April 1994 and the failure to 
intervene with ground troops in the face of widespread criticisms of the 
adequacy of the air offensive during the1999 air war against Serbia 
(ibid:145-6).  
 
4.2.2 Process Tracing 
In addition to measuring policy certainty and news framing, 
Robinson traced the time sequence of news coverage, policy uncertainty and 
intervention in each case, and then estimated when policymakers decided to 
take action. Although details of some official meetings were not available, 
Robinson analysed official documents including press statements, press 
briefings, policy documents and new media reports. The chronology 
established by this process tracing was used to assess whether news 
coverage had been a factor in a given policy process. Despite the limitations 
of the interview based method, Robinson conducted primary telephone 
interviews with officials involved with the relevant policy making process 
in order to counter check the chronology established and to identify any 
other possible influences on policy. In addition, he examined secondary data 
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from the written accounts of commentators, academics and policymakers 
(ibid: 43).  
 
4.2.3 Robinson’s Findings 
Robinson’s findings are summarised in Table 3.2. In the case of 
Somalia, Robinson found that significant levels of news coverage occurred 
only after Bush’s decision to deploy ground troops. In addition, this news 
coverage following the government’s decisions was supportive of the 
government’s decision. Thus, news coverage was found not to be a 
significant influence on government actions. Rather, media coverage 
reflected elite decisions and manufactured consent for official policy (ibid: 
53-62, 121). 
 
Table 3.2: Robinson’s Case Studies and Results 
Case Type of 
intervention 
Media 
framing 
Policy 
certainty 
Media-state 
relationship 
Bosnia 
(Gorazda 
1995) 
Air power Critical and 
empathetic 
Uncertain Strong CNN 
effect 
Bosnia (Feb 
1994) 
Air power Critical and 
empathetic 
Uncertain Strong CNN 
effect 
Intervention 
in Somalia 
in 1992 
Ground 
troops 
Supportive 
and 
empathetic 
Certain Manufacturing 
Consent plus 
enabling effect 
and weak CNN 
effect 
Northern 
Iraq in 
1991 
Ground 
troops 
Critical and 
empathetic 
Certain No strong CNN 
effect; enabling 
effect 
War against 
Serbia in 
1999 
Non-
deployment 
of ground 
troops 
Apr: mixed 
but 
empathetic 
also 
May: 
supportive 
and 
empathetic 
Certain No strong CNN 
effect; 
impediment 
effect dominated 
whilst empathetic 
framing had 
enabling effect 
Rwandan 
genocide in 
1994 
Non-
deployment 
of ground 
troops 
Supportive 
and distance 
Certain Manufacturing 
consent; 
impediment 
effect dominated 
Modified from : Robinson 2002:118 
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In the case of northern Iraq, despite intense critical news coverage of 
Bush’s non-intervention policy, the administration insisted on a non-
intervention policy until geo-strategic concerns propelled first air power, 
and then ground troop deployment, in order to resolve Turkey’s refugee’s 
crisis. At this point, the empathetic-framed coverage had an enabling effect 
by helping justify the US government’s intervention (ibid: 63-71).   
 
On the other hand, a different phenomenon was identified in the two 
instances of intervention in Bosnia. A combination of critical and 
empathetic-frame news coverage and policy uncertainty was found before 
the US government’s threat to use force in 1992. Thus, news media were 
likely to influence the decision to intervene (ibid: 78-84). In the case of 
Gorazde, Robinson found similar patterns of policy-uncertainty. Critical and 
empathetic-framed media coverage was followed by air power intervention 
in February 1994 market-place bombing. Thus, news coverage influenced 
these two cases (ibid: 86-92).  
 
In addition, Robinson argues that policy certainty is the stronger 
variable compared to media framing (ibid: 119). This argument is supported 
by the case of Kosovo in 1999. Although the overall coverage was mixed in 
April, there was critical and empathetic-frame newspaper coverage which 
did not alter the government’s non-intervention policy. The case of Iraq also 
showed that policy certainty was more important than media framing. 
Despite the presence of critical and empathetic-framed coverage, the Bush 
administration avoided intervention until geo-strategic concerns surrounding 
the NATO ally, Turkey, and its Kurdish ‘problem’, forced policymakers to 
take military action (ibid: 119-21).  
 
Comparing the two incidents of Bosnia and the two cases of Somalia 
and northern Iraq, Robinson also found other conditions of the media 
influencing policy. In the two cases relating to Bosnia, news coverage was 
able to trigger the deployment of air power. However, in the Somalia and 
Iraq cases, news coverage did not influence ground troop operations. Since 
air power intervention is less costly both politically and in  terms of the risk 
of casualties within US forces than the deployment of ground troops, 
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Robinson concludes that actions that are less costly and less risky are more 
likely to be influenced by news coverage. Conversely, news coverage is 
unlikely to be a major factor in bringing about high cost and risky 
operations (ibid: 121-6). 
 
In sum, Robinson argues that the existence of the CNN effect in 
contexts relating to foreign policy depends on two conditions. First, news 
coverage may influence policy only where there is policy uncertainty 
measured by elite disagreement. During elite debate, the news media may 
take sides and end up promoting particular elite groups. In this case, critical 
coverage of existing policy puts pressure on the government and triggers 
policy change. However, where there is policy certainty measured by elite 
consensus, critical coverage is unlikely to influence policy. Rather, media 
coverage will become supportive of official policy because policymakers 
and elites try their best to promote their decisions. 
 
The second condition of the CNN effect is the fiscal and political 
cost of policy. Only relatively less costly and less risky decisions (air power) 
may be influenced by news coverage. In high cost and high risk operations 
(ground troops), news coverage is unlikely to be a major factor in decision 
making. 
 
4.3 Limitations of Robinson’s Work 
Robinson notes a series of limitations of his work. First, in order to 
test the robustness of the policy-media interaction model, Robinson suggests 
that further cases should be researched (ibid: 126-7). Second, only the 
strong CNN effect was likely to be captured by Robinson’s policy-media 
interaction model. Other effects such as weak CNN effect, the impediment 
effect and potential CNN effect could not be clearly verified in his study. 
Robinson thus suggests that further research on systematic and theoretically 
informed approaches to measure these types of effect are necessary (ibid: 
127). Third, Robinson focused on a consensus among three policy sub-
systems of US foreign policy making, namely the White House, Pentagon, 
and State Department. Non-elite groups were ignored. Thus, Robinson 
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suggests that other models concerning non-elite groups and agenda setting 
may be considered in further research (ibid: 129). 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Robinson tried to establish 
causal links between policy certainty, media framing and policy change by 
means of process tracing. Although he conducted primary interviews with 
officials, he was not able entirely to eliminate other possible factors such as 
direct interaction among political elites and geo-strategic concerns in times 
of humanitarian crisis. Neither is he able to put forward multiple factor 
explanations for the intervention (ibid: 127-8). Thus, the causal relationship 
between news coverage and policy change remains unclear. Nevertheless, 
Robinson’s study, as a first step in verifying media’s influence on policy, 
identifies the main factors relevant to policymakers’ decisions. (ibid: 42). 
 
4.4 Comments on Robinson’s Work 
Robinson not only recognises the two-way interaction between the 
media and policy makers, but also suggests the importance of media 
framing and policy certainty measured by elite consensus. However, there 
are some limitations of his work. First, Robinson did not study the influence 
of divided framing among different media outlets. In the case of Kosovo, 
Robinson found mixed framing in media accounts. Newspapers criticised 
the government’s non-deployment of ground troop while CBS and CNN 
showed mixed and supportive framing of existing policy.. Nevertheless, 
Robinson did not need to measure the influence of this divided framing as 
the government had a clear policy of non-deployment of ground troop in 
this case. However, it is hard to imagine that different media outlets always 
frame issues in the same way. As I mentioned in the following chapter, 
divided news framing can be found among media with different political 
stances during policy debate. Therefore, the influence of inconsistent 
framing in media coverage should be considered. 
 
Second, perhaps more importantly, Robinson’s model focuses on 
media effect on US foreign policy. As John (1998) states, one of the 
difficulties in policy studies is variability in the policy process in different 
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policy sectors. Even in the same political system of a state, different policy 
areas consist of different issues, different patterns of bargaining and 
different structures, opportunities and constraints. The relative influence of 
politicians, bureaucrats, interest-groups and other actors may differ in 
different policy sectors (John 1998:5-6). Thus, the explanatory power of 
Robinson’s model needs to be tested by cases in a range of different 
domestic policy areas.   
 
Finally, Robinson’s study mainly focuses on the role of media. In 
my view, in order to make a further contribution to policy study, it is 
necessary to take account of existing policy theories in order to develop the 
connection between the role of media coverage and public policy theories.  
 
Despite its limitations, Robinson’s model offers a systematic means 
of measuring policy certainty and media framing, as well as establishing 
causal links between them by means of process tracing. Even though 
Robinson is not able completely to eliminate the possible influence of other 
factors, his methodological framework can be used as a screening test for 
possible media influence.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, early studies of media-policy relations stress the one-
way influence of media and government, and downplay the possibility that 
media and government may influence each other. Robinson’s CNN effect 
model recognises the two-way interaction between media and government. 
Although Robinson’s model, which is based on US foreign policy, needs to 
be tested in domestic policy areas, Robinson made at least two contributions 
to the study of media-policy relations. First, Robinson’s methodological 
framework demonstrates a systematic way to study media-policy relations. 
Second, Robinson demonstrates the importance of two conditions in which 
CNN effect on policy occurs, the first of which is policy certainty and the 
other is media framing.  
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Chapter 4 
Political Context and Press System in Hong Kong 
 
1. Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study focuses on the case of Hong 
Kong. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the political context and 
press system in Hong Kong in order to development a conceptual 
framework. Tracing the development of the political and press systems over 
the past decades, I suggest that the ideological differentiation of the press 
system parallels that of the political spectrum in society. In addition, owing 
to the institutional design that fits in with the ‘executive-led’ principle, the 
Administration led by the Chief Executive (CE), with the support of the pro-
government camp, has overwhelming control over the policy process. 
Nevertheless, the Administration is still constrained by some factors such as 
its sovereign state, the legal system, foreign governments and the consensus 
inside the pro-government camp. These features will be used to support the 
development of a conceptual framework and definitions of some variables in 
Chapter 5.   
 
2. Political Context of Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is situated at the southeastern tip of China. With a total 
area of 1,104 square kilometres, it covers Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon 
peninsula just opposite, and the New Territories, the more rural section of 
Hong Kong, which also includes 262 outlying islands. After the Opium War, 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula were ceded to Britain in 
perpetuity in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking and in 1860 by the Treaty of 
Peking. On 1st July 1898, the New Territories were leased by China to 
Britain for 99 years by the Convention of Peking. According to the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong in 1984, however, 
sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) on 1 July 1997. Since then, Hong Kong has become a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC. Under Hong Kong's mini-
constitution, the Basic Law, and the concept of ‘one country, two systems’, 
the existing economic, legal and social system in Hong Kong will be 
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maintained for 50 years. Also, the SAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy 
except in matters of defence and foreign affairs (Ma 2007:136-7).  
 
At the end of 2008, Hong Kong's population was about 6.98 million 
of which over 95% are Chinese. The average population density was 6,406 
people per square kilometer1. However, actual population density is much 
higher than this as only 25% of the land area of Hong Kong has been 
developed. Given such a highly compact living environment, politicians can 
reach their voters through community networks. This point will be discussed 
later. 
 
2.1 Colonial Era 
Traditionally, the British colonial government did not attempt to 
follow Western democratic models. King (1975:424-31) considers the art of 
colonial government and politics as a ‘synarchy’, which implies a joint 
administration by British and non-British rulers, the latter being mainly 
Chinese leaders, for the most part men of wealth. The political stability of 
Hong Kong was thus based on the ‘administration absorption of politics’, 
which was the process British governing elites co-opted or assimilated the 
non-British socio-economic elites, into the political-administrative decision 
making bodies, including the Executive Council (Exco, the cabinet of the 
colonial Governor) and the Legislative Council (Legco). On the other hand, 
the development of counter-elite groups was prevented (King 1975:437-8).  
 
Before the 1980s, the most powerful and resourceful political groups 
in Hong Kong were those related to the Kuomintang (KMT) of Taiwan and 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the PRC. Thus, there was a political 
spectrum of pro-Beijing-pro-Taiwan. However, apart from the 1956 and 
1967 riots, both parties seldom mobilised their followers to participate in 
Hong Kong politics. Some local groups, including the Reform Club and the 
Civic Association, pushed for democrat reform in Hong Kong before 1980s. 
However, the mobilisation power of those groups was little. Neither did 
                                               
1 Website of Hong Kong SAR Government: http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm 
 75 
such groups enter the political establishment such as the legislature (Ma 
2007:136-7).  
    
Since the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong future in the 
early 1980s, however, the colonial administration had developed a 
representative government, holding district board elections. Some social 
activists formed political groups to run for office in order to increase their 
political influence. Despite limited resources and small memberships, these 
groups were regarded as embryonic political parties. Political reform before 
and after 1997 was a focus of debate at that time. Of these political groups, 
some fought for a democratic political system after 1997. Thus, they formed 
an alliance Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government 
(JCPDG) in 1986, demanding introduction of direct elections to the Legco 
in 1988 and a more democratic formula in the Basic Law.  
 
However, the PRC leaders intended to retain the colonial 
government’s undemocratic bureaucratic polity in order to maintain political 
stability and effective governance. In addition, because of opening up the 
Mainland market, there was a vast investment of Hong Kong tycoons in the 
Mainland and an increased economic presence of Chinese enterprises in 
Hong Kong. Consequently, the PRC Government wielded a considerable 
influence over the Hong Kong business and professional sectors. Following 
Beijing, business elites, together with the local leftists and conservative 
community leaders, formed other alliances against the democrats. Since then, 
a political spectrum of pro-Beijing-pro-democracy had formed in Hong 
Kong (Holliday el al, 2004:206-7, Ma 2007:137-8).  
 
Subsequently, these political groups transformed to political parties 
with a different political stance in order to run for office. The following 
parties belong to the pro-democratic camp: the Democratic Party (DP), the 
Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL), the 
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) and The Frontier (TF) which merged 
with the DP in 2009. In 2006, some barristers, together with some 
professionals and scholars also founded the Civic Party (CP). Meanwhile, in 
addition to the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) which was 
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founded in 1948, the pro-government camp includes the Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong2 (DAB), the Liberal Party (LP) 
founded by business elites and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance 
(HKPA). 
 
2.2 Institutional Contexts of the Post Colonial Era  
2.2.1 The Administration 
Hong Kong SAR is headed by the Chief Executive (CE) who is 
advised on major policy decisions by the Exco, and is assisted by the 
principal officials3. As Li summarises, the powers of the CE can be divided 
into legislative power, including the introduction of legislation, budgetary 
powers, a package on power of veto (overriding), and non-legislative 
powers, including cabinet formation and dismissal and appointment of the 
principal officials and dissolution of the legislature (Li 2007:26).  
 
According to the Basic Law, the CE is returned by an election 
committee and is appointed by the Central Government of the PRC. The 
first CE election committee formed in 1996 had 400 members. However, the 
election committee has expanded to 800 members since 2001. The 
Committee is composed of four 200-member sectors, each is further divided 
into numerous subsectors. Each of these subsectors returns a fixed number 
of election committee members by election or negotiation (ibid: 25). The 
voters of these subsectors are mainly interest groups and professional 
institutes such as chambers of commerce, business owners, trade unions, 
professionals, religious leaders, teachers and social workers. Since a 
majority of these groups is dominated by the pro-Beijing elites, the PRC 
Government has an overwhelming influence on the CE election.  
 
Assisting the CE, the principal officials are responsible for the policy 
formulation and supervision of the subordinate executive department with 
                                               
2 In 2005, the DAB merged with HKPA and the name was changed to Democratic Alliance 
for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, acronym DAB. 
3 The principle officials consist of the Secretaries and the Deputy Secretaries of 
Departments, the Directors of Bureaux, the Commissioner Against Corruption, the Director 
of Audit, the Police Commissioner , the Director of Immigration and the Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise (Basic Law Article 101).  
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their portfolios. Before 2002, the principal officials were employed 
according to civil service terms. Nevertheless, according to the Article 48 (5) 
of the Basic Law, principal officials are nominated by the CE and appointed 
by the Central Government of PRC. Thus, the PRC plays a decisive role in 
the appointment of these officials. With the implementation of the principal 
official accountability system in July 2002, the principal officials are 
political appointees who are directly responsible to the CE. Nevertheless, 
the PRC Government’s role in the appointment of principal officials 
remains unchanged. 
 
Although the Exco had been regarded as the cabinet of the CE since 
the colonial era, it was made up of some principle officials and public 
figures who were part-time amateurs in the first five year subsequent to 
1997. Thus, policy was mainly formulated by the civil service, while the 
Exco played a limited role at that time. However, since the implementation 
of the accountability system in 2002, the Exco has included all principal 
officials and the leaders of the three pro-government parties, namely DAB, 
FTU and LP, as well as some public figures. Since then, the Exco has 
become a key policy making body (Burns 2004:78). The consensus inside 
the Exco is thus crucial to policy making,   
 
2.2 The Legislative Council 
Since the colonial era, the Legco has been responsible for the 
enactment, amendment or repeal of laws, the examination and approval of 
government budgets, and the monitoring of performance within the 
Administration. Most of these functions and powers remained unchanged 
after 1997. In order to help it carry out its duties, the Legco also set up a 
number of panels to study policy in different areas. In addition, two 
committees are particularly important. The first is the Public Accounts 
Committee, which considers reports of the Director of Audit on the accounts 
of government departments and public bodies. The second is the Financial 
Committee, which scrutinises and approves public expenditure proposals 
put forward by the Administration. The Committee’s two subcommittees, 
namely the Establishment Subcommittee and the Public Works 
Subcommittee (PWSC), also examine the Administration’s proposals for the 
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creation of new civil service posts and proposals for projects in the public 
works programme respectively. 
 
Since the early 1990s, some legislators have been returned by 
geographical constituencies (GCs) and functional constituencies (FCs) by 
direct election. According to the Basic Law, the ultimate aim is the election 
of all legislators by universal suffrage. However, the actual method for 
forming the Legco should be determined by the ‘actual situation’ in Hong 
Kong and in accordance with the principle of ‘gradual and orderly 
progress’4. During the period before universal suffrage, the composition of 
the Legco was constantly changing. 
 
The methods for forming the Legco before 2007 are stated in Annex 
II of the Basic Law. The Legco is composed of members returned by three 
types of constituency, namely, the GCs, FCs and the Election Committee 
(EC). The composition and the partisan distribution of the first three term of 
the Legco (1998-2008) are specified in Appendix I.  Since the first term of 
the SAR Legco, pro-democracy politicians have maintained a majority of 
the seats returned by the GCs while the pro-Beijing or pro-government 
camp has dominated the FCs and EC. As shown in Appendix I, from 1998 
to 2000, 40 out of 60 legislators belonged to the CE’s governing coalition. 
From 2000 to 2004, 38 legislators were supporters of the Administration. 
From 2004 to 08, the number of pro-government legislators was 35. In this 
case, regardless of the pro-democrat camp’s position, government proposals, 
with the support of the pro-government legislators, could be endorsed by the 
Legco.  
 
In addition, any changes to the composition of the Legco after 2007 
are to be decided by a two-thirds majority of legislators with the consent of 
the CE. Any such changes are to be reported to the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress (NPCSC) for record5. In other words, the 
                                               
4 Article 68 of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html#section_3 
5  Basic Law Annex II: http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/annex_2.html 
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composition of the Legco cannot be changed without the endorsement of 
Beijing. Thus, constitutional reform is still under debate in Hong Kong. 
 
2.3 Policy Process 
The policy process varies from case to case. However, the 
formulation of policies and legislative proposals typically begin with 
discussions between the Administration and the relevant Legco panels, the 
relevant advisory committees, and in many cases, interest groups. Public 
consultation may be entered into by the Administration before or after these 
discussions. During the course of these discussions and consultations, which 
may last from a few months to a few years, the original proposals may be 
revised, suspended or withdrawn by the Administration. The executive 
branch then submits its proposals to the Exco and seeks the CE in the 
Council's approval to introduce the bill into the Legco. After endorsement 
by the Exco, the bill will be published in the Gazette and introduced into the 
Legco6. If the bill is passed by the Legco, it will be usually signed by the CE 
and gazetted. The bill then becomes the law. Similar considerations apply to 
the Government's budget presented to the Legco in the form of an 
Appropriation Bill. In some emergency cases, however, the CE and the 
Exco may introduce the bill into the Legco without consultation. 
 
Since the colonial era, one of the key features of the Hong Kong 
Government is the ‘executive dominant’ or ‘executive-led’ principle. 
Although this principle is neither well defined nor clearly stated in the Basic 
Law, it is a central sprite of the Basic Law’s political design. In short, 
‘executive-led’ refers to vesting most of the decision making power in the 
CE and the executive branches while the power of the legislature is 
relatively limited (Ma 2007:58). As Lau (2000:4-6) and Ma (2007:58-9) 
                                               
6 When the bill is introduced into the Legco for its First Reading, the official in charge of 
the bill will move the bill's Second Reading with a speech explaining the merits and 
principles of the bill, the Second Reading debate on the bill will normally be adjourned. 
The bill will then be referred to the House Committee of the Council where the members 
will decide whether it will be considered by a Bills Committee or in other manner. A Bills 
Committee thus formed will examine the detailed provisions of the bill and may consider 
any amendments. At the conclusion of its deliberations, the Bills Committee will report 
back to the House Committee to prepare for the resumption of debate on the bill. When the 
bill returns to the council its Second Reading debate is resumed. If the bill receives a 
Second Reading, it will then go through the committee stage, at which amendments can be 
moved, and be given a Third Reading. 
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conclude, there are five basic features of the ‘executive-led’ SAR 
Government. 
 
1. Except for the policy entailing changes to laws or extra financial 
appropriations, most government policies do not need the approval of 
the Legco. Thus, the CE and the principal officials can manipulate their 
policies.    
 
2. The CE has a wide range of powers concerning appointments, including 
the power to appoint judges, members of the Exco, principal officials, 
members and chairs of policy commissions, boards of public 
corporations, advisory committees and some District Council members. 
Except for the appointment of judges, the approval of the Legco is not 
required7. In other words, the CE can influence policy making through 
the control of key personnel of key policy making bodies.  
 
3. According to Article 72 (2) of the Basic Law, Government bills have 
priority for inclusion in the Legco agenda. Moreover, all bills passed by 
the Legco are effective only after they have been signed and 
promulgated by the CE 8 . By contrast, the powers of the Legco are 
limited. Legco members can introduce private bills which do not relate 
to public expenditure, political structure or the operations of government. 
If the CE considers a bill ‘not compatible with the overall interests’ of 
Hong Kong, he can return it to the Legco for reconsideration. The CE 
can dissolve the Legco if he refuses to sign a bill passed the second time 
by the Legco, or the Legco refuses to pass the annual budget or any 
important government bills9. Thus, not only can the CE intervene in the 
Legco agenda, but he also has to power to reject bills passed by the 
Legco and can dissolve the Legco when there is a strong disagreement 
between the Administration and the Legco. 
 
                                               
7  Article 73 and 89 of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html 
8 Article 72 (2) of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html 
9  Article 49 and 50 of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html 
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4. Legislators’ private bills relating to government policies cannot be 
introduced until written consent of the CE is provided10 . Even if a 
private bill passes over all these hurdles, it is unlikely to be passed by 
the Legco without the support of the pro-government camp. According 
to Annex II of the Basic Law, on the passing of bills introduced by the 
Administration, a simple majority vote of the legislators present is 
required. However, the passing of motions, bills or amendments to 
government bills introduced by individual legislators requires a simple 
majority vote of each of the two groups of legislators present: those 
returned by FCs and those returned by GCs and by the EC11. Although 
the pro-democrat camp continues to have a majority of GC legislators, 
most FCs and the EC are both dominated by the pro-government camp. 
In these circumstances, it is difficult for the democrats to propose any 
private bills and amendments to government bills.  
 
5. As mentioned above, the CE is returned by an election committee and is 
appointed by the PRC. Although the election committee consists of the 
60 legislators, including those from the pro-democrat camp, they are just 
a minority in the committee. Thus, the Legco have little influence on the 
election of the CE.  
 
2.4 Constraints on the Administration 
Although the CE, together with the Administration, has the 
overwhelming advantage of the institutional setting, some constraints are 
placed on their powers. Among these constraints, I suggest four to be of 
particular importance.     
 
2.4.1 Legal System 
Since the colonial era, the common law system as found in Britain 
has been applied to Hong Kong. Under the principle of common law 
jurisdiction, members of the judiciary are independent of the executive 
organ of government in the performance of their judicial duties. The 
                                               
10  Article 74 of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html 
11 Annex II of the Basic Law: http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/annex_2.html 
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exercise of power to govern is itself accountable to the law. According to 
the principles of the Rule of Law, the SAR Government may only exercise 
those powers that are authorised by law and in the manner laid down in law. 
The other principle of the Rule of Law is judicial independence where the 
judiciary is independent of the executive authorities, the legislature and all 
external bodies in adjudication (Tai 2007:60-1). In addition, despite the 
political, economic and social impacts of rulings, courts are concerned only 
with what is legally valid with reference to the relevant constitutional and 
statutory provisions and applicable common law principles12.  
 
Judicial independence is evidenced in previous studies. Having 
considered several politically controversial court cases in the aftermath of  
Hong Kong’s transition to Chinese rule, Chan (2002:94-5) suggests that, on 
the whole, Hong Kong courts have retained their impartiality and 
independence. Thus, the Administration is constitutionally constrained by 
the court’s rulings which are supposed to be made impartially. From this 
perspective, despite its institutional power provided by the executive-led 
system, the Administration is constrained by the legal system. The influence 
of the legal system on policy will be further discussed in the case of Central 
Reclamation. 
 
2.4.2 Consensus inside the Pro-government Camp  
The Administration, together with the pro-government camp, has 
overwhelming power to manipulate policy. However, each of the pro-
government parties and individuals has different interests and different 
political stances. As Chu (1995 cited in Ma 2007: 60) suggests, the diverse 
backgrounds of the pro-government parties make elite integration difficult. 
For example, although the LP, representing the interests of various business 
sectors, usually supports the government, they oppose any policy which 
may damage business interests. As a loyal supporter of the Administration, 
the DAB mainly targets grass-roots voters. However, one of the DAB 
legislators, Choy So-yuk is eager on environmental and heritage issues, and 
seldom follows the DAB in cases related to these areas (interview on 21 
                                               
12 Overview of Hong Kong’s judicial system, website of  the  HKSAR Judiciary:  
http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/pdf/hk_jud/chapter1.pdf 
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May 2007). The FTU and the DAB have similar political positions and voter 
bases. However, the FTU plays particular attention to cultural, heritage and 
labour issues (interview with Chan Yuen-han on 23 May 2007). Thus, the 
FTU’s views on these issues may be different from those of the DAB. If 
there is a high level of disagreement between the Administration and the 
pro-government parties, government proposals can never be endorsed by the 
Legco. 
 
2.4.3 Sovereign State 
Under the Basic Law, and the concept of ‘one country two systems’, 
the Hong Kong SAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy except in defense 
and foreign affairs. However, as mentioned above, the CE, the principal 
officials and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal are all appointed 
by the PRC Government. Under the Basic Law, unofficial members of the 
Exco are appointed by the CE. In practice, however, nominations are 
submitted to Beijing beforehand. Only people of the right political 
persuasion who have the blessing of Beijing will be selected. Thus, the top 
level personnel in the SAR Administration are tightly controlled by the 
government of the PRC. In addition, the right to amend the Basic Law, 
guiding the interpretation of its most sensitive sections, and to enact national 
law legislation that is applicable to Hong Kong belong to the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), its Standing Committee (NPCSC), and the PRC 
Government.  
 
The PRC Government also continues to deal with pro-Beijing groups 
in Hong Kong such as the flagship pro-Beijing party, the DAB and the FTU. 
The Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong also plays an 
active role in liaison with local communities and unions in Hong Kong. 
Every time the SAR Government proposes a new policy, these communities 
and unions will be mobilised to support the government. Thus, even though 
the SAR Administration always stresses its autonomy, it is believed that any 
important policies proposed by the SAR Government have to be endorsed 
by Beijing beforehand. This point will be further discussed in the case of 
Article 23. 
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2.4.4 Foreign Governments 
As an international financial and business centre in the region, 
foreign investors traditionally have played a critical role in Hong Kong 
since the colonial era. Western pressure is found not only in relation to 
political issues, but also concerning economic interests. According to the 
‘World Investment Report 2004’, by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Hong Kong retained its position as 
second to Mainland China in foreign direct investment (FDI) inward stock, 
with a total higher than the next five Asian markets combined. The FDI 
flow to Hong Kong in 2003 reached US$13.6 billion13. Of this, over half 
came from western countries14.  
 
Western countries are concerned about the decline of ‘continuity’ 
including liberty and autonomy following Hong Kong’s handover. For 
example, the European Parliament is concerned not only about fair 
competition, but also human rights in Hong Kong. Defending its enormous 
political and economic interests in Hong Kong, Washington also stresses the 
importance of export controls and law enforcement by Hong Kong and pays 
a high level of attention to the economic status, rule of law and human rights 
conditions of Hong Kong. In fact, surveys conducted by the SAR 
Government in 1999 and 2000 showed that a number of multinational 
companies, that set up their regional offices in Hong Kong, were concerned 
about the possible deterioration in government economic policy, political 
climate and rule of law (Ting and Lai 2007:272-7). Hong Kong’s image 
relating to these issues is particularly significant in terms of foreign 
investors’ confidence in Hong Kong. Although the views of western 
countries may only have a limited influence on domestic public attitudes, 
the western business elite’s confidence in Hong Kong may be influenced by 
comments made by western governments. This influence will be discussed 
in the case of Article 23. 
 
 
                                               
13 Administration press release on 24 September 2004: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200409/23/0923106.htm 
14 Website of Invest Hong Kong: http://www.investhk.gov.hk/pages/1/350.html 
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2.5 Summary 
In sum, since the development of representative government in the 
1980s, the political spectrum in Hong Kong has transformed from pro-
Beijing and pro-Taipei to pro-Beijing and pro-democracy categorisation. 
 
Thanks to institutional design in accordance with ‘executive led’ 
principle, the Administration led by the CE has overwhelming powers in the 
policy process. Most government policies, except from those entailing 
change in laws or extra financial appropriations, do not need the approval of 
the Legco. In addition, government proposals can be endorsed by pro-
government legislators regardless of the pro-democrat camp’s position. In 
other words, government policy, which has been endorsed by the Legco or 
is under implementation, can be completely manipulated by the 
Administration. Government proposals can be endorsed by the Legco when 
there is a consensus between the Administration and the pro-government 
parties. The pro-democrat camp, as a minority of the Legco, plays a 
relatively limited role.    
 
Nevertheless, the Administration is constrained by at least four 
factors, namely, the independent judiciary and rule of law, the PRC 
Government, pressure from foreign governments and the consensus between 
the Administration and the pro-government camp.  
 
3. Media System in Hong Kong 
3.1 Overview 
The media system in Hong Kong is dominated by privately owned 
companies. The television, radio and newspaper industries are all highly 
developed and these three strands of the media provide the most important 
sources of information. The broadcasting service is licensed and monitored 
by the government and government agencies. Whilst numerous channels are 
provided by satellite and cable television, the television market in Hong 
Kong is dominated by two commercial television organisations, namely the 
Television Broadcasts (TVB) and the Asia Television (ATV). These two 
companies focus on the local market and enjoy a huge audience. The Radio 
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Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the only public broadcaster in Hong Kong, 
is a government department. However, because of not having its own 
television channel, the RTHK plays a relatively limited role in the television 
market as its programmes are shown on channels operated by the 
commercial broadcasters. The TVB and ATV also provide some news and 
public affairs programmes and provide the most important information 
sources for the general public15. However, television adheres closely to the 
principle of political neutrality (Chan and So 2002: 254-6).  
 
There are also three radio broadcasters in Hong Kong. While the 
RTHK is owned by the government, Commercial Radio and Metro Radio 
are private enterprises. All these organisations provide a fair amount of 
news and public affairs programmes. A previous study also shows that, 
among these, radio phone-in talk shows are particularly important. 
Programme hosts representing particular points of view on political issues 
debate on air with the callers from the general public, thus influencing 
public opinion (Lee 2002). Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 5, most 
policymakers interviewed considered newspapers as their most important 
news source. Thus, the study focuses on the press’s influence on policy 
making.  
 
The market for printed media enjoys almost complete freedom. 
There are over 50 local and foreign newspapers available in Hong Kong. In 
2009, there are 15 major local daily newspapers. In terms of political 
tendency, they can be categorized as Pro-Beijing papers, pro-democrat 
papers and the number of ‘centrist’ commercial papers in between. In terms 
of market position, they can be classified as popular and elitist papers. The 
market positions and political tendencies of these 15 newspapers are 
summarised in Appendix II.    
  
 
                                               
15 According to the regular survey conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the 
University of Hong Kong, in the period between 1994 and 2008, the percentage of people 
claiming television was their main source of news remained higher than those giving 
newspapers as  their news source.  In 2008, for example, 34% and 30% of respondents 
claimed that their main sources of news were television and newspapers respectively. 
(http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/press/main/yr/datatables.html) 
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3.2 Development of the Press in Hong Kong 
The development of the press system in Hong Kong is associated 
with changes in the political spectrum. In the first one hundred years of 
British rule, the Hong Kong government concerned itself primarily with the 
affairs of the British and the non-Chinese community, even though this 
community never exceeded a small percentage of the total population 
(Tsang 1997: 65-66). While the senior officials were British expatriates, 
media elites, especially owners of the press, were mainly Chinese 
intellectuals who spoke different languages in touch with different social 
networks. Moreover, the press in Hong Kong was highly involved in 
mainland China and Taiwan rather than Hong Kong affairs. Partisan 
newspapers, including the pro-Beijing ‘leftist’ papers and pro-Taipei 
‘rightist’ papers were controlled by the CCP and the KMT respectively, not 
by local parties in Hong Kong. As the political ideology was divided 
according to the Mainland and Taiwan continuum, rather than on Hong 
Kong issues, there was no need for the colonial Administration to intervene 
in the press (Kuan and Lau 1999: 278-80). 
 
As mentioned above, the most important political groups in Hong 
Kong before the 1980s were those related to the KMT and CCP. From this 
perspective, the political spectrum in society is consistent with the media’s 
ideological differentiation. In Hallin and Mancini’s (2004:26-30) words, 
there was a political parallelism. 
 
Following large-scale and politically inspired riots in 1967 which 
was an overspill of the Cultural Revolution in China, the colonial 
Government took a series of initiatives such as the creation of the District 
Officer system and the substantial expansion of the network of advisory 
committees (Cheung and Louie 2000:64). The Government also took 
initiatives to improve relations with the public and the media. Subsequently, 
the focus of the press shifted from Chinese politics to the local community 
by providing greater coverage of local news. A group of popular-centrist 
newspapers also emerged and quickly occupied a centrifugal position in the 
market in the 1970s (Kuan and Lau 1999: 280; Lee 2000: 292). Those 
centrist papers, represented by the Sing Pao Daily News (SPDN), the Ming 
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Pao Daily News (MPDN) and the South China Morning Post (SCMP) were 
usually pro-Hong Kong, supporting social stability and prosperity (So and 
Chan 1999:10). Since then, the left-centre-right political spectrum of the 
press was formed in Hong Kong. 
 
Since the rise of the problem of Hong Kong’s future in the mid-
1980s, both the British Hong Kong Administration and the PRC authorities 
had adopted a policy of co-optation to gain the support of the local media. 
The PRC authorities, through politicians, agents and other information 
sources, offered trips to the mainland and invitations to insider briefings to 
proprietors and heads of news desks. The colonial government also gave 
special honors to news proprietors and senior journalists. At the same time, 
the newspapers increasingly focused on local affairs, particularly the 
centrist-popular press while the partisan newspapers were further 
marginalised (Lai 2007:10; 14-5). Nevertheless, the left-centre-right 
spectrum of the press basically remained unchanged at that time. 
 
At this time, most family owned newspapers underwent changes: 
incorporation and extension to non-media businesses. These diversified 
family run businesses also extended into various markets including 
mainland China. Since entry to the mainland market was highly restricted 
by the government, the newspaper owners avoided criticising the PRC 
authorities in order to secure investment on the mainland (Fung 2003: 197-
8).  
 
In addition, the press market in Hong Kong was isolated from free 
competition, pre-stipulated and structured by the three best selling centrist-
popular-centrist newspapers, namely the Oriental Daily News (ODN), the 
SPDN and the Tin Tin Daily News (TTDN), which together had two-thirds 
of the market and half of the total advertising profit. These newspapers, 
alongside other newspapers and distribution agents, established the Joint 
Newspaper Society of Hong Kong, which constituted a cartel to regulate 
their retail prices, sharing their advertising profits, dividing and targeting 
different niche markets. Under the shelter of the cartel, the market was 
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highly segmented and stable as the newspapers competed in concert with 
each other (Fung 2003:193-6). 
 
However, this stable market was upset in mid-1995 when Jimmy Lai, 
the owner of Next Media Group, launched a popular newspaper, the Apple 
Daily News (ADN) which successfully attracted readers with its eye-
catching graphic design, gossip, sex and crime-related stories and relatively 
low selling price. As a result, the newspaper soon built up a daily circulation 
of 300 thousand and cut into the leading positions of the ODN and other 
popular papers. In response to this, other newspapers, including leading 
ones, became engaged in a price war. In this case, the cartel was broken. 
Although the price war led to an overall increase in newspaper circulations, 
newspapers’ profits fell dramatically. Newspapers also modified their 
layouts in order to mimic the ADN’s format which required huge capital 
expenditure. In 1996, the price war was stopped when all newspapers, 
including the ADN raised their prices to their original levels although some 
papers occasionally offered special prices. However, only the capital rich 
newspapers survived, while several publications, including some rightist 
papers, with low circulations, closed down (Fung 2003:207-10).  
 
This price war not only promoted free competition in the press 
market, but also changed the political spectrum of the press. Some previous 
studies consider the ADN as a ‘pro-Hong Kong’ centrist paper (Chan and 
So 2000:255) or liberal pro-Hong Kong paper (Chan and So 1999:14). 
However, Jimmy Lai is well-known for his anti-Communist stance. Treating 
political agenda and anti-Communist feeling as salable items, the ADN took 
advantage of the weaknesses of its competitors, which had been recoiling 
from confronting Beijing. The ADN also supported the pro-democrat camp 
and criticised some other politicians and business tycoons (Lee 2000:306-7). 
After 1997, the ADN became even more critical of the SAR Administration 
and the CE, Tung Chi-hwa (Lee 2004: 222). Thus, in this study, the ADN is 
regarded as a pro-democrat paper. At the same time, after 1997, the PRC 
authorities continued their co-optation policy. For example, the owners of 
the ODN and the STDN were appointed as the members of National 
Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
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Since then, these centrist papers have become relatively conservative, 
avoiding clashes with the PRC Government, although they have not become 
markedly pro-Beijing or pro-Government.  
 
From this perspective, since the rightist newspapers faded away after 
the price war, the left-centre-right group within the press has been replaced 
by the pro-Beijing (or pro-Government)-centrist-pro-democrat classification. 
As mentioned above, a political spectrum of pro-Beijing-pro-democracy has 
formed in Hong Kong since the late 1980s. In this sense, since the launch of 
the ADN, the structure of the press system has again paralleled that of the 
political spectrum.  
 
 
3.3 Organisational Influence on News Framing  
It can be argued that journalists uphold ‘professional ethics’. 
According to the joint code of professional ethics promulgated in June 2000 
by four major journalists’ associations 16 , freedom of speech is a basic 
human right. As an integral part of freedom of speech, press freedom should 
be upheld by journalists. They should stand up to political pressures or 
financial inducements and not succumb to self-censorship. Owners and 
executives, especially of media organisations, also have the responsibility to 
encourage and require staff to adhere to these principles17.  
 
In this sense, despite the political standpoints of news organisations, 
journalists may decide on news framing according to their values and their 
‘professional code’. This argument is supported by a survey carried out in 
2001. According to this survey, about 79% of journalists believe that it is 
important for the media to monitor the government, while 78% claim that it 
is important for the media to  be the mouthpiece of the people (Chan and So 
2003: 259-61). As Chan and Lee (2007:158-9) suggest, the survey shows 
that most journalists hold a liberal-democratic conception of the press which 
                                               
16 The four major journalists’ associations are the Hong Kong News Executives' 
Association (HKNEA), the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists (HKFJ), Hong Kong 
Journalists Association (HKJA) and Hong Kong Press Photographers Association 
(HKPPA). 
17 Website of the Hong Kong Press Council: www.presscouncil.org.hk 
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emphasises a watchdog function of the media in monitoring political leaders 
and other power holders.      
 
However, news coverage is not the result of journalists’ personal 
preferences. Rather, news media are based on large, multitiered 
organisations in which top editors and producers fashion, edit, release news 
story as they see fit. Thus, journalists have to learn to write compelling 
stories that get published or broadcast (Sparrow 1999: 103-37). In this case, 
journalists have to adopt the norms of their organisatoins. This 
organisational influence is supported by interviews with four journalists 
working for three selected newspapers, namely the MPDN, the ODN and 
the ADN. According to all four journalists, when they decide on framing 
news articles, the chief considerations are ‘news values’ which refer to the 
latest developments of issues, the impact on people, human interest and 
moral and political values. In most cases, the mid-level management and 
front-line journalists decide on the framing of news stories on their own. 
Top level management, including chief editors, deputy chief editors as well 
as newspaper owners, seldom interferes with mid-level and front-line 
journalists’ judgments (interview with Journalist A on 29 January 2008; 
Journalist B on 30 January 2008; Journalist C on 30 January 2008, and 
Journalist D on 10 February 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the degree of this autonomy depends on two factors, 
namely the significance of particular news issues, and the political stance 
and culture of specific organisations. If an issue is controversial or 
associated with the newspapers’ standpoints, top management will play 
particular attention to news framing, giving instructions and deciding on the 
quantity and the tone of relevant news articles. Sometimes, journalists are 
ordered to rewrite their articles in order to meet these requirements (ibid).    
 
At the same time, journalists do not simply follow the instructions 
from top level management. Rather, they search out a space where they can 
insist on presenting their own views. As far as such matters are concerned, 
organisational culture is crucial. In some newspapers such as the MPDN, 
according to Journalist A and D, disagreement among front-line journalists 
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and top management is not unusual. At times, frontline journalists follow 
the instructions of their bosses while at other times top management follows 
the advice of their subordinates. On the other hand, according to journalists 
A, B and C, in some newspapers, top management plays a decisive role in 
most cases. Sometimes, the newspaper owners even revise the news titles on 
their own, giving very clear instructions via mid-level management to 
support some areas of policy or criticise particular politicians. In these 
circumstances, the tone of news coverage is mainly decided by top 
management (ibid). 
 
The other consideration affecting news framing is market pressure. 
Although journalists seldom have direct contact with their readers, all the 
four journalists claimed that they always take account of target readers’ 
preferences. Journalist A and B claimed that the ODN readers were mainly 
from the grassroots. Thus, their articles are usually short, clear and shallow. 
Political stance, however, is seldom considered if no instructions are issued 
by the top level. Readers of the ADN, according to journalist C, are 
relatively young, well-educated and pro-democrat. In this case, coverage 
usually supports pro-democrat politicians and their movements although the 
paper intends to run short, straightforward articles (ibid.). 
 
The tension between front-line journalists and top management is 
further supported by interviews with politicians. Politicians such as Chan 
Yuen-han (interview on 23 May 2007), Choy So-Yuk (interview on 21 May 
2007), Selina Chow (interview on 16 January 2008), Jasper Tsang 
(interview on 17 January 2008), Tam Yiu-chung (interview on 16 January 
2008) said that coverage was beyond their expectations thought they 
believed that frontline journalists understood and accepted their views. A 
typical example is the inconsistency between news text and title. In such 
cases, politicians felt that news articles reflected their views accurately 
while the title was framed in a completely different way. Although this 
could be the result of technical errors, politicians believed that the views of 
top management and editors were crucial in some cases.  
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Taking all of these factors into account, despite professional ethics 
and journalists’ own values, frontline journalists do not always decide on 
news framing independently. Rather, the top management of news 
organisation plays a crucial role in the formulation of news framing, 
particularly when an issue is under debate or relevant to the organisations’ 
own views. Journalists also consider the newspaper’s target readers when 
they make decisions on the journalistic style of news articles. In this sense, 
the market positions of newspapers and the political stances of organisations 
are both crucial to news framing.  
 
3.4 Summary  
In short, the development of the press system in Hong Kong 
basically parallels that of the political spectrum in society. When the pro-
democrat parties emerged and the pro-KMT groups faded away in the 1990s, 
the pro-democrat paper, the ADN successfully entered the market and the 
pro-KMT press closed down. The left-centre-right spectrum of the press was 
replaced by the pro-Beijing – centrist – pro-democracy paradigm.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence to show that the market positions and 
political stances of newspaper companies are crucial factors affecting news 
framing particularly when an issue is under debate and related to the 
newspaper company’s views. Thus, it is expected that news framing varies 
between newspapers with different market positions and political stances.  
 
 94 
Chapter 5 
Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
 
1. Introduction 
Drawing on insights from previous studies, in this chapter, I put 
forward a conceptual framework which incorporates various elements of 
public policy theories into Robinson’s (2002) CNN effect model. According 
to this framework, the media’s influence on policy is specific to a series of 
conditions, namely news framing, the consistency in framing among media 
outlets, and policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage. 
In addition, I suggest examining several factors, including long-term and 
short-term public views on the Administration and its policy, institutional 
context of policy, and policymakers’ beliefs and strategies.  
 
In order to test the hypotheses of this framework, I define the 
hypothesised conditions of media effect, and then propose some research 
methods, namely framing analysis, in-depth interviews, process tracing and 
comparison across cases. Data derived from these methods is triangulated in 
order to ensure the validity of the findings. Finally, the criteria for the 
selection of the media outlets and case studies are discussed. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework  
This thesis hypothesises that news coverage of government policies 
or proposals can influence public opinion, and place pressure on the 
policymakers. Consequently, government’s actions or policies can be 
changed. However, the level of media pressure is associated with several 
factors. Two of these factors were borrowed from Robinson’s (2002) CNN 
effect model. First, media pressure on policymakers is significant only when 
news framing is critical of the policy under debate. By contrast, policy is 
unlikely to be influenced when news framing is supportive or mixed. 
Second, in an elite debate, the media can pick up on and magnify the ideas 
of particular groups. In this case, the media run critical coverage of 
government policy, triggering policy change. In other words, media 
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influence is likely to occur only when there is a relatively low level of 
policy certainty measured by elite consensus. By contrast, when there is a 
high level of policy certainty measured by elite consensus over an issue, 
policymakers will try their best to promote their ideas. Thus, media 
coverage tends to follow official policy. In Robinson’s (2002:14-15) words, 
there is a two-way interaction in which the media and the policymakers may 
influence each other. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, some studies of war policy (Entman and 
Page, 1994; Althaus, 2003) suggest distinguishing between substantive and 
procedural criticisms. However, I argue that this classification is not 
appropriate for this study for two reasons. Firstly, due to the complexity of 
domestic policy debates, the borderline between substance and procedural 
criticisms is unclear. For example, in the case of Article 23, although 
criticisms rarely challenged the administration’s goals for national security, 
media coverage described the government’s proposal as a ‘draconian law’. 
Similarly, during the debate on Goods and Services Tax (GST), news 
coverage rarely questioned the narrow tax base problem. However, the 
coverage completely opposed the introduction of the new tax. In the cases of 
Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII) and the old Star Ferry Pier (OSFP), 
the situations were even more complicated as there were a few subjects 
under debate at the same time. On the one hand, critical coverage 
emphasised the administration’s inadequate level of consultation, rarely 
challenging the need for resolving traffic congestion. These criticisms 
seemed to be procedural. On the other hand, the criticisms presented 
fundamental a challenge to existing town planning policy and consultation 
mechanisms. Thus, these criticisms were substantive. In this sense, it is 
difficult to distinguish between substantive and procedural criticisms.  
 
Secondly, this study finds that policymakers’ understanding of 
critical coverage is usually much more complex than the procedural-
substantive classification. For example, during the debate on Article 23 
legislation, some critical coverage focused on the inadequate level of 
consultation of the government’s proposal, urging the administration to 
launch re-consultation by issuing a white bill. From these perspectives, 
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these criticisms were procedural rather than substantive. However, the 
administration felt that the media tended to topple legislative plans 
(interview with Cheng Yiu-Tong on 2 January 2008) and that the 
opponents’ arguments were merely strategies to play for time and magnify 
the voices opposing legislative plans 1 . In the case of the OSFP, the 
administration also doubted that the opponents had initiated the campaign 
against the government project because they hoped to attack the 
administration before the Chief Executive election (interview with a 
government official requesting anonymity on 22 January 2008). From these 
perspectives, the substantive-procedural classification may over-simplify the 
context of the domestic policy debate. The validity of this classification is 
thus problematic.  
 
The third hypothesised factor of media influence is policy certainty 
measured by policy stage. This factor is developed from Robinson’s idea 
that policy uncertainty can be defined by the absence of policy or wavering 
of policy (ibid: 26-7; 135-6). I suggest that absence and wavering of policy 
are caused by the stages of policy. It is because the institutional contexts of 
policy vary from stage to stage. At a relatively early stage such as 
consultation and legislation, policy is uncertain because there is an 
opportunity for politicians and the public to express their views on policy. 
Thus, it is relatively easy for critical coverage to put pressure on 
policymakers, triggering policy change. There is also room for the 
Administration to adjust the policy at relatively low fiscal and political costs. 
By contrast, policy becomes relatively certain when it has been endorsed by 
the Legco or is being implemented. In this case, there is no official channel 
for legislators to influence late-stage policy. Moreover, since adjustment of 
existing policy may affect other relevant policies, the fiscal and political 
costs of change are relatively high.  
 
In addition, some researchers, such as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
play down the possibility and influence of divided framing among different 
media. However, it is dangerous to assume that different media always 
frame an issue in the same way. According to Hallin and Mancini 
                                               
1 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
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(2004:208), although partisan papers are not common in the U.S, many 
American newspapers have relatively consistent political orientations as 
shown in their editorial stances. A previous study also shows that American 
newspapers tend to allocate more resources on news coverage that is 
consistent with their editorial policy (Nacos, 1990 cited in Hallin and 
Mancini 2004: 208). In this case, inconsistency in news framing among 
media outlets with different political stances is possible during a policy 
debate.  
 
Therefore, I hypothesise that media influence is associated with 
media consensus on negative framing, which refers to consistency in 
framing among different media outlets. This hypothesis is based on Entman 
(2000:21-2) and Kull and Ramsay’s (2000:105) findings that members of 
the Senior Executive Service and other policymakers tend to get a sense of 
public opinion from the media. Thus, when all the media outlets with 
different political stances and market positions run critical coverage of a 
particular issue simultaneously, policymakers will perceive a high level of 
public pressure.. In this case, it is relatively easy for news coverage to 
trigger policy change. By contrast, when news framing is inconsistent 
among different media outlets, policymakers will perceive mixed or divided 
public opinion. Thus, media effect on policy is limited.    
 
In addition to these hypothesised factors, I draw some insights from 
existing public policy theories. The first of these is policy image according 
to Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated equilibrium model. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, policy image refers to the public 
understanding of a particular policy or issue. According to Baumgartner and 
Jones, when there is a negative image of an existing policy, any criticisms 
can easily be magnified by the opponents. Following this argument, I 
hypothesise that government officials become particularly sensitive to 
negative coverage when there is a long-term negative image of an issue 
which has existed for years before the policy debate. Otherwise, opponents 
will take the opportunity to magnify their voices in order to attack 
government policy.   
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According to Baumgartner and Jones, policy image is not an 
independent variable. Rather, it is changed by the shifting attention of the 
media (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:50, 103). In this sense, policy image is 
a dependent of the tone of media coverage in the long run. However, this 
study mainly focuses on short-term media effect on policy over a period of 
months. Thus, I suggest that long-term policy image can be considered to be 
an independent variable in a short-term policy debate. 
 
In addition to the long-term image, two kinds of short-term public 
opinion in a policy debate are examined. The first one is government 
popularity, which relates to public attitudes towards the government during 
a policy debate. The second is the public’s attitude towards the policy or 
issue under debate. I hypothesise that policymakers become relatively 
sensitive to critical coverage where there are unfavourable public attitudes 
towards either the Government or its policy. Similar to long-term policy 
image, short-term public views during policy debates are not independent 
variables. Rather, these views can be influenced by numerous factors such 
as news coverage, the economy and political events. Policymakers also try 
to influence public views by all means. In this case, public views may 
fluctuate during policy debates. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
policymakers proactively monitor these two kinds of public views during a 
policy debate. When any one of these views is unfavourable at a particular 
time, the Administration and the pro-government camp will become 
relatively sensitive to the criticisms, including those by the media, in order 
to avoid being further attacked. Otherwise, politicians will be punished by 
their voters at elections.   
 
Although this study aims to examine the media’s influence on policy, 
it is dangerous to assume that all changes in policy are triggered by news 
coverage. In order to avoid overstating the importance of media coverage, I 
suggest examining several factors of policy change. The first one is 
policymakers’ ideas and beliefs. Beliefs refer not only to values and 
understandings of an issue, but also to political tendency. This factor is 
examined because the data derived from interviews with policymakers 
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shows that belief is the chief consideration of most policymakers during 
policy debates. This point will be returned to later in the thesis. 
 
Previous studies also demonstrate the significant role of beliefs in 
the policy process. For example, according to Sabatier’s Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, political actors achieve their objectives in the policy 
process. Thus, policy can be conceptualised in the same way as a belief 
system, ‘including value priorities, perceptions of important causal 
relationships, perceptions of world state, perceptions of the efficacy of 
policy instruments’ (Sabatier 1988:131-2). Shared beliefs not only provide 
the principal ‘glue’ allying political actors within a policy subsystem2, but 
also determine the direction in which the subsystem will seek to move 
governmental programmes (ibid:141-3). In other words, beliefs not only 
determine the direction of actors’ actions, but also enable cooperation 
among actors from various sectors.   
 
The other factor to be considered is institution. As new 
institutionalism suggests, institution refers not only to formal rules and 
compliance procedures, but also operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy 
(Hall, 1986:19). However, political actors are not simply constrained by 
institutional factors. Rather, according to institutional rational choice theory, 
actors usually act tactically in order to maxmise payoffs within their 
institutional positions (John, 1998:125-6). Thus, the strategies of 
policymakers in different institutional positions are examined.   
 
In short, this thesis hypothesises that the media may influence policy 
process only under particular conditions, including substantial critical news 
coverage, a high level of media consensus on framing, a relatively low level 
of policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage. Moreover, 
when short-term or long-term public attitudes towards government and its 
                                               
2 Sabatier suggests that the most useful aggregate unit of analysis for understanding policy 
change is a policy subsystem, which is the coalition of actors from a various public and 
private sectors who are actively concerned with an issue. A policy subsystem includes 
actors at various levels of government active in policy formulation and implementation, as 
well as journalists, researchers, and policy analysts (Sabatier 1988:131). 
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policy remain unfavourable, the government will become relatively 
sensitive to critical coverage. Media influence will be enhanced in this case. 
In addition to media effect, I suggest examining several possible factors 
affecting policy, including institutions and policymakers’ beliefs and 
strategies.   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Defining Variables 
In order to test the hypotheses of this study, it is necessary to define 
the factors or variables of the conceptual framework and the approach to 
measuring. The classification and measuring approaches of these variables 
are summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
3.1.1 Policy Change 
The first variable is policy change. In his study of the CNN effect, 
Robinson recognises that policy outcome can be classified into low change 
(air power) and high cost (ground troops) changes. However, in his study of 
US military interventions in cases of humanitarian crisis, the policy 
outcomes are basically considered to be action and inaction (Robinson 
2002:121-6). In the case of domestic policy changes, however, there are 
many kinds of policy outcome. For example, as Baumgartner and Jones 
suggest, policy change can be classified as change in the agenda of policy 
making institutes, such as parliament and government committees, 
alternations in structure of policy making, expenditure patterns and changes 
in activities, including the routine operations of government agencies and 
officials (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:54). 
 
Following the definition by Baumgartner and Jones, I relate policy 
change to actual changes in the actions of government and policymakers. In 
addition, I suggest that policy change can be classified into two major 
categories according to the fiscal and political costs involved. Changes to 
the agenda of the government, the Legislative Council (Legco) and other 
policymaking bodies usually involve limited fiscal and political costs. Thus, 
these are considered to be low cost changes. Sometimes, the Legco also 
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passes a motion for or against a government policy. Although pressure on 
the Administration may be created, such motions have no legal force. Thus, 
they are also considered to be low cost changes. By contrast, some policy 
changes involve relatively high fiscal and political costs. Such initiatives 
include changes in routine operations and agency budgets, alternation of 
policymaking structures, and the amendment and withdrawal of government 
policy and proposals. In this study, policy change is traced by studying 
government and parliamentary documents as well as news materials. 
 
Table 5.1: Approaches for Measuring Variables and Factors 
Variable/factor Classification Approach to 
Measuring 
Policy change  Low Cost change 
o Agenda change 
o Motions passed by Legco 
 High cost change 
o Routine action change 
o Budgetary change 
o Withdrawal/amendment of 
official policy/proposal 
o Alternation of policy 
making  structures  
 Textual analysis of 
government & 
parliamentary documents 
as well as news materials  
Media Framing  Supportive or Critical or 
Neutral 
 News article and 
keyword count 
Policy certainty 
measured by elite 
consensus 
 High or Low  Comparative approach 
Policy certainty 
measured by 
policy stage 
 High or Low  Comparative approach 
Media consensus  High or Low  Comparative approach 
Long-term policy 
image 
 Positive or negative  In-depth interviews with 
politicians 
 Textual analysis of 
official’s speeches 
Short-term 
government 
popularity 
 High or Low  Survey data of 
independent institutes 
Short-term public 
attitude toward 
government policy 
 Positive or Negative  In-depth interview with 
politicians 
 Survey data of various 
parties  
 
However, some actions of the government and the Legco are not 
considered to be policy changes. Such actions include legal proceedings and 
the implementation of government decisions. Also, press and verbal 
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statements involving no actual actions of the government are not considered 
to be policy changes. 
 
3.1.2 Media Framing 
The definition and approach to studying news framing have been 
adapted from those found in Robinson’s (2002) study. In this study, there 
are three basic kinds of news framing:  
 Supportive or positive framing refers to the way in which 
government policies or proposals are supported while the role of 
opposition is downplayed. 
 Critical or negative framing refers to a narrative in favour of 
opinions expressed against government policy or proposals being 
emphasised while supportive voices are marginalised. 
 Neutral or descriptive framing is the narrative in which supportive 
and critical voices are balanced. Descriptive narratives concerning 
technical or procedural issues are also considered to be neutrally 
framed.  
 
In this study, media framing is analysed through a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of news coverage. News articles 
concerned and keywords in those articles from the selected media outlets are 
searched and then coded according to different framings. The overall 
framing of news coverage is determined from the combined results of the 
article and keyword counts. 
 
In each case study, a coding frame for the article count was designed 
according to the arguments put forward by the proponents and opponents of 
government policy. The framing of coverage can be determined only if at 
least half of articles are coded with a particular frame. Otherwise, the 
framing is considered to be mixed. Similarly, a keyword list is developed 
according to words related to positive and negative framing. News framing 
is determined only if the keywords related to a particular framing outnumber 
those of the other framing. The overall framing of the coverage is 
determined only if the result of the article count is consistent with that of the 
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keyword count. Otherwise, the overall tone of the coverage is considered to 
be mixed.  
 
This approach to measure framing is different from the commonly 
used bi-coder approach. In traditional content analysis, coding is done by 
different researchers separately or by an individual coder over time. The two 
sets of data are then tested by statistical reliability tests in order to confirm 
the reliability of the framing analysis (Hansen et al., 1998:120-1). However, 
as Robinson suggests, even if a dual coder liability test is carried out, the 
precise criteria by which coders reach their consensus remain opaque. By 
contrast, for keyword count, the exact criteria are clearly stated in specific 
keywords (Robinson 2002:138-9). 
 
News articles and editorials of selected newspapers are searched on 
Wisers3, a commercial online database of news articles in Greater China, 
using keywords associated with the debate. The sample period is basically 
defined by the duration of the controversy. The keywords used in the article 
search, the exact sampling period, and the coding framing and keyword list 
are designed for a particular policy debate. Thus, these criteria are specified 
in the analysis of each case study. 
 
Some articles containing the keywords in an article search may be 
irrelevant to the issue. It is hard to image that policymakers take these 
articles into account during a policy debate. In this case, only the texts 
containing at least one paragraph concerning the issues are counted while 
the irrelevant articles are screened off. It is also possible that at times 
selected keywords are used in the narratives which are irrelevant to the issue 
under debate. In order to avoid contamination of the findings, only the 
keywords used in relation to the debate are counted. Those used to refer to 
irrelevant issues are excluded. 
 
It is also hard to imagine that the level of media pressure on 
policymakers is high enough to influence policy if critical coverage remains 
                                               
3 Website of Wisers Information Limited: 
http://www.wisers.com/corpsite/global/en/home/index.html 
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scattered and intermittent. As Robinson suggests, a reasonable benchmark is 
a three or four day period in which there are at least one front-page 
newspaper story per day and a major news segment in the evening television 
news (Robinson 2002: 37-8). Thus, this study assumes that the level of 
media pressure is high enough to influence policy only if there is a 
continuous period of no less than three days in which  each of the selected 
media outlets runs at least one article per day. Intermittent coverage, on the 
other hand, is not considered to be influential. It is possible that there is an 
interruption between two continuous periods of coverage. If this interruption 
lasts for less than three days, I suggest that these two continuous periods can 
be considered as one period. 
 
3.1.3 Media Consensus 
There is a possibility that different media may frame issues in 
different ways. For this reason, I suggest considering the concept of media 
consensus which refers to the level of consistency in news framing among 
different media. In this study, media consensus is measured by a 
comparative approach. In order to examine the influence of media 
consensus, cases with different levels of media consensus are compared in 
this study. 
 
3.1.4 Policy Certainty Measured by Elite Consensus 
In this study, policy certainty is defined as the level of consensus 
among policy sub-systems and political actors. Due to the large number of 
groups and actors involved in a domestic policy community, absolute 
consensus in society is rarely found. Moreover, as former DAB Chairman 
Jasper Tsang (TsangYok-sing) claims, the pro-government camp, as the 
opposition, usually presumes that there are problems with the government’s 
proposals (interview on 17 January 2008). In this case, it is not unusual to 
find that the pro-democrat camp criticises government policy or proposal. 
 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the pro-government camp has 
been in the majority at the Legco since 1997. Regardless of the democrats’ 
criticisms, government policy can be endorsed with the support of the pro-
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government camp in most circumstances. Thus, I suggest that elite 
consensus is considered to be high when there is a high level of consensus 
between the Administration and a majority of the pro-government camp. By 
contrast, when there is a debate between the Administration and the pro-
government parties, elite consensus is considered to be low.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, because of the diverse backgrounds of 
the pro-government parties, it is not surprising that some pro-government 
politicians oppose government policy in some cases. Thus, I suggest a 
comparative approach in which cases with different levels of elite consensus 
are compared.  
 
3.1.5 Policy Certainty Measured by Policy Stage 
As Hogwood and Gunn (1984) argue, it is dangerous to assume a 
clearly defined sequence of the policy stage because ‘policy is often a 
seamless web involving a bewildering mesh of interactions and 
ramifications’. Policy stages are not completely self-contained. The policy 
process frequently ‘loops’ between stages. However, Hogwood and Gunn 
suggest that the process framework can be used as at least a way into the 
analysis of policy, provided that the limitations of the model are borne in 
mind (ibid: 10, 26). Thus, I argue that policy stage provides a useful 
measurement of policy certainty.  
 
As mentioned above, there is no official channel by which the Legco 
and other groups can change a policy when it has been endorsed by the 
Legco. The certainty of this late stage policy is considered to be high. On 
the contrary, early stage policy refers to a policy under consultation, 
legislation or evaluation. At these early stages, there are opportunities for 
legislators and other groups to criticise and amend the policy through 
official channels, such as public consultation and scrutiny of legislative 
proposals. In this case, early stage policy is considered to be relatively 
uncertain. In this study, cases with these two policy stages are compared in 
order to demonstrate media effect on policy at different stages. 
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3.1.6 Long-term Policy Image 
As mentioned above, long-term policy image refers to long-term 
public understanding of a particular policy or issue, which has pre-existed 
for at least a few years before the commencement of the debate. When there 
is a generally unfavourable public perception of a particular policy, negative 
policy image exists. In this case, I hypothesise that media influence is 
enhanced. There is also the possibility that an issue is completely ignored by 
policymakers, the public and the media. In this case, no policy image exists. 
Thus, both the proponents and opponents are relatively free to define the 
image of an issue. Media influence is neither enhanced nor weakened.  
 
In Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) study, policy image is based on 
the long-term framing analysis of news articles over a number of years. Due 
to the problems of availability of news materials and time limitations, it will 
be impossible to conduct such a long-term analysis for this study. However, 
it is possible to study policymakers’ perceptions of long-term policy image 
through in-depth interviews and textual analysis of official statements and 
news materials. 
 
3.1.7 Short-term Public Attitudes towards Policy  
Different from long-term policy image which pre-exists before a 
controversy arises, short-term public attitudes towards policy refer to public 
views on the policy during a debate. Although the Administration usually 
conducts opinion polls during a policy debate (off the record briefing by an 
official on 23 January 2008), the data is not published. Also, independent 
institutes seldom conduct opinion polls for a particular policy debate. In this 
case, the only available data sources of short-term public views on a 
particular issue are surveys carried out by political parties. However, not all 
of these survey results are published. Thus, some data is also obtained from 
in-depth interviews with politicians.  
 
3.1.8 Short-term Government Popularity 
Short-term government popularity refers to the level of short-term 
public satisfaction with the government during a policy debate. This 
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satisfaction rate can be measured by the data from regular surveys 
conducted by independent institutes, including the Public Opinion 
Programme (POP) of the University of Hong Kong. However, it is difficult 
to define an objective standard for high and low level of popularity. Thus, 
popularity is measured through a comparative approach in which cases with 
different levels of government popularity are compared.  
 
3.2 Testing the Hypothesis 
3.2.1 Process Tracing 
Livingston (1997) and Robinson (2002) demonstrate that process 
tracing is an important screening test for the media effect on policy. If 
changes in policy or policymakers’ decisions precede critical news coverage, 
media effect can be eliminated. By contrast, if there is policy change 
subsequent to substantial critical coverage, media influence on policy is 
possible. In this study, the chronologies of cases are established in order to 
the trace the time sequences of changes in all the variables mentioned above. 
This process tracing is mainly done by examining statements by government 
officials and politicians, documents of the Legco and government 
committees and news materials.  
 
3.2.2 In-depth Interviews 
In addition to framing analysis and textual analysis, I will carry out 
in-depth interviews with government officials, Legco and Exco members, 
journalists and other political actors. There are two objectives for the 
interviews. First, the process tracing of the developments of the selected 
cases is limited by the availability of raw materials. In this case, in-depth 
interviews with elites can help in interpreting documents and the 
personalities involved in the relevant decisions. Also, elites at times can 
help to explain the outcome of events and provide information not recorded 
elsewhere (Richards, 1996:200) even though these interpretations may be 
biased and unsystematic. In other words, in-depth interviews can help gain 
an understanding of the development of policy debate.  
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Second, the objective of elite interview is not to establish ‘the truth’. 
Rather, its function is to explore the key actor’s mind-set, including 
perceptions, beliefs and ideologies in policy making and selected cases 
(Richards, 1996:199-200). As the discussion during interview flows 
naturally, it is possible to understand the logic of an interviewee’s 
arguments and the associative thinking that led them to a particular 
conclusion (Devine, 1995:138). In this case, in-depth interviews can help 
explore policymakers’ considerations and their perceptions and uses of the 
media in policy making.   
 
In this study, elite interviews are carried out using a semi-structured 
approach. An interview guide with a list of open-ended questions is used to 
ensure that specific issues can be addressed. Questions that are not included 
in the guide may be asked if I pick up on things mentioned by interviewees. 
As Bryman (2001:314-5) suggests, semi-structure not only provides the 
interviewee a great deal of freedom in how to reply, but also ensures cross-
case comparability by the structured guide. This sort of interview is 
particularly useful when there are fairly clear focuses in the study. 
 
Nevertheless, qualitative interviews have shortcomings. One of the 
limitations is the issue of unrepresentative sampling (Richards, 1996:200). 
In order to address this problem, only key actors who played an important 
role in selected cases are invited for interview. Such people include officials 
managing relevant policy areas, Exco members and party leaders, party 
spokespersons on the relevant policy, as well as other people playing an 
active role. In order to study the influential factors for news framing of the 
selected newspapers, experienced journalists working at the frontline or in 
mid-level management are invited for interview.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I have designed two 
interview guides. The detailed guides are provided in Appendix 4 and 5. 
The first one is for interviews with policymakers, including government 
officials, legislators and Exco members. This guide is in two parts. The first 
covers general issues regarding policy making and the use of media as 
follows.    
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1. What are your considerations during policy making or policy debate? 
2. How do you get to know news coverage? 
3. Which media outlets do you use most?  
4. In your experience, is there any case where your decision or your party’s 
decision was influenced by media coverage? 
 
The second part focuses on specific issues regarding the 
interviewee’s role in the selected cases. The case-specific questions are 
designed to fit in with the institutional positions of the policymakers.   
 
The second guide is designed for the interviews with journalists in 
order to study the roles of journalists and news organisations in news 
production, and journalists’ perceptions of media effect on policy. The four 
basic questions are listed as follows:   
1. How do you decide on the framing of news articles?  
2. What is the role of news organisations in news production?  
3. Do you get feedback from policymakers? 
4. Do you expect that policymakers consider the comments highlighted in 
your articles?  
 
Because of incomplete or incorrect memory, the reliability of the 
interviewee is sometimes questionable (Richards, 1996:200). This problem 
is particularly significant as far as case-specific questions are concerned. 
Moreover, some interviewees may, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
disclose their ideas selectively in order to maintain their public image. For 
example, some policymakers may deny the media’s influence on themselves 
in order to stress their independent thinking. In order to ensure the reliability 
of interview results, the data derived from in-depth interview is triangulated 
with data from other sources such as official documents and news materials. 
 
3.2.3 Focused Comparisons across Cases 
As mentioned above, some variables in media influence are 
measured through a comparative approach. As Mackie and Marsh (1995: 
173-6) conclude, comparative analysis is essential for two reasons. First, 
comparative analysis helps researchers avoid ethnocentrism, which refers to 
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overemphasis of the generality of a single case. Second, a comparative study 
plays an important role in testing concepts across time and space, and 
subsequently developing theories and hypotheses.  
 
In order to examine the hypothesised conditions for media effect, it 
is necessary to apply a variable-oriented approach which aims to examine 
the relationship between factors across a serious of cases (Hague et al 
1992:273). Thus, I employ what Hague et al (1992:280-2) called a ‘focused 
comparison’ which concentrates on the intensive analysis of certain aspects 
across a small number of cases. However, it is difficult to control all the 
hypothesised variables in the real world. As Hague et al (ibid: 274-5) 
suggest, ‘comparison in political science can never become a full equivalent 
of the experiments in natural scientists’ laboratory.’ Thus, in this study, 
focused comparative analysis mainly considers policy changes, media 
framing, media consensus and policy certainty measured by elite consensus 
and policy stage. The criteria for case selection are also based on these 
variables.  
 
I also examine other hypothesised conditions of media effect, 
including long-term and short-term public attitudes towards the Government 
and its policies. Other factors affecting policy change, including institutions 
and policymakers’ strategy and beliefs, are tested by comparing the cases. 
However, because of the limited number of cases, the comparative study of 
these factors is relatively less systematic. 
 
3.2.3.1 Criteria for Case Selection 
In order to make a focused comparison across cases, a series of 
criteria are established to ensure that appropriate cases are selected. It is 
usually argued that media influence on policy is limited by the press’s short 
attention span (Kingdon 1995:58-9). As issues are given prominence for a 
short period of time, the pressure placed on policymakers may be limited. 
However, Robinson’s (2002) study shows that policy changes can be 
triggered as a result of media coverage sustained for weeks or months. This 
study assumes that the media effect on policy can be identified only if there 
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are substantial levels of news coverage of an issue. Thus, the first criterion 
for case selection is the quantity and duration of coverage. Only cases where 
the media ran substantial coverage of a particular issue for at least three 
days are selected. 
 
The second criterion for case selection is accessibility of news 
materials. In this study, news framing is examined by counting the relevant 
news articles and key words related to a particular type of framing. Thus, 
news articles from selected newspapers are searched. All early copies of 
major daily newspapers in Hong Kong are available in microfilm form at 
libraries. However, it is inefficient and fallible to search news articles and 
count keywords from microfilm. Rather, it is more convenient and reliable 
to search news stories from a computer database, and then to count the 
keywords from the softcopies of articles. The most comprehensive 
newspaper database in Hong Kong is provided by Wisers. However, the 
database did not cover all major Hong Kong newspapers until late 2001. In 
order to ensure that all the relevant articles can be searched, only the issues 
after late 2001 are selected. 
 
Moreover, this study asks whether the media’s influence on policy is 
conditional on a number of factors. Thus, the third, the most important 
criterion for case selection is that cases should cover the conditional factors 
of media influence, namely media consensus and policy certainty measured 
by elite consensus and policy stage.  
 
3.2.3.2 Selection of Cases 
According to the criteria mentioned above, four cases have been 
selected as shown in Table 5.2. The first two cases are the debates on the 
Central Reclamation Project Phase III (CR III) and the demolition of the old 
Star Ferry Pier (OSFP) in Central. These two development projects were 
under implementation during the controversies. At the same time, the pro-
government camp supported the Administration during the debate on these 
two cases. Thus, in terms both of the elite consensus and the policy stage, 
the certainty of these two projects remained high. Although the CR III 
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project and the OSFP were handled by the Tung Chi-hwa and Donald 
Tsang’s governments respectively, both projects were mainly managed by 
the Housing, Planning and Land Bureau (HPLB) of the Administration, and 
by the same main official, Michael Suen (Suen Ming-yeung) who was the 
Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands from July 2002 to June 2007. 
The major difference between these two projects was the level of media 
consensus. In the case of CRIII, only one of the selected newspapers 
criticised government policy while the framing of the other two newspapers 
remained mixed. By contrast, during the OSFP debate, all the selected 
newspapers criticised the government. Comparing these two cases, the 
influence of media consensus is examined. 
 
Table 5.2: Cases Selected for Comparative Study 
Cases (Time) Elite Consensus Policy 
Stage 
Media Consensus on 
Negative Tone 
Article 23  
(2002-03) 
High; became low 
subsequently 
Early Medium 
CR III (2003-04) High Late Low 
GST (2006) Low Early High 
OSFP (2006) High Late High 
 
The other case is the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) or the so-called ‘sales tax’, which has been discussed for years in 
Hong Kong. During the nine-month consultation on broadening tax base in 
2006, the possibility of introducing GST was highlighted by the 
Administration. Similar to the OSFP project, GST consultation was handled 
by Donald Tsang’s government and the Legco in the third term. In addition, 
all the selected newspapers criticised the Administration in both cases. In 
other words, the media consensus level remained high in both cases. 
However, there are two major differences between these two cases. First, 
both the pro-government and the pro-democrat camp opposed the GST 
proposal. Second, the idea of GST, as a proposal under consultation, was at 
an early stage. In this sense, in terms both of elite consensus and policy 
stage, the GST proposal was more uncertain than the OSFP project. Making 
a comparison between these two cases can help explore the importance of 
policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage.  
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The final case is the Legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law in 
2002 and 2003. In this case, the Administration proposed to enact national 
security laws. However, after a large-scale anti-government protest on 1 
July 2003, the Administration deferred legislative work, and subsequently 
withdrew the proposal. The case of Article 23 is selected for two reasons. 
Firstly, as with the cases of CRIII and OSFP, there was a high level of elite 
consensus during the Article 23 debate prior to 1 July 2003. However, as a 
policy proposal, the Article 23 proposal was more uncertain than CRIII and 
OSFP. Thus, the importance of the policy stage can be examined when 
comparing these cases.  
 
Second, after 1 July 2003, elite consensus on Article 23 declined 
dramatically. In this case, the Article 23, like the GST proposal, had a low 
level of policy certainty in terms both of elite consensus and policy stage. 
However, the media consensus on Article 23 was lower compared to that of 
the GST debate. Thus, the importance of media consensus can be tested 
when comparing these two cases. 
 
3.3 Selection of Media Outlets 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, for the general public, television is the 
most important source of news in Hong Kong4. It is also believed that the 
two free Chinese television channels are particularly important as the 
penetration rate of the cable television is relatively low5.  However, all the 
officials, legislators and Exco members interviewed claimed that they were 
too busy to watch the news broadcast by the free television channels. In 
addition, as mentioned above, the selection of sample media is based on the 
accessibility and availability of data. Although some news scripts from 
some broadcast media are available from Wisers, but this data is not 
comprehensive.  
                                               
4 According to a regular survey conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the 
University of Hong Kong, in the period between 1994 and 2008, the percentage of people 
claiming television was their main source of news remained higher than those who 
mentioned newspapers.  In 2008, for example, 34% and 30% of respondents claimed that 
their main sources of news were television and newspapers, respectively. 
(http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/press/main/yr/datatables.html) 
5 According to the Annual Report 2007 of the Cable Television Limited, there were about 
882 thousand subscribers (about 13% of total population) in 2007.  
(http://www.i-cablecomm.com/ir/annual/2007/07eng_businessR.pdf) 
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By contrast, from in-depth interviews with policymakers, 
newspapers are their major news sources. For example, Michael Suen 
claimed that he usually relied on two sets of news clippings prepared by 
support staff. One set covers all the articles concerning policy areas 
managed by their own Policy Bureau, while the other covers all the 
important issues raised by newspapers (interview on 22 January 2008). All 
the legislators interviewed claimed that they learned of news coverage 
mainly from the online service provided by Wisers which presents all the 
headlines, editorials, and news articles from all local daily newspapers. In 
addition, as mentioned above, since 2001, news articles of all the major 
local newspapers have been made available by Wiser.  
 
As the Wiser website lists all the news titles, policymakers usually 
select news articles according to titles rather than media outlets. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean all the papers have the same level of 
influence on policymakers. Of the fourteen Exco and Legco members 
interviewed, nine claimed that they paid relatively high attention to certain 
newspapers because of its political stance and market positions. This study 
assumes that media consensus is high only when there is a consistency in 
framing among media outlets with different market positions and political 
tendencies. Thus, three newspapers are selected for framing analysis 
according to their market positions and political stances.  
 
The first newspaper selected is the Oriental Daily News (ODN), the 
best selling newspaper with a circulation of over 1.6 million readers6. In 
terms of market position, the ODN is a popular newspaper or mass-
circulation press, whose readers are mainly grassroots and working class 
(interview with Journalist A on 29 January 2008 and Journalist B on 30 
January 2008). Some previous studies considered the ODN as a politically 
centrist paper as its relationship with the PRC Government was ambiguous. 
However, this newspaper is anxious not to offend Beijing (Lee 2000:305-6). 
In the period between 2003 and 2008, the owner of the ODN, C. K. Ma was 
                                               
6 A survey by AC Nelson in 2004, cited in Next Media Limited Annual Report 2004/05, 
page 2 
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also appointed as a member of National Committee of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the highest level consultative 
body of the PRC Government. Thus, in this study, the ODN is considered to 
be a popular pro-government newspaper, although sometimes it criticises 
the SAR Government and its policies. 
 
The other selected newspaper is the Apple Daily News (ADN) 
which is the second best selling newspaper with a circulation of over 1.2 
million readers7. Like the ODN, the ADN is a popular newspaper which 
treats the audience to vivid, vulgar, and sensational accounts of crime stories 
and daily titbits of soft pornography. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ADN 
and its owner Jimmy LAI have well-publicised anti-Communist stances. In 
this case, the ADN is considered as a popular pro-democrat newspaper. 
 
The Ming Pao Daily News (MPDN), the third selected newspaper, is 
different from the ODN and ADN in two respects. First, the MPDN is the 
best selling intellectual-oriented newspaper with 304 thousand readers8 , 
mainly professionals, intellectuals and middle class. Second, the MPDN is 
considered to be politically neutral. According to journalist A, the top 
management of the MPDN, including the Chief Editor and Deputy Chief 
Editors are slightly pro-democrat. However, they usually intend to 
demonstrate neutrality of coverage. Thus, the overall framing of the 
newspaper paper remains generally neutral (interview on 29 January 2008). 
Thus, the MPDN is considered to be an elitist centrist paper. 
 
These three newspapers have been selected not only because of their 
market positions and political stances, but also because nine of the Exco and 
Legco members interviewed paid particular attention to at least one of these 
papers (see Table 5.3). In this case, as far as policymakers are concerned, 
they are considered as the relatively influential papers. For example, Choy 
So-yuk of DAB claimed that she paid relatively high attention to the ODN 
and the MPDN because the ODN had the highest circulation in Hong Kong 
while most of the readers of the MPDN were middle class and intellectuals 
                                               
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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(interview on 21 May 2007). James To of DP claimed that he paid high 
attention to the ODN and ADN because of their high circulations. He also 
read the MPDN as he considered it as the most politically neutral paper 
(interview on 31 January 2008). 
 
Table 5.3: Politicians Who Pay Particular Attention to Some 
Newspapers 
Politicians MPDN ODN ADN Others 
Bernard Chan   √ - 
Selina Chow √ √ √ HKEJ, STDN 
Choy So-yuk √ √  - 
Kwok Ka-ki √  √ SCMP9, HKEJ 
Lee Wing-tat √ √ √ SCMP, STDN 
Alan Leong   √  
Sin Chung-kai √ √ √ HKEJ, STDN, 
HKET, ODN, SD 
Jasper Tsang √   SCMP, HKEJ, 
STDN 
James To √ √ √ SCMP, STDN 
 
Politicians also aim to read newspapers with different political 
stances in order to be informed of their opponents’ actions and different 
views in society. For example, Sin Chung-kai of DP said that the ADN, the 
MPDN and the Hong Kong Economic Journal (HKEJ) were his ‘must-read’ 
newspapers. Since most DP supporters read these newspapers, their views 
may be influenced by them. However, Sin also read the Hong Kong 
Economic Times (HKET), the Sing Tao Daily News (STDN), the ODN and 
the SUN Daily (SD). As those newspapers usually criticise DP, but he ought 
to read them in order to be informed of different views in society (interview 
on 11 November 2008). Lee Wing-tat of DP also claimed that he paid 
relatively high attention to the ODN and STDN as the views of these two 
newspapers usually contained different opinions from those of the pro-
democrat camp (interview on 23 January 2008). Tam Yiu-Chung of DAB 
also claimed that he learned of the opposition’s movements including their 
activities and arguments from the ADN (interview on 16 January 2008). 
 
The subject under debate may be referred to many different articles 
in newspapers. However, most Exco and Legco members interviewed 
                                               
9 South China Morning Post (SCMP) is the leading English newspaper in Hong Kong 
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claimed that they mainly focused on the editorial, headline and local news 
sections. Other sections, including commentaries, supplements, financial 
and international news, are read only occasionally. Thus, only the articles of 
editorial, headline and local news sections are used in the framing analysis. 
 
4. Summary 
In sum, this study hypothesises that media influence on policy is 
conditional on a series of factors, namely media consensus on critical 
framing and policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage. 
It is also hypothesised that media pressure on government officials may 
increase when long-term and short term public views on the government and 
its policies remain unfavourable. In order to avoid overstating the role 
played by news coverage, I also examine other factors affecting policy 
change, namely institutions and policymakers’ strategies and beliefs. These 
hypotheses are examined in focused comparisons across four selected cases 
in Hong Kong, namely Article 23 legislation, CRIII, GST and OSFP. As 
newspapers are the most importance news sources of policymakers in Hong 
Kong, the coverage of three newspapers with different market positions and 
political stances are analysed.  
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Chapter 6 
Narrative Account of the Case  
of Article 23 Legislation 
 
1. Introduction 
The first case study in this thesis is the debate on the legislation 
concerning Article 23 of the Basic Law regarding national security offences. 
This case was selected because it demonstrates the media’s influence on a 
policy with a high level of elite consensus and a medium level of media 
consensus. This chapter provides a narrative account of the development of 
the debate on Article 23.  
 
2.1 Background of Article 23 
The sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to the PRC on 1 July 
1997. The Hong Kong SAR, according to the concept of ‘one country two 
systems’, exercises a high degree of autonomy. The previous capitalist 
system and legal system also remain unchanged in Hong Kong. Thus, 
during the drafting of the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong in 
the late 1980s, it was considered unacceptable to make the PRC’s laws 
applicable to Hong Kong, including those regarding national security. 
However, Hong Kong, as a part of the PRC, should be bound by these laws. 
The compromise was that it would be up to Hong Kong to legislate such 
laws on its own. Article 23 of the Basic Law was thus born.  
 
However, following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, which 
triggered a protest by one million Hong Kong citizens against the PRC 
government’s bloody suppression of the student movement on the mainland, 
Article 23 was made much harsher with the inclusion of new prohibitions 
against subversion and against foreign political bodies conducting political 
activities in Hong Kong, and political organisations in Hong Kong 
establishing ties with foreign political bodies1 (Cheung 2005: 37). On other 
                                               
1 The Basic Law of the HKSAR, Article 23: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html 
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hand, since 1989, the pro-democrat camp and some human rights groups 
have described Article 23 as a threat to human rights and freedoms in Hong 
Kong, and Article 23 has become a controversial issue.  
 
As a security issue, Article 23 legislation was mainly managed by 
the Security Bureau and the Department of Justice, which is responsible for 
drafting bills. As is different from the local security policy, Article 23 
covers offences regarding national security. Thus, the PRC Government 
played an active role in supporting the SAR Government even though it was 
supposed that the SAR Government should enact this law on its own. 
 
A chronology of the main events in the Article 23 debate is 
summarised in Appendix 6. The controversy over Article 23 arose from the 
time of the drafting of the Basic Law in the 1980s. However, the debate on 
Article 23 mainly took place when the Administration initiated the 
legislative work in the 20-month period between February 2002 and 
September 2003. According to the timing of policy changes and significant 
events, the development of the debate can be divided into six periods. 
1. In the period before 25 February 2002, the Administration avoided 
disclosing any ideas concerning Article 23 legislation.  
2. In the 3-month period between 26 February and 23 September 2002, the 
PRC and SAR governments stressed the necessity for Article 23 
legislation.  
3. Between 24 September and 24 December 2002, the SAR Administration 
conducted a public consultation on its proposals to implement Article 23.  
4. The fourth period is between 25 December 2002 and 13 February 2003. 
In this period, the SAR Administration announced the analysis of 
consultation results and proposed several amendments to its proposals.  
5. In the period between 14 February and 31 August 2003, the official 
legislative process was initiated and moved on in the Legco. 
6. The final period was between 1 July and 5 September 2003. After half a 
million people joint the anti-government protest, the Administration 
proposed three critical amendments to the proposed laws, subsequently 
deferring the legislation. Finally, the plan to enact Article 23 was 
withdrawn. 
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2.2 Before 25 February 2002 
The SAR Government made no initiatives concerning Article 23 
legislation in the first four years following the handover of Hong Kong. In 
July 1999, a spiritual group, Falun Gong was outlawed and branded as an 
‘evil cult’ who threatened national security by the PRC Government. 
Subsequently, the sect members in Hong Kong stirred up controversy 
through a series of protests against the PRC Government. In early 2001, 
some pro-government politicians suggested that the SAR Government 
should enact Article 23 in order handle the Falun Gong issue in Hong Kong2 
while some human rights groups and foreign governments expressed their 
concerns about freedom of Hong Kong3. In February 2001, the CE, Tung 
Chee-hwa, claimed that Falun Gong more or less exhibited some of the 
characteristics of an ‘evil cult’ (heterodox religions) 4 . However, Tung 
stressed that the Administration would not expedite legislation relating to 
Article 235.  
 
Although the Administration avoided discussing Article 23, the 
opposition tried to put this subject on the agenda. For example, in response 
to the CE’s speech concerning Falun Gong, the DP legislators argued that 
the concept of an ‘evil cult’ was not covered by existing laws in Hong 
Kong6. The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, a pro-democrat group also 
urged the Administration to abolish Article 237. In addition, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, the US State Department and the 
British’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office expressed their concerns about 
Article 238. However, the PRC and SAR Governments did not take any 
initiatives regarding Article 23.  
                                               
2 MPDN, 1 February 2001, page A01; 4 February, 2001, page A02. 
3 MPDN, 5 February 2001, page A07; 8 February, 2001, page A01; 28 February 2001, page 
A04. 
4 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200102/08/0208139.htm 
5 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200102/08/0208178.htm 
6 MPDN, 9 February 2001, page A02. 
7 MPDN, 20 August 2001, page A13. 
8 MPDN 10 February 2001, page A10; 28 February 2001, page A04; US State Department, 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Country Reports on Human Rights 
 121 
 
In sum, before February 2002, although some parties, including 
domestic parties and foreign governments, tried to put issues relating to 
Article 23 on the agenda, the PRC and SAR governments kept a low profile, 
avoiding any discussion on Article 23. Thus, the discussion subsequently 
faded out of the picture. 
 
2.3 From 26 February to 24 September 2002 
In late February 2002, Tung Chee-hwa was elected uncontested in 
the second CE election 9 . Since then, both the PRC and the SAR 
governments dramatically changed their attitudes towards Article 23, 
stressing that this law should be enacted. On 26 February 2002, two days 
before nominations for the CE election closed, the SAR Secretary for 
Security, Regina Ip (Ip Lau Shuk-yee) claimed that it was the duty of the CE 
in his second term to enact the laws against treason and subversion 10 . 
Subsequently, the SAR Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung (Leung Oi-sie) 
also disclosed that Article 23 was discussed in her meeting with Li Peng, the 
chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC. Meanwhile, 
the vice-chairman of the NPC's Legislative Affairs Commission, Qian 
Xiaoyang, stated that the SAR should introduce a subversion law as soon as 
possible11.  
 
In the subsequent months, the SAR officials kept claiming that 
enacting Article 23 would not affect human rights and freedoms in Hong 
Kong12. Meanwhile, top level PRC leaders, including President Jiang Zemin 
and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen and the SAR CE, Tung Chee-hwa further 
emphasised the requirement to enact Article 23, describing this legislation 
as the constitutional duty of Hong Kong13. On the other hand, the pro-
democrat camp, including the DP, the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor 
and the Bar Association, together with a pro-Taiwan trade union, expressed 
                                                                                                                       
Practices  - 2001 China (Includes Hong Kong and Macau): 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/686.htm 
9 Results of the CE election 2002: http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/chief/result.htm 
10 MPDN, 27 February 2001, page A02. 
11 MPDN, 28 February 2001, page A04. 
12 MPDN, 14 July 2001, page A10; 15 July 2002, page A10. 
13 MPDN, 26 June 2002, page A04; 2 July 2002, page A12; 3 July 2002, page A08. 
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their concerns about Article 2314. In late July 2002, Margaret Ng (Ng Ngoi-
yee), a pro-democrat legislator returned by the legal constituency, first 
suggested that the Administration should publish a white bill 15  for 
consultation before issuing the blue bill for legislation16.  
 
A month later, freedom of speech became the focus of the debate 
when government officials disclosed some ideas concerning the legislative 
proposal. On 13 September 2002, the MPDN disclosed that some 
expressions of opinion in words might give rise to criminal liability 
according to the proposed anti-sedition law17. On the following day, Elise 
Leung further claimed that at times people had to accept legal responsibility 
for their words18. In response to this, the pro-democrat camp claimed that 
the proposed laws would be a threat to the freedoms of speech and the press. 
Meanwhile, about 30 pro-democrat groups, including human rights groups, 
pressure groups and Christian societies, set up a coalition against the 
proposed anti-subversion laws19.   
 
In short, over this seven month period, when the SAR 
Administration moved the legislative work forward, PRC and SAR officials 
tried to describe Article 23 legislation as a constitutional duty of Hong Kong. 
However, the opposition expressed their concerns about the proposed laws. 
When the Administration disclosed some ideas concerning the proposed 
anti-sedition laws, the democrats further highlighted possible threats to the 
freedom of speech, and formed an anti-Article 23 coalition. The proposal for 
issuing a white bill was also first made by the pro-democrat camp.     
 
 
                                               
14 MPDN, 27 February 2002, page A02; 19 July 2002, page A14; the Speech by the 
Chairman of the Bar Association, Alan Leong: http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/chairman-
corner/speeches/2002/chinese_speech_060402.doc. 
15 When the Administration issues a blue bill, the legislature will initiate the formal 
legislative process.  In contrast, demonstrating how a policy proposal is translated into 
legal language, a white bill is published for public consultation, but not yet received by 
the legislature. Thus, publishing a white bill means a second round of consultation before 
the legislative process is initiated by the publication of the blue bill. 
16 ADN, 22 July 2002, page A13. 
17 MPDN, 13 September 2002, page A02. 
18 MPDN, 14 September 2002, page A04. 
19 MPDN, 9 September 2002, page A08. 
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2.4 From 24 September to 24 December 2002 
On 24 September 2002, the Administration released a consultation 
paper on Article 23 and launched a three-month public consultation 
According to the paper, the proposed laws would prohibit activities in seven 
areas, including treason, secession, sedition (including dealing with 
publications that would incite persons to commit substantive treason, 
secession and subversion offences), theft of state secrets (including the 
unlawful disclosure of information relating to the PRC Authorities and the 
SAR), prohibited organisations including those affiliated to a mainland 
organisation which has been proscribed on the mainland by the PRC 
Government in accordance with national laws on the ground that it 
endangers national security and the operation of foreign political 
organisations in Hong Kong20.  
 
In addition, the Administration proposed some extra-territorial 
application of the laws. The offences of treason, secession, sedition, 
subversion, and the theft of state secrets could be applied to all permanent 
residents of Hong Kong in respect of their actions inside and outside Hong 
Kong. The offences of secession, sedition and subversion could be applied 
to all other persons in respect of their actions outside Hong Kong. For the 
investigating power, the Administration proposed that an emergency entry, 
search and seizure power should be made available to the police for 
investigating some Article 23 offences. The powers could be exercised by a 
police officer with a certain level of seniority, such as a superintendent. The 
Administration also suggested that there was no time limit for bringing 
prosecutions against treason or sedition21. After announcing the consultation 
document, Regina Ip first disclosed the timetable of the legislation, claiming 
that she hoped the proposed law would be passed by July 200322. In other 
words, the Administration hoped to complete the legislation within 10 
months. 
 
                                               
20 Security Bureau of the HKSAR (2002) Consultation Document on Proposals to 
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/consult/2002/bl23-
e.pdf 
21 ibid 
22 MPDN, 26 September 2002, page A06. 
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In response to the consultation document, the pro-democrat camp 
described the proposed laws in a negative way, highlighting potential threats 
to human rights and freedoms. For example, the pro-democrat camp and 
some media described the seven areas covered in the government proposals 
as the ‘seven sins’23. The proposed definition of sedition was considered to 
be an ‘offence committed by speech’24. The proposal to remove time limits 
for bringing prosecutions was also described as a means of ‘imposing 
punishment subsequently’ 25 . Alan Leong, the Chairman of the Bar 
Association even claimed that government proposals were like ‘a revived 
mummy plus terminator’26, and that Article 23 legislation would erode the 
rule of law gradually, like ‘death by slow boiling’27.  
 
Various organisations which might be affected by the proposed law 
also expressed their concerns. Such groups included the Hong Kong 
Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China28, the 
Hong Kong Catholic Church, Falun Gong, the pro-Taiwan groups, the 
libraries of universities and the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), 
the largest trade union for journalists in Hong Kong29. Meanwhile, the pro-
democrat legislators together with the Bar Association, the Law Society30 
and other pro-democrat groups demanded a white bill with actual provisions 
for further public consultation on the provisions31. 
 
                                               
23 MPDN, 25 September 2002, page A01; ADN, 25 September 2002, page A01. 
24 MPDN, 21 September 2002, page A12; 1 October 2002, page A12; 19 November 2002, 
page A13; 23 November 2002, page A10; ADN, 15 November 2002, page A04; 25 
November 2002, page A05; 6 December 2002, page A08.   
25 MPDN, 27 September 2002, page A08; 6 October 2002, page A06; ADN, 25 September 
2002, page A01. 
26 ADN, 8 November 2002, page A04. 
27 MPDN, 11 December, 2002, page A05 
28 The Alliance was established by pro-democrat politicians during the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident. Aiming at ending the one-party dictatorship in China, the Alliance 
organises commemorative activities for the Tiananmen Square incident and liaises with 
Chinese dissidents on the Mainland and overseas. 
29 MPDN, 25 September 2002, page A01; 26 September 2002, page A12; 27 September 
2002, page A08; 4 October 2002, page A06; 16 October 2002, page A17; The HKJA’s 
press release dated 24 September 2002: http://www.hkja.org.hk/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1-
574&lang=en-US 
30 The Law Society is a professional association for practicing solicitors in Hong Kong. 
Traditionally, the Society is a pro-government body.  
http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/about/ 
31 ADN, 27 September 2002, page A10; 13 October 2002, page A04; MPDN, 29 September 
2002, page A08; MPDN 8 October 2002, page A23. 
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Despite the criticisms, the Administration was satisfied with its work. 
Regina Ip claimed that she was happy with the positive feedback from the 
public and the relatively mild comments and coverage by the media 32 . 
Within a few days of the publication of the consultation document, some 
principal officials also praised Ip for her strategy of promoting the 
government proposals33. Moreover, the Administration resisted publishing a 
white bill for consultation34. In the following weeks, Regina Ip and Elsie 
Leung attended numerous public forums, explaining that the proposed laws 
would neither become a threat to the human rights and freedoms, nor restrict 
the activities of any existing groups in Hong Kong. At the same time, the 
PRC Vice-Premier Qian questioned whether opponents of Article 23 had a 
‘devil in their hearts’ (had a guilty conscience)35. All the pro-government 
parties in the Legco also expressed their support for the enactment of Article 
2336. Although some of them pointed out some technical problems with the 
government proposals37, their criticisms were relatively mild. 
 
Subsequently, the debate became a street campaign with both the 
Administration and the democrats trying to bypass the media, delivering 
their own message to the public in pamphlets. In early November, 2002, the 
Administration published a booklet ‘Myths and Facts’ to explain its 
proposals, distributing them to schools, institutes, community centres and 
non-government organisations 38 . Subsequently, some pro-democrat legal 
experts, including barristers, solicitors and academics formed an ‘Article 23 
Concern Group’, distributing a series of booklets in the street, which 
criticised the ‘seven sins’ in the national security law proposals 39 . In 
response to this, the Administration brought out a new series of leaflets 
called ‘Myths and the Truth’, retorting upon the Article 23 Concern Group40. 
 
                                               
32 MPDN, 26 September 2002, page A06. 
33 MPDN, 30 September 2002, page A16. 
34 ADN, 27 September 2002, page A10 
35 MPDN, 26 October 2002, page A02. 
36 MPDN, 25 September 2002, page A04. 
37 MPDN, 4 October 2002, page A12. 
38 MPDN, 7 November 2002, page A10. 
39 MPDN, 9 December 2002, page A17; 23 December 2002, page A06. 
40 MPDN, 18 December 2002, page A04. 
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In addition to the ‘pamphlet war’, both sides in the debate tried to 
mobilise mass movements. Around thirty pro-democrat groups formed a 
coalition called the Civil Human Rights Front, launching a campaign against 
the enactment of Article 2341, including a protest against the proposed law 
on 15 December 2002, ten days before the end of the consultation period42. 
Some Catholic and Protestant groups and the HKJA also called on their 
members or followers to sign a petition opposing the enactment of Article 
2343. In support of this campaign, the pro-democrat legislators initiated a 
motion debate against Article 23 legislation at the Legco meeting in 
December 200244.   
 
In response to the anti-Article 23 campaign, 70 pro-government 
groups formed a ‘Hong Kong Coalition for National Security Legislation’, 
launching a series of activities in support of the enactment of Article 2345. 
These included advertisements in newspapers and a rally backing the 
proposed laws46. With both proponents and opponents trying their best to 
mobilise their supporters to submit their views or petitions during the three 
month public consultation period, the Administration received a record 
number of 90 thousand submissions and 300 thousand signatures when the 
consultation period ended on 24 December 200247. 
 
In addition, the issue was brought to the attention of the international 
community when the former chairman of DP, Martin Lee, visited the US 
and Europe, lobbying politicians and senior officials against Article 23 
legislation48. In response to this, some officials of the SAR Department of 
Justice visited the US, explaining the Administration proposals to the media, 
politicians and officials there49. 
 
                                               
41 MPDN, 13 October 2002, page A08. 
42 MPDN, 16 December 2002, page A02. 
43 MPDN, 13 November 2002, page A08; 25 November 2002, page A10 
44 MPDN, 26 November 2002, page A08 
45 MPDN, 29 October 2002, page A06. 
46 MPDN, 11 December 2002, page A05; 17 December 2002, page A06; 19 December 
2002, page A08; 23 December 2002, page A03. 
47 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
48 MPDN, 25 October 2002, page A10; 13 November 2002, page A08. 
49 MPDN, 14 November 2002, page A16; 27 November 2002, page A12. 
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Meanwhile, some western governments and foreign organisations in 
Hong Kong expressed their concerns over Article 23. For example, after 
meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin, US President Bush expressed his 
concerns over human rights in China and Hong Kong 50 . In the British 
Parliament, a Conservative MP, Howard Flight, the chairman of the Hong 
Kong committee also called a debate on the implementation of Article 23. 
Some MPs expressed concerns over Article 23, urging the SAR Government 
to publish a white bill for further public consultation51. In addition, some 
international human rights groups in Hong Kong urged the Hong Kong 
Government to withdraw the plan to enact Article 2352. David Li (Li Kwok-
po), a pro-government legislator returned by the Financial Constituency, 
also claimed that at least 10 foreign banks in Hong Kong were concerned 
about freedom of information, and called on the Administration to publish a 
white bill before enacting Article 2353.  
 
In short, during the three month consultation period, the PRC and 
SAR governments defended the legislative proposals and resisted publishing 
a white bill, while the democrats, together with other groups who might be 
affected by Article 23, highlighted the potential threat of the government 
proposals. The debate not only took place in the legislature, but also became 
a public campaign when its proponents and opponents started a ‘pamphlet 
war’ and mobilised mass movements. In the meantime, the issue was 
brought to the attention of the international community when some western 
governments and international organisations in Hong Kong expressed their 
concerns about Article 23. 
 
2.5 From 25 December 2002 to 13 February 2003 
Following the public consultation, the Administration and the 
democrats queried the truthfulness of each other’s comments on the 
proposed laws. Moreover, the focus of the debate shifted to Ip’s attitude and 
the Administration’s analysis of the results of the consultation. Although the 
                                               
50 MPDN, 27 October 2002, page A02. 
51 Lords Hansard, Volume 641, Part 9, 27 November 2002:  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo021127/text/21127-
02.htm#21127-02_head0 
52 MPDN, 18 November 2002, page A14. 
53 MPDN, 3 December 2002, page A04. 
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Administration suggested some amendments to its proposals, the democrats 
challenged these suggestions.  
 
The debate on Ip’s attitude was triggered by her criticisms of the 
opposition. In a press conference on 14 January 2003, Ip claimed that the 
opposition’s comments on the proposal laws had misled the public54. At a 
Legco Panel meeting the following day, when questioned by the pro-
democrat legislators, Ip further defended herself, claiming that some 
exaggerated and untruthful comments were deceiving people. In response to 
this, the democrats criticised Ip’s attitude and questioned whether she was 
carrying out the consultation objectively. A democrat also requested Ip to 
re-consider her position as still suitable for conducting the consultation and 
analysis of its outcomes55. Several days later, the Civil Human Rights Front 
staged a protest, urging Ip to stand down56. 
 
Subsequently, the focus of the debate shifted to the analysis of the 
results of the consultations when the Administration published a 
compendium of submissions on 28 January 2003. Among over 97000 
submissions received during the consultation, according to the 
Administration, more than half were categorised as supportive. In addition, 
only a few percent of the submissions requested a white bill or blue bill, 
while a vast majority did not indicate a preference. Of 340 thousand 
signatures received, only 25.5% were supportive while 72.2% expressed 
opposition57.  Nevertheless, Ip tried to play down the importance of these 
signatures.  
 
Most of the submissions are supportive. However, signatures 
are different because they do not mean anything…they do 
not express any reason for an objection. Some signatures are 
problematic…8000 of them consist of the name on its own 
without any signature, just like something copied down from 
the telephone directory.58      
                                               
54 IP’s speech cited in MPDN, 15 January 2003, page A06 
55 Minute of Legco Panel on Security on 15 January 2003: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-
03/english/panels/se/minutes/se030115.pdf 
56 MPDN, 20 January 2003, page A03 
57 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200301/28/0128198.htm  
58 Ip’s speech cited in MPDN 29 January 2003, page A03. 
 129 
 
Meanwhile, Ip announced several amendments to the government 
proposals, including tightening the offence of prohibition of the organisation, 
narrowing down the definitions of ‘war’, ‘unauthorised access and 
disclosure of protected information’ and ‘information relating to the Central 
Authorities and the HKSAR’. The Administration also deleted several 
controversial items from the proposals, including the ‘threat of force’ over 
the offences of secession and subversions and ‘resisting the exercise of 
sovereignty’ in the secession offence. The offences of misprision of treason 
and possession of seditious publications were also abolished. It was also 
proposed that the investigative power of the police and extra-territorial 
measures be further limited. Only police officers of the rank of Chief 
Superintendent of Police or above could authorise the exercise of powers 
under emergency situations. Also, a judicial warrant is required in respect of 
searching or seizing journalistic materials. The offence of treason would 
only apply to Chinese nationals in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong permanent 
residents outside Hong Kong. Whether within or outside Hong Kong, the 
offence should not apply to non-Chinese nationals59. 
 
In spite of these, the opposition claimed that the government had not 
made any significant improvements, and criticised the Administration’s 
resistance to publishing a white bill60. In addition, some submissions by 
opponents, including the DP, the Bar Association, the HKJA and Falun 
Gong were classed as those without explicit views while some were not 
included in the Compendium61. For this reason, the democrats and some 
academics raised some doubts about the Administration’s methods of 
quantitative analysis62. The pro-democrat legislators also initiated a motion 
challenging the Administration’s analysis of consultation results63.  
 
                                               
59 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200301/28/0128198.htm  
60 MPDN, 29 January 2003, pageA04; ADN, 29 January 2003, page A01. 
61 MPDN, 29 January 2003, page A03; ADN, 4 February 2003, page A04; 5 February 2003, 
page A06.  
62 Chung, R. T.Y. and Choy, B, S.T. ‘Casting Doubts on the Compendium of Submissions’, 
POP column dated 29 January 2003, The Public Opinion Programme, the University of 
Hong Kong:  http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns2.html 
63 MPDN 13 February 2003, page A05 
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In a nutshell, following the consultation period, the opposition 
started criticising Regina Ip’s attitude, urging her to step down. Although 
the Administration tried to manipulate the consultation results and suggested 
some amendments to the proposals, the opposition, through protests and a 
motion debate at the Legco, challenged the credibility of the 
Administration’s analysis and criticised their proposed amendments.   
 
2.6 From 14 February to 31 June 2003  
In this six month period, the official legislative process was initiated. 
On 14 February 2003, the Administration launched the official legislative 
process, gazetting the blue bill concerning National Security (Legislative 
Provisions) Bill (NSB). In addition to the amendments which had been 
announced, the Administration added some provisions about proscribed 
organisations. According to the bill, when appeals are lodged by a 
proscribed organisation, the Court can hold proceedings in the absence of 
any person, including the absence of appellants and their legal 
representatives64.  
 
However, the proposed laws were challenged by opponents, 
including the Bar Association. The Administration’s suggestion that the 
Court could hold proceedings in the absence of appellants and their legal 
representatives led them to being described as ‘closed-door trials’ 65 . 
Meanwhile, most pro-democrat groups, including the HKJA, human rights 
groups, Falun Gong and Christian groups continued to oppose the bill. 
 
On 26 February 2003, the Bill was first read in the Legco. Following 
a request of the Administration 66 , the House Committee of the Legco 
decided to accord priority to the scrutiny of the Bill with the support of pro-
government legislators67. Moreover, both the pro-government and the pro-
democrat camps mobilised most of their legislators to join the Bills 
                                               
64 National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, Clause 154, Section 8E:  
http://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/download/s3200307077.pdf 
65 ADN, 15 February 2003, page A01 
66 The Director of Administration's letter dated 27 February 2003 on ‘Proposed Priority in 
the Scrutiny of Bills by Members’: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-
03/english/hc/papers/hc0228let-da0227.pdf 
67 MPDN, 25 March 2003, page A12. 
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Committee in order to dominate it. As a result, 50 out of 60 legislators 
joined the Bills Committee. Since the pro-government camp was in the 
majority, two pro-government legislators were elected as the Chairman and 
Deputy-Chairman of the Committee respectively68. 
 
In the subsequent four month period between March and June 2003, 
the Bills Committee entered an intensive period of activity, holding 29 
meetings and public hearings. 110 groups were mobilised by the pro-
democrat and pro-government camps to attend the hearings in order to 
express their views. Although the democrats tried to play for time by 
repeatedly raising queries, the pro-government camp, as a majority of the 
Committee, manipulated the agenda and progress of scrutiny of the bill. Pro-
democrat legislators also proposed numerous amendments to the Bill. 
However, these amendments were not accepted by the Administration and 
the pro-government camp.  
 
In June 2003, the Administration announced that it would table 51 
amendments to the Bill, including two proposed by the DAB and the LP. It 
was proposed that the offence of sedition be further tightened. A time limit 
of two years was proposed for prosecution for the offence of handling 
seditious publications. It was also proposed that the authorization of 
emergency investigation powers be further limited to Assistant Police 
Commissioner level or above, while ‘closed door trials’ for appeals against 
proscription could be used under regulations vetted by the Legco69. 
 
In addition to the debate inside the Legco, the battle was extended to 
street level. Between late May and early June 2003, in their annual protest 
and commemoration ceremony for the Tiananmen Square incident, the 
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in 
China highlighted potential threats under Article 23 to its operations and 
freedom in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the member groups of the Civil Human 
Rights Front, called on their members and the public to take to the street on 
                                               
68 MPDN, 6 March 2003, page A18; 7 March 2003, A11. 
69 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200306/03/0603276.htm 
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1 July, the sixth anniversary of the HKSAR70 . More than 50 Christian 
leaders from various churches also put on a rare display of unity, calling on 
their 600 thousand followers in Hong Kong to join the July 1 protest71. In 
response to this protest, the FTU held a carnival on 1 July in the Victoria 
Park where the anti-Article 23 protest began72.    
 
Western governments also played a significant role. Of these, the US 
was the most active in their criticisms of Article 23. The US General Consul 
in Hong Kong and the International Relations Committee of the US House 
of Representatives claimed that Article 23 legislation might affect the 
international community’s confidence in Hong Kong73, and would erode 
freedoms in Hong Kong 74 . The White House made an even stronger 
criticism on Article 23, claiming that the NSB could harm local freedoms 
and autonomy in Hong Kong, and urged the Legco to make amendments to 
the bill75. The US House of Representatives also passed a resolution, urging 
the PRC and Hong Kong governments to withdraw the proposal to enact 
Article 2376. 
 
The other country that played an active role in the debate was the 
UK, the former sovereign state of Hong Kong. In its Reports on Hong Kong 
published every six months, the British Government continuously expressed 
its concern on the enactment of Article 23. In March 2003, the Foreign 
Office Minister, Bill Rammell, urged the Hong Kong government to ensure 
that the final legislation was consistent with the spirit of the Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law77. On 30 June 2003, the day before the anti-
government protest, Rammell further criticized the fact that the provisions 
on the proscription of organisations would blur the dividing line between the 
                                               
70 MPDN, 14 April 2003, page A14; 25 June 2003, page A08, 30 June 2003, page A10. 
71 MPDN, 21 June 2003, page A10 
72 MPDN, 25 June 2003, page A08. 
73 The US Consulate-General’s press release on the speech by the US Consul-General: 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/cg_jk2003051601.html 
74 The US Consulate-Generals’ press release on the speech by Henry Hyde: 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk_article23_2003061701.html 
75 The Statement of the Press Secretary to the US Present: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030619-1.html 
76 The US Consulate-General’s press release on the resolution passed by the House of 
Representatives: http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk_article23_2003062702.html 
77 The press release on the statement by British Foreign Office Minister: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=2007317 
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two autonomous legal systems by introducing linkages to mainland law into 
Hong Kong legislation78. Meanwhile, the Canadian consulate in Hong Kong 
and the European Union also made similar criticisms of the proposed laws79.  
 
In response to western government’s criticisms of Article 23, both 
the PRC and the SAR governments stressed that foreign countries had no 
right to criticise and interfere in Hong Kong issues because it was an 
internal affair within China80. The PRC President, Hu Jintao also stated that 
concerns over Article 23 were unnecessary and that the legislation would 
have a beneficial effect both on national security and stability in Hong 
Kong81. Meanwhile, in order to ease Hong Kong people’s discontent, the 
PRC Government launched two economic initiatives. The first was to allow 
mainlanders to visit Hong Kong on individual visas, boosting Hong Kong 
tourism and retail industries82. The other was the Mainland and Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), a free trade agreement 
which opens up huge Mainland markets for Hong Kong goods and 
services83.  
 
In summary, in this six month period, as the majority in the 
legislature, the pro-government camp moved forward the scrutiny of the 
NSB according to the Administration’s schedule. At the same time, while 
the PRC government tried to ease people’s concerns, the pro-democrat camp 
mobilised a series of mass movements. Some western governments also 
intensified their criticisms of the proposed laws.  
   
2.7 From1 July to 5 September 2003 
On 1 July 2003, a few hundred thousand people took to the streets. 
While the police said that at least 350,000 had taken part in the protest, the 
Civil Human Rights Front claimed that the turnout had exceeded half a 
million, much higher than the Administration and the organisers expected. It 
                                               
78 The press release on the statement by British Foreign Office Minister: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=2006763 
79 MPDN, 24 June 2003, page A12; 1 July 2003, page A10. 
80 MPDN, 20 June 2003, page A18; 28 June 2003, page A03; 1 July 2003, page A10. 
81 MPDN, 5 June 2003, page A06.  
82 ODN 6 March 2003, page A16. 
83 ODN 6 June 2003, page A31.  
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was also the largest-scale protest in Hong Kong since 1 million people hit 
the streets in support of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement in 
198984. In addition to the member groups belonging to the Civil Human 
Rights Front, there were many self-mobilised people who took to the streets 
for various reasons, such as the continual economic downturn since the 
1998 Asian financial crisis and the government’s failure to control the 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). However, 
criticisms of the Article 23 proposals were highlighted in the protest85 . 
There were also 1000 journalists opposing Article 23 legislation86.   
 
Although the protest blocked the traffic and business in the central 
area of the Hong Kong Island for about 7 hours, the march was held in a 
peaceful and orderly manner. At the end of the protest, the pro-democrat 
camp demanded an immediate dialogue with the CE, threatening to mobilise 
the public to besiege the Legco building on July 9 when the NSB was put to 
a vote87.  
 
In the evening, the CE’s Office held an urgent meeting, subsequently 
releasing a statement, claiming that the CE understood the aspirations of the 
participants. However, the statement stressed that enactment of Article 23 
was a constitutional duty of the Hong Kong SAR88. In other words, the 
Administration persisted with Article 23 legislation. 
 
The following morning, the CE called a special meeting with some 
Principal Officials and the leaders of the pro-government parties. Most 
members of the pro-government camp and the Administration resisted 
suspending or postponing the legislation. However, the Chairman of DAB, 
Jasper Tsang proposed two amendments to the most controversial 
provisions of the NSB. The first was to delete the section on the proscription 
of organisations, which had been criticized by western countries. The 
                                               
84 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A03. 
85 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A03. 
86 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A10 
87 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A03. 
88 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/01/0701204.htm 
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second was to address to concerns on press freedom, maintaining freedom 
of information and expression by allowing public interest defence89. 
 
Meanwhile, the consensus level of the pro-government camp had 
declined. Some pro-government legislators returned by the functional 
constituencies decided to re-consult their voters before voting for the NSB90, 
while some professional institutes also urged their representatives in the 
Legco to vote against the Bill91 . Moreover, most other pro-government 
legislators avoided expressing support for Article 23 proposals when the 
democrats initiated an adjournment motion stating that ‘How Hong Kong 
should deal with the strong demands made by over 500000 people on 1 
July’ on 4 July. Of the 20 legislators who spoke during this debate, only five 
were from the pro-government camp. Of these, only two DAB members 
claimed that Article 23 should be enacted, while the other three pro-
government legislators urged the Administration to address people’s 
aspirations92. 
 
The PRC Government also held a high level meeting. On 3 and 4 
July 2003, the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of 
China held a special two day meeting on Hong Kong. At this meeting, the 
two PRC departments overseeing Hong Kong policy, namely the Hong 
Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office of the Central 
People’s Government in the Hong Kong SAR, were criticised for incorrectly 
gauging public opinion in Hong Kong over Article 23. The meeting also 
considered various concessions to make the legislation more palatable93.  
 
On 4 July 2003, the consensus level inside the pro-government camp 
further decreased when James Tien (Tien Pei-chun), an Exco member, and 
LP Chairman, announced his party's new position on his return from Beijing. 
Tien claimed that he had discussed the matter with Liao Hui, the Director of 
the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Tien also claimed that he had 
                                               
89 MPDN, 3 July 2003, page A02. 
90 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A02. 
91 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A04. 
92 Minutes of council meeting of the Legco:   
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0704ti-translate-e.pdf 
93 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
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been given a clear indication that the PRC Government insisted only that 
Article 23 be enacted, and that it did not have any views on the details or the 
timetable for its enactment. Thus, Tien proposed the deferral of the NSB 
until December 200394.   
 
As the LP had a decisive eight votes in the Legco, the NSB could not 
be passed without the support of the party. Nevertheless, the following day, 
the CE held a press conference on 5 July 2003, announcing that the second 
and third readings would be resumed on July 9, as originally scheduled. 
However, the CE announced three critical amendments to the Bill. In 
addition to the two brought by Jasper Tsang on 2 July, the Administration 
proposed to delete the provision which confers powers of search without 
court warrant on the police in the exercise of emergency investigation 
powers95.  
 
In response to this, the LP claimed that the party had to consult the 
public before making a decision96. The following night, however, the LP 
announced that the party reiterated its request to the Administration to defer 
the second reading of the NSB, and that Tien had resigned from the Exco 
with immediate effect97. In the meantime, the CE called a special Exco 
meeting, subsequently announcing that, because of the change in the LP’s 
position, the Administration had decided to defer resuming the second 
reading of the Bill and to step up efforts to explain the amendments to the 
community in the coming days98. 
 
Despite the deferral of Article 23 legislation, the Civil Human Rights 
Front shifted its focus of the rally on 9 July 2003, demanding further 
government reforms, such as introducing universal suffrage for the CE and 
the Legco. In addition, the pro-democrat camp urged Regina Ip to stand 
                                               
94 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
95 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/05/0705158.htm 
96 MPDN, 6 July 2003, page A04. 
97 The LP’s press release on its statement: 
http://www.liberal.org.hk/contents/modules/news/shownewsdetails.php?newsid=5739&pag
e=1&filtergroupid=9&panchor=news5739  
98 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/07/0707019.htm 
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down,99 while the DAB and other pro-government legislators also claimed 
that Ip was no longer the suitable person to promote Article 23100. A week 
later, Ip announced her resignation from the post of Secretary for Security 
for personal reasons101.  
 
Although there was no further reform of the SAR Administration 
and the Exco, the PRC Government set up a high level Central Leading 
Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs led by PRC Vice President Zeng 
Qinghong in order to strengthen the co-ordination of policy on Hong Kong 
and Macau102.    
 
In early August 2003, Ambrose Lee (Lee Siu-kwong), the 
Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption was 
appointed as Secretary for Security. However, the plan to promote Article 
23 legislation remained unclear103. On the other hand, the PRC Government 
seemed to insist the enactment of Article 23. On 9 August 2003, Sheng 
Huaren, the NPC Vice-Chairman and Secretary called on the Hong Kong 
Delegates of NPC to ‘actively match up and support Article 23 
legislation’104.  Subsequently, the China Daily, an official newspaper of the 
PRC Government, also ran a commentary article after two pro-democrat 
legislators had attended a seminar organised by a pro-independent group in 
Taiwan. Claiming that these two democrats openly supported pro-
independence forces in Taiwan, this commentary called for an early 
enactment of Article 23105.   
 
Nevertheless, the SAR Administration denied that there was pressure 
from the PRC Government106. Meanwhile, further deferral of Article 23 
legislation was proposed by two Exco members, Jasper Tsang and Leung 
Chun-ying. They claimed that Article 23 could be enacted after the Legco 
                                               
99 MPDN, 8 July 2003, page A04. 
100 MPDN, 10 July 2003, page A14. 
101 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/16/0716223.htm 
102 MPDN, 19 July 2003, page A03; 28 September 2003, page A17. 
103 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200308/04/0804252.htm 
104 MPDN, 10 August 2003, page A12. 
105 Cited in MPDN, 19 August 2003, page A09. 
106 MPDN, 20 August 2003, page A17. 
 138 
election in 2004107. On 3 September 2003, the ODN disclosed that the PRC 
Government had changed its position, allowing further deferral of Article 23 
legislation108. Two days later, the CE announced that the Administration had 
reported to the PRC Government the decision to withdraw the NSB109.  
 
In short, in this two month period, there were a series of critical 
policy changes. Following large-scale anti-government protests, there was 
an elite debate within the pro-government camp. Since some pro-
government legislators refused to support the NSB, the Bill was amended, 
deferred and finally withdrawn. In addition, there was also significant 
personnel turnover within the SAR Administration and structural reform in 
the PRC Government. 
 
2.8 Concluding Remarks 
In sum, throughout the debate on Article 23 legislation, the 
opponents, including the pro-democrat camp, Christian Churches, journalist 
groups, pro-Taiwan groups, Falun Gong and some western governments, 
described the government proposals as a threat to human rights and 
freedoms, urging the Administration to issue a white bill for further 
consultation. Resisting the proposal for a white bill, the PRC and SAR 
governments defended the proposal laws. During the public consultation on 
Article 23 legislation, the debate turned into a street campaign when both 
sides allied with their own supporters, distributing pamphlets and organizing 
large-scale rallies.   
 
Although the democrats challenged Regina Ip’s attitude and the 
government’s analysis of consultation results, the Administration initiated 
the official legislative process. As the pro-government camp dominated the 
legislature, the scrutiny of the proposed law was moved forward in line with 
government schedules.  
 
                                               
107 MPDN, 21 August 2003, page A02; 24 August 2003, page A10. 
108 ODN 3 September 2003, page A23. 
109 The Administration’s press release on the statement of the CE’s Office: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/05/0905235.htm 
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After half a million people had joined in anti-government protests 
organised by the pro-democrat camp, however, the consensus level inside 
the pro-government camp declined. Although the Administration proposed 
some critical amendments to the most controversial provisions, some pro-
government legislators refused to support the proposed laws. Subsequently, 
there were a series of policy changes, including the deferral of legislation, 
personnel turnover within the SAR Administration, the setting up of a high 
level group overseeing Hong Kong policy in the PRC Government, and the 
withdrawal of the proposed laws. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis of the Case of Article 23 Legislation 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the previous chapter, which provided a narrative account 
of the Article 23 debate, in this chapter, I test the hypotheses of this study by 
tracing the time sequence of several factors, namely, policy change, policy 
certainty and news framing. Finally, I further discuss the other possible 
influential factors on policy change and the link with media coverage.  
 
2. Policy Change 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in this study, policy change is grouped 
into two categories according to fiscal and political costs. In the case of the 
Article 23 debate, both low cost and high cost changes were identified. The 
time sequence and costs of these policy changes are summarised in Table 
7.1.   
 
2.1 Low Cost Changes  
During the debate on Article 23 legislation, all the low cost changes 
in policy were agenda changes of the Legco and the PRC and SAR 
governments. The Legco agenda changes were motions initiated by the 
democrats. The first one was against the Article 23 legislation confirmed in 
late November 2002 and took place on 11 December 20021. The second 
motion criticising the Administration’s analysis of the results of the 
consultation was decided in mid-February 2003 and took place on 26 
February 2003 2 . The final Legco agenda change was the adjournment 
motion on 3 July 2003, two days after the July 1 protest3. However, none of 
these motions were passed by the Legco. Neither did these motions trigger 
any further policy change. 
 
                                               
1 MPDN, 26 November 2002, page A08 
2 MPDN 13 February 2003, page A05 
3 Minutes of council meeting of the Legco:   
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0704ti-translate-e.pdf 
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Table 7.1: Policy changes during the debate on Article 23 Legislation 
Date Events Types of 
change 
Cost  
Before  
26/02/ 2002 
The Administration’s decision on 
enacting Article 23 
Introducing 
new policy 
High 
7 Nov 2002 
-28 Jan 2003 
The Administration committed itself 
to considering amendment of its 
proposals, and then announced 
amendments.  
Change in 
proposal 
High 
25 Nov 2002 The DP confirmed to initiate a 
motion against Article 23 legislation 
at the Legco meeting on 11 
December 2002.   
Agenda 
change 
Low 
12 Feb 2003 The DP confirmed the motion 
criticising the Administration’s 
analysis of consultation results at the 
Legco meeting on 26 February 2003. 
Agenda 
change 
Low 
7-27 Jun 
2003 
The Administration proposed 51 
amendments to the NSB.  
Change in 
proposal 
High 
1 Jul 2003 Urgent meeting of the CE’s Office 
held. 
Agenda 
change 
Low 
2 Jul 2003 The CE’s special meeting with 
Principal Officials and leaders of 
pro-government party. 
Agenda 
change 
Low 
3 Jul 2003 An adjournment motion in the 
Legco. 
Agenda 
change 
Low 
3-4 Jul 2003 Special meeting of the Politburo 
Standing Committee of the 
Communist Party of China. 
Agenda 
change 
Low 
5 Jul 2003 The Administration’s announcement 
of 3 critical amendments to the Bill 
Change in 
proposal 
High 
6 Jul 2003 James Tien’s resignation from the 
Exco. 
Personnel 
turnover 
High 
7 Jul 2003 The Administration’s announcement 
of deferral of the 2nd and 3rd readings 
of the Bill  
Deferral of 
proposal 
High 
Early Jul 
2003 
Setting up of a high level Central 
Leading Group on Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs in PRC Government. 
Alternation 
of  structure 
High 
16 Jul 2003 Regina Ip’s resignation from the 
Secretary of Security. 
Personnel 
turnover 
High 
5 Sep 2003 The Administration’s withdrawal of 
the NSB. 
Withdrawal 
of proposal 
High 
 
After the 1 July protest, a series of urgent meetings were held by the 
SAR and PRC Governments. On the evening of 1 July, there was a CE 
Office special meeting4. The following day, the CE held a further meeting 
                                               
4 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/01/0701204.htm 
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with some principal officials and the leaders of pro-government parties5. On 
3 and 4 July, the Communist Party of China also held a special meeting of 
the Politburo Standing Committee, discussing the latest developments in 
Hong Kong6. More importantly, some decisions on high cost policy changes 
were made at these meetings.   
 
2.2 High Cost Policy Changes 
There were a total of nine high cost policy changes including 
adjustments, deferral and withdrawal of proposed laws, key personnel 
turnover and alternations in structure of policy making. The first high cost 
change was the decision to enact Article 23. This plan was first disclosed in 
late February 2002 7 . However, as the legislation concerning Article 23 
involved a series of complicated provisions, it is sensible to suggest that the 
Administration had prepared the proposals well before disclosing its plan. 
Thus, the decision to enact Article 23 was likely to be made before late 
February 2002.  
 
The second high cost changes were the amendments to the proposed 
laws. These amendments were first claimed by Regina Ip in a forum on 2 
November 20028 and announced in late January 20039. After discussions in 
the Legco, the Administration in June also proposed a further series of 51 
amendments covering 6 areas of the Bill10. However, these two series of 
changes were relatively technical and minor. The sections regarding key 
offences were kept in place. 
 
Even more significant high cost policy changes were made following 
the protest on 1 July 2003. The first one was three critical amendments to 
the most controversial sections of the National Security Bill (NSB) 11 . 
                                               
5 MPDN, 3 July 2003, page A02. 
6 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
7 MPDN, 27 February 2001, page A02. 
8 MPDN, 3 November 2002, page A03 
9 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200301/28/0128198.htm  
10 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200306/03/0603276.htm 
11 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/05/0705158.htm 
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Although these three amendments were announced on 5 July 2003, two of 
these were disclosed by an Exco member, Jasper Tsang on 2 July 200312. In 
addition, between 2 and 4 July, the SAR and PRC governments held urgent 
meetings to discuss the situation in Hong Kong. It is reasonable to believe 
that these amendments were made on 2 July while the decisions were made 
at these two meetings although the announcement was made on 5 July 2003. 
 
Subsequently, James Tien’s resignation from the Exco not only 
resulted in personnel change of the Exco 13 , but also forced the 
Administration to defer the legislation of the NSB 14 . Although Tien’s 
resignation was announced on 6 July, he and the LP announced their new 
positions, urging the Administration to defer the legislation on 4 July15. 
Before that, Tien also discussed this issue with officials in Beijing. Thus, it 
is believed that Tien and his party had changed their views before 4 July 
2003. 
 
The other personnel change was the resignation of Regina Ip as 
Secretary for Security on 16 July 2003. Although Ip’s announcement of her 
resignation was subsequent to the deferral of the legislation, there was 
evidence that Ip’s decision was made before July 2003. On 31 May 2003, 
the ODN disclosed a rumour that Ip had decided to resign after Article 23 
legislation was concluded16. This rumour was confirmed by the CE after 
announcing Ip’s resignation17. Two years later, the MPDN further disclosed 
that Ip had applied for postgraduate study in the Stanford University in 2002. 
When her application was accepted in March 2003, she informed the CE 
that she would leave her position in July 2003 18 . In this sense, Ip’s 
resignation was unlikely to have been the result of the Article 23 debate. In 
addition, after the meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee of the 
                                               
12 MPDN, 3 July 2003, page A02. 
13 The Liberal Party’s press release on its statement: 
http://www.liberal.org.hk/contents/modules/news/shownewsdetails.php?newsid=5739&pag
e=1&filtergroupid=9&panchor=news5739  
14 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/07/0707019.htm 
15 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
16 ODN, 31 May 2003, page A31.  
17 The Administration’s press release on the transcript by the Chief Executive on 17 July 
2003: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/17/0717219.htm 
18 MPDN, 15 June 2005, page A02. 
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Communist Party of China held on 3 and 4 July, the PRC government set up 
a high level Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs led 
by PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong in order to strengthen the co-
ordination of Hong Kong policy19. 
 
The final high cost change was the announcement of the withdrawal 
of the NSB on 5 September 200320. Since two Exco members, proposed 
further deferral of Article 23 legislation in late August21, it was sensible to 
assume that the Exco started considering withdrawal of the Bill at that time. 
Subsequently, the ODN, on 3 September 2003, disclosed that the PRC 
Government had allowed further deferral of the legislation22. Thus, it is 
believed that the decision to withdraw the bill was made by the PRC and 
SAR governments between late August and early September 2003.   
 
3. Policy Certainty 
3.1 Elite Consensus 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, policy certainty measured by elite 
consensus is considered to be high when the SAR Administration and most 
members of pro-government parties reach a consensus over an issue. 
Conversely, elite consensus levels decline when there is disagreement 
between the SAR Administration and the pro-government camp. In the case 
of Article 23, the PRC Government also played a crucial role in Article 23 
legislation. Thus, when there was disagreement between the PRC 
Government and the SAR Government and the pro-government camp, the 
elite consensus level was considered to be low. In the case of Article 23, the 
elite consensus level remained high before 1 July 2003 but subsequently 
declined dramatically.  
 
3.1.1 The Period before 31 August 2003 
In the period between 26 February 2002 and 31 August 2003, the 
PRC and the SAR officials together with the pro-government camp strictly 
                                               
19 MPDN, 19 July 2003, page A03; 28 September 2003, page A17. 
20 The Administration’s press release on the statement of the CE’s Office: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/05/0905235.htm 
21 MPDN, 21 August 2003, page A02; 24 August 2003, page A10. 
22 ODN 3 September 2003, page A23. 
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supported the government proposals. Although some pro-government 
legislators and Exco members criticised some sections of the government 
proposals occasionally, those criticisms were relatively mild. In addition, 
pro-government parties and the trade unions mobilised their supporters to 
submit supportive views and to attend the rally backing Article 23 
legislation 23 . The pro-government legislators also co-operated with the 
Administration, dominating the Bills Committee in order to move forward 
the scrutiny of the Bill as the Administration had scheduled.  
 
Some criticisms of the government proposals were made by Albert 
Chen (Chen Hung-yee), a member of the Basic Law Committee24. Chen 
pointed out many problems concerning the proposed laws25 , urging the 
Administration to publish a white bill26. However, apart from Chen, nobody 
in the Committee expressed such views. More importantly, the Committee 
is merely an advisory board. Thus, Chen’s criticisms did not affect the 
overall consensus within the pro-government camp. 
 
However, at the end of the consultation period, according to the 
MPDN, there was a debate taking place within the Administration. Some 
officials suggested that the Administration should respond to public pressure, 
publishing a white bill in order to avoid further harm to government 
popularity. However, other officials were concerned that publishing a white 
bill would postpone the legislation, providing more time for the opponents 
to magnify the voices against the proposed laws27. In this sense, the elite 
consensus level declined slightly at that time. However, the Administration 
made no concessions in the end. Since the blue bill was gazetted on 14 
February 2003, there had been no criticisms of the bill expressed within the 
pro-government camp. Thus, in general, elite consensus remained at a high 
level before 1 July 2003.   
                                               
23 MPDN, 11 December 2002, page A05; 23 December 2002, page A03. 
24 The Basic Law Committee is an advisory board on the interpretation of Basic Law.  
According to Article 158 of the Basic Law, the power of interpretation of this Law shall be 
vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The Standing 
Committee of the NPC shall consult the Basic Law Committee before giving an 
interpretation of this Law: http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm 
25 MPDN, 3 October 2002, page A10; 7 November 2002, page A03; 22 November 2002, 
page A09; 20 June 2003, page A18;  
26 MPDN, 24 December 2002, page A10. 
27 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
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3.1.2 The Period after 1 July 2003  
The consensus level within the pro-government camp declined 
dramatically following a large-scale anti-government protest on 1 July 2003. 
On 3 July 2003, some pro-government legislators returned by the functional 
constituencies also decided to re-consult their voters before voting for the 
NSB28. Furthermore, most pro-government legislators avoided expressing 
their support for the Bill during the debate in the Legco on 4 July29.  
 
An even more significant decrease in elite consensus was caused by 
a disagreement between the Administration and the LP. On 4 July 2003, 
James Tien proposed a deferral of the second reading of the NSB30 while the 
PRC and SAR Governments persisted with its schedule. Although the 
Administration proposed three critical amendments to the Bill31, the LP 
persisted with its own proposal while Tien resigned from the Exco 32 . 
Subsequently, the disagreement between the Administration and pro-
government camp spread to personnel issues. While the pro-democrat camp 
urged Regina Ip to stand down 33 , the DAB and some pro-government 
legislators also claimed that Ip was no longer the suitable person to promote 
Article 23 although they did not agree to dismiss her.34 
 
In August 2003, there was also a disagreement between the PRC and 
SAR Governments. On the one hand, a senior official and an official 
newspaper of the PRC stressed that Article 23 should be enacted as soon as 
possible35. On the other hand, the SAR Administration’s plan to resume 
work on Article 23 legislation remained unclear while some Exco members 
                                               
28 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A02. 
29 Minutes of the Legco council meeting:   
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0704ti-translate-e.pdf 
30 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
31 MPDN, 6 June 2003, page A01; the Administration’s press release on the transcript of 
the Chief Executive: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/05/0705158.htm 
32 The Liberal Party’s press release on its statement: 
http://www.liberal.org.hk/contents/modules/news/shownewsdetails.php?newsid=5739&pag
e=1&filtergroupid=9&panchor=news5739  
33 MPDN, 8 July 2003, page A04. 
34 MPDN, 10 July 2003, page A14. 
35 MPDN, 10 August 2003, page A12; 19 August 2003, page A19. 
 147 
proposed a further deferral of the legislation36. Bearing these factors in mind, 
it is a fair assumption that the elite consensus remained low after 1 July 
2003.    
 
3.2 Policy Stage 
In terms of policy stage, the certainty of Article 23 was relatively 
low. The Administration’s proposal was first announced as a consultation 
paper. Although the Administration subsequently gazetted a blue bill, 
initiating the official legislative process, there was ample scope for the 
legislature to amend or reject the Bill. After the Administration deferred the 
second reading of the Bill on 5 July 2003, the plan to enact Article 23 
remained unclear. In this sense, the level of policy certainty measured by 
policy stage further declined after early July.  
 
In short, although elite consensus remained extremely high before 
July 2003, the government proposal, as a bill to be passed by the Legco, was 
at a relatively early and uncertain stage. Thus, the overall level of policy 
certainty was considered to be medium. After the 1 July protest, elite 
consensus dramatically declined, while the legislative plan became unclear. 
In this case, policy certainty measured by both in terms of elite consensus 
and policy stage declined to an extremely low level.   
 
4. Analysis of News Framing  
4.1 Methods 
News coverage was analysed by article count and keyword test. 
News articles and editorials of the three selected newspapers were searched 
from the Wiser database by the keywords ‘Article 23 (二十三條/廿三條/23
條)’ and ‘national security (國家安全)’. Only the texts with at least one 
paragraph relating to the Article 23 debate were selected and studied, while 
irrelevant articles were screened off. 
 
This study focuses on the debate following the PRC and SAR 
officials’ disclosure of their plan to enact Article 23. Thus, the sample 
                                               
36 MPDN, 21 August 2003, page A02; 24 August 2003, page A10. 
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period began on 26 February 2002 when Regina Ip first claimed that the 
SAR should enact Article 23. The end date of the article search was 5 
September 2003 when the Administration announced the withdrawal of the 
NSB. 
 
For article count, a coding frame was designed according to the 
arguments highlighted in the debate. The detailed coding frame was listed in 
Appendix 7A. The framing of news articles was divided into three different 
types: Positive framing is a narrative supporting the proposals for Article 23 
legislation and its timetable. This kind of framing consists of the following 
elements:  
 Officials’ speeches and voices supporting the government proposals and 
schedule were highlighted. 
 The urgency and constitutional duty of enacting Article 23 were 
emphasised. 
 The government proposal was considered to be moderate and liberal. 
 Opponents of the government proposals were considered to be radicals, 
savages and opportunists. 
 The officials managing Article 23 legislation were described as rational, 
professional and reasonable. 
 Public consultation on Article 23 legislation was considered to be 
sufficient, scientific and objective. 
 Protests against the government proposals were described as a 
disturbance of public peace and traffic. 
 A white bill was considered as an unnecessary move.  
 Comments by foreign governments and organisations on Article 23 were 
considered to be interference in the internal affairs of China and Hong 
Kong. 
 The PRC Government’s views on Article 23 legislation were considered 
to be legitimate. 
 Public attitudes were considered to be favourable to the Administration 
and the enactment of Article 23.       
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Negative framing is favourable to opinions against proposals for Article 23 
legislation and its timetable. This kind of news coverage consists of the 
following elements: 
 Voices against the government proposals and schedule for Article 23 
were highlighted. 
 Misgivings about potential threats to human rights and freedoms were 
highlighted.  
 Government proposals were considered to be ambiguous and draconian 
laws. 
 Opponents of government proposals were considered to be freedom 
fighters, law professionals and intellectuals. 
 Officials managing Article 23 legislation were described as arrogant and 
unreasonable. 
 Consultation on Article 23 was considered to be inadequate, unscientific 
and biased. 
 Protests against the government proposals were considered to be 
peaceful while the marchers were described as people showing 
independent thinking and high ‘quality’. 
 A white bill was considered to be necessary. 
 Comments by foreign governments and organisations were considered 
to be in defence of human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong. 
 The PRC Government’s comments on Article 23 were considered to be 
a threat to the autonomy of Hong Kong. 
 Public views were considered to be unfavourable to the Administration 
and the enactment of Article 23.  
 
In addition, there is neutral framing. The characteristics of this framing are 
listed as follows: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article. 
 Neither supportive nor critical arguments were highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues were merely described and explained.  
 
For keyword tests, the keywords in relation to positive and negative 
framings were identified. The opponents of Article 23 described the 
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proposed laws as ambiguous draconian laws, highlighting misgivings about 
them and the need to issue a white bill for further consultation. The 
opponents also considered the proponents to be ‘royalists’ who blindly 
supported the Administration. In this case, ‘misgiving/worry (憂慮/疑慮)’, 
‘draconian law (惡法)’, ‘ambiguous/blurred (含糊/模糊)’ ‘white bill (白
紙 )’ and ‘royalist (保皇 )’ were selected as the keywords for negative 
framing.  
 
The proponents of Article 23 highlighted the constitutional duty to 
safeguard national security, describing the laws proposed by the government 
proposals as moderate and liberal. Moreover, the proponents considered the 
opponents’ criticisms and misgivings over the proposed laws to be 
exaggerations, and misunderstandings. Thus, ‘national security (國家安全)’, 
‘duty (責任)’, ‘moderate/liberal (寬鬆)’, ‘exaggerating (誇張/誇大)’ and 
‘misunderstanding/myth (誤會/誤解)’ were selected as keywords associated 
with positive framing.      
 
In order to avoid contamination caused by words used irrelevantly, 
the keywords were only counted when used in relation to relevant subject 
matter. For example, ‘national security’ was counted only if it was used in 
relation to security issues. Those used in the titles of legislative bills and 
organisation such as ‘National Security Bill’ and ‘Hong Kong Coalition for 
National Security Legislation’ were screened off. Similarly, the word ‘duty’ 
was counted only when it referred to the constitutional duty to enact Article 
23 and to safeguard. Such words used in relation to other issues were not 
counted. 
 
4.2 Results 
Throughout the 556-day sample period between 26 February 2002 
and 5 September 2003, the MPDN ran 1006 articles (1.8 per day) while the 
ODN ran 393 only (0.7 per day). The ADN ran 1291 articles (2.3 per day), 
the highest level of coverage. As shown in Appendix 7B, in all the five 
analysis periods mentioned in the previous chapter, the overall framing of 
the ODN remained mixed, while that of the ADN remained negative. For 
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the MPDN, mixed framed coverage was found only in the first analysis 
period between 26 February and 23 September 2002. In the rest of time, the 
coverage in the MPDN remained negatively framed.     
 
As this study assumes that sufficient pressure on policymakers could 
be created only when there is a substantial quantity (at least 1 article per day) 
of sustained (lasting for at least 3 days) negative framing (with half of the 
article and keywords coded as critical overall). In addition, it is also 
assumed that media pressure on policymakers is increased when the three 
selected newspapers ran sustained negative coverage simultaneously. 
Combining the analysis results for the three newspapers, I found 11 periods 
when the three newspapers were running sustained coverage simultaneously. 
The framing analysis for this sustained coverage is summarised in Appendix 
7C. 
 
As shown in Table 7.2, of the 11 periods, the first one (between 23 
September and 10 October 2002, the 18 days immediately subsequent to the 
launch of public consultation) showed overall framing for all three 
newspapers that was mixed. In other words, media consensus remained at an 
extremely low level at that time. This finding is consistent with the 
Administration’s perception that the response from news coverage was mild 
in this period37. 
 
However, in the subsequent 10 months between mid October 2002 
and July 2003, while the ODN retained mixed framing, the tone of the 
MPDN and ADN became negative. Despite this medium level of media 
consensus over critical framing, government officials and Exco members 
perceived a negative tone in coverage during this period38 (interview with 
Cheng Yiu-tong on 2 January 2008). (The inconsistency between framing 
analysis results and policymakers’ perceptions will be discussed later.) It is 
thus reasonable to suggest that policymakers’ felt pressure as a result of 
news coverage. However, in the two periods subsequent to 19 August 2003, 
only the ADN remained negatively framed, while the tone of the other two 
                                               
37 MPDN, 26 September 2002, page A06. 
38 Regina Ip’s statement cited in MPDN, 3 November 2002, page A04. 
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papers was mixed. In this case, media pressure was weakened by the decline 
of media consensus in this period. 
 
Table 7.2: The framing analysis in the 11 periods in which all three 
selected newspapers ran sustained coverage simultaneously  
Framing decided by the combined 
results of article and keyword counts  
Date Length 
(Days) 
MPDN ADN ODN 
23/9 – 
10/10/2002 
18 Mix Mix Mix 
16 – 18/10/2002 3 Neg Neg Mix 
26/10 – 
8/11/2002 
14 Neg Neg Mix 
15/11 – 
25/12/2002 
41 Neg Neg Mix 
5 – 31/1/2003 27 Neg Neg Mix 
7 – 16/2/2003 10 Neg Neg Mix 
26/2 – 1/3/2003 4 Neg Mix Mix 
5 – 9/6/2003 5 Neg Neg Mix 
18/6 – 27/7/2003 40 Neg Neg Mix 
19 – 24/8/2003 6 Mix Neg Mix 
3 – 5/9/2003 3 Mix Neg Mix 
 
5. Testing the Hypotheses 
5.1 Tracing the Time Sequence  
As mentioned above, before September 2002, coverage of Article 23 
legislation remained intermittent and scattered. Thus, the media are unlikely 
to have influenced the launch of the public consultation on Article 23. In the 
first 18 days of the consultation period, although sustained coverage was run 
by the three newspapers, the coverage remained mixed in its framing. Thus, 
media pressure on the Administration was considered to be limited in this 
period.   
 
However, in the subsequent months between 16 October 2002 and 9 
June 2003, while the ODN retained mixed framing, the tone of the MPDN 
and ADN’s sustained coverage became negative, except for the period 
between 26 February and 1 March 2003, when the ADN adopted mixed 
framing. Thus, there was a medium level of media consensus most of the 
time. According to the chronology, during or after a period when such 
sustained critical coverage was run, there were numerous low and high cost 
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policy changes, namely a DP legislator’s introduction of a motion against 
Article 23 legislation in late November 2002, the Administration’s 
amendments to the proposed law between early November 2002 and late 
January 2003, and the DP’s initiation of a motion debate challenging the 
Administration’s analysis of the consultation results in February 2003. On 7 
June 2003, the Administration also proposed its 51 amendments to the Bill. 
In this sense, media influence on this policy changes was possible. 
 
There were several extremely high cost changes in the week 
subsequent to the protest on 1 July 2003. In order to examine the new 
framing prior to these changes, I divided the peak of sustained coverage 
between 18 June and 27 July 2003 into four sub-periods. Framing analysis 
for these four sub-periods is provided in the Section 3 of Appendix 7C. As 
Table 7.3 shows, in all these four periods, the ODN retained mixed framing, 
while tone of the ADN remained critical. Thus, media pressure resulting 
from media consensus was determined by the changes to the MPDN’s 
framing.  
 
The first period was between 18 June and 1 July, the period prior to 
the urgent Exco meetings and Jasper Tsang’s disclosure of critical 
amendments to the NSB on 2 July. In this period, since only the ADN was 
negatively framed, while the framing of both the MPDN and ODN remained 
mixed, media pressure on the Administration was weakened by the low 
level of media consensus. In this sense, news coverage was unlikely to be an 
influential factor affecting these two changes. 
 
Table 7.3: Framing analysis for sustained coverage in the period 
between 18 June and 27 July 2003 
Framing decided by article and keyword 
counts  
Date Length 
(Days) 
MPDN ADN ODN 
18/6 – 1/7/2003 14 Mix Neg Mix 
2 – 4/7/2003 3 Neg Neg Mix 
5 – 6/7/2003 2 Mix Neg Mix 
7 – 27/7/2003 21 Neg Neg Mix 
 
Between 2 and 4 July, the three days subsequent to the 1 July protest, 
the framing of the MPDN and ADN was critical, while the ODN retained 
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mixed framing. Thus, media pressure was considered to be increased. 
However, the LP’s proposal for a deferral of the legislation on 4 July and 
the Administration’s announcement of three critical amendments to the NSB 
were unlikely to be influenced by coverage in this period. This is because, 
as mentioned above, Jasper Tsang disclosed critical amendments to the NSB 
on 2 July. James Tien also talked to the PRC officials in Beijing before 
announcing his proposals. In other words, both the Administration and Tien 
had started to prepare these changes before critical coverage was run. 
Although it can be argued that critical coverage between 2 and 4 July 
created pressure, forcing the Administration and Tien to reconfirm their 
decisions, news coverage was not a key factor triggering the changes to 
policymakers’ positions. 
 
In the period between 5 and 6 July, media pressure was weakened 
when the MPDN became mixed framed again. Thus, James Tien’s 
resignation on 5 July is unlikely to have been triggered by news coverage. 
Nevertheless, as Robinson (2002:40) suggests, politicians might take 
account of coverage in the future when deciding policy. It can be argued that 
critical coverage in the previous few days had alerted the Tien and his party 
to possible media pressure. In Robinson’s words, there was a potential effect. 
However, for Tien, resignation from the Exco was an extremely high cost 
decision. It was questionable if such a high cost change was the result only 
of the potential effect of a medium level of media consensus. In addition, 
the Administration did not announce the deferral of legislation before Tien 
announced his resignation and his party showed resistance to supporting the 
NSB. In this sense, it is unlikely that the deferral was caused news coverage. 
Moreover, in the period between 7 and 27 July, after the legislation had 
been deferred, the MPDN became negatively framed again, leading to an 
increase in media consensus and media pressure. As this period came after 
decision to defer the legislation, media influence on the deferral of 
legislation can be ruled out. 
 
The crucial change, the withdrawal of the NSB was announced on 5 
September. However, as shown in Table 7.2, in the two peaks of sustained 
coverage in August and September 2003, the MPDN and ODN remained 
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mixed framed, while the tone of the ADN was critical. As media pressure on 
the Administration was weak, the withdrawal of the NSB was unlikely to 
have been triggered by these two peaks of coverage. Although potential 
media effect on this change is not completely excluded, it is problematic 
that such an extremely high cost change could be triggered by the potential 
effect of news coverage only. 
  
In short, process tracing during the Article 23 debate showed that 
media influence on policy was possible only in some cases. In the period 
between October 2002 and June 2003, there were changes to the Legco’s 
agenda and some relatively minor amendments to the Article 23 proposal 
during or after sustained critical coverage run by two of the three selected 
newspapers. In this case, media influence on policy was possible. In the 
period subsequent to 1 July 2003, however, the decisions on policy changes 
had been made before critical coverage was run. Although it was possible 
that news coverage might either reinforce policymakers’ decisions or 
potentially influence policy changes, it is hard to imagine that news 
coverage was a major factor in the policymakers’ decisions on the policy 
changes.  
 
5.2 Policy Certainty Measured by Elite Consensus and Policy 
Stage 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are two hypotheses on policy 
certainty and media influence. First, critical coverage was likely to occur 
when there was elite debate. Second, policy certainty measured elite 
consensus and policy stage is the stronger variable compared with critical 
coverage. In the period prior to 30 June 2003, policy certainty measured by 
elite consensus remained at a high level, while that measured by policy 
stage was low. Meanwhile, media consensus over negative framing 
remained at a medium level for most of this period. From this perspective, 
critical coverage can occur despite a high level of elite consensus. The elite 
consensus-news framing hypothesis was not supported in this case.  
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Moreover, process tracing showed that media influence was possible 
for the policy changes, including the amendments to Article 23 proposals 
and the agenda changes in the Legco. In other words, critical coverage could 
influence policy despite a high level of elite consensus and a medium level 
of media consensus. It can be argued that overall policy certainty concerning 
the Article 23 proposal was weakened by uncertainty in terms of early 
policy stage. Thus, the Article 23 proposal, as a policy at an early stage, 
could be changed even though media consensus over critical coverage was 
not high. From this perspective, elite consensus was not a strong variable 
compared with critical coverage. Rather, the uncertainty found at an early 
policy stage is a crucial condition for media influence on policy.  
 
In the period subsequent to 1 July 2003, as mentioned above, there 
was a dramatic decline of elite consensus. However, policymakers’ 
decisions on policy changes were all made before sustained critical coverage 
was run. Although there might be potential media effects on policy, news 
coverage was not a key factor in these changes. In this case, the policy 
changes in this period do not help testing whether critical coverage can 
influence policy when there is a low level of policy certainty measured by 
elite consensus and policy stage.  
 
For the elite consensus-news framing hypothesis, despite the elite 
debate, throughout the period subsequent to 1 July 2003, the media 
consensus over critical coverage had never been higher than a medium level. 
When there was disagreement between the PRC and SAR governments in 
August 2003, the media consensus level further decreased to a low level. In 
other words, the level of media consensus over critical framing did not 
increase although there was a decline of elite consensus. From this 
perspective, elite debate may not lead to an increase in media consensus 
over critical framing.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, the case of Article 23 debate 
did not support all the hypotheses of this study. Regardless of the elite 
consensus, media consensus over critical tone remained at a medium level. 
In addition, media influence on policy was possible despite a high level of 
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elite consensus. However, the policy changes prior to 1 July 2003 support 
the hypothesis that media influence is possible when there is policy 
uncertainty measured by policy stage.  
 
6. Possible Causes of Policy Changes 
As mentioned above, the policy changes subsequent to 1 July 2003 
were unlikely to have been influenced by news coverage. Moreover, the 
hypotheses of this study are not fully supported by the case of Article 23. In 
order to provide a better account of the role of the media, I examined several 
possible factors for policy change. Some factors, namely the institutions and 
the pressure from non-domestic actors, are independent of news coverage. 
By contrast, the other factors interact with news coverage. Such factors 
include the election cycle, long-term policy image, short-term public views, 
mass movements and actors’ beliefs and strategies. It should be noted that 
these factors are not mutually exclusive. Rather, I suggest that these factors 
co-exist and interact with one another. 
 
6.1 Institutional Factors 
The first institutional factor is the Basic Law. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, The Hong Kong 
SAR on its own should enact laws concerning national security offences 39. 
In this sense, for the initiation of the enactment of Article 23, this 
constitutional factor was one of the main conditions.    
 
The normal practice of legislation was also important. Even though 
the Administration planned to enact the controversial law in only seven 
months, the Administration had to follow the normal procedures for 
legislation, including public consultation and scrutiny in the Legco. 
Although these legislative procedures did not trigger policy change directly, 
they not only provided opportunities (including public consultation and 
Legco meetings) for  opponents  to criticise the proposed laws, but also time 
for the pro-democrat camp to consolidate the activities of various groups 
                                               
39 The Basic Law of the HKSAR, Article 23: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html 
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and launch campaigns to influence the public views and news coverage. 
Without these procedures, the opponents would have had limited time and 
opportunities to exert pressure on the Administration to influence the 
proposed law. From this perspective, normal practice governing legislation 
proved to be a necessary condition for policy change throughout the Article 
23 debate. 
 
The institutional context of the Legco played a decisive factor in 
policy change. The pro-government camp, as a majority in the Legco, was 
able to dominate the Bills Committee, moving forward scrutiny of the NSB 
as the Administration planned before July 2003. However, when the LP and 
some other pro-government legislators, changed their positions in early July 
2003, the proposed law could not be passed. In this case, the legislative plan 
would either have to be deferred or withdrawn. From this perspective, in the 
existing institutional context, elite disagreement between the Administration 
and the pro-government legislators was a sufficient condition for the 
deferral of Article 23 legislation in early July.  
 
6.2 Pressures from Non-domestic Actors 
As mentioned in previous chapter, Article 23 legislation involved 
some non-domestic actors, namely the PRC Government and some western 
governments and international organisations. According to the Basic Law, 
the Hong Kong SAR exercises a high degree of autonomy40. Article 23 also 
states that the Hong Kong SAR shall enact the law on its own41. In this case, 
the PRC Government is not officially supposed to interfere with the 
enactment of Article 23. In other words, the PRC Government was bound 
by the Basic Law. Nevertheless, the PRC Government, through unofficial 
channels, played an important role throughout the debate. This role was 
evidenced by the PRC top officials’ statement backing the SAR 
Administration’s proposals. In addition, the SAR Administration did not 
announce critical amendments to and the withdrawal of the NSB until the 
PRC Government had agreed to do so. In other words, the PRC 
                                               
40 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, Article 2: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_1.html 
41 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, Article 23: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html 
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Government’s decision was not only a cause for the persistence of the 
legislative plan before July 2003, but also a decisive factor for the critical 
changes to and the withdrawal of the NSB after July 2003.  
 
Some western governments and international organisations, 
particularly the US and the UK governments, also exerted an influence as 
their criticisms of the NSB, as mentioned in Chapter 5, affected foreign 
investors’ confidence in Hong Kong. The SAR Administration’s 
considerations of western governments’ criticisms were supported by some 
evidence. First, a few days prior to the gazetting of the NSB, while all the 
legislators were not able to get hold of the Bill, the SAR Administration sent 
the Bill to the British Consul and the General Chamber, the largest chamber 
of commerce dominated by foreign enterprises, for reference42. Second, both 
the democrats and the SAR Administration lobbied the officials and 
politicians of western governments and international bodies. Third, after the 
1 July protest, the Administration proposed three critical amendments to the 
proposed laws, including deleting the whole section regarding the 
proscription of organisations, which met with the greatest criticism by 
western governments. From this perspective, the Administration not only 
took account of the pressures of western governments and international 
organisations throughout the debate, but also made relevant amendments to 
the Bill in response to those pressures.   
 
In order to put their message across to the public in Hong Kong, the 
non-domestic actors relied on the media. Thus, western governments and 
organisations announced their statements through press releases. Defending 
the NSB, the PRC officials also delivered public speeches at various events. 
In this sense, the media functioned as a communicator putting across the 
non-domestic actors’ message to the public. However, the Hong Kong 
newspapers have very limited circulations in mainland China and western 
countries. Thus, regardless of the news framing, these non-domestic actors 
were relatively independent of the domestic media coverage in Hong Kong. 
In other words, the relationship between the domestic media and non-
domestic actors was asymmetric. 
                                               
42 MPDN, 13 February 2003, page A05 
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6.3 Election Cycle 
The other institutional factor is the election cycle. From 2002 and 
2003, there were two critical elections, namely the CE in February 2002 and 
the District Council (DC) elections in November 2003. It was believed that 
enacting Article 23, as a controversial issue, would trigger a lively debate, 
affecting the pro-government camp’s performance in the elections. This 
argument is supported by the fact that both the PRC and SAR governments 
avoided disclosing any ideas about Article 23 legislation until Tung Chee-
hwa had been elected uncontested in February 2002. Thus, it is believed that 
the two governments tried to avoid any controversy on Article 23 during the 
CE election. In addition, according to the Administration’s schedule, the 
NSB was passed four months prior to the DC election. It is believed that the 
Administration worried that the Article 23 debate would affect the 
popularity of pro-government candidates and the election results. 
 
Although none of the Principal Officials and Exco members is 
elected43, the Administration should take the DC and Legco elections into 
account. As Jasper Tsang stated, if the pro-government camp could not 
maintain a majority in the Legco and the DCs, there would be difficulties 
for the Administration’s governance. Thus, during policy making, the 
Administration had to consider the effect on the pro-government camp’s 
performance in the elections. Tsang also admitted that the Administration 
and the pro-government camp planned to pass the NSB as soon as possible 
in order to avoid the negative impact on pro-government candidates at the 
DC election (interview on 17 January 2008). The election cycle was also 
crucial to the Administration’s withdrawal of the NSB. After the legislation 
had been deferred in early July 2003, the Administration realised that the 
task could not be achieved before the DC election in November 2003. 
Neither was it likely to have been passed before the Legco election in 
September 2003. Thus, the legislative proposals were withdrawn in order to 
settle the debate on Article 23 as soon as possible. Otherwise, the pro-
government camp would have been seriously affected at the elections.  
 
                                               
43 According to the Basic Law, the SAR Principal Officials are nominated by the CE and 
appointed by the PRC Government, while the Exco members are appointed by the CE. 
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It is also reasonable to argue that, due to the election cycle, 
policymakers became relatively sensitive to criticisms of Article 23, 
including those by the media. In this case, despite a medium level of media 
consensus, policymakers perceived a negative tone in the news coverage in 
the period subsequent to mid-October 2002. In other words, the media’s 
influence was increased by the election cycle. However, critical coverage 
did not simply prohibit the Administration from initiating legislation. Rather, 
the Administration acted tactically, trying to complete the legislative 
process between the elections. These strategies of the Administration will be 
discussed later.   
 
6.4 Long-term Policy Image 
The Administration’s sensitivity to negative coverage may be linked 
with the long term public understanding of the Article 23. This argument is 
consistent with the concept of ‘policy image’ proposed by Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993). Since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, as mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the pro-democrat camp and some human rights groups have 
described Article 23 as a threat to human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong. 
Thus, both the PRC and the SAR Governments had realised that Article 23 
was an unpopular issue before deciding to enact it. Thus, it is sensible to 
suggest that the government officials were particularly sensitive to negative 
news coverage, and proactively responded to any criticisms, including those 
by the media even though media consensus did not remain at a high level. 
 
6.5 Short-term Public Mood 
In addition to long-term image, short-term public attitudes towards 
the Administration and the Article 23 proposal during the debate were also 
important to policy change. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the 
Hong Kong economy had begun to slide into recession, which created 
financial difficulties for many people. In addition to the economic downturn, 
there were at least three incidents directly affecting public attitudes towards 
the SAR Government in 2003. Firstly, in early 2003, the outbreak of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) not only resulted in 299 deaths, but 
also resulted in further economic downturn and high unemployment rates 
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recorded in Hong Kong. Although the outbreak of the epidemic disease may 
have been the result of various factors, there were many criticisms of the 
government’s delayed response.   
 
Secondly, despite the economic downturn, the Financial Secretary 
Antony Leung in his budget speech in March 2003, proposed an increase in 
salary tax 44  which would impose a further financial burden on people. 
Thirdly, the media uncovered the fact that Antony Leung had purchased a 
luxury car before he announced rises in vehicle taxes in the budget45. In 
order to express his regrets over the matter, Leung donated HK$380000, 
double the amount of the tax difference, to charity46 . Nevertheless, his 
integrity and political wisdom were challenged 47 . Subsequently, Leung 
announced his resignation on 16 July 2003, also the day of Regina Ip’s 
resignation.  
 
Although the PRC Government launched some economic initiatives, 
namely the CEPA48 and the rules allowing mainlanders to visit Hong Kong 
on individual visas49, the public mood did not improve. According to a 
regular survey, there was a dramatic rise in dissatisfaction rates towards the 
SAR Government in the first half of 2003. In January, about 50% of people 
claimed that they were dissatisfied with the SAR Government. This 
percentage gradually increased to a peak of 70% in July 200350. Finally, half 
a million people took to the streets on 1 July 2003. An on-site survey also 
shows that about 90% of marchers protested against Article 23 legislation, 
while more than 90% claimed that they were dissatisfied with the overall 
performance of the SAR Government51.  
                                               
44 Budget Speech 2003/04, paragraph 77-79: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2003/eng/budget.htm#Salaries%20Tax 
45 ADN 9 March 2003, page A01 
46 ADN 11 March 2003, page A01 
47 MPDN 10 March 2003, page A02; ADN 17 March 2003, page A07; 18 March 2003, 
page A08 
48 ODN 6 June 2003, page A31 
49 ODN 6 March 2003, page A16 
50 Press release on 5 August 2003, Website of the Public Opinion Programme,  University 
of Hong Kong: http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release127.html 
51 Chan, J. M. and Chung, R. T. Y. (2003) ‘Who can Mobilise 500,000 People to Rally? 
July 1 Demonstration and Political Communication in Hong Kong ‘ Column Article, Public 
Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong, published on 16 July 2003: 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns22.html 
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There is evidence to suggest that the Administration had been aware 
of the unfavourable public mood during public consultation in 2002. In late 
November 2002, Jasper Tsang claimed that the government’s first priority 
was to ease people’s discontent. Thus, he urged the CE to seriously consider 
people’s suggestions on the Article 23 proposal52. At the end of the public 
consultation in December 2002, some officials suggested that the 
Administration should make concessions because of its low popularity53. 
Thus, it is believed that the Administration and the pro-government camp 
took account of unfavourable public attitudes towards the Government and 
Article 23. 
 
However, the Administration and other politicians were not simply 
made aware of public views from news coverage. Neither did they follow 
public opinions and news coverage. Rather, the Administration and pro-
government considered public views as a dependent variable affected by 
news coverage, thus trying to manipulate news framing in order to influence 
public views. This argument was supported by statements made by a 
government official and an Exco member. Firstly, since mid-October 2002, 
the MPDN and ADN were critically framed, the Administration had realised 
the reverse of public opinion. In early November 2002, Regina Ip 
complained that the media did not cover her explanations of government 
proposals, making people feel that their views were being ignored by the 
government 54 . Two days later, Ip further claimed that it was negative 
coverage that had changed public opinion on the government proposals55. In 
other words, the Administration believed that public views had been 
affected by news coverage. 
 
An Exco member, Cheng Yiu-tong held similar views. Denying the 
direct pressure from news coverage, Cheng claimed that he did not simply 
get a sense of public opinion from the media. Furthermore, he claimed that 
public opinion was changed by negative coverage. As he stated, people felt 
                                               
52 MPDN, 26 November 2002, page A08 
53 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
54 MPDN, 1 November 2002, page A07. 
55 MPDN, 3 November 2002, page A04. 
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that the enactment of Article 23 was the civic duty of Chinese citizens in the 
first month of public consultation. Subsequently, people’s misperceptions 
were created after some politicians’ criticisms had been continually 
magnified by the media. Thus, there was reversal of public opinion on the 
proposed laws. Cheng further claimed that, at a later stage of the debate, the 
media completely ignored the voices of the pro-government camp, and that 
the media wanted to topple plans for Article 23 legislation (interview on 2 
January 2008). In other words, Cheng believes that the media not only had 
an influence on, but also intended to influence public opinion to order to 
influence the proposed laws.  
 
In this sense, the Administration did not recognise the representative 
role of the media. Rather, the public mood was considered to be a dependent 
variable affected by news coverage. In order to avoid pressure from the 
unfavourable public mood, the Administration paid a high level of attention 
to the news coverage and lobbied the journalists. This explains why Regina 
Ip and other government officials attended several forums organised by 
journalists’ groups, explaining the government proposals. 
 
However, it should be noted that politicians did not consider general 
public opinion. According to Jasper Tsang, although there were opinion 
polls monitoring public views, the DAB assessed people’s view through its 
own channels, which meant mainly via direct contact with people and the 
community network of the party. As the assessment was unsystematic and 
biased, the DAB underestimated people’s misgivings about the proposed 
laws, ignoring changes in the public mood and moving forward scrutiny of 
the NSB in the Legco. Tsang stated: 
During the outbreak of SARS, we kept visiting the 
communities. We did not talk about Article 23 there. Rather, 
we only helped people improve environmental health. We 
perceived that people appreciated and supported us in this 
regard. Being over optimistic, we thought that we were 
supported by people, but we did not see the dead in the 
Amoy Garden and the Prince of Wales Hospital (PWH,)56 
which resulted in strong discontent towards the Government. 
There was also an economic problem. We did not realise that 
                                               
56 Amoy Garden, a real estate and PWH were the most important disaster areas affected by  
SARS. 
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such problems were even more important. People’s 
discontents had accumulated over several months. However, 
we did not receive any message (from the party’s community 
network) about the objections to Article 23. We focused on 
the debate in the Legco only. That is the problem. (Interview 
on 17 January 2008) 
 
As the party mainly contacted its supporters through the community 
network, the party was selectively informed about public opinion and either 
intentionally or unintentionally, reinforced its own ideas about Article 23 
legislation.  
 
Politician’s subjective understanding of their voters’ views also 
played a critical role in the Administration’s deferral of the NSB on 7 July 
2003. On 5 July 2003, when the Administration and the Exco rejected James 
Tien’s proposal for the deferral of legislation and persisted with the original 
schedule, Tien claimed that he would look at ‘people’s responses’. The 
following evening, however, Tien resigned from the Exco. The LP also 
decided not to support the Bill, forcing the Administration to postpone the 
legislation.  
 
According to Selina Chow, the LP Vice-Chairman, Tien did not 
conduct a systematic analysis of public opinion. Rather, once the 
Administration had announced its decision, the LP received a great deal of 
feedback through various channels, mainly contacts with voters of the 
functional constituencies57. Chow added that, at the critical moment, the 
core members of the party also ‘took the pulse direct’ (made their own 
judgments by gut feeling) (interview on 16 January 2008). Chow’s 
statement was supported by the business sectors’ responses to the deferral of 
the legislation. The General Chamber, by which Tien was returned to the 
Legco, welcomed the Administration’s decision to defer the legislation, 
urging the Administration to focus on improving the economy. The other 
chambers of commerce and some investment banks expressed similar 
                                               
57 Between 2000 and 2004, all the 8 Liberal legislators were returned by the functional 
constituencies.    
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views58. In this sense, the LP’s decision was mainly based on the views of 
party voters and politicians’ subjective interpretations of these views.  
 
However, the media’s influence on LP was denied by Chow for two 
reasons. First, making its decision within one day, they had no time to go 
through all the news coverage. Second, after the Administration announced 
its compromised proposal on 5 July, Chow perceived that the news coverage 
concerned was descriptive or neutral. Thus, the party did not feel any 
pressure from media (ibid.). Chow’s perceptions were consistent with the 
results of framing analysis that, as shown in Table 7.2, media consensus 
over negative framing declined to a low level between 5 and 6 July 2003. In 
this case, news coverage was unlikely to have played a significant role in the 
LP’s decision on objecting to the Administration.    
 
Not only the pro-government camp, but also the opponents were 
informed of public views in a similar way. According to Alan Leong, 
Chairman of the Bar Association at that time, although he learned about 
public views from news coverage, which ‘slightly’ reinforced his ideas, he 
attended numerous forums and consultation meetings organised by various 
groups. Leong stated:  
If I only read newspapers, I would have no feeling for real 
life. At those meetings, we have face-to-face contact with 
people, hearing their voices, seeing their faces… Through 
this face-to-face experience with people, I could confirm the 
messages expressed in the news coverage. (Interview on 28 
November 2008)  
 
As Leong stated, from the forums, he felt that public views were consistent 
with his own. However, Leong only mentioned the forums organised by 
pro-democrat groups such as Christian groups and the CTU (ibid). In other 
words, like the proponents of Article 23, he interpreted the public views 
selectively.  
 
In this sense, both the pro-government camp and the opposition did 
not get sense of public views systematically. Rather, politicians selectively 
listened to their own supporters or people with similar political tendencies, 
                                               
58 MPDN, 8 July 2003, page A10 
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while voices different from their own positions, including those expressed in 
news coverage, were played down. In this sense, politicians’ own beliefs 
were important in their interpretations and uses of public opinions. This 
finding is consistent with Sabatier’s (1988) argument of policy learning that 
political actors resist information challenging their basic beliefs, and use an 
information buttress and elaborate their beliefs.  
 
In short, during the Article 23 debate, there was evidence showing 
that unfavourable public attitudes towards the Administration and the 
proposed law were taken into account by the Administration and the pro-
government camp. Considering news coverage as an influential factor 
affecting public views, politicians paid high levels of attention to news 
coverage and tried to influence news framing. However, neither the 
proponents nor the opponents looked at the general public opinions 
systematically. Rather, through direct contacts and the community network, 
politicians focused on the views of their supporters, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. In this case, politicians’ perceptions of public views were 
distorted. The media’s influence on politicians was also weakened. This 
explains why the pro-government camp wrongly estimated people’s 
discontent towards the government and the proposed law until the 1 July 
protest.  
 
6.6 Large-scale Demonstration 
The other factor affecting policy change was large-scale protest. 
During the Article 23 debate, both the proponents and the opponents of 
Article 23 legislation organised numerous protests. Of these, the largest-
scale one on 1 July 2003 was particularly important. Before this protest, 
despite a medium level of media consensus over critical framing, the 
Administration had not made any critical amendments to the NSB. Neither 
did any pro-government politicians refuse to support the Bill. Following this 
protest, media consensus had never been higher than a medium level. 
However, the SAR and PRC governments immediately held a series of 
urgent meetings at which decisions on critical amendments to the NSB were 
made. Some pro-government legislators also changed their positions on the 
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Bill. In this sense, the medium level of media consensus created by the 
MPDN and ADN’s critical coverage was not a sufficient condition for 
critical amendments to the Bill and the decline of elite consensus. Rather, 
the large-scale protest on 1 July was the crucial factor in these changes. 
 
How did the large-scale protest influence policy? The 
Administration and the government camp’s response to protests provided 
important insights. On December 2002, the democrats organised an anti-
Article 23 protest with only 60 thousand demonstrators59. In response to this, 
the Administration verbally re-confirmed its plan to adjust the Article 23 
proposal a week later60. This delayed response showed the limited pressure 
brought about by this protest. In contrast, after 500 thousand people took to 
the streets on 1 July 2003, the CE immediately held an urgent meeting, 
discussing critical amendments to the Bill. In addition, most principal 
officials stressed that they had clearly heard people’s voices61. At the special 
meeting of the PRC Government on 3 and 4 July 2003, the wrong 
assessment of public opinion in Hong Kong was discussed62. From this 
perspective, policymakers considered the scale of protest as an indicator of 
public views. Thus, the large-scale protest on 1 July was considered to be 
the expression of strong public opinion against the SAR Administration and 
its policies. This not only created sufficient pressure on the Administration 
and some pro-government legislators, but also forced them to change their 
positions.  
 
In addition, when the PRC and SAR governments were considering 
the amendments to the Bill between 2 July and 4 July 2003, the democrats 
organised a further anti-Article 23 rally outside the Legco Building on 9 
July, the day of the second and third reading of the Bill. Demanding the 
withdrawal of the proposed law, the democrats claimed that there might be a 
few hundred thousand people joining the rally63. Because of the large scale 
of the 1 July protest, the PRC and SAR Governments and the pro-
                                               
59 MPDN 16 December 2002, page A04 
60 MPDN 22 December 2002, page A04 
61 MPDN 3 July 2003, page A06 
62 MPDN 5 July 2003, page A02. 
63 MPDN 3 July 2003, page A03 
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government camp ought to consider the pressure not only from past large-
scale protests, but also from future mass movements. 
 
There was also an interaction between the 1 July protest and news 
coverage. In the three days subsequent to the 1 July protest, the MPDN’s 
framing changed from mixed to negative. As a result, there was an increase 
in the level of media consensus. Describing the protest as the expression of 
public opinion, the critical coverage criticised the Administration, its Article 
23 proposals and even its governing style64. In this sense, the extremely 
large-scale protest created an issue and an opportunity for the media to 
criticise the Administration and its policies. In the meantime, critical 
coverage legitimates the protest, magnifying the pressure on the proponents 
of Article 23, and reinforcing the democrats’ confidence in the upcoming 
anti-Article 23 rally. In this sense, I suggest that news coverage and large-
scale mass movements reinforce each other.  
 
It can be argued that it was the media coverage that mobilised the 
demonstrators. For example, the ADN’s front page was headlined ‘Go to the 
Street, See you there’ on 1 July 200365 . A survey conducted along the 
marching route on 1 July 2003 shows that over 60% of the demonstrators 
regarded information from newspapers, radios and television as having 
influenced their decision to participate in the rally. About 50% of the 
demonstrators also said that they most frequently read the ADN, while the 
ODN and MPDN lagged far behind at 22% and 16% respectively66. 
 
However, the causal relation between news coverage and people’s 
participation in the protest remain unknown for some reasons. Firstly, the 
survey finding is completely based on people’s perceptions of the media 
effect on themselves. Secondly, although 50% of respondents read the ADN, 
it is unknown whether these people were mobilised by the ADN’s coverage, 
or their actions and their choice of newspaper were based on their existing 
                                               
64 MPDN 2 July 2003, page A02 
65 ADN, 1 July 2003, page A01. 
66 Chan, J. M. and Chung, R. T. Y. (2003) ‘Who can Mobilise 500,000 People to Rally? 
July 1 Demonstration and Political Communication in Hong Kong ‘ Column Article, Public 
Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong, published on 16 July 2003: 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns22.html 
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political stances. Thirdly, the survey found that around 70% of respondents 
regarded the call for action by friends, colleagues and schoolmates as 
influential. More than 90% demonstrators of participated in the rally 
alongside friends, families, spouses or schoolmates. In other words, social 
networks played an important role in people’s participation in the July 1 
protest67. 
 
In short, although it is unknown whether it was the news media that 
mobilised the demonstrators, there was a positive reinforcement effect 
between critical coverage and large-scale protest. As the large number of 
demonstrators was considered to result from strong public views against the 
Administration and the Article 23 proposal, the large-scale protest on 1 July 
2003 not only placed pressure on the Administration and the pro-
government camp, but also provided an opportunity for the media to run 
further critical coverage, magnifying the pressures on policymakers and 
reinforcing the democrats’ confidence in further actions. Consequently, the 
SAR and PRC governments made critical amendments to the NSB, while 
some pro-government legislators changed their positions, resulting in 
deferral of the legislation. 
 
6.7 Beliefs of Actors 
One element in the political actors’ ideas and beliefs is their 
understanding of Article 23. The pro-government camp’s support of the 
Article 23 was based on its idea that the enactment of Article 23 was the 
constitutional duty of Hong Kong. As Jasper Tsang stressed, the DAB truly 
believed that the law should be enacted (interview on 17 January 2008). In 
this sense, the pro-government camp’s idea was an important condition for 
their persistence over the enactment of Article 23.   
 
However, persistency of ideas varies from group to group. After 
strong public views against the Administration and the Article 23 proposal 
had been expressed by the large number of demonstrators on 1 July 2003, 
Tsang claimed that he did not change his position even though he realised 
                                               
67 ibid 
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there were strong public views against Article 23. Conversely, he, as the 
Chairman of the DAB, suggested that the Bill should be passed as soon as 
possible, so that the Administration could prove that the opposition’s 
misgivings were unfounded (interview on 17 January 2008). On the other 
hand, the LP and some pro-government legislators’ positions were changed 
after the 1 July protest.68.  
 
Ideas were also important to the opponents of Article 23. Since 1989, 
the democrats in Hong Kong have considered Article 23 as a threat to 
human rights and freedoms. Throughout the debate, this idea was 
highlighted by the opponents of Article 23. Democrats such as a DP 
legislator, James To (interview on 31 January 2008) and the Chairman of 
the Bar Association, Alan Leong also emphasised that their positions on the 
proposed law were mainly based on their beliefs in human rights and 
freedoms (interview on 28 November 2008). Thus, it can be argued that the 
democrats’ campaign against the Article 23 legislation was driven by their 
beliefs.  
 
Not only the democrats, but also some journalists at various levels 
have similar ideas about human rights and freedoms. Throughout the 
controversy on Article 23 legislation, these two groups, namely the HKJA, 
and the Hong Kong News Executives' Association (HKNEA), voiced their 
concerns over the government proposal. They also conducted a series of 
surveys, claiming that the proposed law would affect press freedom and the 
operation of the media seriously69. On 1 July 2003, there were also 1000 
journalists, including the Chief Editor of the MPDN and owners of the ADN 
and the other pro-democrat paper, the Hong Kong Economic Journal, took 
to the streets. Thus, it is appropriate to suggest that because of the beliefs in 
freedom of press, some journalists highlighted the criticisms of the proposed 
law in their media outlets. More importantly, the journalists’ campaign was 
taken into account by the Administration. Every time amendments were 
proposed by the Administration, the issue of press freedom was addressed. 
In the first round of amendments to its proposals in January 2003, the 
                                               
68 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A04; 8 July 2003, page A10 
69 MPDN, 21 December 2002, page A05; 4 May 2003, page A16 
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Administration proposed that a judicial warrant was required in respect of 
search for or seizure of journalistic materials. In June 2003, the 
Administration proposed a time limit of two years for prosecution for the 
offence of handling seditious publications. In early July, the Administration 
further proposed introducing ‘public interest’ as a defence for unlawful 
disclosure of certain official information, in order to protect and alleviate the 
concerns of the media.  
 
The media’s influence was also enhanced by the positive 
reinforcement relations between the ideas of the democrats and media 
coverage. James To felt that highlighting the criticisms of the proposed law, 
the media ‘helped’ the democrats a great deal throughout the Article 23 
debate (interview on 31 January 2008). Alan Leong also claimed that if the 
media had not magnified and delivered the Bar Association’s voices to the 
public, the outcome of the debate would have been different. He also 
believed that because of their misgivings concerning the press freedom, 
journalists highlighted the Bar Association’s criticisms of the proposed law 
(interview on 28 November 2008). From this perspective, the ideas of 
democrats and journalists reinforced each other. Because of their ideas, 
journalists tended to highlight the criticisms of the proposed law. From the 
critical coverage, the democrats were aware of the media’s support, 
reinforcing their ideas and encouraging them to take further actions against 
the proposed law. This also provided further opportunities for the media to 
run critical coverage in support of the democrats’ campaigns.  
 
The other element in political actors’ belief systems is political, 
stance which enables the liaison among these groups to become established. 
During the debate on Article 23, the voices against the proposed law not 
only came from the pro-democrat parties and their politicians, but also from 
some groups such as the Bar Association and Christian groups. Although 
these groups are not affiliated to any pro-democrat party, they traditionally 
play an active role in the pro-democrat camp, supporting the democratic 
movement in Hong Kong. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
these groups proactively supported the pro-democrat camp, opposing the 
government proposals. Similarly, the pro-government groups also formed an 
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alliance supporting the enactment of Article 23. Although the media, in this 
case, could enhance the communication among various groups, news 
coverage was not a necessary factor for co-operation between various 
groups. Rather, political stance played an important role in mobilisation of 
the campaign against the legislation, placing pressure on the Administration. 
This finding is consistent with Sabatier’s (1989) argument that actors’ 
beliefs function as the ‘glue’ in coalitions. 
 
6.8 Strategies of actors  
As the institutional rational choice approach suggests, political 
actors are not only influenced by external factors, but also act tactically in 
order to maximise their own payoffs. During the Article 23 debate, tactical 
actions were taken both by the proponents and opponents in order to protect 
their own interests.  Although the Hong Kong SAR had to enact Article 23 
according to the Basic Law, the SAR Administration was not only 
constrained by this constitutional duty, but also made use of it. In order to 
legitimate their legislative plans, throughout the debate, both the PRC and 
SAR governments, together with the pro-government camp, described the 
enactment of Article 23 as the constitutional duty of Hong Kong. In other 
words, the notion of constitutional duty was used to defend the proposed 
law. Neither were the Administration and the pro-government camp simply 
constrained by the election cycle. Rather, as mentioned above, with its 
constitutional power, the Administration manipulated the legislative 
schedule in order to minimise the negative influence on pro-government 
candidates during elections.  
 
Moreover, in order to put its message across to the public, the 
Administration not only tried to influence news framing, but also created its 
own channel to reach people. The first of these strategies was to defend the 
proposed law through exclusive interviews with government officials 
conducted by the ODN. The other strategy was distributing pamphlets 
responding to criticisms and misgivings about the proposed law. The pro-
government groups also set up an alliance, launching a series of campaigns, 
including rallies and advertisements in newspapers.      
 174 
 
The pro-democrat legislators also incorporated their actions in the 
Legco with street campaigns in order to magnify the voices against the 
proposed law. While the democrats entered into an alliance with pro-
democrat groups, launching a series of protests, pro-democrat legislators 
initiated a series of motions criticising the Administration. After the 1 July 
protest, the pro-democrat camp also initiated an adjournment motion in the 
Legco, urging the Administration to respond to people’s demands. Although 
the subject matter was removed when the Administration deferred the 
legislation on 7 July 2003, the democrats shifted the focus of the protest on 
9 July 2003, calling for political reform, including introducing universal 
suffrage for the CE and the Legco, which is traditionally a demand made by 
the pro-democrat camp. In this sense, the democrats adopted strategies not 
only to magnify voices against the proposed law, but also to take an 
opportunity to give voice to their own demands.    
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In sum, not all the hypotheses in this study were supported by case 
of Article 23 debate. Despite the change in elite consensus, the media 
consensus over critical tone remained at medium level. In other words, 
media framing did not change with elite consensus level. In addition, 
process tracing demonstrated that media influence on policy was possible 
despite the high level of elite consensus. Thus, elite consensus was not a 
stronger variable than critical framing. The only hypothesis supported by the 
Article 23 debate is that media influence is likely to be possible when there 
is uncertainty measured by policy stage.  
 
In order to provide a better explanation of the policy change, I 
examine several factors and their relation with news coverage. As shown in 
Table 7.4, there was a series of factors involved in policy changes in the 
Article 23 debate. Among these factors, the institutions, the long-term image 
of Article 23, election cycle, actors’ beliefs and strategies exerted an 
influence throughout the debate. Because of the institutional constraints of 
the Basic Law, the SAR Administration had to initiate Article 23 legislation. 
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The institutional procedures of legislation also provided opportunities and 
time for the democrats to ally themselves with other groups and magnify the 
voices against the proposed law. In this process, the actors’ beliefs not only 
influenced actors’ positions on the enactment of Article 23, but also 
functioned as the ‘glue’, facilitating the coalition of various groups. In this 
case, critical news coverage played a supportive role, reinforcing democrats’ 
ideas and confidence in the campaign against the proposal laws, and 
magnifying the pressure on the Administration. 
 
Meanwhile, because of the negative long-term image of Article 23, 
the Administration and the pro-government camp considered Article 23 to 
be a controversial issue. Thus, they became relatively sensitive to criticisms. 
In order to minimise the negative impact on the pro-government camp, the 
Administration, together with the pro-government parties, designed a 
legislative schedule tactically, trying to enact Article 23 in the period 
between the CE election in 2002 and the DC election in 2003.   
 
The Administration’s sensitivity to critical coverage was increased 
by negative image and the election cycle. Moreover, the Administration 
believed that public views on the Article 23 proposal had been influenced 
by critical coverage. Thus, although the media consensus remained only at a 
medium level, the Administration made some minor adjustments to the 
proposed law before July 2003 in response to the criticisms, including those 
by the media. From this perspective, policy was not only influenced by 
critical coverage, but also by the Administration’s tactical mediation.  
 
However, because politicians learned about public views from the 
subjective interpretations of their supporters, the pro-government camp 
wrongly assess short-term public views. Thus, the proposed law persisted 
and its scrutiny was moved forward by pro-government legislators as the 
Administration scheduled until the large-scale protest on 1 July 2003, which 
was considered to be an expression of strong public views against the 
Administration and its policies. Since then, some pro-government 
politicians’ had changed their stances, resulting in elite debate. This protest 
also triggered the PRC Government’s special meeting and reform of the 
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institution for Hong Kong policy. In this case, the critical coverage of the 
MPDN and ADN legitimated the protests and the voices against Article 23, 
reinforcing the pressure on the Administration. Nevertheless, all these high 
cost policy change took place only following the 1 July protest. Furthermore, 
the media consensus remained at a medium level, like that prior to 1 July. In 
this sense, critical coverage was not a sufficient condition for the high cost 
policy changes. 
 
Moreover, the two sections of the NSB criticised by western 
governments and journalist groups were only abolished following the 1 July 
protest. Thus, it is sensible to suggest that pressure from these two parties 
was not a sufficient condition for high cost policy change. Without the 
pressure created by the1 July protest, the Administration would not have 
made these changes. Neither was news coverage an influential factor in the 
withdrawal of the NSB in September 2003. Rather, in order for the pro-
government camp to retain its majority of the DC and Legco, the 
Administration and the pro-government camp had to avoid any further 
negative influence on pro-government candidates in the upcoming DC and 
Legco elections. In this sense, the election cycle was the main consideration 
of the withdrawal of the Bill.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I argue that the routes of 
media effect on policy are more complex than the hypotheses in this study. 
Rather, policy change was the result of a series of co-existing factors and 
their interactions. News coverage was only one of these factors which was 
applicable for some of the policy changes.  
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Table 7.4: Factors Affecting Policy Changes during Article 23 
Debate 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
N
on-dom
estic actors 
L
ong-term
 policy im
age 
Short term
 public m
ood 
M
ass M
ovem
ents 
E
lection C
ycles 
Ideas / B
eliefs 
Strategies 
Role of 
Media 
Before  
26/2/02 
The Administration’s 
decision on enacting 
Article 23 
√ √ √   √ √ √ Not necessary / 
potential effect 
7/11/02 
-28/1/03 
The Administration 
committed itself to 
consider amending its 
proposals, and then 
announced amendments 
to its proposal.  
√ √ √ √  √ √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas/ 
Magnifying 
pressure 
25/11/02 The DP confirmed the 
intention to initiate a 
motion against Article 
23 legislation at the 
Legco meeting on 11 
December 2002.   
√  √ √   √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas/ 
Magnifying 
pressure 
12/2/03 The DP confirmed the 
motion criticising the 
Administration’s 
analysis of consultation 
results at the Legco 
meeting on 26 February 
2003. 
√  √ √   √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas/ 
Magnifying 
pressure 
7-27/6/03 The Administration 
proposed 51 
amendments to the 
NSB.  
√ √ √ √  √ √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas/ 
Magnifying 
pressure 
1/7/03 Urgent meeting of the 
CE’s Office. 
√  √  √ √   Not necessary 
2/7/03 The CE’s special 
meeting with Principal 
Officials and leaders of 
pro-government party. 
    √    Not necessary 
3/7/03 An adjournment motion 
in the Legco. 
√  √ √ √ √ √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas/ 
Magnifying 
pressure 
3-4/7/03 Special meeting of the 
Politburo Standing 
Committee of the 
Communist Party of 
China. 
 √   √    Not necessary 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 7.4 (Cont.) 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
N
on-dom
estic actors 
L
ong-term
 policy im
age 
Short term
 public m
ood 
M
ass M
ovem
ents 
E
lection C
ycles 
Ideas / B
eliefs 
Strategies 
Role of 
Media 
5/7/03 The Administration’s 
announcement of 3 
critical amendments to 
the Bill 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas; 
Forcing the 
Administration 
to confirm 
decision 
6/7/03 James Tien’s 
resignation from the 
Exco. 
   √ √    Not necessary / 
potential effect 
7/7/03 The Administration’s 
announcement of 
deferral of the 2nd and 
3rd readings of the Bill  
√    √    Not necessary / 
potential effect 
Early 
7/03 
Setting up of a high 
level Central Leading 
Group on Hong Kong 
and Macau Affairs in 
PRC Government. 
    √    Not necessary 
5/9/03 The Administration’s 
withdrawal of the NSB. 
√ √ √  √   √ Not necessary / 
Potential effect 
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Chapter 8 
Narrative Account of the Case of  
Central Reclamation 
 
1. Introduction 
The second case in the thesis gives an account of the controversy 
over reclamation projects, particularly Central Reclamation Phase III (CRIII) 
and Wanchai Development Phase (WDII) in the Victoria Harbour between 
Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula. This case was selected 
because it demonstrates a situation with a high level of elite consensus and 
mixed news framing. This chapter provides a narrative account, namely the 
institutional setting of town planning policy in Hong Kong, and the 
background and development of the debate on the reclamation projects. 
 
2. The Institutional Setting of Town Planning Policy  
in Hong Kong 
Town planning and development projects were mainly managed by 
the Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau (HPLB) of the Administration. 
Usually, when an Outline Zone Plan (OZP) for a development project is 
proposed, the HPLB will consult with the Legco Panel on Planning, Land 
and Works (PLW Panel) and with the Panel on Environmental Affairs (EA 
Panel), the relevant District Councils (DCs) and the public. In addition, 
most funding in relation to the development plans should be approved by 
the Legco’s Financial Committee or its Public Works Subcommittee. 
However, after funding for the implementation of the development plan is 
endorsed, there was no institutional channel for the Legco to intervene in the 
project.  
 
Whilst the final decision is made by the CE in the Exco, the Town 
Planning Board (TPB), a key institution, recommends that the 
Administration amend the OZP according to the results of the consultation 
before the development plan is published in the government gazette. 
According to the Town Planning Ordinance (TPO), all the TPB members 
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are appointed by the CE1. The Board consists of seven official members and 
30 non-official members representing various professions, expertise and 
community interests.  
 
Before April 2004, the positions of TPB Chairman and Vice-
chairman were traditionally occupied by official members. The Board also 
relies on government administrative and technical support2. Moreover, all 
the TPB meetings were closed. Thus, when the Administration introduced 
the comprehensive Town Planning Bill into the Legco in order to streamline 
planning procedures in February 2000, pro-democrat legislators raised a 
number of issues, including the chairmanship, openness and public 
accountability of the TPB3. Consequently, the Committee was unable to 
complete the scrutiny of the Bill before the term ended in July 2000. Thus, 
the Committee decided to dissolve 4 . Subsequently, the Administration 
decided to amend the TPO in stages, giving priority to amendments for 
which there was general consensus5. 
 
In sum, although the views of the Legco, DCs are taken into account, 
the TPB plays a particularly important role in the Administration’s decisions 
on development projects. Since TPB membership and the technical 
information needed for decision making are tightly controlled by the 
Administration, the Administration can influence the Board’s decisions. In 
addition, the final decisions should be made by the CE in the Exco in most 
cases. From this perspective, the Administration usually has overwhelming 
influence on development policy. Nevertheless, when the Administration 
proposed amendments to the TPO in order to streamline town planning 
procedures, the legislators grasped the opportunity to challenge the 
chairmanship, openness and accountability of the TPB, holding back the 
Administration’s proposal. 
 
                                               
1 Website of the TPB: http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/about_us/intro.html 
2 Ibid. 
3 Minutes of the meeting of the Bills Committee on Town Planning Bill on 11 April 2000: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/bc/bc08/minutes/bc081104.pdf 
4 Report of the Bills Committee on Town Planning Bill dated 2 June 2000:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/hc/papers/cb1-1726.pdf 
5 Legco paper for the Bills Committee on the Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120918cb1-2390-1e.pdf 
 181 
3. Background of the CRIII and WDII 
The CRIII and WDII arose from a series of planning studies 
commissioned by the Administration first dated back to the 1980s. In 1989, 
a feasibility study endorsed by a government committee recommended a 
reclamation plan with an area of about 108 hectares along the waterfront 
from Central to Causeway Bay. The objective of this Central and Wanchai 
Reclamation (CWR) project was to provide land for various transport links 
and development projects. The project is divided into five phases, namely 
Central Reclamation Phase I, II, III, and Wanchai Development Phase I and 
II. The CRI and CRII and the WDI were completed between 1993 and 
19986. 
 
In June 1997, before the sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted to the 
PRC Government, a Protection of Harbour Bill proposed by a pro-democrat 
legislator Christine Loh (Loh Kung-wai) was passed by the Legco with the 
support of pro-democratic legislators, and became the Protection of Harbour 
Ordinance (PHO)7. According to the PHO, the Victoria Harbour is to be 
protected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage site 
for the Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there is a presumption 
against reclamation in the Harbour8 . However, the Ordinance does not 
specify the criteria for rebutting the presumption against reclamation.   
 
In the subsequent period, the Administration suspended and 
reconsidered several reclamation projects, including the Southeast Kowloon 
Reclamation (SEKR) proposal which would provide land for a new cruise 
terminal and tourism node development 9 . However, according to the 
Administration, the PHO was not the main consideration. Rather, these 
changes were mainly based on people’s increasing resistance to 
reclamation10 and the decreasing demand for residential properties11. 
                                               
6 Paper of the joint meeting of the PLW Panel and the EA Panel on 13 October 2003:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-1e.pdf 
7 Official record of the proceedings of the Council meeting of the Legco: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/lc_sitg/hansard/970627fa.doc 
8 Section 3 of the PHO: 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/e1bf50c09a33d3dc482564840019d2f4/aedef982
3e95e4e248256529002902ee?OpenDocument 
9 MPDN, 4 February 2003, page A02 
10 MPDN, 2 August 2002, page B10 
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On the other hand, the CWR project, including the CRIII and the 
WDII, was moved forward by the Administration. The purpose of the CRIII 
was to provide land for essential transport infrastructure including the 
Central-Wanchai Bypass (CWB) and the Road P2 network in order to 
provide urgent relief for the traffic congestion problems of Hong Kong 
Island. Other infrastructure accommodated in the CRIII would be a military 
dock for the People’s Liberation Army and an overturn tunnel for the 
Airport Railway and other lines of the underground railway. Some 
reclaimed land would be reserved for commercial uses and leisure 
purposes12. 
 
When the draft Central District (Extension) OZP of the CRIII was 
exhibited for public inspection in 1998, the Administration received some 
objections demanding scaling down the reclamation. Thus, the 
Administration reduced the extent of reclamation from 38 to 23 hectares. 
The TPB also adopted the Administration’s amendments to the draft OZP in 
199913. In the following years, there were no objections to the CRIII when 
the reclamation plan passed through a due process involving statutory town 
planning and environmental impact assessment procedures and public 
consultation. The Legco’s Finance Committee also approved funding for the 
CRIII’s detailed design and construction in 2000 and 2002 respectively14.  
 
Similar to the CRIII, the 28.5 hectare-reclamation in the WDII was 
amended during early discussions. According to the Administration, the 
purpose of the WDII was to provide land for transport links, including the 
CWB and the Island Eastern Corridor Link (IECL), residential and hotel 
developments, a leisure area and other waterfront facilities15 . When the 
funding proposal for the feasibility study for the WDII was endorsed by the 
                                                                                                                       
11 MPDN, 4 February 2003, page A02 
12 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
13 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
14 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
15 Paper for the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 23 November 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1127cb1-403-7e.pdf 
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Public Works Subcommittee of the Legco Financial Committee in February 
1999, there were no objections to project16. During a public consultation 
forum in February 2000, however, the Administration first proposed the 
construction of a Harbour Park on a 2 hectare-man-made island in the 
Harbour17. This proposal was criticised by legislators at a Legco PLW Panel 
meeting 18 . Subsequently, the TPB and the Administration withdrew the 
Harbour Park proposal19. Since then, the debate on the WDII was settled. 
 
In sum, despite the endorsement of the PHO and the suspension of 
some reclamation projects, the CRIII and WDII projects decided in the 
1980s were moved forward in order to provide land for transport links and 
other development projects. There were criticisms when the CRIII and 
WDII passed through a series of statutory procedures and consultations. 
However, the debates were settled after the Administration had adjusted the 
designs of these two reclamation plans before 2002. Since then, there has 
been a high level of consensus over these two projects between the 
Administration, the Legco, DCs and various statutory bodies, and 
professional and environmental groups.   
 
4. Development of the debate on the CRIII and WDII 
The chronology of the development of the reclamation debate is 
summarised in Appendix 8. The debate mainly took place in the period 
between 22 March 2002 and October 2004. In accordance with the timing of 
policy changes and important events, the development of the debate is 
divided into six periods as follows:  
1. In the period between 22 March 2002 and 11 September 2003, the 
Harbour Park proposal triggered legal proceedings against the WDII. 
Subsequently, the institutional context of the PHO was changed by the 
Court’s judgement.  
                                               
16 Minutes of the meeting of the Public Works Subcommittee of the Legco Financial 
Committee: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw240299.htm 
17 Information  cited in the judgement concerning an application for judicial review by the 
SPHL in respect of the WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
18 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl240200.pdf 
19 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl011207.pdf 
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2. In the period between 12 September and 5 October 2003, the focus of 
debate shifted to the CRIII. When an environmental group instituted 
legal proceedings against the CRIII, the Administration suspended this 
project temporarily.  
3. In the period between 6 and 30 October 2003, although the Court 
allowed a full resumption of work related to the CRIII, the 
Administration decided to partially resume reclamation work because of 
the ‘public debate’. 
4. Between 31 October 2003 and 8 January 2004, the Administration not 
only disclosed a series of agenda changes, but also decided to make 
changes to the routine operations of the TPB.   
5. In the fifth period between 9 January and 8 March 2004, the Court 
handed down a ruling against the WDII, further changing the 
institutional context of the PHO. This led to a series of agenda changes 
by the Administration.  
6. In the final period between 9 March and 16 October 2004, the legal 
battle on reclamation was settled after the Court handed down a 
judgement in favour of the CRIII. Nevertheless, the Administration 
launched a series of changes to town planning policy.  
 
4.1 From 22 March 2002 to 11 September 2003 
In this 537-day period, the debate on reclamation was triggered by a 
sudden change in the TPB’s decision on the Harbour Park proposal within 
the WDII. Although the Harbour Park proposal was withdrawn in 2001, at 
the TPB meeting in March 2002, a member on behalf of other absent 
members, raised objections to the exclusion of the Harbour Park. Other 
members also took the view that the Park would provide a leisure area for 
people. Thus, the Board resolved to include the Park in the WDII OZP20. In 
the next month, the Administration gazetted the OZP of the WDII, in which 
the Harbour Park proposal was included 21 . In late April 2002, an 
                                               
20 The minutes of TPB meeting cited in the judgement concerning an application for 
judicial review by the SPHL in respect of the WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
21 The Government of HKSAR Gazette, 19 April 2002, Vol.16, No.2272: 
http://www.gld.gov.hk/cgi-
bin/gld/egazette/gazettefiles.cgi?lang=e&extra=&year=2002&month=04&day=19&vol=06
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environmental group, the Society for the Protection of the Harbour Limited 
(SPH) together with a pro-democrat legislator opposed the Harbour Park 
proposal22. Subsequently, both the pro-democrat and pro-government camps 
started criticising the construction of the Harbour Park23.  
 
In early September 2002, the TPB claimed that there were over 770 
submissions against the OZP of the WDII during the 2-month exhibition 
period. The objectors, including political parties and environmental groups, 
mainly opposed the Harbour Park. Some major real estate developers were 
also concerned that the prices and views of their properties in the harbour-
front area would be affected by the reclamation and associated development 
projects24. On 6 December 2002, the TPB looked at the developers’ views, 
reducing the maximum building heights from 100m to 60m25. However, the 
Board persisted with the Harbour Park proposal and claimed that the Park 
would allow people to ‘hug the Harbour’26. In response to this, in February 
2003, the SPH applied for a judicial review (JR) of TPB’s decision in 
respect of the draft OZP of the WDII. The Society also claimed that the 
Administration would sell the reclaimed land as premium land and that the 
reclamation project would change the Harbour into a small river27.  
 
In the following month, the Court of First Instance (CFI) ordered 
that the TPB could not forward the WDII OZP to the Exco for decision 
making until the JR case was settled28 . In other words, the plans were 
suspended. In July 2003, the CFI not only ordered the TPB to reconsider the 
draft of the WDII OZP, but also handed down a judgment specifying the 
criteria for rebutting the presumption against reclamation. According to the 
judgment, the purpose and extent of each proposed reclamation in the 
Harbour ought to be assessed by reference to the three tests of: (1) 
compelling, overriding and present need, (2) no viable alternative, and (3) 
                                                                                                                       
&no=16&gn=2272&header=1&part=0&df=1&nt=gn&acurrentpage=12&agree=1&newfile
=1&gaz_type=mg 
22 MPDN, 30 April 2002, page A13 
23 MPDN, 7 May 2002, page A10; 9 May 2002, page A19 
24 MPDN, 7 September 2002, page B05 
25 MPDN, 7 December 2002, page A06 
26 MPDN, 4 January 2003, page A16 
27 MPDN, 8 April 2003, page A12 
28 ODN, 15 March 2003, page A18 
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minimum impairment to the Harbour. Otherwise, the presumption against 
reclamation in section 3 of the PHO would not be rebutted29. In other words, 
the judgment changed the context of the PHO. 
 
In response to this judgment, the Administration and the TPB 
adjusted the WDII OZP. On 18 July 2003, the TPB withdrew the Harbour 
Park proposal whilst the Board decided to appeal to the Court of Final 
Appeal (CFA) directly to seek a clarification of the legal principles behind 
the PHO 30 . Meanwhile, the Administration initiated a review of the 
judgment’s influence on other reclamation projects31. From this perspective, 
changes in the contexts of PHO not only triggered changes to the WDII 
proposal, but also led to agenda changes of the Administration and the TPB.  
 
Despite the debate on the WDII, two development projects involving 
reclamation were moved forward without criticism. The first took place 
before the SPH applied for the JR on the WDII. In February 2003, the CRIII 
contract was awarded and was scheduled to last for 55 months. A few weeks 
later, work related to the CRIII commenced32. The second project concerned 
reclamation in Hei Ling Chau (HLC), an island outside the Harbour. The 
Administration proposed this project for the development of a ‘super-scale 
prison’. Since the HLC reclamation would take place outside Victoria 
Harbour, this project was not constrained by the PHO. At the meeting of the 
Legco Financial Committee on 16 May 2003, although some legislators 
questioned this proposal for security reasons, nobody opposed the 
reclamation plan. Finally, funding for a feasibility study on this project was 
approved33. 
 
In early May 2003, before the CFI handed down its judgment, the 
Administration also ordered that the first stage of amendment of the TPO 
                                               
29 Judgement concerning an application for judicial review by the SPHL in respect of the 
WDII: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-
scan.pdf 
30 Legco paper for the joint meeting of EA Panel and PLW Panel on 27 November 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1127cb1-403-7e.pdf 
31 MPDN, 9 July 2003, page A06 
32 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
33 Minutes of the Legco Financial Committee meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/fc/fc/minutes/fc030516.pdf 
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should be introduced into the Legco. On 9 May 2003 and 21 May 2003, the 
‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’ (TPAB 2003) was published in 
the gazette34 and first read in the Legco35. The TPAB 2003 mainly focused 
on accelerating the process for the development plan36. On 23 May 2003, 
the Legco’s Bills Committee on the TPAB 2003 was formed for the scrutiny 
of the TPAB 2003. 
 
In sum, the debate in this period focused on the Harbour Park 
proposal of the WDII. The Administration and the TPB persisted with the 
proposal until the institutional context of PHO was changed by the Court’s 
judgment. This change not only forced the TPB and the Administration to 
withdraw the Harbour Park proposal, but also triggered an agenda change 
on the part of the Administration (review of other reclamation projects). 
Nevertheless, before the Court handed down its ruling against the WDII, 
two projects involving reclamation, namely the CRIII and HLC reclamation 
were moved forward as ordinary plans. Moreover, the Administration 
introduced the TPAB 2003 into the Legco for the amendment of the TPO.  
 
4.2 From 12 September to 5 October 2003 
In this 23-day period, the focus of the debate shifted to the CRIII 
project. On 12 September 2003, threatening to seek a High Court injunction 
against the Administration, the Chairman of the SPH, Winston Chu urged 
the Administration to suspend all reclamation projects, including the CRIII, 
until the CFA had settled disputes about their legality 37 . After the 
Administration had clarified that the WDII, CRIII and SEKR were the final 
reclamation projects in the Harbour, the SPH adjusted its proposals, 
demanding the Administration to reduce 50% of the extent of the CRIII 
from 18 hectares to no more than 9 hectares, and to promise not to use the 
reclaimed land for commercial purposes.38.  
 
                                               
34 The Administration’s press release on the ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200305/09/0509143.htm 
35 Website of the Legco: http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/bills/bill0304.htm 
36 The Administration’s press release on the ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200305/09/0509143.htm 
37 MPDN, 13 September 2003, page A10; 18 September 2003, page A15 
38 MPDN, 21 September 2003, page A04 
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Subsequently, some environmental groups and opinions expressed in 
the media questioned the relationship between Chu and a major real estate 
developer, Sun Hung Kai, who opposed reclamation in the Harbour 39 . 
Nevertheless, the SPH, with the support of some pro-democrat politicians, 
organised a series of anti-reclamation campaigns, including fundraising for 
the legal battle40 and a picture exhibition explaining how reclamation would 
change the Harbour into a river41. The society also described the Harbour as 
a unique public asset of Hong Kong42 and claimed that the reclaimed land 
would be used for commercial purposes43. Subsequently, about 500 people 
attended the anti-reclamation rally organised by the Action on the Protection 
of the Harbour (APH), a group set up by some professionals and pro-
democrat politicians from the Central and Western District Council 44 . 
Meanwhile, pro-democrat legislators shifted the focus of the discussion of 
the TPAB 2003, criticising the openness of the TPB. At the first meeting of 
the Bills Committee on TPAB 2003 in September 2003, pro-democrat 
legislators urged the Administration to open up the TPB meetings for public 
participation45. 
 
In response to the criticisms, the administration, on the one hand, 
agreed that the Harbour was an asset belonging to the people. On the other 
hand, the Administration emphasised the fact that the CRIII would provide 
urgent relief for the traffic congestion problems of Hong Kong Island46. 
Since work on the CRIII had been commenced, the Administration also 
claimed that the suspension of reclamation work would cost taxpayers HK$ 
1 million per day in compensation for the contractors. If the CRIII was 
terminated, it would cost about HK$1 billion 47 . Moreover, the 
Administration stressed that the picture prepared by the SPH was outdated 
                                               
39 MPDN, 25 September 2003, page A04; 26 September 2003, page A06; ODN, 26 
September 2003, page A40 
40 MPDN, 19 September 2003, page A17 
41 MPDN, 2 October 2003, page A12 
42 ADN, 26 September 2003, page A06  
43 MPDN, 26 September 2003, page A03 
44 MPDN, 29 September 2003, page A08 
45 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-
03/chinese/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120918.pdf 
46 MPDN, 13 September 2003, page A10 
47 MPDN, 20 September 2003, page A08 
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and misleading48, and that only one hectare of CRIII’s reclaimed land would 
be used for commercial purposes49. 
 
In late September, after a meeting with the Secretary for Housing, 
Planning and Lands (SHPL), Michael Suen (Suen Ming-yeung)50, the SPH 
applied to the High Court for a JR on the Administration’s decisions in 
relation to the CRIII and demanded an interim injunction over work related 
to the CRIII 51 . Noting that judicial proceedings had commenced, the 
Administration, on its own initiative, suspended all marine work related to 
the CRIII pending the High Court’s judgment on the interim injunction 
case52.  
 
In the meantime, the Administration disclosed some changes to the 
reclamation project and agenda triggered by the CFI’s ruling. The first one 
was the termination of two consultancy studies of the SEKR53. The second 
was the study of alternatives, including electronic road pricing (ERP), to 
alleviate traffic congestion in Central54.  
 
In short, during this period, the focus of the debate shifted to the 
CRIII when the SPH urged the Administration to suspend all reclamation 
projects until the CFA had settled disputes about their legality. The Society 
also described the Harbour as an asset of the people, showing damage 
caused by reclamation plans in pictures. In response to this, the 
Administration not only challenged the validity of the SPH’s information, 
but also highlighted the cost of suspending reclamation work and the urgent 
need for transport links and the high cost of suspending reclamation work. 
Although Winston Chu’s relations with real estate developers were 
questioned, the pro-democrat camp not only supported the SPH’s anti-
                                               
48 MPDN, 24 September 2003, page A02; 26 September 2003, page A03; 2 October 2003, 
page A12. 
49 MPDN, 21 September 2003, page A04 
50 MPDN, 23 September 2003, page A09 
51 MPDN, 26 September 2003, page A03 
52 The Administration’s press release on the statement of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/27/0927160.htm 
53 MPDN, 27 September 2003, page A12 
54 MPDN, 13 October 2003, page A03 
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reclamation campaigns, but also shifted the focus of the scrutiny of the 
TPAB 2003, demanding that the Administration open up the TPB meetings. 
 
Despite these criticisms, the Administration launched policy changes 
only in relation to legal proceedings and the Court’s ruling. One of these 
changes was the temporary suspension of the CRIII work, which was 
triggered by the SPH’s application to the High Court for a JR on the CRIII. 
The CFI’s ruling also triggered the termination of consultancy study on the 
SEKR and the review of alternatives to traffic congestion. 
 
4.3 From 6 to 30 October 2003  
In the 25-day period, the implementation of the CRIII was changed 
again. On 6 October 2003, the High Court delivered its judgment in favour 
of the Administration, and allowed for work on the CRIII to be resumed55. 
Nevertheless, the Administration did not order full resumption of all marine 
work. Instead, only such work that would not cause any irreparable damage 
to the Harbour, such as dredging, was resumed. According to Michael Suen, 
the ‘public debate’ on the issue was one of the Exco’s considerations. Suen 
said:  
The Executive Council has taken into account the fact that at the 
moment there is a very heated public debate on the whole question 
of reclamation. And so we are going to proactively approach the 
other side to try to see whether there are still common grounds for us 
in this particular matter. We will also be approaching the appropriate 
panel in the Legislative Council so that there is an opportunity for a 
public debate on this particular issue so that people understand the 
rationale we are advancing in our course and also for us to reply to 
any criticism against us.56 
 
The HLC reclamation was also affected although it was not 
constrained by the PHO. In late October 2003, the Director of the Civil 
Engineering Department said that this plan would be delayed because of the 
climate of public opinion against reclamation. Furthermore, consultation on 
this proposal would be divided into two phases. This official also claimed: 
                                               
55High Court’s Judgement concerning an application from the SPH for interim injunction in 
respect of CRIII: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-
04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-2e-scan.pdf 
56 The Administration’s press release on the speech of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
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‘Nowadays, public relations and public opinions should be taken into 
account for engineering works.’57 From this perspective, the Administration 
sensed that public opinion was against reclamation and took it into account 
in this period. 
 
After failing to stop the CRIII works through legal proceedings, 
Winston Chu threatened to mobilise a public march against the government. 
At the meeting with Michael Suen, Chu also urged the Administration to 
accept five demands before the SPH instituted further legal proceedings. 
These demands included suspension and review of the reclamation project, 
re-consultation on reclamation, creation of a Harbour Authority to oversee 
these projects and restructuring the TPB58. Meanwhile, the pro-democrat 
camp and the environmental groups launched further anti-reclamation 
campaigns, including protests59. 
 
The pro-democrat camp also initiated agenda changes in the Legco. 
A DP legislator, Wong Sing-chi at a meeting of the Legco PLW Panel in 
early October 2003, requested a joint meeting with the EA Panel to discuss 
issues relating to the CRIII and WDII60. At the first joint Panel meeting on 
13 October 2003, the reclamation projects were criticised by legislators61. In 
response to this, Michael Suen suggested that the Legco hold public 
hearings to collect public views62. Subsequently, Panel members accepted 
this suggestion63 . According to Suen, the Administration hoped that the 
hearings could provide an opportunity for public debate on this issue so that 
people could understand the Administration’s arguments from media 
coverage (interview on 22 January 2008). From this perspective, the 
Administration tried to best use the institutional channels and the media to 
put its message across to the public. 
                                               
57 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
58ODN, 9 October 2003, page A31 
59 MPDN, 20 October 2003, page A10; 30 October 2003, page A17 
60 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl031009.pdf 
61 Minutes of the joint meeting of the PLW Panel and the EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1031.pdf 
62 Minutes of the joint meeting of the PLW Panel and the EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1013.pdf 
63 Minutes of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1031.pdf 
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During this period, there was a further incident. On 11 October 2003, 
Winston Chu claimed that he and the legal adviser of the SPH had received 
letters threatening his and his family’s personal safety. Thus, he resigned as 
head of the SPH and the society’s vice-chairwoman, Christine Loh took 
over his role64. Although most news coverage sympathised with Chu, the 
Administration and the opponents of the reclamation also censured the 
threat. Thus, it can be argued that this incident did not favour any party in 
the debate.   
 
In short, in this period, the High Court ruling allowed the full 
resumption of work related to the CRIII. Nevertheless, taking account of the 
‘public debate’, the Administration decided only to partially resume 
reclamation work. Because of the failure to stop reclamation work through 
legal channels, the SPH changed its strategy, threatening to mobilise a 
public demonstration. Meanwhile, the pro-democrat camp changed the 
Legco agenda, requesting a joint Panel meeting in order to put further 
pressure on the Administration. In response to this, the Administration made 
use of rules, proposing a public hearing in order to put its message across to 
the public. 
 
In addition, Winston Chu received threatening letters and resigned as 
the Chairman of SPH. However, this incident was considered to be 
irrelevant to the debate on reclamation. 
 
4.4 From 31 October 2003 to 8 January 2004 
In this 70-day period between 31 October 2003 and 8 January 2004, 
the Administration disclosed several policy changes. First, at the meeting on 
31 October 2003, the TPB officially requested the government to conduct a 
comprehensive review of planning and engineering plans in the WDII65. In 
other words, the Board confirmed that the design of the WDII should be 
amended. Secondly, Michael Suen, at a public seminar, said that the 
                                               
64 MPDN, 12 October 2003, page A01 
65 The Administration’s press release on the TPB statement: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200311/07/1107205.htm 
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government was considering, through legislation, prohibiting further 
reclamation in the Harbour after the CRIII, WDII and SEKR projects were 
completed66. Thirdly, in November 2003, a TPB member, Rebecca Chiu, 
claimed that the TPB had noted the problems of existing consultation 
mechanism reflected in the debate on CRIII, and had started exploring ways 
of improving the board’s public relations and transparency. The Department 
of Planning also claimed that proposals for opening up TPB meetings would 
be submitted to the Legco for consideration in the following months67. In 
other words, the Administration decided to open up some TPB meetings.  
 
Despite these policy changes, the HLC prison development plan was 
moved forward. On 19 December 2003, the Administration launched the 
first round of public consultation on the HLC prison development proposal68. 
In addition, the Administration, with the pro-government camp’s support, 
took some initiatives to counteract the opposition’s criticisms. The first 
example was that the pro-government camp mobilised several groups to 
counteract opinions against reclamation at Legco’s public hearings. As a 
result, there were divergent views on the CRIII among various groups 
expressed at the public hearings on 27 November and 8 December 200369. 
Thus, pressure on the Administration was weakened. The second 
counteraction of the Administration was propaganda. Through some 
newspapers, the SPH distributed a pamphlet criticising the Administration’s 
reclamation plans70. In response to this, the Administration distributed its 
own leaflets in Central in order to explain the rationale for the reclamation 
plans71.      
 
In a nutshell, in response to criticisms, the Administration disclosed 
two agenda changes, including a review of the WDII and the proposal to 
introduce legislation against further reclamation in the Harbour. The 
                                               
66 MPDN, 14 November 2003, page A15 
67 MPDN, 17 November 2003, page A10 
68 The Administration’s press release on the public consultation: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200312/19/1219271.htm 
69 Minutes of the joint meetings of PLW Panel and EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1127.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1208.pdf 
70 MPDN, 2 December 2003, page A18 
71 MPDN, 19 December 2003, page A15 
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Administration also decided to change the operation of the TPB, opening up 
some TPB meetings. In the meantime, with the support of the pro-
government camp and associated groups, the Administration successfully 
weakened the pressure created by the opponents at public hearings. The 
Administration also distributed its pamphlets in the street while the SPH had 
distributed its leaflet in newspapers.  
   
4.5 From 9 January to 8 March 2004 
On 9 January 2004, the CFA handed down a judgment, ordering the 
TPB to reconsider the WDII project. The CFA also laid down a single test 
replacing the three tests as previously set out in the High Court’s judgment. 
This test was that the presumption against reclamation could only be 
rebutted by establishing an overriding public need for reclamation, 
including the economic, environmental and social needs of the community, 
which could not be achieved through alternative means 72 . From this 
perspective, the rules of town planning policy were again changed by the 
Court’s ruling. In response to the ruling, the Administration instructed the 
TPB to review all reclamation projects, including the CRIII and SEKR, in 
order to satisfy the test as imposed by the CFA73.  
 
Meanwhile, the Administration and TPB reached a consensus over 
the openness of the Board meeting. At a TPB meeting on 16 January 2004, 
the Board members agreed that the public should be allowed to attend the 
hearing part of TPB meetings and other meetings, except for when 
confidential items were being discussion. The Administration also re-
confirmed that some TPB meetings would be opened up74. Since then, pro-
government legislators had changed their positions, demanding that the TPB 
meetings be opened up75. In other words, all the major parties, namely the 
Administration, the TPB, the pro-democrat and the pro-government camps, 
                                               
72 CFA’s judgment on WDII on 1 January 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplwcb1-761-1e.pdf 
73 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200401/09/0109278.htm ;  
Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl040115.pdf 
74 MPDN, 27 January 2004, page A08  
75 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl040127.pdf 
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agreed to open up some TPB meetings at that time. Nevertheless, the SPH 
and the pro-democrat camp continued their street campaigns including open 
letters and sea parade on the ferry76. 
 
In sum, in this period, the CFA’s judgment against the WDII 
changed the context of the PHO. In response to this, the Administration and 
the TPB changed the agenda, reviewing all reclamation projects accordingly. 
After the Administration and TPB had confirmed a decision to open up 
some TPB meetings, the pro-government legislators followed the 
Administration, supporting opening up such meetings. As a result, all the 
key institution, including the Administration, TPB and the Legco reached 
consensus over this issue. In spite of this, the opposition continued their 
street campaigns to put pressure on the Administration.     
 
4.6 From 9 March to 16 October 2004 
In this 220-day period, the legal battle on reclamation was settled 
after the High Court had handed down a ruling in favour of the 
Administration. Nevertheless, the Administration launched a series of 
structural alternations in relation to town planning policy. 
 
On 9 March 2004, the High Court made a ruling confirming the 
legality of the CRIII project 77 . On the same day, the Administration 
announced that the government would negotiate with contractors to resume 
work within a month, and that there would not be further reclamation 
projects in Victoria Harbour after the remaining three projects, namely 
CRIII, WDII and SEKR were completed78. 
 
Subsequently, Christine Loh said that SPH was looking for further 
legal tussles. In order to speed up the judicial process, she hoped the appeal 
against the High Court’s judgment would go to the CFA directly instead of 
via the Court of Appeal. Otherwise, the legal debate might cost over HK$ 5 
                                               
76 MPDN, 17 January 2004, page A16; 19 January 2004, page A16 
77 High Court’s judgment on CRIII on 9 March 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/papers/eaplw1127cb1-1258-1e-
scan.pdf 
78 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of PSHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200403/09/0309199.htm 
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million and last for over a year79. However, this direct appeal, according to 
the law, should be based on the consent of both sides of the lawsuit. As the 
Administration rejected the SPH’s request80, the society could only apply to 
the Court of Appeal for the appeal. In April 2004, Loh announced that the 
SPH would not lodge any appeal against the judgement on the CRIII81. In 
other words, the legal battle over the reclamations was over while the CRIII 
project continued. Nevertheless, the pro-democrat camp continually 
launched protests against reclamation82.  
 
Despite the continuation of work on the CRIII, the Administration 
launched several structural alternations associated with town planning 
policy. The first was the creation of the Harbour-front Enhancement 
Committee (HEC), a new advisory group on the development of Victoria 
Harbour. The main role of the HEC was to provide advice on the usage and 
management of existing and new harbour-front areas only83. In this sense, 
the powers of the HEC were limited. Decisions on reclamations were still 
tightly controlled by the Administration and the TPB. 
 
The second structural alternation concerned changes in the 
composition of the TPB. As the tenure of appointment of TPB members is 
usually for a period of no more than two years, the CE had to appoint a new 
TPB in the first half of 2004. In early April 2004, the Administration 
gazetted the new appointment of the TPB for a two-year term. Among the 
33 non-official members, 18 are re-appointments, while the remaining 15 
are new appointments84. Although the position of the Chairman was still 
occupied by an official member, it was the first time a non-official member 
was appointed as Vice-Chairman of the TPB. 
 
In early May 2004, at a meeting of the Bills Committee on TPAB 
2003, the Administration suggested, by administrative means, opening up 
                                               
79 MPDN, 22 March 2004, page A13 
80 MPDN, 27 March 2004, page A15 
81 MPDN, 16 April 2004, page A18 
82 MPDN, 22 March 2004, page A13; 3 May 2004, page A06 
83 The Administration’s press release on feedback to High Court’s judgment: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200403/09/0309203.htm 
84 The Administration’s press release on the appointment of TPB members: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200404/02/0402203.htm 
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the hearing part of TPB meetings. However, Committee members insisted 
that it was necessary to lay down the opening up of TPB meetings in law85.  
A few days later, the Administration accepted the Committee's request to 
add a new section to amendment bill to the effect that all TPB meetings 
would be open to the public, except for the deliberation part in relation to 
consideration of representations / comments and planning applications and 
under certain specified circumstances in respect of other meetings. The 
Committee thus accepted the Administration’s proposal86. Subsequently, the 
TPAB 2003 and its amendments were passed at the Council meeting of the 
Legco on 7 July 200487. Since then, the openness of the TPB has been 
changed. 
 
The CFA’s ruling on the WDII and PHO also led to changes to the 
SEKR proposals. As the Administration believed that the SEKR did not 
meet the criteria set up by the CFA’s ruling, the proposal was re-designed 
by inviting tenders for consultancy studies88 and launching a new round of 
consultation89. Moreover, several development projects, including the cruise 
termination associated with the SEKR, were re-considered90. Although the 
HLC prison plans were not constrained by the PHO, after the second round 
of public consultation between May and July 200491, the Administration 
withdrew the plan because of various groups’ objections92.   
 
In sum, in this final period, after the CFA had confirmed the legality 
of the CRIII, the Administration made use of institutional rule, increasing 
the fiscal cost of appeal. Consequently, the SPH was forced to give up legal 
proceedings against reclamation. In spite of this, the opponents of 
reclamation continued their street campaigns for harbour protection. 
                                               
85 Minutes of the Bills Committee on 5 May 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
86 Paper of the Bill Committee of TPAB 2003:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
87 Hansard record of the Council meeting on 7 July 2004: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0707ti-translate-e.pdf 
88 MPDN, 19 March 2004, page A28 
89 MPDN, 28 July 2004, page A09 
90 MPDN, 12 September 2004, page A15 
91 The Administration’s press release on the public consultation: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200405/31/0531192.htm 
92 Paper for the Legco Financial Committee 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/fc/fc/papers/fi04-15e.pdf 
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Whilst the CRIII projects continued, the Administration introduced 
two changes in structures in relation to town planning policy, including the 
creation of the HEC and the appointment of new TPB members. In addition, 
the Administration also accepted the Legco’s proposal to open up TPB 
meetings. Nevertheless, because of the limited terms of reference of the 
HEC and the Administration’s control over the TPB chairmanship, town 
planning policy remained tightly controlled by the Administration.    
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In short, the controversy over reclamation in the Victoria Harbour 
was triggered by the Administration and TPB’s persistence over the Habour 
Park proposal of the WDII. Subsequently, the focus shifted to the CRIII and 
other reclamation projects and the openness of the TPB.  
 
Describing the Harbour as an asset of the people, the SPH, together 
with the pro-democrat camp and environmental groups, highlighted the 
damage to the Harbour caused by reclamation. The purpose of reclamation 
plans, according to these opponents, was to provide land for developers and 
land premium for the government. On the other hand, according to the 
Administration, while the Harbour was an asset of the people, the 
reclamation projects was the only means of providing viable and urgent 
relief for traffic congestion. The Administration not only stressed the 
infeasibility of adjusting the reclamation plans, but also emphasised the high 
fiscal cost of suspending reclamation work. Arguing that information 
provided by the SPH was outdated and misleading, the Administration 
claimed that the CRIII, WDII and SEKR were the final reclamation projects 
in the Harbour. Moreover, most of the reclaimed land would be used for 
leisure purposes.  
 
The Judiciary played an important role in the debate. After the SPH 
had successfully challenged the legality of the WDII, resulting in 
amendments to the WDII plan, the Society instituted further legal 
proceedings against the CRIII and other reclamation projects. In addition, 
the SPH, together with democrats and environment groups, tried to put 
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pressure on the Administration by means of mass movements. Playing a 
supportive role, the pro-democrat camp also changed the Legco agenda in 
order to put further pressure on the Administration. In addition to proposing 
joint meetings of the PLW and EA Panels, the pro-democrat legislators 
seized the opportunity to shift the focus of scrutiny of the TPAB 2003, 
urging the Administration to open up the TPB meetings. 
 
In response to the court’s rulings, the Administration reviewed and 
adjusted the WDII and other reclamation projects accordingly. While the 
SPH applied to the High Court for an interim injunction on the CRIII, the 
Administration also suspended work on the CRIII until the court had laid 
down its ruling. However, legal proceedings were not the only factor in 
policy changes. Despite the Court’s allowance for the full resumption of 
work on the CRIII, because of the ‘public debate’, the Administration did 
not fully resume reclamation work until after the Court had confirmed the 
legality of the CRIII project. In addition, the Administration launched some 
policy changes irrelevant to the court’s rulings. These initiatives included 
the personnel changes to the TPB, opening up of the hearing part of TPB 
meetings and the creation of a new advisory body.  
 
Nevertheless, while adjusting its policies, the Administration 
adopted strategies to manipulate these changes. Despite personnel changes 
in the TPB, the Administration still controls its Chairmanship. Whilst the 
hearing parts of the TPB meetings are opened up to the public, critical 
meetings involving confidential or sensitive information are kept closed. 
The terms of reference of the new advisory body are also limited in advising 
on the development of existing and further reclaimed land. Making use of 
institutional rules, the Administration has also counteracted its opponents’ 
voices. When pro-democrat legislators criticised the reclamation projects at 
the Legco joint Panel meeting, the Administration proposed public hearings 
so that the pro-government groups could counteract the voices against 
reclamation. In addition, after the Court had laid down a ruling in favour of 
the CRIII, the Administration rejected the SPH’s request for a direct appeal 
to CFA. Consequently, the time and fiscal costs of legal proceedings were 
increased. Thus, the Society was forced to give up legal proceedings. 
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Chapter 9 
Analysis of the Case of Central Reclamation 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to investigate the relations between policy change and news 
coverage, this chapter analyses policy change, policy certainty and news 
framing during the controversy over reclamation. Tracing the time sequence 
of these factors, I test of the hypotheses of this study. Other possible factors 
and their relations with news coverage are also examined in order to provide 
a better account of media-policy relations.   
 
2. Analysis of Policy Change 
During the reclamation debate, both high cost and low cost changes 
in policy were identified. Some of these were associated with judicial 
rulings, while others were decided by the Administration, the TPB and the 
Legco. The time sequence of these policy changes during the reclamation 
debate is summarised in Table 9.1. However, some actions of the 
Administration and the SPH were not considered as policy changes. Such 
actions included the SPH’s institution of legal proceedings and the 
implementation of the government’s new decisions. For example, when the 
government had decided to open up some TPB meetings, the TPB’s 
discussion of the issues was regarded as the implementation of the 
Administration’s decision rather than as a policy change. Similarly, after the 
Administration had proposed public hearings on WDII and CRIII, the 
subsequent procedures and the hearings per se were not regarded as policy 
changes. Neither were the amendments associated with the SEKR 
considered as policy changes after the government had decided to 
reconsider this project. 
 
2.1 Low Cost Changes 
2.1.1 Changes by the Administration 
During the reclamation debate, there were several low cost changes, 
mainly changes to the agendas of the Administration and the Legco. For the 
 201 
Administration, two agenda changes were made subsequent to the court’s 
judgments concerning the WDII and PHO. The first was the Administration 
and TPB’s review of all reclamation projects in the Habour, including the 
WDII, CRIII and SEKR1, after the Court of First Instance (CFI) had handed 
down its judgment on July 20032. The second was the TPB’s re-assessment 
of all reclamation projects 3  after the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) had 
handed down its judgment on the appeal case of the WDII in January 20044. 
The other agenda changes were the review of town planning policy in 
October and November 2003. These included exploring alternatives to 
traffic congestion 5 , and the plan to prohibit further reclamation in the 
Harbour through legislation 6 . In addition, in December 2003, the 
Administration distributed its leaflets in the streets in order to explain the 
reclamation plans to the public7. Since the fiscal and political costs of this 
short term project were limited, this initiative was considered to be a low 
cost change. 
 
2.2.2 Agenda Changes in the Legco 
The Administration and the pro-democrat camp not only initiated 
agenda changes in the Legco, but also affected each other’s agendas. In May 
2003, when the Administration introduced the TPAB 2003 into the Legco8, 
the pro-democrat camp changed the agenda, calling on the Administration to 
open the TPB meetings9. Subsequently, the Administration and the TPB 
started the review of openness of the TPB10.   
 
                                               
1 MPDN, 9 July 2003, page A06 
2 Judgement concerning an application for judicial review by the SPHL in respect of the 
WDII: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-
scan.pdf 
3 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200401/09/0109278.htm ;  
Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl040115.pdf 
4The  CFA’s judgement on WDII on 1 January 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplwcb1-761-1e.pdf 
5 MPDN, 13 October 2003, page A03 
6 MPDN, 13 November 2003, page A16 
7 MPDN, 19 December 2003, page A15 
8 The Administration’s press release on the TPAB 2003: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200305/09/0509143.htm 
9 Minutes of the meeting of Bills Committee on TPAB 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/chinese/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120918.pdf 
10 MPDN, 17 November 2003, page A10 
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Table 9.1: Policy Change during the Debate on Reclamations 
Date Policy Change Types of change Cost of 
change 
22/3/2002 The TPB’s persistence with the Harbour 
Park proposal 
Change to existing 
proposal 
High 
14/3/2003 The CFI prohibited the TPB from 
forwarding the WDII OZP to the Exco. 
Proposal suspended High 
6/5/2003 The Administration’s initiation of an 
amendment of theTPO. 
Agenda change Low 
8/7/2003 The CFI’s judgment on the JR of WDII Change to existing 
policy 
High 
8/7/2003 The Administration’s review of the 
judgment’s influence on reclamation 
projects 
Agenda change Low 
18/7/2003 The TPB’s withdrawal of the Harbour 
Park proposal 
Amendment of 
existing proposal 
High 
18/9/2003 The pro-democratic camp’s demand on 
opening up TPB meetings 
Agenda change Low 
26/9/2003 The termination of consultancy studies on 
the SEKR 
Change to existing 
proposal 
High 
27/9/2003 The temporary suspension of CRIII Existing policy 
suspended 
High 
6/10/2003 The High Court’s judgment allowing the 
continuance of CRIII 
Existing policy 
continued  
Low 
7/10/2003 The partial resumption of CRIII Change in routine 
operation 
High 
9/10/2003 The A pro-democrat camp’s request for 
joint meeting Panel meeting 
Agenda change Low 
12/10/2003 The Administration’s review of viability 
of ERP 
Agenda change Low 
13/10/2003 The Administration’s proposal for public 
hearings 
Agenda change Low 
27/10/2003 The delay of the HLC prison plan11. Change to existing 
proposal 
High 
13/11/2003 The Administration’s review of 
legislation against further reclamation 
Agenda change Low 
16/11/2003 The Administration’s decision on opening 
up TPB meetings 
Change to routine 
operation 
High 
20/12/2003 The Administration’s distribution of 
leaflets 
Change to routine 
operation 
High 
9/1/2004 The CFA’s ruling against the WDII and 
reinterpreting the PHO 
Change ton 
existing policy  
High 
9/1/2004 The Administration and TPB’s review of 
reclamation projects 
Agenda Change Low 
9/3/2004 The High Court’s ruling confirmed the 
legality of the CRIII12 and the full 
resumption of CRIII 
Existing policy 
continued 
Low 
9/3/2004 The creation of the HEC  Alteration of  
structure  
High 
2/4/2004 The new appointment of the TPB Personnel changes  High 
12/5/2004 The Administration’s decision on opening 
up TPB meeting by adding a new section 
in to TPAB 2003 
Changes to routine 
operation 
High 
16/10/2004 The withdrawal of HLC prison proposal Withdrawal of 
proposal 
High 
                                               
11 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
12 High Court’s judgment on CRIII on 9 March 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/papers/eaplw1127cb1-1258-1e-
scan.pdf 
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The Administration also changed the agenda initiated by the pro-
democrat camp. In October 2003, when the pro-democrat camp requested a 
joint meeting of the PLW and EA Panels to discuss issues relating to the 
CRIII and WDII 13 , the Administration changed the agenda, suggesting 
public hearings on the reclamation in the CRIII and WDII in the Legco14. 
Subsequently, public hearings took place on 27 November and 8 December 
2003. 
 
2.3 High Cost Policy Changes  
2.3.1 Changes to the WDII 
The first high cost change in this study was the sudden change in the 
TPB’s position on the Harbour Park proposal in March 200215. The other 
two high cost changes in WDII were ordered by the CFI. One was the 
temporary suspension of the WDII ordered by the CFI in March 200316. The 
other changes took place on 8 July 2003 when the CFI handed down its 
judgment on the JR case of WDII, specifying the criteria for rebutting the 
PHO’s presumption against reclamation and ordering the Administration to 
reconsider the WDII17. This judgment not only forced the Administration to 
reconsider the WDII, but also changed the existing contexts of the PHO. 
Thus, the Administration had to review all the reclamation projects 
accordingly. Subsequently, the TPB withdrew the Harbour Park proposal18. 
 
2.3.2 Change in the CRIII 
The CRIII work had commenced before the focus of the debate 
shifted towards it. Thus, the high cost changes in the CRIII project were 
mainly associated with its implementation. The first change to the CRIII 
                                               
13 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl031009.pdf 
14 Minutes of the joint meeting of the PLW  and  EA Panels: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1013.pdf 
15 The minutes of TPB meeting cited in the judgement concerning an application for 
judicial review by the SPHL in respect of WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
16 ODN, 15 March 2003, page A18 
17 Judgment concerning an application for judicial review by the SPHL in respect of WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
18 Legco paper for the joint meeting of the EA  and PLW Panels on 27 November 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1127cb1-403-7e.pdf 
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was its temporary suspension, announced on 27 September 2003, two days 
after the SPH applied to the High Court for a JR on the legality of the CRIII, 
and demanded for an interim injunction over work on the CRIII. According 
to the Administration’s statement, this decision was mainly based on legal 
considerations19.  
 
The second change in the CRIII’s implementation was announced on 
7 October 2003, the day after the High Court laid down the judgment 
rejecting the SPH’s application for an interim injunction on the CRIII. 
Although the judgment allowed the full resumption of the CRIII, the 
Administration decided to resume only part of the work that would not 
cause any irreparable damage to the Harbour20. Finally, the CRIII was full 
resumed after the High Court confirmed its legality in March 2004. In this 
case, although the implementation of the CRIII was changed twice, the 
project continued at the end of the legal battle.  
 
2.3.3 Other Reclamation Projects 
In addition to the WDII and CRIII, other development plans were 
changed during the debate on reclamation. The first one was the SEKR. As 
a reclamation project in the Harbour, it was affected by the Administration’s 
review of all such projects. In addition, there were changes in 
implementation. The first was the termination of consultancy studies 
announced in September 200321. After the legal battles on reclamation were 
over, the Administration disclosed further changes to the SEKR, including 
its re-design and re-consultation22. In other words, the SEKR proposal was 
reconsidered according to change in the context of the PHO.  
 
The other project changed was the HLC prison plan outside the 
Harbour. This project was supposed to be free from the constraints of the 
PHO. However, in October 2003, the Administration decided to delay this 
                                               
19 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/27/0927160.htm 
20 The Administration’s press release on the speech of SHPL (English part): 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
21 MPDN, 27 September 2003, page A12 
22 MPDN, 19 March 2004, page A28; 28 July 2004, page A09; 12 September 2004, page 
A15 
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plan because of public views against reclamation23. Subsequently, this plan 
was withdrawn in October 2004 after two rounds of public consultation24. 
    
2.2.4 Alterations in Structure  
The other type of high cost policy change during the reclamation 
debate was structural alteration of relevant policymaking bodies. The first 
was the creation of the HEC announced on 9 March 200425. Although it is 
unknown when the Administration decided to set up this advisory body, the 
Chairman of the HEC claimed that he was invited to join the Committee 
around the end of March 200426, a few weeks after the announcement of the 
creation of the Committee. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the decision 
on setting up this Committee was made in a hurry. 
 
The other structural change was personnel change within the TPB. 
The new composition of the TPB was published in the gazette on 2 April 
200427. This was the first time a non-official member was appointed as 
Vice-Chairman. Although it was difficult to trace when the Administration 
made its decision on this appointment, it is a reasonable assumption that this 
personnel change had been confirmed before early April 2004.  
 
There were also changes in the operation of the TPB during the 
scrutiny of amendments to the TPAB 2003. Although the first stage of 
amendments to the TPO focused on accelerating the processing of 
development plans, in mid-November 2003, the Administration disclosed 
that it had decided to open up some TPB meetings. The Administration had 
clearly made this decision before that time. However, the Administration 
adjusted its proposals subsequently. On 4 May 2004, the Administration 
proposed opening up TPB meetings by Administrative means while it was 
rejected by the Bills Committee on the TPAB 200328. In its letter to the 
                                               
23 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
24 Paper for the Legco Financial Committee 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/fc/fc/papers/fi04-15e.pdf 
25 The Administration’s press release on feedback on the High Court judgment: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200403/09/0309203.htm 
26 MPDN, 30 April 2004, page A08 
27 The Administration’s press release on the appointment of TPB members: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200404/02/0402203.htm 
28 Minutes of the Bills Committee on 5 May 2004:  
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Committee dated 12 May 2004, the Administration accepted the 
Committee's request to add a new section to the bill to the effect that some 
meetings of TPB should be opened to the public29. Thus, it can be argued 
that the Administration adjusted its proposal in the period between 4 and 12 
May 2004. 
 
In a nutshell, during the reclamation debate, there were several low 
cost agenda changes of the Administration and the Legco. For the 
Administration, the agenda changes concerned the review of reclamation 
projects and alternatives to relieving traffic congestion and harbour 
protection. In the Legco, both the Administration and the pro-democrat 
camp also tried to manipulate agenda changes.   
 
There were also various types of high cost policy changes. The first 
was the change in contexts of the PHO by the courts’ rulings. The second 
was the amendments of the existing reclamation project (WDII) and 
proposals (SEKR) according to the court’s judgments. Even the HLC prison 
development plan, which was not constrained by the PHO, was delayed, 
subsequently being withdrawn. The implementation of the CRIII work was 
also changed twice during legal proceedings, although the project continued 
when the legal battle was over. In addition, there were structural alternations, 
including the creation of the HEC and personnel changes, as well as changes 
to the openness of the TPB. 
 
3. Analysis of Policy Certainty 
3.1 Elite Consensus Level 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, before April 2002, nobody in 
the key institutions raised objections to the WDII and CRIII. Neither did the 
SPH criticise these reclamation projects. Thus, the level of elite consensus 
was considered to be high. However, after the Administration had published 
the WDII OZP, including the Harbour Park proposal, in the gazette in April 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
29 Paper of the Bills Committee of the TPAB 2003:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
 207 
2003 30 , the SPH, together with a pro-democrat legislator, opposed the 
Harbour Park proposal31 . Subsequently, both the pro-democrat and pro-
government camps criticised the Harbour Park proposal32. In other words, 
there was an elite debate between the Administration and the pro-
government camp at that time.  
 
Nevertheless, the elite debate focused on the Harbour Park only. 
There were no objections to the other proposals in the WDII and CRIII. 
After the Harbour Park proposal had been withdrawn, the pro-government 
camp supported CRIII and WDII. Apart from Choy So-yuk, a member of 
the SPH, nobody from the pro-government camp expressed support for the 
SPH’s campaign. At the first joint meetings of the PLW and EA Panels, 
apart from Choy, all the DAB members kept silent. James Tien of LP 
claimed that he and his party still supported the infrastructure plans related 
to the CRIII 33 . At public hearings held by the joint Panel meeting in 
November and December 2003, several pro-government groups of 
commercial vehicle owners and operators expressed their support for e 
reclamation for the construction of the CWB 34 . Some pro-government 
legislators also claimed that the SPH’s alternative reclamation proposal was 
merely at a conceptual stage, and recalled this when the funding for CRIII 
was approved by the Legco35. 
 
There was also a high level of elite consensus over the issues 
relating to the openness of the TPB during the discussion of the TPAB 2003. 
Since the first meeting of the Bills Committee on the TPAB 2003 on 18 
September, pro-democrat legislators had continually urged the 
Administration to open up TPB meetings at the first stage of amendment. 
                                               
30 The Government of HKSAR Gazette, 19 April 2002, Vol.16, No.2272: 
http://www.gld.gov.hk/cgi-
bin/gld/egazette/gazettefiles.cgi?lang=e&extra=&year=2002&month=04&day=19&vol=06
&no=16&gn=2272&header=1&part=0&df=1&nt=gn&acurrentpage=12&agree=1&newfile
=1&gaz_type=mg 
31 MPDN, 30 April 2002, page A13 
32 MPDN, 9 May 2002, page A19 
33 Minute of the joint meeting, Legco Paper No. CB(1)390/03-04: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1013.pdf 
34 Minute of the joint meeting, Legco Paper No. CB(1)820/03-04: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1127.pdf 
35 Minute of the joint meeting, Legco Paper No. CB(1) 811/03-04: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1208.pdf 
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On the other hand, pro-government legislators had not demanded opening 
up the TPB meetings until the Administration and the TPB decided to do so. 
In other words, the pro-government camp followed the Administration.    
 
There was also a consensus between the TPB and the Administration 
during the reclamation debate. On 8 July 2003, the CFI handed down its 
judgement against the WDII. The TPB, at its meeting on 18 July 2003, 
unanimously agreed to lodge an appeal against the judgement although the 
Board decided not to pursue the Harbour Park proposal 36 . The quick 
response and unanimous decision of TPB members showed their persistence 
over WDII. They also agreed to open up some meetings to the public when 
the Administration brought up this issue to Board37. From this perspective, 
there was also a high level of elite consensus between the Administration 
and the TPB over the openness of TPB.  
 
In short, throughout the reclamation debate, there was a high level of 
consensus between the TPB and the reclamation projects. Although there 
was an elite debate on the Harbour Park proposal, the pro-government camp 
supported the CRIII and the remaining part of the WDII after the proposal 
had been withdrawn. The pro-government camp also demanded the 
Administration to open up TPB meetings only after the Administration 
decided to do so. Thus, elite consensus level was considered to be high. 
 
3.2 Policy Stage 
Despite the high level elite consensus, in terms of policy stage, the 
policy certainty of reclamation plans varied from project to project. Of these 
projects, the SEKR and HLC prison plan were at the earliest stage. During 
the debate, consultancy studies on the SEKR were being conducted while 
public consultation on the HLC prison had not begun.yet. Since these two 
projects were being planned, there was a great deal of space to make 
changes to these projects. Thus, for these two projects, policy certainty 
measured by policy stage was relatively low. 
                                               
36 The Administration’s press release on the statement of TPB: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/19/0719140.htm 
37 MPDN, 27 January 2004, page A08  
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By contrast, the WDII and CRIII were at a relatively late stage. As 
parts of the Central Reclamation Plan decided in 1980s, some infrastructure 
associated with these two projects, including the CWB, had been partially 
constructed before the debate. Although the Exco had not made the final 
decision on OZP within the WDII, the Legco had approved the funding for 
this project before the debate. The CRIII, at an even later stage, had been 
commenced before it was criticised. From this perspective, in terms of 
policy stage, the certainty level of the CRIII and WDII was high. 
 
In terms of policy stage, there was also an uncertainty over town 
planning policy during the reclamation debate. The TPAB 2003 was 
introduced into the Legco for amendments to the TPO. In this sense, town 
planning policy was under evaluation at that time. Since this amendment 
exercise provided an opportunity for pro-democrat legislators to raise issues 
relating to the TPB, the certainty of town planning policy became relatively 
low. 
 
Taking both elite consensus and policy stage into account, the CRIII 
and WDII showed the highest level of policy certainty measured by elite 
consensus and policy stage. In contrast, the SEKR and HLC prison plans 
were relatively uncertain as these two projects were being planned. Despite 
a high level of elite consensus, town planning policy was uncertain in terms 
of policy stage. Thus, town planning policy remained at a medium level 
certainty in general.   
 
4 Analysis of News Framing  
4.1 Methodology   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the period for analysis is 
defined by the time of the debate on the WDII and CRIII, as well as for 
relevant policy changes. Thus, the sampling period began on 22 March 2002 
when the TPB decided to persist with the Harbour Park proposal. The end 
date of the article search was 16 October 2004 when the Administration 
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announced the final policy change, i.e. the withdrawal of the HLC prison 
development plan.    
 
News articles and editorials of the three selected newspapers were 
searched on the Wisers database using the key words ‘reclamation (填海)’, 
‘Town Planning Board (城市規劃委員會 /城規會 )’, ‘Town Planning 
Ordinance (城市規劃條例)’ and ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003 
(城市規劃(修訂)條例草案 2003)’. Only the texts containing at least one 
paragraph relating to the reclamation projects and the TPB and TPAB 2003 
were selected, while the irrelevant articles were screened off. 
 
This study assumes that the media’s influence on policy is possible 
only if there is a substantial quantity (at least one article per day) of 
sustained (over a minimum of 3 days) and negative (overall half of the 
articles is critically framed) coverage followed by policy change. Thus, the 
article and keyword counts focus on this kind of sustained coverage. 
 
A coding manual for article count was designed according to the 
arguments highlighted by proponents and opponents of the reclamation 
projects and town planning policy. A detailed coding manual is shown in 
(Appendix 9A).There are basically three types of news framing as follows:    
 
Positive framing is a narrative supporting the Administration, its 
reclamation projects and existing town planning policy. This kind of 
framing consists of the following elements:  
 Reclamation projects were considered as a relief for traffic congestion 
and other development problems.  
 The officials’ speech and voices supporting reclamation were 
highlighted. 
 The SPH and Winston CHU were described as representatives of real 
estate developers affected by the reclamation projects. 
 The legal battles on reclamation were regarded as a waste of time and 
taxpayer’s money 
 Information in the SPH’s pamphlet was outdated and misleading. 
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 The anti-reclamation protests and the protestors were considered to be 
radical and annoying. 
 The extent of existing reclamation plans was considered to be 
minimized, while the amendments and suspension of these plans were 
considered to be infeasible and expensive. 
 The reclamation plans were considered to be legitimate as they had gone 
through a due process of statutory procedures and consultation 
 The existing town planning policy was considered to be effective and 
legitimate. 
 The TPB was described as a professional and legitimate body, while its 
closed-door meetings could ensure that the members could express 
views freely. 
 
Negative framing shows favour to the voice against reclamation plans and 
the existing town planning policy. This kind of news coverage consists of 
the following elements: 
 Reclamation projects caused damage to the Harbour and the 
environment  
 The opponents’ speeches and opinions against reclamation were 
highlighted. 
 The SPH and Winston CHU were considered to be heroes fighting for 
people’s interests and Harbour protection. 
 The legal battles on reclamation were framed as a fight for people’s 
interests and Harbour protection. 
 The information in the SPH’s pamphlet was described as up to date and 
valid. 
 The anti-reclamation protests and the protestors were considered to be 
peaceful and legitimate. 
 The extent of existing reclamation plans were considered to be excessive, 
while the amendments and suspension of those plans were considered to 
be viable and necessary. 
 The reclamation plans were considered  outdated  
 Existing town planning policy was considered as ineffective and 
outdated. 
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 The TPB was described as a closed body which represented the interests 
of business and professional sectors, while its closed-door meetings 
were considered to be unnecessary. 
 
In addition, there is neutral framing. The characteristics of this framing are 
listed as follows: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article. 
 Neither supportive nor critical arguments were highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues, such as judicial proceedings, were 
merely described and explained. 
 
This study assumes that policymakers usually took account of news 
coverage in relation to reclamation projects and town planning policy. Thus, 
news articles concerning the threats to Winston Chu these issues were 
regarded as neutral description. 
 
The keywords associated with positive and negative framings were 
also quantified. Although the purposes of reclamation varied from project to 
project, the opponents of reclamation described those projects as 
environmental issues, considering the Harbour as an asset of the people 
which should be protected. Thus, the damage caused by reclamation to the 
environment was highlighted. In this circumstance, ‘protect/protection (保
護 )’, ‘environment (環境 )’, ‘asset (資產 )’ and ‘damage (破壞 )’ were 
selected as keywords associated with negative framing. In contrast, the 
Administration and the proponents of reclamation considered it to be useful 
in providing relief for traffic congestion, emphasising the high cost of 
suspending reclamation work, including compensation claimed by 
contractors. In this case, ‘transport/traffic (交通)’, ‘congestion (擠塞/塞車)’, 
‘cost (代價)’ and ‘compensation/claim (賠償/補償/索償)’ were regarded as 
keywords in relation to positive framing. 
 
In order to avoid contamination of the results, the keywords referring 
to irrelevant issues and the titles of persons and groups were screened off. 
For example, the word ‘protection’ was counted only when it was used in 
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the issues in relation to Harbour protection and environmental protection. 
When used in ‘Society for Protection of the Harbour’ or ‘Protection of the 
Harbour Ordinance’ it was excluded. Neither was it counted when it was 
used in relation to ‘physical protection’ in the threat case of Winston Chu. 
Similarly, the word ‘environment’ used in ‘Secretary of Environment, 
Transport and Public Work’ and ‘political environment’ was not counted.  
 
4.2 Results of Framing Analysis  
During the938 days between 22 March 2002 and 16 October 2004, 
the ADN and ODN ran 122 (0.13 per day) and 104 (0.11 per day) articles 
concerning the reclamation projects and town planning policy respectively. 
The MPDN ran 199 (0.21 per day) articles, the highest quantity among the 3 
selected papers. However, the coverage was not evenly distributed. As 
mentioned in the pervious chapter, the sample period can be divided into six 
periods to be analysed. The detailed results of article count and keyword test 
in these six periods are summarised in Appendix 9B.  
 
As this study assumes that only critical news coverage sustained for 
at least 3 days can place sufficient pressure on policymakers, I focus on the 
framing of the sustained coverage for the three selected papers. As shown in 
Appendix 9C, between September 2003 and May 2004, the MPDN ran six 
peaks of sustained coverage, while the ADN ran five peaks. For the ODN, 
there was only one peak of sustained coverage between 4 and 14 October 
2003.  
 
This study assumes that media pressure on policymakers is increased 
when all the three selected papers ran sustained critical coverage 
simultaneously. Taking all the sustained coverage of the three papers into 
account, there was only one period when all three newspapers ran sustained 
coverage. During this 11-day period between 4 and 14 October 2003, the 
keyword test of all three papers demonstrated negative framing. However, 
article count showed that only ADN’s coverage was negatively framed, 
while the tone of the other two papers remained mixed. Thus, only the 
overall framing of the ADN was considered to be negative, while that of the 
MPDN and ODN was mixed (see Table 9.2). From this perspective, there 
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was a low level of media consensus over the news framing in the period. 
Media pressure on policymakers was considered to be low. 
 
Table 9.2: Framing of Sustained Coverage of the Three Newspapers 
between 4 and 14 October 2003 (11 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN  
Framing Total No. of article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 8 (1) 3 5 
Negative / Critical  10 12 (1) 5 
Neutral / Descriptive 17 (2) 9 (1) 9 
Total 35 (3) 24 (2) 19 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 3.18 2.18 1.73 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Mixed Negative Mixed 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
11 
10 
4 
15 
15 
15 
4 
20 
6 
6 
1 
11 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 30 54 24 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
18 
6 
0 
10 
39 
12 
3 
10 
19 
3 
0 
5 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 34 64 27 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Negative Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Mixed Negative Mixed 
 
5.  Testing the Hypotheses 
5.1 Tracing Time Sequence 
This study assumes that the media’s influence on policy is possible 
only if there is sustained critical coverage followed by policy change. News 
coverage of the reclamation debate remained extremely limited and 
scattered until mid-September 2003. Thus, policy changes prior to that time 
were unlikely to have been influenced by news coverage. Those changes 
included the Administration’s decision to introduce TPAB 2003 into the 
Legco, the CFI’s ruling against the WDII, and the withdrawal of the 
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Harbour Park proposal, as well as the pro-democrat camp’s demand to open 
up TPB meetings. 
 
In the period subsequent to October 2003, only the ADN ran 
sustained negative coverage, while the framing of the MPDN and ODN 
remained mixed. Thus, the media pressure on policymakers was weakened 
by the low level of media consensus. It can be argued that this level of 
media pressure might influence some low cost agenda changes, such as the 
pro-democrat camp’s suggestion of a joint Panel meeting and the 
Administration’s review of the alternatives to traffic congestion and harbour 
protection. However, it is hard to imagine that such a low level of media 
pressure could trigger a series of high cost policy changes, such as the delay 
of the HLC prison development plan which was announced on 27 October 
2003, after the three papers ran sustained coverage simultaneously.  
 
 A partial resumption of the CRIII was announced on 7 March 2003, 
at the peak of the three newspapers’ sustained coverage. In order to examine 
the media’s influence, I focused on the news framing in the three days prior 
to this policy change. As Table 9.3 shows, in the three day period prior to 7 
March 2003, the overall framing of all the three newspapers remained 
mixed (see Table 9.5). From this perspective, coverage was unlikely to have 
been an influential factor in the decision on partial resumption.    
 
Nevertheless, the media’s influence on high cost policy change was 
evidenced by the officials’ statements. Announcing the partial resumption of 
the CRIII on 7 October 2003, Michael Suen claimed that the Exco had taken 
account of the ‘heated public debate’ on reclamation and the criticisms of 
the Administration38. According to the Chinese version of Suen’s statement, 
the ‘public debate’ referred to the wide range of people’s opinions on 
reclamation39. He also said that, in the public debate at the Legco Panel, the 
Administration would respond to the criticisms in order to explain the 
                                               
38 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
39 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the SHPL (Chinese part): 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007218.htm 
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Administration’s rationale to the people40. Furthermore, on 27 October 2003, 
the Administration claimed that consultations on the HLC prison plan would 
be delayed because of the public views against reclamation41. Thus, the 
Administration and the Exco’s decisions on the delayed of HLC prison 
development plan, the partial resumption of CRIII, and the suggestion of a 
public hearing were all based on the perception of negative public views. 
 
Table 9.3: Framing of Coverage of Reclamation Debate 
between 4 and 6 October 2003 (3 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 0 0 
Negative / Critical  2 5 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 2 1 1 
Total 4 6 3 
Average No. of articles per day 1.60 2.00 1.00 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Negative 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
4 
2 
0 
5 
5 
4 
1 
8 
1 
1 
0 
5 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 11 18 7 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
1 
2 
0 
2 
8 
3 
0 
1 
6 
0 
0 
1 
Negative / Critical 
Total 5 12 7 
Framing decided by keyword count Negative Positive Mixed 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Mixed Mixed Mixed 
 
Explaining his statement, Suen on the one hand stressed that the 
decision on the partial resumption of the CRIII was mainly based on legal 
considerations. On the other hand, he claimed that the Administration hoped, 
through the media, that the discussion at the Legco meetings would put the 
                                               
40 The Administration’s press release on the speech of  the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
41 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
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government’s message across to the public. Being asked if this task had 
been achieved by the public hearings, Suen said ‘Of course not.’ (Interview 
on 22 January 2008) In other words, the Administration perceived a 
negative tone in the coverage and took it into account before 7 October 2003. 
As the Administration did not sense any change in the tone of news 
coverage, this perception persisted after the Legco completed its public 
hearings in December 2003. In this sense, the Administration’s perception 
of public views was consistent with that of the news coverage. Thus, it is 
reasonable to suggest that these two perceptions were associated with each 
other. From this perspective, media influence on these two high cost policy 
changes was possible.  
 
In short, there was an inconsistency between the results of framing 
analysis and the Administration’s perceptions. On the one hand, the 
Administration perceived a negative tone in the coverage. On the other hand, 
only one of the selected newspapers ran sustained critical coverage. It might 
be argued that policymakers were personally affected by random media 
reports. In Robinson’s terms, there was a weak CNN effect (Robinson 
2002:38-9). However, it is hard to imagine that random coverage could 
trigger a series of high cost policy changes over months.    
 
5.2 Policy Certainty 
5.2.1 Elite Consensus  
This study sets up two hypotheses regarding the relation between 
elite consensus and critical coverage. First, critical coverage is unlikely to 
occur when there is elite consensus. Second, compared with critical 
coverage, elite consensus is a stronger variable. Policy is unlikely to be 
influenced by critical coverage when there is a high level of elite consensus.    
 
As mentioned above, the level of elite consensus remained high 
while there was a low level of media consensus over critical framing. In this 
case, the hypothesised inverse relation between elite consensus and critical 
coverage was supported. Nevertheless, the Administration perceived 
negative news framing and launched a series of policy changes. In this sense, 
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the limited quantity of critical coverage managed to put sufficient pressure 
on the Administration, resulting in policy change, despite a high level of 
elite consensus. Thus, the case of the reclamation debate did not support the 
second hypothesis on the relations between elite consensus and critical 
coverage. 
 
5.2.2 Policy Stage 
This study also assumes that it is relatively difficult for news 
coverage to influence a policy with a high level of certainty measured by 
policy stage. Since the changes to the WDII were ordered by the court 
before sustained coverage was run, this change is not thought to have been 
influenced by news coverage. 
 
As mentioned above, policy certainty of the SEKR, HLC prison 
proposals and the town planning policy was relatively low. After the 
Administration had perceived negative news framing, the SEKR and HLC 
prison plan were reconsidered and there were personnel and operational 
changes in the TPB. From this perspective, these changes supported the 
hypothesis that news coverage could influence policy in the uncertainty 
stage. However, the hypothesis was only partially supported by the case of 
the CRIII, which had a high level of certainty measured by policy stage. 
Although this project persisted after the legal battle, there were some high 
cost changes after the Administration perceived negative news framing. 
These changes included temporary suspension and partial resumption. From 
this perspective, it is possible for the coverage to influence policy with a 
high level of certainty in terms of policy stage.         
 
In a nutshell, the hypotheses of this study are not all supported by 
empirical findings. Furthermore, there was an inconsistency between the 
framing analysis results and the Administrations’ perception of coverage. 
There was also evidence showing that news coverage could trigger policy 
change despite a high level of certainty measured by elite consensus and 
policy stage. From this perspective, the media’s influence on policy is 
possible regardless of policy certainty.    
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However, it is hard to imagine that such a low level of media 
consensus could result in the Administration’s perception of negative 
coverage, triggering a series of high cost policy changes. In order to provide 
a better account of the media’s role, I further explore various possible 
factors for policy changes and their relationship with news coverage. 
 
6. Possible Route of Media Effect on Policy 
In order to explain the Administration’s perception of coverage and 
the possible route of media effects, I suggest several factors affecting policy 
change. Of these, some are independent of the media, while some interact 
with news coverage. I suggest that these factors co-exist and reinforce one 
another in some circumstances. 
 
6.1 Institutions 
The first factor in policy change is institution, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, is traditionally defined as formal rules and procedures and 
government organisations in which political behaviour takes place. As the 
old institutional approach suggests, rules and procedures, as basic 
independent variables, prescribe political behaviour (Rhodes, 1995:46, 54-
5). One of the key institutional factors is the legal system of Hong Kong. In 
fact, during the reclamation debate, the courts played an important role as its 
rulings not only determined if existing reclamation projects could be 
continued, but also changed the contexts of the PHO.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Administration and other 
policymakers are constitutionally constrained by the court’s rulings, which 
are supposed to be made impartially. Thus, the courts’ decisions and  related 
policy changes were all supposed to be independent of media influence. 
Such changes included: 
 the CFI’s prohibition against forwarding the WDII OZP to the Exco on 
14 March 2003;  
 Change in the criteria for reclamation and the re-consideration of WDII 
ordered by the CFI on 8 July 2003;  
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 the TPB’s withdrawal of the Harbour Park proposal on 18 July 2003 
according to the new criteria defined by the CFI;  
 the High Court’s permission to continue work on the CRIII on 6 October 
2003;  
 the change in criteria for reclamation ordered by the CFA on 9 January 
2004, and 
 the High Court’s confirmation of the legality of the CRIII in March 
2004.  
 
In addition, the Administration’s review of existing reclamation 
projects in the Harbour, and the re-consideration of the SEKR are 
considered to be initiatives according to the criteria defined by the CFI and 
CFA’s rulings. Thus, news coverage is not considered as a necessary 
condition for these changes. 
 
Not only the Administration, but also pro-democrat legislators are 
constrained by the legal system. In this case, although the pro-democrat 
camp tried to place pressure on the Administration through the special joint 
Panel meeting of the Legco, the legislators had to avoid interference with 
the fair administration of justice42.  
 
The appointment of TPB members in April 2004 also resulted from 
the legal constraints. The TPB is established according to the TPO, while 
the tenure of appointments of the Board’s members is usually for no more 
than two years43. As the terms for existing TPB members were set out in the 
first half of 2004, the Administration had to make a new round of 
appointment at that time. Thus, the time of the new appointments of TPB 
members in April 2004 was determined by the tenure of members. 
 
In addition to formal rules, past political decisions are embodied in 
the institutions (John 1998: 40-42). During the reclamation debate, the 
Administration and pro-democrat legislators were both constrained by their 
                                               
42 Minutes of the joint meeting of the PLW and EA Panels: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/minutes/eapl1031.pdf 
43 Website of TPB: http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/about_us/intro.html 
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past decisions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Central 
Reclamation Plan was decided in the 1980s. Before the debate, the 
reclamation projects had passed through all the statutory and consultative 
procedures and the CRI and CRII had been completed. Bearing this in mind, 
it was relatively difficult for the Administration to make changes to the 
CRIII and WDII projects. As Suen stated, ‘We have already constructed the 
two ends of the road. We should finish the rest anyway.’ (Interview on 22 
January 2008)  
 
Although the opponents of reclamation claimed that scaling down 
the CRIII would not affect the development of the CWB, any adjustment of 
the existing development project should be reassessed through a series of 
statutory and consultative procedures. Since the position of the pro-
democrat camp changed at that time, these reassessments were likely to 
result in a serious delay to and dramatic changes to these projects. For the 
CRIII, the cost of adjusting the project also involved compensation for the 
contractors because reclamation work had commenced before the debate. In 
other words, the Administration was bound by its past decisions because of 
the high political and fiscal costs of any change to existing policy.  
 
However, the costs of the changes in existing policies depended on 
the stage of the policy. For the CRIII and WDII, except for the Harbour 
Park, the reclaimed land would be used for the development of the CWB, 
part of which had been finished before the debate. Thus, the costs of 
adjustment of these projects were relatively high. In contrast, the SEKR and 
HLC prison plans were still being designed during the debate. Since there 
was room for the Administration to amend those plans, the costs of change 
were relatively low. This argument explains why the Administration 
persisted with the CRIII and WDII until the courts handed down the rulings, 
while the SEKR and HLC prison plan were reconsidered and withdrawn on 
the Administration’s initiative. 
 
Pro-democrat legislators were also influenced by their past decisions 
on reclamation projects. As a former DP Chairman, Lee Wing-tat states, a 
political party needs to remain consistent in its position (interview on 23 
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January 2003). Before the debate, the reclamation projects were approved 
by legislators, including those of the pro-democrat camp. Although pro-
democrat legislators changed their positions, criticising the reclamation 
plans, those legislators tried to avoid overthrowing their past decisions in a 
high profile manner. This argument is supported by two findings. First, the 
special joint Panel meeting at the Legco was requested by Wong Sing-chi, a 
newly elected DP legislator who was not involved in past discussions of 
reclamation. Second, all the anti-reclamation protests were organised by the 
SPH and the APH, a group set up by other pro-democrat District Councilors, 
and supported by pro-democrat legislators. In other words, pro-democrat 
legislators played a supportive role with a low profile, rather than the 
leading role. Further evidence of this argument is discussed in the case of 
the demolition of the old Star Ferry Pier.  
 
6.2 Ideas and Beliefs 
The ideas and beliefs systems of political actors also played an 
important role during the reclamation debate. The first policy change 
associated with policymakers’ ideas was the TPB’s persistence with the 
Harbour Park proposal in March 2002. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the Board supported the construction of the Park, despite criticisms 
of the proposal. Thus, it is believed that the Board’s decision was mainly 
based on its existing idea.   
 
The other change that resulted from policymakers’ ideas was agenda 
change during the scrutiny of TPAB 2003 at the Legco. At the first meeting 
of the Bills Committee in September 2003, the democrats urged the 
Administration to open up the TPB meetings. Since this change was made 
before sustained coverage, news coverage was unlikely to have been an 
influential factor. In addition, the same demand was made by the legislators 
during the amendment exercise of the TPO in 2000. Thus, the opposition 
expressed the same idea in 2003. A DP legislator, James To, who was also 
Chairman of the Bills Committee on TPAB 2003, further claimed that this 
demand was mainly based on the pro-democrat camp’s beliefs in public 
accountability and openness of public bodies (interview on 31 January 
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2008). From this perspective, the change in the agenda of TPAB 2003 was 
mainly resulted from pro-democratic legislators’ belief systems. 
     
The Administration and TPB’s decision on opening up some TPB 
meetings was also independent of news coverage. There were only four 
news stories about the openness of the TPB and the scrutiny of the TPAB 
2003 during the sampling period. Only one of these was run before the 
Administration decided to open up the TPB meetings. Although a TPB 
member claimed that the controversy over reclamation made the members 
alter the problems of transparency of Board 44 , the other TPB member 
claimed that the board had studied the issues relating to its openness during 
the TPO amendment excise in 2000. Since then, most TPB members had 
understood that some of meetings would be opened up. Thus, most members 
raised no objection when the Administration brought up this issue to the 
board in January 2004 (interview with a TPB member requesting anonymity 
on 14 May 2007). From this perspective, the TPB had prepared to open up 
some of its meetings before the reclamation debate. In this sense, change in 
the openness of TPB was mainly based on members’ existing ideas, 
although it can be argued that news coverage might function as a catalyst 
accelerating the implementation of these ideas.  
 
The other important element of the belief system is the political 
tendency which influences relations between various groups. Although the 
SPH did not highlight its political stance, the Chairwoman of the Society, 
Christine Loh is active as a pro-democratic politician. The PHO, which the 
legal battle over reclamation was based on, was also proposed by Loh and 
passed by the colonial Legco with the support of pro-democratic legislators 
in 199745. It can be argued that pro-democrat legislators requested the joint 
Panel meeting because they regarded the SPH as a member of the pro-
democrat camp. 
 
                                               
44 MPDN, 16 November 2003, page A10 
45 Official record of the proceedings of the Legco meeting: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/lc_sitg/hansard/970627fa.doc 
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In the meantime, the belief system also prevented the pro-
government camp from supporting the SPH’s campaign. As a SPH member 
and a DAB legislator, Choy So-yuk, claimed that she and the Society had 
the same goal of harbour protection but different political stances. Although 
Choy supported the SPH’s campaign, she was told by the DAB not to work 
with the Society. According to Choy, the DAB was constrained by its pro-
government stance. Furthermore, the DAB believed that the SPH would 
never support the party whether the party supported the anti-reclamation 
campaign or not (interview on 21 May 2007). 
 
Explaining the difference in belief system between the pro-
government and the pro-democrat camps, the founding Chairman of DAB, 
Jasper Tsang, also claimed that the pro-democrat camp usually presumes 
that government policy is no good, while the DAB usually trusts the 
Administration. Thus, when the Administration is criticised, the DAB will 
consider the Administration’s explanation. In addition to its own belief 
system, the DAB is also bound by its supporters’ political stances. 
According to Tsang, if the people criticising government policy are not from 
the pro-government camp, the DAB would hesitate to work with these 
opponents. This is because of resistance on the part of the party’s loyal 
supporters and voters. During the reclamation debate, the SPH and its 
campaign were supported by the pro-democrat camp. If the DAB allied 
itself with the SPH, the party would be criticised by its supporters (interview 
on 17 January 2008). From this point of view, the inaction of the DAB was 
explained by the party and its supporter’s political stances.  
     
In short, there was evidence that the media’s influence was unlikely 
to be a necessary factor in some policy changes. The pro-democrat 
legislators changed the agenda on the scrutiny of the TAPB because of their 
belief in public accountability and openness of public bodies. Those 
legislators requested a joint Panel meeting of the Legco as their political 
tendency was the same as that of the SPH. The change in openness of TPB 
meetings was also decided before the reclamation debate.  
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6.3 Long-term Policy Image 
Despite a low level of media consensus, the Administration 
perceived negative news framing. Thus, I suggest that policymakers become 
relatively sensitive to critical coverage in some circumstances. In other 
words, policymakers’ sensitivity to critical coverage is increased by some 
factors. One of these factors is long-term policy image, which is the pre-
existing public understanding of reclamation. This argument is consistent 
with the concept of ‘policy image’ proposed by Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993). 
 
The long-term negative image of reclamation is evidenced by a news 
article in the MPDN on 2 August 2002, before the reclamation debate. In 
this article, the Director of Territory Development claimed that the 
government was aware of people’s concerns over the protection of the 
environment and increasing resistance to reclamation. In this circumstance, 
several reclamation projects in various areas in Hong Kong had been 
suspended or terminated over the past few years46 . In other words, the 
Administration had realised the unpopularity of reclamation and had 
withdrawn some reclamation projects before the reclamation debate. In 
Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) terms, there was a negative policy image 
for reclamation. In this circumstance, it was relatively easy for the 
opposition to magnify the voices against reclamation. Thus, government 
officials become particularly sensitive to the criticisms, including those by 
the media, and may try to counteract those criticisms. 
 
6.4 Short-Term Public Mood 
The other factor increasing policymakers’ sensitivity to critical 
coverage is short-term public attitudes towards the Administration and its 
policies. As mentioned in the case of Article 23, in the period around the 
large-scale anti-government rally on 1 July 2003, dissatisfaction rate of the 
government increased to the historical high level of 70%47. Although the 
dissatisfaction rate slightly decreased to 50% in the following 4 months, the 
                                               
46 MPDN 2 August 2002, page B10 
47 Press release on 5 August 2003, Website of the Public Opinion Programme, the 
University of Hong Kong: http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release127.html 
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satisfaction rate remained at a level of 20%48. Thus, government popularity 
was considered to be low during the reclamation debate.  
 
In the case of partial resumption of work on the CRIII, there was 
evidence showing that the Administration not only took account of its 
unpopularity, but also considered public attitudes against reclamation. In the 
day prior to the announcement of partial resumption of work on the CRIII, a 
government source told MPDP that the Administration believed that the 
reclamation controversy had given rise to  public concern over harbour 
protection. From the experience of the ‘1 July protest’, the Administration 
were concerned that a full resumption would provoke the public, triggering 
further large-scale protests. Thus, the Administration planned to take some 
initiatives in order to demonstrate its sincere intention to listen to the 
public49. In other words, the Administration perceived public views against 
both the government and reclamation. In addition, as mentioned in the case 
of Article 23, government officials considered public views as a dependent 
variable affected by news coverage. From this perspective, it can be argued 
that the officials were extremely sensitive to any criticisms of the 
government, including those made by the media. Thus, a limited level of 
critical coverage might trigger as response by the Administration. 
 
Further evidence was found in Michael Suen’s statements. 
According to Suen, the Exco took account of the ‘criticisms’ of the 
Administration and the ‘public debate’ 50 , which referred to people’s 
opinions 51 . In other words, the Exco members perceived public views 
against reclamation. This finding was consistent with Suen’s perception of 
negative coverage (interview on 22 January 2008). Thus, it is argued that 
the limited level of critical coverage, together with unfavourable public 
mood, could result in the Administration’s perception of negative news 
                                               
48 Press release on 25 November 2003, Website of the Public Opinion Programme, the 
University of Hong Kong: http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release149.html 
49 MPDN, 7 October 2003, page A02 
50 The Administration’s press release on the speech of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
51 The Administration’s press release on the speech of SHPL (Chinese part): 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007218.htm 
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framing. In this case, an increased media influence prevented the full 
resumption of the CRIII. 
 
Public views against reclamation per se also influenced the 
withdrawal of the HLC prison plan. The Administration decided to delay the 
consultation on the HLC prison plan because of public views against 
reclamation in October 200352 when there was substantial coverage. It can 
be argued that the media’s influence was increased by negative public mood. 
However, when the Administration announced the withdrawal of the prison 
plan in October 2004, the reclamation debate had been over for months, 
while coverage had become extremely scattered. However, the 
Administration stressed public views against the proposal53. From this point 
of view, public views per se could have resulted in the withdrawal of HLC 
prison plan.    
 
6.5 Election Cycle 
The other factor enhancing policymakers’ sensitivity to news 
coverage is election cycle, which is also associated with institutional setting 
and public mood. As mentioned in the case of Article 23, the Administration 
and the pro-government camp hoped to settle all the controversies before the 
DC election in November 2003 and the Legco election in September 2004. 
Moreover, in the DC election in 2003, the DP won 99 seats while the DAB 
got only 62, losing 21 seats, including those of some very senior politicians. 
The overall share of the vote of the DAB also dropped from 45% in 1999 to 
39% in 200354. Thus, in the period subsequent to this DC election, the 
Administration made further concessions in order to avoid any further 
influence on the pro-government candidates in the 2004 Legco election.  
 
From this perspective, the creation of the HEC and the TPB’s 
changes in Vice-Chairmanship and openness could be considered as the 
Administration’s concessions made under the pressure of the election cycle 
                                               
52 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
53 Paper of  the Legco Financial Committee 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/fc/fc/papers/fi04-15e.pdf 
54 MPDN, 25 November 2003, page A02 & A04 
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and negative public attitudes. It is also appropriate to suggest that the 
Administration became sensitive to critical coverage in this case.  
 
6.6 Strategies of Actors  
Despite external constraints, as the new institutional approach and 
institutional rational choice theory suggest, actors within their institutional 
positions adopted various strategies in order to maximise their payoffs or to 
minimise their losses. Some policy changes thus resulted from the actors’ 
mediations with various factors.       
 
6.6.1 The Administration 
Despite the policy changes during the reclamation debate, there was 
evidence showing that Administration acted tactically in order to mediate 
with the opponents and their criticisms, and to manipulate policy change in 
some cases. The first one was the legal battle. After the High Court 
confirmed the legality of the CRIII in March 2004, the SPH requested that 
the appeal against this judgement went to the CFA directly in order to speed 
up legal proceedings. This direct appeal should be based on the consent of 
both sides of the lawsuit. However, the Administration rejected the 
Society’s request. Finally, the SPH decided not to enter into a legal tussle 
because of the high fiscal costs and long time needed for an appeal. From 
this perspective, the legal battle was settled by the Administration’s strategy.  
 
Some actions of the Administration could be regarded as the 
strategies to please the judges. When the SPH had applied for the interim 
injunction over the CRIII in September 2003, the High Court did not order 
the suspension of reclamation work. However, the Administration on its 
own initiative announced the temporary suspension of the CRIII55. Some 
legal professionals argued that the Administration tried to demonstrate its 
intention to protect the harbour in order to impress the judges56. Similarly, 
the partial resumption of work on the CRIII and the Administration’s review 
of alternatives to traffic congestion could be considered as the initiatives to 
                                               
55 The Administration’s press release on the statement of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/27/0927160.htm 
56 MPDN, 28 September 2003, page A04 
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please the judges although, as mentioned above, media effects on those 
initiatives were possible. When the Administration announced these policy 
changes, the CFA and the High Court were still processing the appeals of 
the WDII and the JR on the matter of the CRIII. However, when all these 
legal battles were settled in 9 March 2004, the Administration announced 
the full resumption of the CRIII, while the alternative reliefs for traffic 
congestion were never mentioned again. From this perspective, it can be 
suggested that these initiatives were merely gestures to demonstrate the 
Administration’s intention to protect the Harbour.    
 
These initiatives could be also considered as the Administration’s 
contingency plans. Before the High Court handed down its ruling, there was 
a possibility that the CRIII plan would be prohibited completely. In this 
circumstance, the Administration might be ordered to repair the damage to 
the Harbour. According to the engineering professionals, the fiscal cost of 
recovering reclamation works, such as piling, is extremely high57. Thus, it 
can be argued that the Administration decided to resume some reparable 
work such as dredging only in order to minimise possible fiscal loss. 
Moreover, if reclamation was not allowed, the Administration had to take 
other initiatives to resolve traffic problems as soon as possible. Thus, it was 
reasonable for the Administration to start the review of various alternatives 
before the courts handed down the rulings. However, after the legal battles 
had been settled, this review was no longer necessary. In other words, the 
Administration’s changes in agenda and the partial resumption of work on 
the CRIII could be considered as strategies to minimise possible losses 
caused by legal battles. As mentioned above, however, those policy changes 
were also influenced by news coverage. In this case, the policy changes 
resulted from a series of factors, including media pressure and the 
Administration’s strategy of minimising possible losses under the 
institutional constraints.  
 
The Administration also made use of the rules of the Legco. While 
the pro-democrat legislators criticised the reclamation plans at the first 
special joint meeting of the PLW and EA Panels on 13 October 2003, the 
                                               
57 MPDN, 4 October 2003, page A03 
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Administration proposed a public hearing on reclamation, providing an 
opportunity for the pro-government groups to support the reclamation plans. 
As mentioned above, the Administration also tried to explain its rationale to 
the people through media coverage of the debate at the Legco (interview on 
22 January 2008). Thus, the Administration’s suggestion was considered as 
a strategy to counteract the voices against reclamation and to influence news 
framing.  
 
However, after the hearings, the Administration still perceived 
negative news framing (interview with Michael Suen on 22 January 2008). 
Announcing the plan to distribute pamphlets in the streets, the 
Administration also admitted it disadvantageous position where public 
opinion was concerned58. Thus, the distribution of leaflets was considered as 
an adjustment of the Administration’s strategy to bypass the media and 
directly deliver the message to the public.  
 
Moreover, with its constitutional power, the Administration 
manipulated the structural alterations of the TPB. Although a non-official 
member was first appointed as Vice-Chairman, the Administration still 
controlled the chairmanship and membership of the TPB. In addition, the 
Administration and the TPB only opened up the hearing part of the meetings 
for consideration of representations or comments and planning applications 
apart from items involving confidential or sensitive information. The 
deliberation part of decision remained closed.  Furthermore, the newly 
created HEC has no power of influence over reclamation projects. Decisions 
on reclamation projects and the town planning policy are still tightly 
controlled by the Administration and the TPB. In other words, although 
structural alterations could be considered as responses to criticisms, the 
Administration adopted strategies to maintain its overwhelming influential 
power over town planning policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
58 MPDN, 19 December 2003, page A15 
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6.6.2 The Pro-government Camp 
The pro-government camp also adopted strategies to minimise their 
losses. Throughout the reclamation debate, pro-government legislators did 
not express their support for the Administration. Rather, these legislators, on 
the one hand, kept silent at the Legco most of the time. On the other hand, 
they mobilised pro-government groups to counteract opinions against 
reclamation at the hearings. According to the former DAB Chairman, Jasper 
Tsang, the party’s silence was a strategy to avoid criticism by the media 
(interview on 17 January 2008). In other words, pro-government legislators 
tried to conceal their supportive position because of their perceptions of 
negative coverage.    
 
6.6.3 The Opponents of Reclamation  
The opponents of reclamation also took a series of tactical actions 
within their own institutional positions in order to maximise pressure on the 
Administration. Although the Legco could neither change the reclamation 
projects nor interfere with the judiciary, pro-democrat legislators requested 
a special joint meeting of the PLW and EA Panels in order to create a 
platform to criticise the Administration. The other pro-democrat politicians 
from the DC, together with the SPH and some environmental groups, also 
organised a series of anti-reclamation protests. From this point of view, 
opponents in different positions took different actions to put the 
Administration under pressure. 
 
In this case, the news coverage played two roles in the opponents’ 
campaigns. First, according to the Convenor of the AHP, Kwok Ka-ki who 
is also a pro-democrat DC member, when he set up the AHP with other 
District Councilors after the SPH had applied for a JR on the CRIII, he did 
not know anybody from the SPH although they became partners in the 
campaign subsequently. The media was a channel for Kwok and other 
politicians to get information about the SPH’s campaign (interview on 30 
January 2008). In this case, the media functioned as a communicator among 
political actors. 
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Second, the opponents of reclamation also perceived that news 
coverage was in their favour when they launched the campaign. According 
to Kwok, there was substantial news coverage at an early stage of the debate, 
although the framing of the press became mixed subsequently. Although 
Kwok denied the media’s influence on his idea of harbour protection, he 
claimed that the launch of the anti-reclamation campaign was associated 
with the quantity of coverage. Kwok claimed:  
Media coverage cannot change my view. I never switch 
from decision A to decision B because of coverage. 
However, coverage can change my decision on social 
actions. We can urge the government to protect the harbour 
and stop reclamation everyday. As you know, however, it 
is useless. If we do it everyday, nobody will care. Thus, I 
look at coverage. If the media run substantial coverage 
concerned, we will take the opportunity to intensify our 
voices, triggering further discussion. In contrast, when the 
media pay lower attention to the issue, we will make less 
effort. (Interview on 30 January 2008) 
 
From this point of view, the opponents preferred launching their campaigns 
when they perceived substantial coverage of existing policy. In other words, 
substantial coverage not only changed the opponents’ agendas, but also 
encouraged the launch of further actions.  
 
The agenda of change to the Legco initiated by the pro-democrat 
camp was also associated with coverage. As mentioned in the case of 
Article 23, when pro-democrat legislators discovered a significant issue 
from news coverage, they would take various actions inside and outside the 
Legco to magnify the issue (interview with Lee Wing-tat on 23 January 
2008). From this perspective, the pro-democrat camp requested a joint Panel 
meeting at the Legco not only because the legislators and the SPH had the 
same political stance, but also because they believed the issue of 
reclamation could be magnified. From this point of view, there was a 
positive reinforcement relation between news coverage and actions against 
the existing policy.   
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7. Concluding Remarks: 
In a nutshell, the case of the reclamation debate does not support all 
the hypotheses of this study. Despite the low level of media consensus and 
the high level of policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy 
stage, there were policy changes following sustained coverage. In addition, 
there was an inconsistency between the framing analysis results and the 
Administration’s perception of negative coverage. The full resumption of 
the CRIII, which had extremely high certainty, was the only case that 
supported the hypothesis that policy certainty was a relatively strong 
variable compared with coverage.  
 
In order to explain the media’s influence, I suggest that it was 
enhanced by three conditions, namely short term public views against the 
Administration and reclamation projects, and long term negative policy 
image of reclamation, and election cycles. In addition, news coverage was 
only one of the influential factors affecting policy change. In some 
circumstances, policy changes were triggered by other factors such as the 
courts’ rulings, while media influence was not a necessary condition. 
Moreover, the policymakers were not simply constrained by external factors. 
Rather, policymakers, within their own institutional positions, adopted 
various strategies to maximise their payoffs or minimise their losses. As 
summarised in Table 9.4 policy changes resulted not only from several 
factors simultaneously, but also from mediation between policymakers and 
those factors.     
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Table 9.4: Factors Affecting Policy Changes During 
Reclamation Debate 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
Ideas / Beliefs 
Short term
 public m
ood 
Long term
 policy im
age 
Election C
ycles 
Strategies of actors 
Media 
effect 
22/3/2002 The TPB persisted with the 
Harbour Park proposal. 
 √     Not necessary 
14/3/2003 The CFI prohibited the TPB 
from forwarding the WDII 
OZP to the Exco.  
√      Not necessary 
6/5/2003 The initiation of amendment 
of the TPO  
 √     Not necessary 
8/7/2003 The CFI’s judgment on the JR 
of WDII, changing contexts of 
PHO. 
√      Not necessary 
8/7/2003 The Administration’s review 
of the judgment’s influence on 
reclamation projects.  
√      Not necessary 
18/7/2003 The TPB’s withdrawal of the 
Harbour Park proposal 
√      Not necessary 
18/9/2003 The pro-democratic 
legislators’ demand on 
opening up TPB meetings 
 √     Not necessary 
26/9/2003 Termination of two 
consultancy studies of the 
SEKR 
√      Not necessary 
27/9/2003 Temporarily suspension of 
CRIII 
  √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
6/10/2003 The High Court’s judgment 
over the interim injunction 
case, allowing the 
continuation of the CRIII 
works. 
√      Not necessary 
7/10/2003 Partial resumption of CRIII 
work. 
  √ √ √ √ Prohibiting 
effect 
9/10/2003 The pro-democrat camp’s 
request for a joint Panel 
meeting at the Legco 
√ √    √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas 
12/10/2003 The Administration review of 
the viability of ERP 
  √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 9.4 (Cont.) 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
Ideas / Beliefs 
Short term
 public m
ood 
Long term
 policy im
age 
Election C
ycles 
Strategies of actors 
Media 
effect 
13/10/2003 The Administration proposal 
for public hearings 
√  √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
Enhanced by 
other factors 
27/10/2003 The delay of the HLC prison 
plan 
  √ √ √ √ Prohibiting 
effect 
13/11/2003 The Administration’s review 
of legislation against further 
reclamation 
  √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
16/11/2003 The Administration’s decision 
on opening up TPB meetings. 
 √ √ √ √ √ Accelerate 
implementatio
n of existing 
ideas 
18/12/2003 The Administration’s 
distribution of leaflets 
  √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
Strong effect 
9/1/2004 The CFA’s ruling against 
WDII and the reinterpretation 
of PHO. 
√      Not necessary 
9/1/2004 The Administration and TPB’s 
review of reclamation projects 
√      Not necessary 
9/3/2004 The resumption of CRIII  √      Not necessary 
9/3/2004 The creation of HEC    √ √ √ √ Pressure on the 
Administration
, enhanced by 
other factors 
Strong effect 
2/4/2004 The personnel changes to  the  
TPB 
√      Not necessary 
2/4/2004 The appointment of a non-
official member of TPB Vice-
Chairman 
  √ √ √ √ Potential effect 
12/5/2004 Opening up TPB meetings by 
adding a new section in to 
TPAB 2003 
  √ √ √ √ Potential effect 
16/10/2004 Withdrawal of HLC prison 
plan 
  √ √   Not necessary 
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Chapter 10 
Narrative Account of the Case of  
the Goods and Services Tax 
 
1. Introduction 
The third case in this study is the debate on the introduction of the 
Goods and Services Tax1 (GST) in Hong Kong. This case was selected 
because it demonstrates the media’s influence on policy where there is a low 
level of elite consensus. This chapter provides a narrative account of the 
GST debate. Although this debate started in 2000 when the Administration 
announced its plan to study the introduction of new taxes, significant policy 
change was made in 2006 when the Administration launched a public 
consultation, advocating a GST proposal. Thus, this study focuses on the 
debate in 2006.  
 
2. Background of the GST 
The introduction of a consumption-based tax or GST has been 
discussed for 20 years. In 1987, the Financial Secretary, Sir Piers Jacobs 
suggested introducing a sales tax in order to broaden the tax base. However, 
this proposal was withdrawn because of objections by the Legco2. In the 
following years, the discussion on introducing a new tax was suspended as 
the government had a considerable surplus because of the revenue from the 
Company Profits Tax and Land Premium.   
 
However, since the financial year 1998/99, the government has had 
an operating deficit3 because of the Asian financial crisis. In response to the 
fiscal problems, in his budget his speech made on 8 March 2000, the 
Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, announced plans to set up a Task Force 
chaired by the Secretary for the Treasury to examine the viability of the 
existing tax regime. Furthermore, the government set up an independent 
                                               
1 The GST is a consumption-based tax which is similar to the sales tax and Value Added 
Tax in other countries.  
2 MPDN, 16 Dec 1999, page A01  
3 Operating deficit is defined as the situation where the government’s recurrent expenditure 
is estimated to exceed recurrent revenue. 
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committee to look into the suitability of introducing new types of broad-
based taxes, including a consumption-based tax4.  
 
In June 2000, the Administration announced the creation of an 
Advisory Committee on New Broad-based Taxes (ACNBT)5. After a 10-
month discussion period, the Committee published a Consultation Paper on 
‘A Broader-based Tax System for Hong Kong?’, which provided 13 
alternatives. Of these, the GST was highlighted as the option which could 
produce stable and significant revenue6. However, both the pro-democrat 
and pro-government camps expressed objections to the introduction of a 
GST, claiming that people and businesses would be burdened by a new tax. 
Representatives of various business sectors, including catering, tourism and 
retail also claimed that the Hong Kong economy would be damaged by 
introducing a GST7.  
 
Despite the criticisms, the ACNBT, in its final report published in 
March 2002, concluded that GST was the best option for the purpose of 
resolving the government’s structural deficit8problems. Both the opposition 
and the pro-government parties again opposed the Committee’s proposal, 
claiming that the introduction of a GST would ‘rob the poor and help the 
rich’9. 
 
In 2004, the Hong Kong economy experienced a rapid recovery. The 
government’s fiscal problems were resolved by an increase in revenue from 
company profits tax, salary tax and land premiums. However, in his Budget 
Speech, the Financial Secretary, Henry Tong, claimed that the tax base in 
Hong Kong was still narrow. Thus, an internal committee of the 
                                               
4 The 2000-01Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, 8 March 2000, paragraph 196-208: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2000/english/efile.htm#Review%20of%20Public%20Finances   
5 The Administration’s press release on the creation of the ACNBT 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200006/02/0602196.htm 
6 Consultation paper on ‘A Broader-based Tax System for Hong Hong?’: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/consult/2001/condoc-e.pdf 
7 MPDN, 7 August 2001, page A12. 
8 Final Report to the Financial Secretary by the Advisory Committee on New Broad-based 
Taxes, Paragraph 48: http://www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/acnbt/english/finalrpt/btreport.pdf 
9 MPDN, 2 March 2002, page A06. 
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Government would submit a report with a proposed GST framework and an 
implementation timetable at the end of 200410. 
 
On other hand, all the parties in the Legco continued to criticise the 
GST proposal. In 11 July 2004, Vincent Fang (Fang Kang), a legislator 
candidate of the functional constituency for wholesale and retail, together 
with several chambers of commerce from the retail sector, set up an ‘Anti-
GST Alliance’ expressing objections to the introduction of GST11. As Fang 
is a LP member, the alliance was considered to be supported by the party.   
 
In March 2005, despite the fiscal surplus, Tong, in his Budget 
Speech, claimed that the government’s internal committee had completed its 
study on the GST, and that the Administration would conduct a public 
consultation on this subject. Tong stressed that there were people who 
supported the introduction of GST. He also quoted the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) report where the view was expressed that Hong 
Kong should introduce a GST to solve the problems arising from its 
structural deficit12. 
 
In short, the awareness of tax base problems was triggered by the 
Government’s fiscal problems caused by the Asian financial crisis. Despite 
the recovery of the economy and the increase in Government revenue, the 
Administration highlighted the tax base problem, moving forward the study 
of a GST. On the other hand, both the pro-democrat and pro-government 
camp, together with the business sector, considered a GST as a burden on 
people and continued to oppose the introduction of this tax.   
 
3 Development of the GST debate in 2006 
The chronology of the debate on the GST is summarised in 
Appendix 10. The controversy is divided into two periods. The first one is 
between 22 February and 18 October 2006. In this period, the 
Administration decided to initiate a consultation on a GST and persisted 
                                               
10 The 2004-05 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 113  
11 Website of the Anti-GST Alliance: http://www.nogst.org.hk/as.htm 
12 The 2005-06 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 102-104: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2005/eng/budget41.htm 
 239 
with advocating the GST proposal despite the debate in the Exco. In the 
second period between 19 October and 5 December 2006, the 
Administration’s determination to advocate a GST declined. Subsequently, 
the GST proposal was withdrawn.   
 
3.1 From 22 February to 18 October 2006 
On 22 February 2006, Henry Tong, in his Budget Speech, 
announced consultation plans on a GST proposal in the middle of the year. 
Meanwhile, the GST proposal became relatively concrete. According to 
Tong, the government intended to provide tax refunds for visitors and allow 
importers to defer payments so as to relieve pressure on their cash flow. To 
reduce the erosion of people’s purchasing power, the government would 
propose relief and compensatory measures, including the reduction of other 
taxes13.  
 
In early July, the Administration, through press briefings, workshops 
and information leak, disclosed the details of the GST proposal and relevant 
background information to the media. On 18 July, the Administration 
announced a consultation paper concerning ‘Public Consultation on Tax 
Reform’, and launched a 9-month public consultation. In the paper, the 
Administration stressed that the GST was the best and the only viable 
alternative to broaden the tax base, claiming that a GST would result in 
stable, predictable and significant revenue, even with an ageing population. 
Thus, the Administration suggested applying a GST rate of 5% to all the 
household consumption expenditure. The Administration also highlighted 
some of the proposed tax relief measures, including a Tourist Refund 
Scheme; reduction of existing tax rates; one-off supplements for households 
under the protection of Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA), 
and an annual cash GST allowance for low-income households not in 
receipt of CSSA14. Tong also claimed that, for the first five years after the 
introduction of GST, all revenue generated would be returned to the 
                                               
13 The 2006-07 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 70-72 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2006/eng/budget21.htm 
14 Consultation Paper on Public Consultation on Tax Reform, published on 18 July 2006: 
http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/doc_and_leaflet.htm 
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community through tax relief and other compensation measures15. From this 
perspective, the Administration not only described GST as a stable income 
source, but also played down the possible cost impact and highlighted the 
possible benefits for people.   
 
However, most parties in the Legco expressed objections to the GST 
proposals, highlighting the government’s considerable surplus. The possible 
burden on people and businesses, including administrative costs, were still 
the focus of these parties’ objections. Furthermore, the Anti-GST Alliance 
chaired by Vincent Fang announced that the Alliance would launch a 
campaign against the introduction of the GST. In response to these, Henry 
Tong persisted with the consultation, claiming that a fair tax system and a 
stable income source were needed for the long-term interests of Hong 
Kong16. 
 
In the following period, both the democrats and the pro-government 
camp took various actions against the GST proposal. The DP, together with 
the other pro-democrat parties and trade unions set up a ‘People’s livelihood 
Alliance’, launching anti-GST campaigns, including protests17, proposing a 
motion against the GST in the Legco18 ,demanding that the Administration 
terminate its consultations on the GST19.  
 
The pro-government camp also opposed the GST proposals. The LP 
and several chambers of commerce, held an anti-GST protest with the 
support of several thousand people from the catering, tourism and retail 
sectors20. A week later, James Tien, the LP Chairman, claimed that it was 
wrong to launch a 9-month consultation on the GST21. In other words, the 
LP supported the DP’s demand that the consultation should be terminated. 
When the LP legislators visited Beijing in September 2006, the party also 
                                               
15 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200607/18/P200607180108.htm 
16 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the FS: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200607/19/P200607190133.htm 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200607/19/P200607190100.htm (Chinese part) 
17 MPDN, 21 July 2006, Page A14 
18 MPDN, 14 August 2006, Page A10 
19 MPDN, 21 August 2006, Page A10  
20 MPDN, 1 August 2006, Page A12; 7 August 2006, Page A06 
21 MPDN, 16 August 2006, Page A14  
 241 
expressed its objections to the GST proposals to PRC Government senior 
officials, although these officials refused to interfere with Hong Kong 
affairs22.  
 
The other major pro-government parties also expressed objections to 
the GST in a relatively low profile manner. The President of the FTU, 
Cheng Yiu-tong, who was also an Exco member, claimed that the FTU 
opposed the introduction of GST23. The DAB also quoted an opinion poll, 
claiming that over 80% of the public did not welcome the introduction of 
the GST. Thus, the party would not support the GST proposal24. As the LP, 
FTU and DAB had their representatives in the Exco, these parties’ 
criticisms of the GST proposals demonstrated the debate in the Exco. In the 
following months, although the Taxation Institution of Hong Kong, some 
international credit rating agencies, individual accountants and economists 
expressed support for the introduction of the GST, most of the political 
parties, trade unions and business sectors staged a number of anti-GST 
protests. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Administration persisted with the GST proposals, 
claiming that the tax base problem should be resolved. Henry Tong and 
Frederick Ma (Ma Si-hang), Secretary for Financial Affairs and Treasury 
conducted a series of consultations in various regions of Hong Kong25. In 
mid-September 2006, the CE, Donald Tsang also described the GST by 
commenting that  ‘good medicine often comes as a bitter pill’, claiming that 
a government with a long-term commitment to Hong Kong had to formulate 
policies that could serve the real interests of the community. Tsang further 
urged the opponents of the GST to provide sustainable alternatives to 
resolve the tax base problems26. 
 
In short, after announcing the plans for consultation on the GST in 
February 2006, the Administration moved forward their work on 
                                               
22 MPDN, 15 September 2006, Page A10  
23 MPDN, 9 August 2006, Page A15 
24 MPDN, 11 August 2006, Page A12 
25 MPDN, 5 September 2006, page A14 
26 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200609/12/P200609120173.htm 
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introducing a GST. In response to criticisms, the Administration not only 
described the GST as a stable income source and the only viable solution to 
the tax base problem, but also suggested some tax relief measures such as 
allowances for the grassroots population to address the cost impact on 
people. Whilst most parties in the Legco, together with trade unions and 
business sectors did not deny the tax base problem, they highlighted the 
issue of the government’s fiscal surplus, considering GST as an unfair tax 
and a burden on people and businesses. Thus, not only the pro-democrat 
camp, but also all the major pro-government parties in the Exco launched 
campaigns against the GST proposal, urging the Administration to terminate 
their consultations. Despite the elite debate, the Administration, in the first 
three months of consultation, persisted with the GST proposal.   
 
3.2 From 19 October to 5 December 2006 
On 19 October, with the support of both the opposition and pro-
government camp, the Legco passed a motion opposing the introduction of 
the GST 27 . Although Henry Tong questioned whether the motion 
represented public opinion 28 , the Administration’s determination to 
advocate a GST declined subsequently. On 24 October, Tong claimed that 
the government would explore the viability of alternatives such as a capital 
gain tax, a progressive tax or dividend tax to broaden the tax base. In 
addition, the government would undertake an interim review before the end 
of the consultation29.  
 
In November and December 2006, while the Administration 
continued with the consultation, fifteen out of eighteen District Councils in 
Hong Kong passed motions opposing the introduction of a GST30. Although 
the DC is not a key institution in policy making, the motions were able to 
place further pressure on the Administration.     
                                               
27 Minutes of the Legco meeting, LC Paper No. CB(3) 188/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/minutes/cm061018.pdf  
28 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200610/19/P200610190284.htm 
29 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200610/24/P200610240212.htm 
30 Public Consultation on the Tax Reform Final Report, Appendix A, Published in June 
2007: 
http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/pdf/finalreport.pdf 
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On 5 December 2006, Henry Tong announced that the 
Administration would not be advocating GST for the remaining four months 
of the consultation period. Moreover, Tong admitted that public opinion 
opposed introducing a GST. He claimed:  
There are two main points. First, the public shares the view that 
there is a need to broaden our tax base. Second, although the 
public understands that GST can broaden our tax base, it is clear 
from the views collected that we have not been able to convince 
the majority to accept GST as the main option to address the tax 
base problem. We accept that at this time there is insufficient 
public support nor are the conditions right for introducing GST.31 
 
In other words, the GST proposal was withdrawn even though the 
consultation on broadening the tax base was continued. In addition, the 
Administration perceived that there was public opinion opposing the GST. 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
In a nutshell, for the Administration, the idea of introducing GST 
was based on the narrow tax base, which led to a dramatic decrease in the 
government income during economic downturns. Thus, during the GST 
debate in 2006, the Administration highlighted the tax base problem and 
tried to describe a GST as the only viable alternative to resolve this problem. 
The Administration also downplayed the possible cost impact on people and 
businesses, stressing proposed relief measures, including allowances for the 
grassroots population..  
 
On the other hand, the pro-democrat and pro-government camps as 
well as the business sector, had expressed their objections to the GST 
proposal before 2006 although they did not deny the tax base problem. 
Throughout the controversy in 2006, these parties described GST as a 
financial burden on people and businesses, highlighting administrative costs 
and other financial impacts on people. 
 
                                               
31 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050115.htm  
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Despite the criticisms, the Administration persisted with the GST 
proposal in the first three months of the consultation period. After the Legco 
had passed a motion against the GST proposal, however, the 
Administration’s determination to advocate the proposal waned. Finally, the 
Administration withdrew the proposal in the middle of the consultation 
period.  
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Chapter 11 
Analysis of the Case of the Goods and Services Tax 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the previous chapter that provided a  narrative account of 
the debate on Goods and Services Tax (GST), this chapter examines several 
factors, namely, policy change, policy certainty and the quantity and 
framing of news coverage. In order to test the hypotheses of this study, the 
time sequence of these factors is traced. I also discuss the relations between 
news coverage and other possible factors of policy change 
 
2. Analysis of Policy Change 
In this study, policy change is classified into two major categories 
according to political and fiscal costs. During the debate on the GST in 2006, 
there were only two changes in policy. The first is the Legco’s passing of a 
motion against the introduction of a GST on 19 October 20061. Since this 
motion has no legislative effect, it is considered as a relatively low cost 
change. 
 
The second policy change is the end of advocating the GST proposal 
on 5 December 2006. This withdrawal of the government proposal is 
considered to be a relatively high cost change. The actual time of the 
decision on this change is unknown. However, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, several days after the Legco passed the motion against the GST 
proposal, the Administration claimed that they would carry out an interim 
review and explore other alternatives to broaden the tax base2. Thus, it is 
sensible to suggest that the Administration started considering the 
withdrawal of the proposal after this motion had been passed by the Legco. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Minutes of the Legco meeting, LC Paper No. CB(3) 188/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/minutes/cm061018.pdf  
2 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200610/24/P200610240212.htm 
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3. Analysis of Policy Certainty 
3.1 Elite Consensus 
Throughout the GST debate in 2006, both the opposition and the 
pro-government camp had expressed their objections to the GST proposal. 
The pro-government parties re-emphasised their existing points of views, 
highlighting the burdens of introducing a GST on the grassroots populations 
and the business sectors. In the legislature, pro-government legislators 
supported the motion against the GST, placing further pressure on the 
Administration. In the meantime, some Exco members also criticised the 
GST proposals. From this perspective, there was a debate between the 
Administration and the pro-government camp. Thus, policy certainty 
measured by elite consensus remained extremely low during the GST debate.   
 
3.2 Policy Stage 
Studying the introduction of GST for 6 years, the Administration had 
worked out the details of the GST proposal before the launch of public 
consultation. Nevertheless, this proposed policy was still at a relatively early 
stage. Even if this proposal passed through public consultation, it had to be 
endorsed by the Legco before being implemented. In this case, there was 
space for the legislators to amend or reject this proposal. Thus, there was a 
high level of uncertainty concerning the GST proposals. In other words, 
both in terms of elite consensus and policy stage, the policy certainty of the 
GST proposal was considered to be low during the debate in 2006.     
   
4. Analysis of News Framing  
4.1 Methodology 
In order to analyse the framing of news coverage concerning the 
GST debate, article counts and keyword count were applied. News articles 
and editorials of the three selected newspapers were searched using the 
Wisers database by entering the keywords ‘Goods and Services Tax (商品
及服務稅)’, ‘GST’, ‘Consumption Tax (消費稅)’, ‘Sales Tax (銷售稅)’, 
‘tax base (稅基)’ ‘government income (政府收入)’, ‘government surplus 
(財政盈餘)’ and ‘government deficit (財政赤字)’. Only the texts containing 
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at least one paragraph relating to the GST debate, tax base, and other issues 
relating to tax reform were selected and studied, while the irrelevant articles 
were screened off. 
 
This study focuses on the GST debate after the Administration 
decided to advocate the GST by public consultation in 2006. Thus, the 
sampling period started from 22 February 2006 when the Administration 
announced the consultation plan. The end date of the article search was 5 
December 2006, the day the Administration announced that it was ending its 
advocation of the GST. 
   
For article count, a coding manual was designed according to the 
arguments highlighted during the debate in order to analyse the framing of 
the news coverage. A detailed coding frame is provided in Appendix 11A. 
Basically, the news stories tended to be framed in three different ways:   
 
Positive framing is a narrative supporting the Administration and its GST 
proposal. This type of framing consists of the following elements:  
 Officials’ speeches and voices supporting the introduction of a GST 
were highlighted.  
 The narrow tax base was emphasised and described as along term 
problem.  
 The GST was considered to be  the best and the only viable option to 
resolve the problem of narrow tax base. 
 The GST was described as a fair tax.  
 The proposed tax relief and compensatory measures such as allowance 
for the grassroots populations and tax reductions were highlighted.  
 
Negative framing is a narrative favourable to the voices opposing the GST 
proposal. This type of news coverage consists of the following elements: 
 Voices expressed opposing the introduction of a GST were highlighted. 
 The Government’s considerable levels of fiscal reserve and surplus were 
highlighted. 
 Viable alternatives to resolving the tax base problem were highlighted. 
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 The GST was described as an unfair tax which would widen gap 
between rich and poor. 
 Administrative fees, costs and other possible burdens on people and 
businesses caused by a GST were highlighted   
 
In addition, there is a neutral type of framing. The characteristics of this 
framing are listed as follows: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article. 
 Neither supportive nor critical arguments were highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues were described and explained.  
 
For a keyword test, keywords in relation to positive and negative 
framing were identified. The opponents of a GST highlighted the 
Government’s considerable levels of fiscal reserve surplus and possible 
Administrative fee, costs and burdens on people and businesses caused by a 
GST. On the other hand, highlighting the possible fiscal deficit in the future, 
the Administration described a GST as a stable income source, which was 
important to the long term interests of Hong Kong. Thus, ‘administrative fee 
(行政費)’, ‘cost（成本）’, ‘burden（負擔）’, ‘surplus （盈餘）’ and 
‘reserve（儲備） ’ were selected as the keywords associated with the 
negative frame while ‘long term（長遠）’, ‘stable(穩定)’, ‘allowance（津
貼/補貼）’ and ‘deficit (赤字)’ as positive keywords. The word ‘tax base 
(稅基)’ was not regarded as a keyword although it was highlighted by the 
Administration. This is because both the proponents and opponents admitted 
that the tax base was narrow, but they supported different alternatives to the 
problem.    
 
In order to avoid contamination from the irrelevantly used words, 
only the keywords used in relation to the GST debate were counted. For 
example, the word ‘stable’ is counted only when it was used in relation to 
government income. Usages that referred to organisation names, titles and 
other irrelevant issues were screened off.      
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4.2 Results 
In the 287-day sampling period between 22 February and 5 
December 2006, both the MPDN and ADN ran over 200 relevant articles, 
while the ODN ran only 134.. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
sampling period could be divided into two analysis periods. The framing 
analysis results for the three selected papers in these two periods are 
summarised in Appendix 11B.     
 
This study assumes that media influence is strong enough only when 
negative coverage is sustained for at least three days. As summarised in 
Section 1 of Appendix 11C, all three newspapers ran several peaks of 
sustained coverage during the GST debate. This study also assumes that 
media pressure is increased if the three selected newspapers run sustained 
critical coverage simultaneously. Thus, I combined the data of the three 
papers, finding that between 13 July and 20 October, there were five periods 
in which all three newspapers ran sustained coverage. The frame analysis 
results of these five peaks of coverage are listed in Section 2 of Appendix 
11C.   
 
As shown in Table 11.1, only in the 13 days between 13 and 25 July, 
the period following the announcement of consultation on the GST, the 
overall framing of all three newspapers remained critical. Since there was a 
high level of media consensus over critical framing in this 13-day period, it 
was possible for the coverage to influence subsequent policy change. 
Table 11.1: The framing analysis in the 5 periods in which all  three 
selected newspapers ran sustained coverage simultaneously  
Framing decided by the combined 
results of article and keyword counts  
Date Length 
(Days) 
MPDN ADN ODN 
13 – 25/7/2006 13 Neg Neg Neg 
21 – 25/8/2006 5 Mix Mix Mix 
4 – 6/9/2006 3 Neg Mix Mix 
13 – 16/9/2006 4 Mix Neg Mix 
16 – 20/10/2006 5 Mix Neg Mix 
 
These results of framing analysis in July were consistent with the 
Administration’s perception of coverage. On 24 July, the Administration 
held a press briefing, lobbying the senior financial journalists. According to 
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an article in the MPDN, an official source claimed that the government had 
mainly relied on journalists at the local news desk in the past. Due to the 
deep-rooted negative image of the GST, the critical voices were highlighted. 
The Administration thus tried a different approach, lobbying financial 
journalists3. In other words, the Administration perceived a negative tone in 
the coverage in July 2006. 
 
In the other four periods, however, the framing of the three 
newspapers remained either mixed or inconsistent. Media consensus was 
thus considered to be low. In this sense, the media’s pressure on 
policymakers remained at an extremely high level only in the period 
between 13 and 25 July, subsequently decreasing even though the framing 
of individual newspapers was critical. After 20 October, the media’s 
pressure on policymakers further declined as the coverage of all the three 
newspapers remained intermittent.  
 
Nevertheless, the Administration perceived that the news coverage 
remained unfavourable to the GST proposal in September and October. On 
4 September 2006, Henry Tong, at a lunch with journalists, complained that 
the media coverage was not in-depth enough. The problems of the ageing 
population and the narrow tax base were not brought to the public for 
consideration4. In other words, the Administration was dissatisfied with the 
coverage at that time. A month later, Tong further expressed his 
disappointment. Quoting an official source, the MPDN on 10 October 2006 
claimed that Tong was disappointed with two parties. The first was the LP, 
as a pro-government party, which held an anti-GST protest, and published 
articles opposing the GST in the press. The second was the media, which 
did not help the public focus on the problems arising from a narrow tax 
base5. In other words, there was inconsistency between framing analysis 
results and the Administration’s perceptions. Despite media consensus 
remaining at a low level, the Administration perceived negative framing in 
September and October 2006. 
                                               
3 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04 
4 ODN, 5 September 2006, page A08 
5 MPDN, 10 October 2006, page A07 
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5. Testing the Hypotheses 
5.1 Tracing Time Sequence  
As mentioned above, there were two policy changes during the GST 
debate in 2006. The first one was the anti-GST motion against the GST 
proposed by the DP on 13 August6, and passed by the Legco on 19 October7. 
The second change was the withdrawal of the GST proposal in October8. As 
mentioned above, it is believed that the Administration started considering 
this change after the anti-GST motion had been passed by the Legco. Both 
policy changes took place after the three selected newspapers had run 
sustained critical coverage in July 2006. Although the media consensus 
declined in the following months, the Administration’s perception of news 
framing remained negative in September and October. From this perspective, 
media influence on the two policy changes during the GST debate was 
possible.        
 
5.2 Policy Certainty Measured by Elite Consensus and  
Policy Stage 
There are two hypotheses concerning elite consensus. First, critical 
coverage is likely to occur when there is an elite debate. Second, when there 
is a low level of policy certainty measured by elite consensus, it is relatively 
easy for critical coverage to influence policy.  
 
As mentioned above, since 2000 when the Administration started the 
study of the GST, the pro-government camp, together with the business 
sector, had started criticising this tax. During the debate in 2006, the pro-
government camp, including some Exco members launched further 
campaigns, voicing their objections to the GST proposals throughout the 
debate. Thus, there was disagreement between the pro-government camp 
and the Administration. This policy uncertainty measured by elite consensus, 
together with sustained critical coverage in July 2006, supported the first 
                                               
6 MPDN, 14 August 2006, Page A10 
7 Minutes of the Legco meeting, LC Paper No. CB(3) 188/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/minutes/cm061018.pdf  
8 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050115.htm  
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hypothesis. However, in the following months, while the elite debate 
continued, media consensus declined. Although the Administration still 
perceived a negative tone in the news coverage, media consensus over 
negative framing did not change with the level of elite consensus. The 
hypothesis was not supported in this case.     
 
Nevertheless, both the elite debate and the Administration’s 
perception of negative news framing persisted throughout the GST debate. 
There were also policy changes following sustained critical coverage. Thus, 
critical coverage may have been a factor in policy change during elite debate. 
The second hypothesis was supported in this case. 
 
This study also hypothesises that it is relatively easy for critical 
coverage to influence policy with uncertainty measured by policy stage. As 
mentioned above, in terms of policy stage, the GST proposal was uncertain 
during the debate in 2006. The withdrawal of this uncertain policy 
supported the hypothesis that critical coverage could influence an uncertain 
policy. In this case, the hypothesis was supported.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, although the hypothesis on 
media-policy stage was supported, the two hypotheses concerning elite 
consensus were not fully supported. In this sense, it can be argued that the 
relation between news framing and policy certainty in terms policy stage is 
more complex than the hypothesis in this study. Furthermore, it is 
questionable how the Administration’s perception of critical framing 
resulted from a low level of media consensus in September and October 
2006. It is also hard to imagine the influence of this perception lasting for 
more than a month, triggering high cost changes in December. In this sense, 
the time sequence of news framing and policy change did not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the media effect on policy change.   
 
In order to address these problems, I examine several factors in 
policy change. Some are independent of media effect, while others are 
associated with the media. I argue that policy changes result from the co-
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existence of these factors and the interaction between these factors and news 
coverage.   
 
6. Possible Route of Media Effect on Policy 
6.1 Institutional Factors 
The first factor in policy change is institution, which here refers not 
only to formal rules and organisations. During the GST debate, two 
institutional factors, namely the Basic Law and the legislature were 
particularly important to policy change. 
 
6.1.1 The Basic Law 
As mentioned in the case on Central reclamation, according to the 
principle of the Rule of Law, the Administration and other policymakers are 
constrained by the legal system. According to the Basic Law, the mini-
constitution of Hong Kong, the Administration should achieve a fiscal 
balance and avoid deficits. As Article 107 of the HKSAR Basic Law states:   
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow 
the principle of keeping the expenditure within the limits of 
revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a 
fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget 
commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic 
product.9 
 
In this case, the Administration should resolve any matters which 
cause fiscal problems in the long run. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Administration has stressed the problem of the narrow tax base since the 
economic downturn between 2000 and 2003. From this perspective, the 
Administration proposed the introduction of a GST was because of the 
constitutional constraints of the Basic Law. News coverage was not a 
necessary condition for moving forward the study of GST in this case.  
 
6.1.2 The Legislature 
The other institutional factor relating to policy stage explains the 
withdrawal of GST proposal. The introduction of a GST requires the review 
                                               
9 Website of the HKSAR Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_5.html 
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and amendment of a large number of laws and regulations to enable the 
government to levy the new tax from various sectors. In this circumstance, 
the legislature plays a critical role in passing government proposals. Since 
1997, the pro-government camp has maintained a majority in the Legco. 
Thus, legislative proposals can be endorsed with the support of the pro-
government parties. However, this institutional advantage depends on 
consensus between the Administration and the pro-government camp. If 
pro-government legislators oppose government proposals, they can never be 
passed by the Legco. 
 
In October 2006, an anti-GST motion was supported both by the 
opposition and the pro-government camp. In other words, both political 
camps clearly expressed their objections to the GST proposals. In this case, 
whether the Administration persisted with the GST proposal or not, any 
legislation concerning the introduction of a GST was unlikely to be 
supported by the majority of legislators. From this perspective, in the 
existing institutional setting, elite debate per se, was a sufficient condition 
for the withdrawal of the GST proposal. The legislature is an institutional 
constraint on the Administration in this case. 
 
The opponents of the GST were also constrained by the legislative 
process. Since the Administration had not initiated the legislative process, 
the legislature could not completely reject the proposal. In this case, 
legislators could only initiate an anti-GST motion without legislative effect. 
Although this motion brought pressure to bear on the Administration, it was 
not constitutionally necessary for the Administration to follow this motion.   
 
6.2 Ideas and beliefs 
The ideas and beliefs of policymakers played an important role in 
the Administration’s decision. As mentioned above, the introduction of a 
GST was first proposed and advocated by Donald Tsang in 2000 when he 
was the Financial Secretary. When Tsang took over the role of the CE, the 
Administration launched a further consultation on a GST. An Exco member, 
Jasper Tsang also claimed that, having served the Government for many 
years, Donald Tsang and Henry Tong experienced the fiscal pressure on the 
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government during the economic downturn. Thus, they considered GST as 
the best and only viable solution to the tax base problem (interview with 
Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008). In this sense, the Administration’s 
proposal of a GST was driven by an idea which was independent of news 
coverage.  
 
Furthermore, despite the withdrawal of the GST proposal at the end 
of the debate, the Administration persisted with the idea. According to 
Jasper Tsang, the Administration did not actually give up on plans to 
introduce the GST.. Rather, Donald Tsang hoped to introduce the GST 
within his term. Preparing detailed proposals for the implementation of a 
GST, the Administration will launch this proposal once there is an 
opportunity. For example, the opportunity window may be open in a non-
election year where there is a high level of justification in doing so, such as 
a low level of government surplus (ibid). In other words, the Administration 
not only persists with its idea, but is also moving forward on this policy 
change in a hidden way. From this perspective, the pressures created by 
various parties, including the media, are able to influence the 
Administration’s actions, but unable to change the Administration’s ideas.  
 
Ideas were also important to the opponents’ actions. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the opponents had considered the GST to be a burden 
on people and businesses before 2006. In all the anti-GST campaigns, these 
ideas were highlighted. Thus, the passage of an anti-GST motion in the 
Legco could be considered as the opponents’ strategy to express their 
existing ideas, placing pressure on the Administration. Although these ideas 
were legitimated and reinforced the critical coverage, these ideas were 
mainly based on the long-term policy image of the GST and short-term 
public mood. This point will be discussed later in this chapter.    
 
6.3 Election Cycle 
As mentioned above, despite the level of media consensus, the 
Administration perceived negative news framing in September and October 
2006. In this case, I suggest that policymakers’ sensitivity to critical 
coverage is associated with some factors. The first factor enhancing the 
 256 
media’s influence is the election cycle. As the CE, Donald Tsang was 
running for election to a second term in early 2007, he had to avoid any 
controversial issues that might affect the government and his popularity.  
 
This argument is supported by Tsang’s avoidance of issues relating 
to the GST. In fact, since Tsang was the Financial Secretary, he had started 
advocating the introduction of the GST. It was believed that he was keen on 
the GST proposal. Nevertheless, at his Policy Address10 on 11 October he 
announced, Tsang totally ignored issues relating to GST11. During the GST 
debate in 2006, Tsang delivered only two public statements concerning the 
GST. One was made on 12 September when he emphasised the rationale for 
introducing a GST,12 while the other was made on 5 December when the 
Administration announced the withdrawal of the GST proposal13. In other 
words, Donald Tsang delivered only one speech defending the GST 
proposal during the consultation period. Thus, the low profile of Tsang and 
the withdrawal of the GST proposal could be considered as the 
Administration’s strategy to settle the debate before the election in early 
2007. It is also reasonable to suggest that the Administration was 
particularly sensitive to critical coverage even though there was a low level 
of media consensus after July 2006. In other words, media influence was 
increased by the election cycle.  
 
6.4 Long-term Policy Image 
The other influential factor is the long-term image of the GST, 
which relates to public understanding of the tax. Since 2000, the legislators 
and the media have focused on the proposed tax’s impact on people’s 
livelihood and the business environment. In news coverage, the GST is also 
considered to be a  financial burden on people and businesses. In other 
words, the negative image of the GST has been established since then. 
These descriptions of the GST were still highlighted throughout the debate 
in 2006.  
                                               
10 Policy address is the annual plan of the Hong Kong Government by the Chief Executive.  
11 2006-07 Policy Address: http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/06-07/eng/pdf/speech.pdf 
12 The press release on the speech by the Chief Executive: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200609/12/P200609120173.htm 
13 The press release on the speech by the Chief Executive: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050102.htm 
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The long-term negative image of the GST can be supported by a 
news article in the MPDN on 25 July 2006. In this article, an official source 
claimed the there is a deep-rooted negative image of the GST. Thus, 
journalists of local news tended to highlight criticisms of the GST proposal. 
Lobbying financial journalists, the Administration tried to highlight the 
problem of a narrow tax base14. In other words, the Administration realised 
the negative image of GST and tried to re-define this image by shifting the 
issue from the local news to the financial beat.. Thus, it was not surprising 
that the Administration became sensitive to critical coverage even though 
media consensus declined after July 2006.  
 
Not only the Administration, but also the opponents were influenced 
by the long-term image of the GST. Traditionally, the grassroots 
populations are the major supporters of the DAB and FTU. As the GST has 
been regarded as a burden on low income earners since 2000, it was not 
surprising that the DAB and FTU opposed the GST proposal. Moreover, the 
LP’s voters, mainly the businesses in the retail, catering and tourism sectors 
were concerned not only about the GST’s influence on public consumption 
and tourist spending, but also about the high administrative costs resulting 
from the GST. As the long-term negative image of the GST had been 
established among people, including voters of pro-government parties, 
before 2006, the parties had to oppose the GST in order to retain the support 
of their own voters. Otherwise, the parties would be punished by their voters 
at future elections. From this perspective, the long-term image of the GST 
was crucial to the opponents’ positions. In this case, it was appropriate to 
suggest that opponents of the GST paid relatively high levels of attention to 
coverage of the GST in order to protect their voters’ interests. 
 
The relation between the long-term image of GST and news 
coverage remains unknown unless a study of coverage over years is carried 
out. In the debate in 2006, the negative image of the GST was established, 
while opponents had expressed their opinions against the GST before 
critical coverage was run. Thus, news coverage in 2006 was not a necessary 
                                               
14 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04 
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condition for determining the image of the GST and opponents’ positions, 
although critical coverage could reinforce this image and the oppositions’ 
ideas.   
 
6.5 Short-term Public Mood 
The short-term public attitude towards the Administration and the 
GST also influenced the launch and withdrawal of the GST proposal. 
During the GST debate, public opinion was relatively favourable to the 
Administration. Since Donald Tsang took over the position of CE in 2005, 
the Administration became relatively popular. In the first half of 2006, the 
dissatisfaction rate of Donald Tsang’s Government’s Administration was 
below 15%, while the satisfaction rate ranged between 49 to 55%15. In this 
circumstance, public opinion was relatively more favourable towards 
Tsang’s government than towards Tung’s government.  
 
There was evidence to show that the Administration took account of 
its popularity when deciding to launch the GST proposal. In May 2006, two 
months before the launch of consultation on the GST, the MPDN quoted a 
government official, claiming that because of its relatively high popularity 
rate, the Administration could afford to handle some controversial issues, 
including the introduction of a GST16. In other words, the Administration’s 
confidence in advocating the GST proposal was enhanced by the 
government’s popularity. In this sense, the public mood favourable to the 
Administration enabled the launch of the GST proposal. As news coverage 
of GST remained intermittent before the launch of the GST consultation, the 
role of the media could be excluded in this case. 
 
However, during the consultation on the GST between July and late 
November 2006, a survey showed that the satisfaction rate of the 
                                               
15 Press releases of the Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong:  
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release347.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release354.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release359.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release364.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release370.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release376.html  
16 MPDN, 10 May 2006, page A08 
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Government gradually declined from 47% to 40% while the dissatisfaction 
rate increased from 12% to 18%17. The other opinion poll also showed the 
decline in Donald Tsang and Henry Tong’s popularity in the same period18. 
Although it is questionable whether the GST debate was the only factor for 
the decline in government popularity, there are numerous surveys conducted 
by various pro-government and pro-government parties, demonstrating that 
a majority of people and businesses opposed the introduction of the GST19. 
Thus, it was reasonable to argue that the decline of government popularity 
was partly caused by the GST debate.  
 
The Administration’s consideration of public views is evidenced in 
the government’s officials’ statements. When announcing the withdrawal of 
the GST proposal, Henry Tong on the one hand, claimed that the majority of 
the public understood the tax base problem. On the other hand, Tong said 
that the majority did not consider GST to be an appropriate option to solve 
the tax base problem20. On the same day, Donald Tsang claimed that the 
decision was based on ‘public opposition’21. Jasper Tsang also claimed that 
voices against the GST were much stronger than the Administration had 
expected (interview on 17 January 2008). From this perspective, the short-
term change in public views was an influential factor, forcing the 
Administration to settle any controversies before the CE election. 
 
The short-term public views against the GST were also important to 
its opponents. Although the pro-government camp had decided their 
positions before 2006, it can be argued that public views against GST 
reinforced the opponents’ ideas, encouraging the launch of further anti-GST 
                                               
17 Press releases of the Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong: 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release387.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release397.html 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release413.html 
18 The Press release of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong: 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/tellab/pdf/telepress/06/tsangDec06.pdf 
19 MPDN, 19 July 2006, page A04; 20 July 2006, page A09; 1 August 2006, page A12; 11 
August 2006, page A12, 30 August 2006, page A11; 22 September 2006, page A18; 27 
September 2006, page A19; 11 October 2006, page 20; 19 October 2006, page A12, and 16 
October 2006, page A19 
20 The Administration’s press release on the FS speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050115.htm 
21 The press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050102.htm 
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campaigns. However, the opponents were not simply following public 
opinion. Rather, politicians made use of public views to legitimate their 
voices. For example, announcing its objections to the GST, the DAB also 
quoted its opinion poll showing that more than 80% of public opposed the 
introduction of the GST 22 . Various businesses also adopted the same 
strategy, quoting their own surveys to express their voices against the GST23.  
 
Although there was substantial critical coverage in some periods 
during the GST debate, it is dangerous to conclude that negative public 
views had resulted from news coverage. Rather, I argue that there was a  
relation between news coverage and short-term public views in three ways. 
First, the media functioned as a communicator, facilitating information flow 
between the public and the policymakers. Thus, not only could people get a 
sense of the views of policymakers, but also proponents and opponents 
could be informed of each others’ arguments. Moreover, most news 
coverage of the opinion polls concluded that the decline of government 
popularity resulted from the GST debate24 . In this case, news coverage 
alerted government officials and politicians to the possible influence of the 
GST debate, magnifying the pressure on the Administration. Second, the 
negative tone of the coverage legitimated the voices against the GST. Being 
encouraged by critical coverage, the opponents intensified their campaigns 
while the public reinforced their ideas against GST. In other words, critical 
coverage reinforced public opinion against GST.   
 
Finally, as mentioned in the case of Article 23, the Administration 
considered public opinion as a dependent variable affected by news 
coverage. Thus, when public opinion remained unfavourable to the GST, the 
Administration not only became relatively sensitive to critical coverage, but 
also made an effort to lobby the media.  
  
                                               
22 MPDN, 11 August 2006, Page A12 
23 MPDN 19 July 2006, page A04; 27 September 2006, page A19; 11 October 2006, page 
A20; 26 October 2006, page A19. 
24 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04; 9 August 2006, page A15; 23 August 2006, page A11; 
29 August 2006, page A09; ODN 23 August 2006, page A31; 11 October 2006, page A23; 
ADN, 25 July 2006, page A06; 26 July 2006, page A08; 9 August 2006, page A04; 30 
August 2006, page A04; 27 September 2006, page A06. 
 261 
 
6.6 Strategies of Actors  
As the institutional rational choice approach suggests, political 
actors are not only constrained by external factors, but also adopt various 
strategies to maximise their own payoffs. During the GST debate, tactical 
actions were carried out both by the Administration and opponents of the 
GST.     
 
Although the legislators could not stop the consultation on the GST, 
both the pro-democrat and pro-government camps adopted various strategies 
to maximise pressure on the Administration. Similar to the case of Article 
23 and Central reclamation, pro-democrat legislators combined their actions 
in the Legco with the street campaigns. While the DP initiated a motion 
against the GST in the Legco, other democrats allied themselves with pro-
democrat groups and trade unions, launching a series of anti-GST protests25. 
The pro-government parties also expressed their objections to the GST in 
various ways. While the DAB and FTU opposed the GST proposal in a 
relatively low profile manner, the LP, allied with the business sector, 
launched an anti-GST protest26. The LP legislators also tried to lobby senior 
officials of the PRC Government 27 . Although the PRC Government 
officially refused to interfere with Hong Kong affairs, the LP’s high profile 
demonstrated the party’s determination to oppose the GST proposal, placing 
pressure on the Administration.  
 
Not only the opponents, but also the Administration adopted 
strategies to advocate its ideas and protect its interests. As mentioned above, 
when the Administration realised the persistence of critical news framing, 
government officials tried to shift the journalistic focus from the local news 
to the financial section, lobbying financial journalists28. In other words, the 
Administration tried to influential the focus of coverage, in order to 
counteract criticisms of the GST. Moreover, despite the withdrawal of the 
GST proposal at the end of the debate, the Administration acted tactically to 
                                               
25 MPDN, 21 July 2006, Page A14 
26 MPDN, 1 August 2006, Page A12; 7 August 2006, Page A06 
27 MPDN, 15 September 2006, Page A10  
28 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04 
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persist with its idea. Working on detailed plans for the implementation of 
the GST, the Administration waited for the opportunity to launch this 
proposal again (interview with Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008). In other 
words, the Administration adjusted its strategy, persisting with its plan in 
another way. 
 
The withdrawal of the GST proposal was also considered as a 
strategy to protect the Administration’s interests for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, it was a strategy to avoid controversy before the CE 
election. Second, according to Jasper Tsang, if the Administration persisted 
with the introduction of the GST, the DAB, as a pro-government party, 
might be forced to change its position, in support of GST. However, this 
would seriously affect the popularity of the DAB, impacting on its 
performance in elections. If the pro-government camp lost its seats in the 
Legco and the District Councils, the Administration might lose its support in 
these two bodies (Interview with Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2007). From 
this perspective, the withdrawal of the GST proposal was a strategy not only 
to protect the pro-government camp’s interests, but also to maintain the 
Administration’s support in the Legco and the DC.      
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Throughout the controversy on GST in 2006, there was a low level 
of policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage. In addition, 
the Administration had perceived negative news framing before the two 
policy changes, namely the anti-GST motion passed by the Legco and the 
Administration’s withdrawal of the GST proposal. This supports the 
hypothesis that critical coverage can influence policy with uncertainty 
measured by elite consensus and policy stage.  
 
However, the hypothesis of a relation between news framing and 
elite consensus is not supported by the GST debate. After the launch of 
consultation on the GST in July, the three selected newspapers also ran 
sustained critical coverage simultaneously in the first few weeks. In the 
following months, however, while elite debate persisted, media consensus 
declined. In this case, news framing did not simply follow elite consensus.  
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In addition, the hypotheses of this study could not explain why 
media consensus declined after July 2006 while the policy remained 
uncertain. It is also questionable if a low level of media consensus could 
have resulted in bringing about the Administration’s perception of negative 
coverage, triggering policy change in October and December. In order to 
address these problems, I examine several factors, namely institutional 
factors, election cycle, long-term policy image, short-term public views and 
policymakers’ ideas and strategies.  
 
Regarding the decline in media consensus, I argue that the 
Administration, through lobbying journalists, influenced the framing of 
some newspapers. However, policymakers’ sensitivity to critical coverage 
was increased by several factors, namely the upcoming CE election, the 
negative long-term image of the GST and short-term public views against 
the GST. Thus, despite a decline in media consensus, the Administration 
perceived a negative tone in the news coverage, resulting in inconsistency 
between framing analysis results and the Administration’s perceptions.    
 
Although the Administration perceived negative news framing, news 
coverage was not a necessary condition for the two policy changes during 
the GST debate. The anti-GST motion passed by the Legco was the 
opponents’ strategy to re-emphasise their existing ideas, which mainly 
resulted from the opponents’ strategy and ideas based on long-term policy 
image and short-term public mood. As the opponents had decided their 
positions on GST before 2006, critical coverage in 2006 was not a crucial 
factor. Neither was news coverage a necessary condition for the withdrawal 
of the GST proposal.  Within existing institutional contexts, disagreement 
between the Administration and the pro-government camp was a sufficient 
condition for this change. In addition, long-term policy image of the GST 
and short-term public mood and the upcoming CE election were also taken 
into account by the Administration. However, these were not sufficient 
conditions for changing the Administration’s ideas. Actually, the 
Administration carried out tactical actions, moving forward the work to 
introduce the GST in a hidden way. The withdrawal of the proposal was 
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merely the Administration’s strategy to protect its own interests and those of 
the pro-government camp.     
 
The role of the media was not completely excluded. It can be argued 
that critical coverage legitimated and reinforced the voices against the GST. 
Being encouraged by the coverage, the opponents of the GST campaign 
intensified their campaigns. As a communicator, the media also facilitated 
the information flow between the public and policymakers, alerting 
policymakers to the relations between the GST debate and government 
popularity, placing further pressure on the Administration. Nevertheless, 
news coverage was not a necessary condition for the two policy changes 
during the debate. In this sense, the role of news coverage in the two 
changes was relatively minor. 
 
In a nutshell, although there were policy changes following critical 
coverage during the GST debate, the media’s influence on policy was not 
fully evidenced. Rather, as summarised in Table 11.2, policy changes were 
mainly the results of other factors. Legitimating and reinforcing the 
opponents’ ideas, which had been decided before 2006, the role of coverage 
was minor and not necessary for policy changes.    
 
Table 11.2: Factors Affecting Policy Changes during the GST 
Debate 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
Ideas / Beliefs 
Short term
 public m
ood 
Election C
ycles 
Strategies 
Media effect 
19/10//06 Passing of an 
anti-GST motion  
√ √ √  √ 
5/12/06 Withdrawal of the 
GST proposal  
√ √ √ √ √ 
 Communicator 
 Reinforcing opponents’ 
ideas 
 Magnifying pressure on 
the Administration 
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Chapter 12 
Narrative Account of  
the Case of the Old Star Ferry Pier 
 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter provides a narrative account of the fourth case in this 
thesis, the debate on the demolition of the old Star Ferry Pier (OSFP) in 
Central. This case is selected because it demonstrates policy changes with a 
high level of elite consensus and a high level of media consensus over 
negative framing.  
 
2. Background of the Demolition of the OSFP 
The ferry service between Central of Hong Kong Island and Tsim 
Sha Tsim of Kowloon peninsula is operated by the Star Ferry Company, 
Limited (SFCL). Because of its long history, the OSFP and its clock tower 
in Central owned by the Hong Kong Government is generally considered as 
a tourist and historical icon in Hong Kong. As the Central Reclamation 
Phase III (CRIII) project affected a range of existing waterfront facilities, 
the OSFP and the Queen’s Pier (QP) nearby were moved to a new location 
in Central in 2006.  
 
As a part of the CRIII project, the reprovisioning arrangements for 
the OSFP and QP in Central, like other town planning policies, are mainly 
managed by the Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau (HPLB) of the 
Administration. Because of the long history of these two piers, the Home 
Affairs Bureau (HAB) also assessed their heritage value with reference to  
advices form the Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB) appointed by the CE.  
 
The re-provisioning arrangements for the OSFP and QP were mainly 
discussed during scrutiny of the CRIII. Despite the controversy over the 
CRIII in 2003 and 2004, at the key institutions, including the Legco, District 
Councils (DC), relevant consultative bodies and environmental groups, the 
demolition of the two piers was neglected before September 2006. For 
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example, in 1999, when the Administration consulted the Legco’s Panel on 
Planning, Lands and Works (PLW Panel) on the CRIII, the implications of 
the reclamation project on the OSFP and QP were not mentioned1. 
 
In April 2000, when the Public Works Subcommittee (PWSC) of the 
Legco’s Finance Committee considered the funding proposal for the 
consultants' fees and site investigation of the CRIII, Chan Yuen-han of the 
FTU claimed that the Administration’s information about the re-
provisioning of the OSFP was too ‘broad-brush’. However, she raised no 
objection to the refurbishment of the pier at that meeting2. 
 
Two years later, the re-creation plan of the OSFP was decided. In 
March 2002, when the Administration consulted the PLW Panel on the 
proposal to implement the CRIII project, the Administration mentioned that 
the location and design of the new SFP approved by the TPB adopted a 
historical heritage approach, and that it had reached a consensus with the 
SFCL that the design for the new pier would preserve the special 
characteristics of the original pier. In the same month, the Administration 
briefed the AAB regarding the findings and recommendations of a Built 
Heritage Impact Assessment for the CRIII in 2001. As the OSFP built in 
1957 was neither a declared monument nor a graded historical building with 
sufficient heritage value for in-situ preservation, the AAB did not raise any 
objection to the re-provisioning arrangements regarding the OSFP and its 
clock tower3. 
 
In June 2002, PWSC considered the proposal to implement the 
CRIII project. When the Administration advised the location for re-
provisioning of the OSFP at this meeting, Chan Yuen-han urged the 
Administration to fulfil its earlier promise that the design of the new SFP 
                                               
1 PLW Panel paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-
99/english/panels/plw/papers/pl1006_4.htm, and PLW Panel meeting minutes:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl100699.pdf 
 
2 Legco paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/fc/pwsc/papers/p00-1e.pdf, and  
minutes of PWSC meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw120400.pdf 
3 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting on 20 September 2006 CB(1)414/06-07: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl060920.pdf 
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would preserve the special characteristics of the OSFP. Nevertheless, 
nobody raised objections to the demolition plan at the meeting.4  
 
In short, there was little discussion about the demolition of the OSFP 
and QP before 2006. Neither was there any objection to the demolition of 
these two piers in all the key institutions, although individual legislators 
urged the Administration to preserve the characteristics of the OSFP.  
 
3. Development of the Debate on the OSFP and QP: 
The controversy over the demolition of the OSFP and QP mainly 
took place in the period between July 2006 and early 2007. The chronology 
of the debate is summarised in Appendix 12. According to the time of 
policy change and important events, the development of the debate is 
divided into five periods as follows:  
1. The first period is between 12 May and 9 August 2006. In this period, 
the design of the new SFP in Central was announced while there were 
no voices against the demolition of the old pier until a small 
conservation group launched an online petition.  
2. In the period between 10 August and 26 October 2006, the pro-democrat 
camp changed their views on the demolition of the OSFP, initiating 
agenda change in the Legco.  
3. In the period between 27 October and 30 November 2006, the closing 
ceremony of the OSFP took place. After 150 thousand people had 
flocked to the pier, the opponents intensified their voices against the 
demolition work. 
4. The fourth period is between 1 and 15 December 2006. During this 
period, an official survey report, which was unsupportive of demolition 
plans, was uncovered by a conservation group. This triggered the agenda 
change of the Administration.    
5. In the final period between 16 December 2006 and 3 February 2007, in 
addition to the acceleration of demolition work, the Administration 
launched a series of changes to existing policy.  
                                               
4 PWSC paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/fc/pwsc/papers/p02-41e.pdf, and 
minutes of meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-
02/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw020605.pdf 
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3.1 From 12 May and to 9 August 2006   
As mentioned above, there were no objections to the demolition of 
the OSFP before July 2006. When the SFCL announced the Victorian 
design of the new SFP in Central on 12 May 2006, the news media mainly 
focused on the architecture of the pier5. In June 2006, when the Central and 
Western District Council (WCDC) discussed re-provisioning arrangements 
for the OSFP and QP at the meetings of Food, Environment, Hygiene and 
Works Committee and Traffic and Transport Committee, the Committee 
members focused on the design and the traffic arrangements of the new SFP 
only.6  
 
Objections to the demolition of OSFP were first raised by a small 
conservation group, the SEE Network. On 17 July 2006, the group launched 
an on-line petition, urging the government to suspend the demolition plan of 
the OSFP, its clock tower and the clock7. However, neither the Legco nor 
the Administration responded to this campaign until 10 August.  
 
2.2 From 10 August and 26 October 2006   
On 10 August 2006, a pro-democrat legislator, Kwok Ka-ki 
requested that the PLW Panel hold a special meeting to discuss the issues 
related to demolition of the OSFP.8  In the meantime, the SEE Network 
allied with some art groups, launching some street campaigns, including art 
exhibitions at the OSFP. The groups also presented a petition of collected 
signatures at the Central Government Offices9. 
 
On 20 September, the PLW Panel held a special meeting to discuss 
two items, including the issues relating to the OSFP. At this meeting, the 
                                               
5 MPDN, 13 May 2006, page A08  
6 Minutes of the Food, Environment, Hygiene and Works Committee meeting of W&CDC 
(in Chinese): 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/doc/FEHWC_3_2006_Min_Chinese.d
oc , and minutes of the Traffic and Transport Committee meeting of W&CDC (in Chinese): 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/doc/3_TTC_MIN_CHIN_2006.doc 
7 MPDN, 18 July 2006, page A22 
8 PLW Panel paper CB(1)2129/05-06(02) (in Chinese):  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2129-2c.pdf  
9 MPDN, 21 August 2006, page A11 
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OSFP was described as an icon of people’s collective memory. All six 
deputations, including those from various conservational groups and the 
Chairman of the CWDC, opposed the demolition of the OSFP. The Panel 
also passed a motion, urging the Administration to defer the demolition 
plan 10 . After the PLW Panel meeting, some District Councillors also 
expressed their objections to the demolition plan. At the Council meeting of 
the CWDC in October 2006, eight members, including the Council 
Chairman, called on the Administration to preserve the OSFP and QP.11 
 
However, the Administration persisted with the demolition plan. 
Quoting a study in 2005, the Administration claimed in a discussion paper 
that relocating the existing clock to the new clock tower was not feasible 
because of the unavailability of new parts and components of the clock and 
subsequent maintenance12. In October 2006, the Administration, in a written 
response to the PLW Panel’s motion, reiterated that the deferral of 
demolition of the OSFP would affect public works projects which had to be 
commenced according to programme and contracts awarded13. 
 
In sum, during the period between 10 August and 26 October 2006, 
while the SEE Network, allied with some art groups, continued their 
campaigns, some pro-democrat politicians changed their positions on the 
demolition of OSFP, initiated agenda change in the Legco and DC. 
Nevertheless, the Administration persisted with the existing plan, stressing 
that preservation of the pier was infeasible and would affect other 
development projects.     
 
2.3 From 27 October to 30 November 2006 
From late October 2006, the news media had shifted their attention 
to the closing ceremony of the OSFP held by the SFCL, running stories 
                                               
10 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting CB(1)414/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl060920.pdf 
11 Minutes of the Council meeting (in Chinese): 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/Minutes/doc/DC/19.doc 
12 PLW Panel paper CB(1)2208/05-06(02), paragraph 9:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2208-2e.pdf 
13 PLW Panel paper:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-46-1-e.pdf 
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about the history of the site and people’s memories of the pier. In the 
evening of 11 November, the SFCL held a ceremony and a charity farewell 
ride with four ferries taking 1800 people from the OSFP in Central to Tsim 
Sha Tsui. Meanwhile, about 150 thousand people flocked to the OSFP and 
Central waterfront, some to take the ride at the old pier for the last time, 
others to photograph the clock tower14.  
 
On the following day, there was substantial news coverage of 
people’s memorial and farewell activities. Many of the news stories 
highlighted individuals’ memory of the OSFP. Two of the selected 
newspapers also criticised the demolition of the OSFP. The MPDN’s 
editorial argued that people’s attachment to the OSFP reflected the failure of 
the government’s consultation mechanism15. A column of the ODN claimed 
that the demolition of the OSFP was the murder of history16.  
 
From this point onwards, the SEE Network and a small pressure 
group, Independent Media, together with some major conservation groups 
and students, gradually intensified their campaigns. On 12 November, about 
20 activists started a sit-in outside the OSFP, demanding a halt to demolition 
work. In the following weeks, the activists launched further protests. For 
example, some activists climbed onto the roof of the OSFP, and beamed the 
words ‘Save Me’ onto the clock tower17. Some protesters also climbed up to 
the Star Ferry clock tower18. Meanwhile, the Conservancy Association, a 
major conservation group also expressed its support of the campaign for 
preservation of the OSFP and QP19.   
 
On the day after the closing ceremony of the OSFP, about 500 
members of the Society for the Protection of the Harbour (SPH), the DP and 
CP staged a protest march in Central, calling on the public to carry on the 
campaign against reclamation and the demolition of the OSFP20. While this 
                                               
14 MPDN, 12 November 2006, page A03 
15 MPDN, 12 November 2006, page A02 
16 ODN, 12 November 2006, page A22 
17 MPDN, 19 November 2006, page A15 
18 MPDN, 1 December 2006, page A17 
19 ADN, 20 November 2006, page A20 
20 MPDN, 13 November 2006, page A06 
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subject was discussed again at the PLW Panel meeting in November 2006, 
the pro-democrat camp questioned the feasibility of various preservation 
options and challenged the existing heritage policy. Some suggested that the 
Administration should preserve the clock tower, while others urged the 
Administration to consult concerned parties and the relevant DC21.  
 
On the contrary, although some pro-government legislators criticised 
the Administration verbally22, they did not take further action in the Legco. 
Neither did they express support for the protestors. From this perspective, 
the pro-government camp still supported the Administration at that time. 
 
In sum, after over a hundred thousand people had flocked to Central 
during the closing ceremony of the OSFP on 30 November, the news media 
considered people attachment to the OSFP as the failure of the existing 
heritage policy. At the same time, the pro-democrat camp and conservation 
groups intensified their voices against the demolition plan of the OSFP and 
QP.  Despite this, there was no change to the positions of the Administration 
and the pro-government camp. 
 
3.4 From 1 December to 15 December 
Among the DAB legislators, Choy So-yuk of the DAB was the only 
one who expressed an objection to the demolition of the OSFP. In addition 
to criticising the demolition of the OSFP in the Legco, Choy accidentally 
triggered a debate on the Administration’s integrity. She asked a written 
question at the Legco on the criteria for the classification of historical 
buildings and whether the Administration would re-consider classifying the 
OSFP as a historical building so that it would be protected by the 
Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance. On 6 December, in response to 
Choy’s question, the Secretary for Home Affairs (SHA) claimed that, 
according to the built heritage impact assessment for the CRIII conducted in 
                                               
21 Minute of PLW panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061114.pdf 
22 ibid. 
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2001, and the AAB’s assessment report, the Administration would not re-
consider declaring the OSFP as a monument23.  
 
In SHA's reply, the built heritage impact assessment referred to was 
the ‘Survey Report of Historical Buildings and Structures within the Project 
Area of the Central Reclamation Phase III’ conducted by a heritage 
consultant commissioned by the Antiquities and Monuments Office in 2001. 
The Survey Report described the OSFP as a structure of great significance 
and warned that its destruction would provoke a public outcry and dismay. 
The Report also recommended that consideration should be given to 
relocating the clock tower, if not the whole pier building, to a new home 
suitably in harmony with its surroundings. Meanwhile, the Report pointed 
out that the QP had been the landing pier for new Governors. Thus, the QP 
together with Edinburgh Place nearby, had performed some civic and 
political functions in the colonial period of post-war Hong Kong. Their 
demolition for reclamation would scrap forever the concrete link to a brief 
past of local development24. In other words, the Report does not sound 
supportive of the demolition of the OSFP and QP. 
 
This Survey Report was supposed to be attached to the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Report on the CRIII as an appendix. 
However, on 11 December 2006, the SEE Network claimed that the relevant 
hyperlink to the Survey Report on the Government website was missing. 
Thus, the group raised the question of whether the Administration had 
concealed the report25.  
 
The following morning, the AAB held an urgent closed door 
meeting. Immediately after the meeting, demolition work on the OSFP 
commenced. The clock face was removed from the clock tower. In the 
evening of the same day, the Administration issued a press release stating 
that the AAB had reviewed the discussion paper and minutes regarding the 
                                               
23 The Administration’s press release on the reply of the Secretary for Home Affairs: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/06/P200612060159.htm 
24 Survey Report of Historical Buildings and Structures within the Project Area of the 
Central Reclamation Phase III:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-511-2-e.pdf 
25 MPDN, 12 December 2006, page A04 
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demolition plan of the OSFP in 2002, which recorded that AAB did not 
raise any objection to the demolition of the pier. Rather, the Board only 
asked the Government to preserve the significant relics of the clock tower 
and the QP and consider reconstructing them on the new harbourfront. The 
Administration also claimed that the website’s missing link to the survey 
report was due to technical problems26.  
 
While the AAB held an urgent meeting on 12 November, some 
protesters broke the police barricade and rushed into the cordoned-off 
former Star Ferry terminal in Central. Other protestors outside also 
continued a sit-in27. On the evening of 13 December, police officers rushed 
to the spot to remove the demonstrators from the OSFP, along with some 
legislators. One of the demonstrators was arrested for ‘criminal damage’ to 
property28.  
 
When the police was clearing up the OSFP, in order to express 
support for the protestors, the pro-democrat camp at the Legco’s Council 
meeting, with the permission of the President of the Legco, initiated a 
motion to adjourn the Council meeting for the purpose of debating the issue 
of ‘Demolition of the clock tower at the Star Ferry Pier’29. At a special 
meeting of the PLW Panel on 14 December 2006, pro-democrat legislators 
also suggested that the demolition of the OSFP and its clock tower should 
be suspended30. Subsequently, the protestors and the pro-democrat camp 
further strengthened their cooperation. On 15 December 2006, the pro-
democrat legislators and the SEE Network launched Heritage Watch, an 
alliance of academics, students, environmentalists, legislators and activists. 
The alliance announced that it would organise a candle-light vigil at the 
OSFP concourse on 24 December.31  
 
                                               
26 The Administration’s press release:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-511-3-e.pdf 
27 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
28 MPDN, 14 December 2006, page A03 
29 Minutes of the Legco Council Meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1213-translate-e.pdf 
30 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061214.pdf 
31 MPDN, 16 December 2006, page A06  
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In response to this, the SHPL stressed that it was too late to change 
the decision to demolish the pier, and that it was not feasible to preserve the 
pier building and the clock tower 32 . The CE also stressed that the 
Government had spent five years to satisfy all the statutory requirements 
and consultation procedures before finalising the decision on demolition of 
the OSFP. 33   In addition, the pro-government camp persisted with its 
supportive position. At the PLW Panel meeting mentioned above, apart 
from Choy So-yuk of DAB and Wong Kwok-hing of FTU who criticised 
the Administration, all the pro-government legislators kept silent34. In this 
sense, most pro-government legislators did not oppose the Administration.  
 
Nevertheless, on 13 December 2006, the MPDN quoted an official 
source, claiming that the Administration had initiated a review of heritage 
policy. In addition to history, the ‘social significance’ of the heritage 
buildings would be taken into account.35   In other words, there was an 
agenda change in the Administration.  
 
In short, during this 15-day period, when an official survey report, 
which did not sound supportive of the demolition of OSFP and QP, was 
discovered by the SEE Network, the Administration’s integrity was 
challenged. This not only caused the pro-democrat camp and protestors to 
intensify their campaigns against the demolition work, but also triggered the 
agenda changes of the AAB and the Legco. Although the Administration, 
with the support of the pro-government camp, persisted with the existing 
project, the Administration changed its agenda, preparing a review of the 
existing heritage policy.   
 
3.5 From 16 December 2006 to 3 February 2007 
In the period subsequent to 16 December 2006, there was a series of 
policy change. The first was the acceleration of the demolition of the OSFP. 
                                               
32 The Administration’s press release on the response of the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/13/P200612130316.htm 
33 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/13/P200612130248.htm 
34 Minutes of  the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061214.pdf 
35 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
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Although some members of the PLW Panel urged the Administration to 
suspend the demolition of the OSFP until 18 December 2006, in the 
morning of 16 December, workers unusually worked through the night, 
demolishing the clock tower with the pieces taken away by barge within a 
few hours 36 . At the PLW Panel meeting on 18 December 2006, the 
Administration informed Panel members that the clock tower had been 
disposed of at the public fill reception facilities and mixed with other 
materials. However, the Administration had used three-dimensional laser 
scanning to record the dimensions of the OSFP while the faces and the 
mechanical parts of the old clock had been preserved for possible use in 
future. The Administration also claimed that the QP would be demolished as 
planned but the plaque of the pier would be preserved.37 
 
In response to this, the pro-democrat camp, cooperating with the 
protestors, continued criticising the Administration and its development 
projects. On 16 December, 20 protesters started a 49-hour hunger strike in 
commemoration of the 49 year history of the OSFP.38  
 
On 18 December 2006, the PLW Panel held another special meeting 
to discuss the subject matter in the presence of ten deputations of various 
conservation and professional groups39. The infeasibility of restoring the 
pier’s old clock was challenged at this meeting. According to a written 
submission of the SFCL, the company had donated the faces and parts of the 
clock to the Hong Kong Museum of History because of the public's strong 
sentiment towards the clock. However, the company stressed that restoring 
the piers clock was infeasible40. Despite this, the SEE Network and the 
University of Hong Kong's University Museum and Art Gallery invited Neil 
Brennan Wright from the clockmaking company, Thwaites & Reed to Hong 
Kong. This clockmaker had been maintaining the Great Clock of 
Westminster Palace for 30 years. Having inspected the clock of the OSFP, 
                                               
36 MPDN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
37 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061218.pdf 
38 ODN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
39 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061218.pdf 
40 PLW Panel paper CB(1)554/06-07(06) (in Chinese):  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw1218cb1-554-6-c.pdf 
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Wright, told the Panel that the clock, made by the famous clockmaker Dent 
in the 1950s, could be re-erected in many forms, such as in a new clock 
tower or as a museum piece41. In other words, Wright disagreed to the 
statement by the Administration and the SFCL that the clock could not be 
restored and maintained.  
 
In addition to the demolition of the OSFP, the other development 
plans were criticised. On 17 December, some pro-democrat legislators and 
District Councilors, together with the protestors, expressed their concerns 
about various historical sites which might be affected by development 
projects. These buildings included the F Block of Victoria Prison built in 
1841, the old Central Police Station built in 1864, Yau Ma Tei Police 
Station (YMTPS) built in 1922 and Jade Market which was a favourite for 
collectors from all over the world 42 . On the following next day, when 
protestors had finished the 49-hour hunger strike at the OSFP, they shifted 
their focus, voicing objections to the renewal plan in Wanchai43. Two days 
later, the pro-democrat legislators, together with Chan Yuen-han of FTU, at 
a meeting of the PWSC of the Finance Committee, rejected the 
government's request for an extra fund for the design costs and site 
investigation of the proposed Central Kowloon Route. Although the 
Administration claimed that the government needed the money to continue 
its study on the proposed trunk road, legislators said that they feared the 
new route would affect the YMTPS and Jade Market nearby44. 
 
On 24 December, about 200 people joined the Heritage Watch’s a 
candle-light vigil at the OSFP concourse to mark the demolition of the half-
century-old clock tower45. In the day prior to this vigil, however, the CE, in 
a radio programme, announced a second series of policy changes. While 
stressing that the demolition of the OSFP and QP could not be stopped, the 
CE promised that the Government would reassemble the OSFP clock and 
                                               
41 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061218.pdf 
42 MPDN, 18 December 2006, page A06 
43 ODN, 19 December 2006, page A02 
44 Minutes of PWSC meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw061219.pdf 
45 MPAN, 25 December 2006, page A04  
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re-erect it on a new clock tower to be constructed at a suitable location. In 
addition, the Government would work with experts to preserve the 
components of the QP as far as possible so that it could be reconstructed at a 
suitable location.46 . In other words, the demolition plan of the QP was 
adjusted. On 23 January 2007, the Administration briefed the PLW Panel on 
the proposals to ‘relocate’ the QP. Deputations from various professional 
and community bodies also expressed their views at the same meeting.47 
Although the relocation plan had not been decided when the QP was 
demolished in 2007, the components of the pier was preserved for 
reassembling.   
 
The other policy change was the amendment of existing heritage 
policy. As mentioned above, the MPDN disclosed that the Administration 
had started the review of existing heritage policy on 13 December 2006.48 A 
week later, the amendment plan of existing heritage policy became concrete 
when the Administration disclosed the plan of consultation on built heritage 
conservation policy in 2007. Under the new standards for monuments, 
peoples’ collective memory and the social value of historical sites would be 
taken into account.49  At a statement delivered on 23 December 2006, the 
CE confirmed that he had already asked the Home Affairs Bureau, which 
had carried out a public consultation on heritage policy in 2004, to again set 
up a discussion on this policy.. He also pledged that the Government would 
fully consider the public's collective memory and demands in future.50 On 8 
January 2007, when a new series of consultations on built heritage 
conservation was launched, the Secretary for Home Affairs (SHA) said that 
the Government saw a recent spate of public concern and heated discussions 
on heritage conservation in the community, particularly on people's 
yearning for collective memory.51  
                                               
46 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
 
47 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl070123.pdf 
48 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
49 MPDN, 20 December 2006, page A08 
50 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
51 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080232.htm 
 278 
 
In addition to the change in heritage policy, there were two structural 
reforms to institutions. The first was personnel change in the AAB. On 24 
December 2006, quoting a government source, the ODN disclosed a plan for 
AAB reform whereby more professionals and conservationists would be 
appointed as committee members 52 . On 8 January 2007, when the 
consultation on built heritage conservation policy was launched, the 
Administration announced that the number of members of the AAB would 
be increased from 21 to 28. Among the 28 members, fifteen were newly 
appointed53.  
 
The other structural reform was change to senior government 
structure. On 3 February 2007, the CE, Donald Tsang claimed that if he won 
the election for a second term, he would create a Development Bureau in 
order to co-ordinate and balance the needs for development, and 
environmental protection and heritage conservation 54 . After Tsang was 
elected, this plan was officially announced at the Legco meeting on 3 May 
200755, and passed by the Legco on 14 June 2007.56 On 1 July 2007, the 
Development Bureau was established. In the subsequent period, the 
demolition plans of the Victoria Prison and the old Central Policy Station, as 
well as several other historical sites, were also adjusted. 
 
In short, in the period subsequent to 16 December 2006, there was a 
series of significant policy changes in the demolition of the OSFP and other 
areas of heritage policy. Despite voices against the demolition work, the 
Administration had speeded up demolition of the OSFP. In response to this, 
the opposition strengthened the cooperation and intensified their campaigns, 
including organising protests, criticising various development plans and 
rejecting the Administration’s request for fund for a highway project.  
 
                                               
52 ODN, 24 December 2006, page A19 
53 Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080234.htm 
54 MPDN, 4 February 2007, page A01 
55 The Administration’s press release on the CE’s statement: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/03/P200705030180.htm 
56 MPDN, 15 June 2007, page A06 
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Subsequently, the Administration launched further policy changes, 
including amendment to the demolition plan for the QP and consultation on 
existing heritage policy. There were also alterations in policy making 
structures. Some development plans which might affect historical sites were 
also reconsidered.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the controversy over the demolition of the OSFP was 
triggered by a small conservation group, the SEE Network, in July 2006. 
When the SEE Network highlighted the historical value of the OSFP, 
calling on the Administration to preserve the pier, pro-democrat politicians 
and other conservation groups changed their positions, describing the pier as 
an icon of people’s collective memory, initiating agenda change at the 
Legco and urging the Administration to suspend its demolition plans.  
 
On the other hand, throughout the debate, the Administration, with 
the support of the pro-government camp, emphasised the legality of the 
project, claiming that the development plan had passed through all the 
statutory consultation process. It was thus impractical and too late to amend 
the project.   
 
After more than a hundred thousand people flocked to the Central 
water front during the closing ceremony of the OSFP on 11 November 2006, 
the media started criticising the demolition plan and the existing heritage 
policy. Meanwhile, the activists gradually intensified their protests while 
pro-democrat politicians placed further pressure on the Administration in 
the Legco. The disclosure of an official survey report, which was 
unfavourable to the demolition plan, also triggered the agenda change at the 
AAB.  
 
Subsequently, relatively significant policy changes took place. In 
addition to the acceleration of demolition work, the Administration adjusted 
the demolition plan of the QP and launched a consultation on heritage 
policy. The Administration also launched structural reforms of relevant 
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institutions and reconsidered various development projects that might affect 
historical sites.   
 
Despite the failure in preventing the demolition of the OSFP, the 
pro-democrat camp strengthened its cooperation with activists, organising 
further protests and expressing concerns about various historical sites. In the 
Legco, the pro-democrat camp also rejected the Administration’s request for 
a fund for a development project which might affect an historical site.  
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Chapter 13 
Analysis of the Case of the Old Star Ferry Pier 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provides a narrative account of the controversy 
over the demolition of the old Star Ferry Pier (OSFP) in Central. This 
chapter further analyses several factors, namely, policy change, policy 
certainty and news framing. Time sequence of the changes in those factors 
is traced in order to test the hypotheses of this study. Finally, I discuss other 
factors and their relations with news coverage and policy change.   
 
2. Analysis of Policy Change 
The policy changes during the OSFP debate are summarised in 
Table 13.1. In the period prior to 15 December 2006, there were only 
relatively low cost changes, including the agenda change of the Legco and 
the Administration. After 15 December 2006, however, there were relatively 
high cost changes in existing demolition plans and heritage policy.  
 
It should be noted that only the new decisions and new initiatives of 
policymakers are considered to be policy changes. The implementation of 
the decision is not considered to be policy change. For example, the 
Administration’s review of existing heritage disclosed on 13 December 
2006 was regarded as an agenda change. Further disclosures of this review 
and the launch of re-consultation in the subsequent month were only 
considered as the implementation of this change. 
 
2.1 Low Cost Changes 
The first change to the agenda took place in the Legco’s PLW Panel. 
Between 20 September and 18 December 2006, the Panel held a series of 
special meetings to discuss issues relating to the demolition of the OSFP. 
The first meeting was held at the request of a pro-democrat legislator on 10 
August 20061. At the first special meeting on 20 September 2006, the Panel 
                                               
1 PLW Panel paper CB(1)2129/05-06(02) (in Chinese):  
 282 
also passed a motion, urging the Administration to defer the demolition plan 
for the OSFP2. The second Legco agenda change was initiated by the pro-
democrat camp when the police rushed to the spot to remove the 
demonstrators from the OSFP on 13 December 2006. In order to express 
support for the protestors, a CP legislator initiated a motion to adjourn the 
Council meeting to debate the issue of the demolition of the OSFP. 
However, the Legco did not pass any concluding motion3. 
 
Table 13.1: Policy Changes during the OSFP Debate 
Date Event Type of policy 
change 
Cost 
10/8/2006 Kwok Ka-ki’s request for the 
PLW Panel 
Agenda change Low 
20/9//2006 The PLW Panel’s motion 
demanding the deferral of the 
demolition of the OSFP 
Motion against 
exiting policy  
Low 
12/12/2006 The AAB’s urgent meeting Agenda change Low 
13/12/2006 The MPDN disclosed the 
Administration’s review of 
heritage policy. 
Agenda change Low 
13/12/2006 The Legco’s debate on the 
issue of the OSFP 
Agenda change Low 
16/12/2006 The acceleration of the 
demolition of the clock tower 
Change in 
routine 
operation 
High 
19/12/2006 The Legco’s rejection of the 
funding request for the CKR 
Budgetary 
change of other 
project  
High 
19/12/2006 The disclosure of the plan of 
re-consultation of heritage 
policy 
Agenda change Low 
23/12/2006 The disclosure of the plan to 
reform the AAB 
Alternation of 
structure 
High 
23/12/2006 The announcement of the 
change in the relocation of the 
QP 
Amendment of 
existing policy 
High 
3/2/2007 The CE’s proposal to create a 
Development Bureau.  
Alternation of 
structure 
High 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2129-2c.pdf  
2 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting CB(1)414/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl060920.pdf 
3 Minutes of the Legco Council Meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1213-translate-e.pdf 
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Besides, the Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB) held an urgent 
meeting on 12 December 2006, after the SEE Network had discovered an 
official report unfavourable to the demolition of the OSFP and QP4. After 
the meeting, the Administration confirmed that the AAB did not raise any 
objection to the demolition of the pier5 and commenced the demolition work 
immediately. Nevertheless, the commencement was not regarded as a policy 
change as it was implemented according to the original plan of the 
Administration6.  
 
The second agenda change of the Administration was disclosed by 
the MPDN on 13 December 2006. A government source claimed that the 
Home Affairs Bureau had initiated a review of existing heritage policy7. 
This plan became concrete a week later 8 . Subsequently, this plan was 
confirmed by the CE on 23 December 20069, and was launched by the 
Administration on 1 January 2008 10 . As existing heritage conservation 
policy was not changed at that time, the consultation was considered to be 
an agenda change rather than a change to existing policy.  
 
2.2 High Cost Changes    
In the period subsequent to 15 December 2006, there were several 
high cost changes. The first one was the acceleration of the demolition work. 
Before the dawn of 16 December 2006, workers unusually worked through 
the night, and then demolished the clock tower, with the pieces taken away 
by barge in the morning. On the same day, the clock tower was disposed of 
at a landfill site, and mixed with other materials11. It was unusual for the 
workers to work through the night and remove and dispose of the clock 
tower in a few hours. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
Administration speeded up the demolition work. 
                                               
4 MPDN, 12 December 2006, page A04 
5 The Administration’s press release:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-511-3-e.pdf 
6 ADN, 12 December 2006, page A22 
7 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
8 MPDN, 20 December 2006, page A08. 
9 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
10 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080232.htm 
11 MPDN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
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The other development project was also affected. On 19 December 
2006, the Public Works Subcommittee (PWSC) of the Legco’s Finance 
Committee rejected the government’s request for funding the design and 
investigation of the proposed Central Kowloon Route (CKR) as legislators 
feared the new route would affect the Yau Ma Tei Police Station (YMTPS) 
and the Jade Market12. In addition, there were changes to the demolition 
plan of the QP. On 18 December 2006, the Administration said that the QP 
would be demolished as planned13. On 23 December 2006, however, the CE 
claimed that the Government would preserve the components of the QP so 
that it could be reconstructed at a suitable site14.  
 
Moreover, there were structural alterations made to relevant policy 
making institutions. One involved personnel changes to and structural 
reform of the AAB. These changes were first disclosed by the ODN on 24 
December 200615 and announced on 8 January 200716. The other structural 
reform was a change to a senior government structure, the creation of a 
Development Bureau. This plan was announced by the CE on 3 February 
200717 and was passed by the Legco at 14 June 200718. 
 
In sum, the low cost changes, including agenda changes of the Legco 
and the Administration, took place before 15 December 2006. After 15 
December 2006, however, some relatively high cost changes to policies 
were made or announced by the Administration. These changes included the 
acceleration of policy implementation, amendment of existing policy and 
alterations to policy making structures.    
 
 
                                               
12 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw061219.pdf 
13 Minutes of the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061218.pdf 
14 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
15 ODN, 24 December 2006, page A19 
16 Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080234.htm 
17 MPDN, 4 Mar 2007, page A01 
18 MPDN,  15 June 2007, p.A06 
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3. Analysis of Policy Certainty 
3.1 Elite Consensus 
In the period prior to July 2006, as mentioned in Chapter 12, none of 
the key institutions, including the Administration, the Legco and other 
statutory bodies, raised objections to the demolition of the OSFP. After the 
SEE Network had launched a petition urging the Administration to preserve 
the pier on 17 July 2006, some professionals, the pro-democrat camp and 
individual pro-government legislators changed their positions, criticising the 
demolition plan. These pro-government legislators included Choy So-yuk of 
the DAB and the three FTU members. Nevertheless, apart from these four 
legislators, a majority of the pro-government camp remained supportive of 
the Administration and the demolition plan. At the Legco meetings 
concerning the demolition of OSFP, most pro-government legislators kept 
silent. Although some of them verbally criticised the Administration 
occasionally, they never voted against the Administration19 . Thus, elite 
consensus in the Administration and the pro-government camp remained 
high throughout the controversy.   
 
In the period between July and October 2006, a consultative body, 
the Harbour-front Enhancement Committee (HEC), and the Hong Kong 
Institute of Architects (HKIA) and some members of the Central and 
Western District Council (CWDC) raised objections to the demolition plan20. 
However, none of these bodies are responsible for making policy. Thus, 
their views were not important to the overall elite consensus level in the 
Administration and the key institutions.     
 
In sum, during the debate on the OSFP, only the pro-democrat camp 
and a minority of pro-government legislators changed their views. Despite 
                                               
19 PLW Panel paper:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2208-2e.pdf,  
and minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-
06/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl060920.pdf 
The Administration’s press release on the response of the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/13/P200612130316.htm 
Minutes of the PWSC meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw061219.pdf 
20 ODN, 27 July 2006, page A24; 10 August 2006, p.A26 
Minutes of the CWDC Council meeting (in Chinese): 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/Minutes/doc/DC/19.doc 
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verbal criticisms of the demolition plan, a majority of pro-government 
legislators strictly supported the Administration. This argument is further 
confirmed by the interview with Choy So-yuk (interview on 21 May 2007) 
and Jasper Tsang, the founding Chairman of the DAB (interview on 17 
January 2008). Thus, the elite consensus level over the demolition of the 
OSFP was considered to be high throughout the controversy. 
 
3.2 Policy Stage 
In terms of policy stage, there was extremely high policy certainty 
with the demolition of the OSFP. Although the demolition work had not 
commenced when the debate began in October 2006, the demolition plan, as 
a part of the CRIII project, was being implemented. Moreover, in December 
2006, the Administration further increased policy certainty by means of 
commencing and accelerating demolition work, removing the most iconic 
part of the OSFP. These initiatives made irreparable damage to the pier, 
making the demolition plan become even more certain afterwards.     
 
The demolition plan of the QP was also at the implementation stage. 
Although the demolition works were scheduled to commence in the July of 
2008, the relevant work contracts were awarded. Thus, there was a high 
level of certainty with this project.   
 
There was also a high level of certainty of the existing heritage 
conservation policy based on the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance 
(AMO). It was because the contexts of the ordinance and relevant decision-
making procedures were well established, while the Administration did not 
initiate any amendment exercise of this law before the debate. Nevertheless, 
membership of the AAB was uncertain during the debate. As the existing 
AAB members completed their terms at the end of 2006, a new appointment 
should be made. In other words, the Administration had to initiate personnel 
changes at that time.  
 
In addition, the CKR were being planned during the debate. When 
the Legco rejected the funding request for this project on 19 December 2006, 
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even the design of this highway had not been confirmed. Thus, the CKR had 
low certainty measured by policy stage.     
 
Taking both elite consensus and policy stage into account, there was 
a high level of policy certainty with the demolitions of the OSFP and the QP 
as well as for existing heritage policy. By contrast, despite the high level of 
elite consensus, the CKR, which was being planned, was relatively 
uncertain. There was also an uncertainty of personnel changes to the AAB 
during the debate.  
 
4. Analysis of News Framing 
4.1 Methodology 
The framing of news coverage is measured by article count and 
keyword count. News articles and editorials of the three selected 
newspapers were searched using the Wisers database by the keywords ‘Star 
(天星)’ ‘Star Ferry (天星小輪)’, ‘Star Ferry Pier (天星碼頭)’, ‘Queen’s 
Pier (皇后碼頭)’ and ‘conservation (保育)’. The articles irrelevant to the 
demolition plan were screened off, while only texts containing at least one 
paragraph concerning the issues relating to the OSFP, the QP and heritage 
conservation were selected. The sampling period started from 13 May 2006 
when the SFSL announced the design of the new SFP in Central. The end 
date of the article search was 3 February 2007, the date after the CE 
announced the last proposed policy change directly relating to the 
demolition of the OSFP.  
 
For article count, a coding frame was designed according to the 
arguments of the proponents and opponents of the demolition plan (see 
Appendix 13A). Positive framing is a narrative supporting the 
Administration and the demolition of the OSFP and QP. This kind of 
framing consists of the following elements:  
 The overall tune of the article was supportive of the demolition of the 
OSFP and existing heritage policy. 
 The demolition plan was considered to be a development issue related to 
traffic congestion.     
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 Voices of government officials and the supporters of the demolition plan 
were highlighted.  
 The problem of traffic congestion was highlighted.  
 Preservations of the OSFP and its components were considered to be 
infeasible and unnecessary.  
 Adjustment of the demolition plan was considered to be infeasible and 
costly 
 Protests were considered to be violent or radical 
 Protesters were framed as radicals or a minority  
 The demolition plan was framed as a legitimate decision which had 
passed through all the consultation and statutory processes. 
 The missing hyperlink in the AAB’s Survey Report was described as a 
technical mistake. 
 Existing of heritage policy and its consultation mechanism were 
considered to be effective and legitimate. 
 The OSFP was considered to be a primitive  or old building 
 The demolition work and police action were considered to be decisive 
and resolute 
 The article consisted of any other elements in favour of the 
Administration and its heritage policy  
 
Negative framing is a narrative in favour of the voices against the 
demolition projects. This kind of news coverage consists of the following 
elements: 
 The overall tune of the article was critical of demolition of the OSFP 
and existing heritage policy. 
 The demolition plan was considered to be a heritage conservation issue 
which discards history and people’s memory. 
 The voices of the opposition and people missing the OSFP were 
highlighted. 
 People’s memories of the OSFP were highlighted   
 The preservations of the OSFP and its parts were considered to be viable 
and necessary 
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 Adjustment of the demolition plan was considered to be viable and 
necessary  
 Protests were considered to be peaceful or legitimate 
 Protesters were framed as fighters or intellectuals such as artists, 
students and university lecturers  
 The demolition plan was framed as a outdated decision which showed 
up a mismatch with the latest public views 
 The missing hyperlink to the AAB’s Survey Report was considered to 
be the Administration’s means of concealing  unfavourable information 
 Existing heritage policy and its consultation mechanism were considered 
to be inefficient and outdated 
 The OSFP was framed as a heritage building or an icon of the people’s 
memory 
 The demolition work and the police action were considered to be 
merciless 
 The article consisted of any other elements unfavourable to the 
Administration and its heritage policy 
   
Besides, there is also a neutral framing. The characteristics of this framing 
are listed as follows: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article 
 Neither supportive nor critical arguments were highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues were described and explained. For 
example, an article explained the three-dimensional laser scanning 
technology for recording the dimensions of the OSFP. 
 
The keywords associated with positive and negative framings were 
also quantified. During the debate, the opponents of the demolition plan 
described the demolition of the OSFP as issues related to heritage 
conservation, highlighting people’s memory and the history of the pier. 
Thus, ‘conservation (保育)’, ‘memory (回憶/記憶)’ and ‘history (歷史)’ 
were selected as keywords associated with negative framing. In contrast, the 
Administration considered the demolition plan as means of providing relief 
for traffic congestion. The Administration also stressed that plan had passed 
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through all the statutory procedures and the contracts had been awarded. 
Thus, ‘traffic/transport (交通)’, ‘procedure (程序)’ and ‘contract (合約)’ 
were considered as positive keywords.  
 
In order to avoid contamination from irrelevantly used words, only 
the keywords used in relation to the debate on OSFP and heritage issues 
were counted. For example, the word ‘history’ was not counted when it was 
used in the name of ‘Hong Kong Museum of History’. 
 
4.2 Results  
In the 268-day sampling period between and 12 May 2006 and 3 
February 2007, the MPDN and ADN ran similar levels of coverage. There 
were 109 articles (0.41 per day) and 103 articles (0.38 per day) in the 
MPDN and ADN respectively. The ODN ran 71 articles (0.26 per day), the 
lowest level among the 3 selected papers. As mentioned in Chapter 12, the 
development of OSFP debate can be divided into five periods. The framing 
analysis of coverage in these five periods is summarised in Appendix 13B.  
 
This study assumes that media’s influence on policy is possible only 
if critical coverage is sustained for at least three days. Moreover, media 
pressure on policymakers is increased when the three selected newspapers 
run sustained critical coverage simultaneously. As shown in Appendix 13C, 
the three papers ran several peaks of sustained coverage during the OSFP 
debate. Combining the data of the three newspapers, I found two periods in 
which they all ran sustained coverage.  
 
The first peak of sustained critical coverage started on 10 November 
2006, the day prior to the closing ceremony of the OSFP. As shown in Table 
13.2, the overall framing of the three newspapers remained negative in this 
4-day period. Thus, there was a high level of media consensus over negative 
framing. This coverage not only highlighted history and people’s memories 
of the OSFP, but also criticised the existing heritage policy. For example, 
the editorial of the MPDN argued that people’s attachment to the OSFP 
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demonstrated the failure of the government’s consultation mechanisms21. A 
column of the ODN was also titled ‘the demolition of the OSFP is murder of 
history’22.   
 
Table 13.2: Framing Analysis of Sustained Coverage of the OSFP 
Debate between 10 and 13 November 2006 (4 Days) 
 
Article Count 
No. of total articles (No. of editorial)  
Framing MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 0 0 0 
Negative / Critical  12 (1) 16 7 
Neutral / Descriptive 2 3 1 
Total 14 (1) 19 8 
Average No. of articles per day 3.50 4.75 2.00 
Framing decided by article count Negative Negative Negative 
 
Keyword count 
Framing Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Procedure 
Contract  
0 
4 
0 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 4 2 1 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
1 
9 
12 
0 
8 
12 
1 
9 
9 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 22 20 19 
Framing decided by article count Negative Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Negative Negative Negative 
 
Lasting for about 2 weeks, the second peak of sustained critical 
coverage started when the SEE Network uncovered an official report 
unfavourable to the demolition plan. In these 2 weeks between 12 and 25 
December, the framing of the three newspapers remained negative (see 
Table 13.3). Media consensus on overall critical framing was considered to 
be high in this case.  
 
Negative coverage mainly criticised the Administration and 
sympathised with the protesters. For example, after the protesters had been 
                                               
21 MPDN, 12 November 2006, page A02 
22 ODN, 12 November 2006, page A22 
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removed from the OSFP by the police, both the MPDN and ODN quoted a 
protestor’s father ‘I am proud of my son’23. The ODN also described the 
protestors as ‘brave warriors’24 while the MPDN highlighted the fact that 
some of the protestors were intellectuals, such as university lecturers and 
students25. After the rapid destruction of the clock tower, the editorial of the 
MPDN claimed that the demolition of the pier would result in sequelae, 
undermining people’s trust in the government, and making the development 
plan even more difficult26. The editorial of the ODN was titled ‘The prestige 
of Government has been broken before the destruction of the Pier.’27 
 
Table 13.3: Framing Analysis of Sustained Coverage of the OSFP 
Debate between 12 and 25 December 2006 (14 Days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of article (No. of article)  
Framing MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 4 1 2 
Negative / Critical  35 (5) 28 (1) 32 (5) 
Neutral / Descriptive 14 10 8 
Total 53 (5) 39 (1) 42 (5) 
Average No. of articles per day 3.79 2.78 3 
Framing decided by article count Negative Negative Negative 
 
Keyword count 
Framing Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Procedure 
Contract  
12 
15 
5 
1 
3 
5 
4 
5 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 32 9 11 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
24 
34 
81 
37 
20 
29 
27 
22 
62 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 139 86 111 
Framing decided by article count Negative Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Negative Negative Negative 
 
 
 
                                               
23 MPDN, 14 December 2006, page A05; ODN, 14 December 2006, page A30 
24 ODN, 14 December 2006, page A30 
25 MPDN, 14 December 2006, page A05 
26 MPDN, 18 December 2006, page A04 
27 ODN, 16 December 2006, page A31 
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In short, during the controversy over the OSFP, there were two 
periods in which the three selected newspapers ran substantial critical 
coverage simultaneously. The first peak was around the time of the closing 
ceremony of the OSFP (10 to 13 November 2006), while the second one 
was between 12 and 25 December 2006. As there was a high level of media 
consensus over negative framing, news coverage can be considered as an 
influential factor for policy change subsequent to this coverage. 
 
5. Testing the hypotheses 
5.1 Tracing the time sequence  
During the OSFP debate, there were two low cost policy changes 
prior to the first peak of critical coverage. One is the Legco agenda change 
on 10 August 2006 while the other is the PLW Panel’s motion against the 
demolition plan on 20 September. Before these events, news coverage of the 
OSFP in the three selected newspapers remained limited and intermittent. 
Thus, news coverage is unlikely to have been an influential factor in these 
two changes.. 
 
In the month subsequent to the first peak of critical coverage, 
although there was no policy change, both the Administration and the pro-
democrat camp became extremely sensitive to criticisms. When the SEE 
Network uncovered an official survey report unfavourable to the demolition 
plan on 11 December 2006, the AAB held an urgent meeting, confirming 
that the committee had no objections to the demolition plan the next 
morning28. When the police removed the protesters from the OSFP on 13 
December 2006, pro-democrat legislators immediately initiated a motion 
debate on the OSFP29. 
 
More importantly, during the second peak of critical coverage, 
several policy changes were announced or disclosed by the Administration. 
The first was the plan of the consultation on heritage policy disclosed on 13 
                                               
28 The Administration’s press release:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-511-3-e.pdf 
29 Minutes of the Legco Council Meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1213-translate-e.pdf 
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December, the second day of the second peak of coverage30. While the 3 
newspapers ran critical coverage simultaneously in the following 2 weeks, 
this plan was moved forward, finally being launched officially on January 
2007 31 . The other policy change during the second peak of negative 
coverage was the rapid destruction of the clock tower on 16 December 
200632. A week later, the CE announced an adjustment to the demolition 
plan of the QP33. As the Administration persisted with the demolition plan 
on 18 December, it can be argued that the plan was changed in the few days 
subsequent to 18 December. In other words, a decision on this high cost 
change was made during the second peak of critical coverage.   
 
Reform of the AAB was also decided during the second peak of 
critical coverage. This reform plan was first disclosed by the media by 24 
December 200634. Although the existing AAB members finished their terms 
on 31 December 2006, the Administration did not announce new 
appointments until 8 January 2007 35 . It can be argued that this late 
announcement was due to sudden changes to the Administration’s plan for 
AAB appointments. This argument was supported by Patsy Cheng, the 
Director of the SEE Network, who claimed that the Administration gave her 
a hurried invitation for AAB membership, which she rejected. (Interview on 
15 May 2007). From this perspective, the decision on AAB reform was 
subsequent to critical news coverage.       
 
The creation of the Development Bureau was also a decision made 
after the second peak of critical coverage. In fact, a study of policy bureau 
reform was begun in the fall of 2006. Since September 2006, a few 
alternatives for reform were disclosed by the media36. However, the creation 
of a Development Bureau was not disclosed until the CE announced his 
proposal on 3 February 2007. Moreover, the CE claimed that the mission of 
                                               
30 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
31 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080232.htm 
32 MPDN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
33 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
34 ODN, 24 December 2006, page A19 
35 Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080234.htm 
36 ODN, 10 September 2006, page A23  
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the new bureau was to co-ordinate and balance needs for development, and 
needs for environmental protection and heritage conservation37. In other 
words, the new bureau was created to address the heritage problems which 
were highlighted during the OSFP debate.  
 
The opponents also initiated policy changes during the second peak 
of critical coverage. On 19 December 2006, pro-democrat legislators, 
together with the FTU legislators, rejected the government’s request for 
funding the design and investigation of the CKR38 . As these legislators 
never expressed any objections to the project before this time, it is 
reasonable to suggest that these legislators changed their positions during 
the second peak of critical coverage.     
 
In sum, news coverage in the three selected newspapers remained 
intermittent until November 2006. Thus, process tracing showed that news 
coverage was not a factor affecting the Legco’s agenda changes in August 
2006 and the motion passed by the PLW Panel in September 2006. After the 
first peak of critical coverage between 10 and 13 November 2006, however, 
policymakers became sensitive to the issues related to the OSFP. When the 
three papers ran the second peak of critical coverage in December 2003, 
various types of policy change were launched. These changes included 
agenda changes to the Legco and the AAB. The Administration also started 
a reviewed of heritage policy and launched several high cost changes, 
including the acceleration of demolition work, changes to demolition plans 
of the QP, reform of the AAB and the creation of a Development Bureau. 
Since these decisions on policy change were made during or after 
substantial critical coverage was run, media influence on those policy 
changes was possible. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
37 MPDN, 4 Feb 2007, page A01 
38 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw061219.pdf 
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5.2 Policy Certainty 
5.2.1 Elite Consensus 
There are two hypotheses concerning elite consensus. First, critical 
coverage is unlikely to occur when there is a high level of elite consensus. 
Second, it is relatively easy for critical coverage to influence policy during 
an elite debate. These two hypotheses were not supported by the OSFP 
debate. While the pro-government camp supported the Administration and 
its policy throughout the debate, there was a high level of media consensus 
over critical framing in two periods. In this sense, despite a high level of 
elite consensus, all the selected media ran substantial critical coverage. The 
first hypothesis was not supported in this case.  
 
In addition, process tracing showed that sustained critical coverage 
was followed by various types of policy changes. Although demolition of 
the OSFP continued, the Administration did not work as ordinarily planned. 
Rather the demolition work was speeded up. From this perspective, media 
influence on policy was possible although elite consensus remained at a 
high level. 
 
5.2.2 Policy Stage 
This study also assumed that it is relatively easy for critical coverage 
to influence policy with high certainty measured by policy stage. As 
mentioned above, the CKR and the personnel of the AAB were relatively 
uncertain in terms of policy stage. These two policies were changed after 
substantial critical coverage was run. In this sense, this hypothesis was 
supported.   
 
The demolition of the OSFP and the QP were under implementation 
during the debate. Thus, there was a high level of certainty over these two 
projects. Despite the continuation of the two projects, some adjustments 
were made by the Administration after substantial critical coverage was run. 
Similarly, existing heritage policy under the AMO was certain. However, 
the Administration launched a consultation on it. From this perspective, 
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media influence on policy is possible despite a high level of certainty 
measured by policy stage.   
 
Taking all of these factors into account, the hypotheses of this study 
were not supported by the case of demolition of the OSFP. In spite of the 
high level of policy certainty measured by elite consensus and policy stage, 
media influence on policy was possible. Furthermore, previous studies 
usually suggest that substantial critical coverage pushes policymakers down 
a particular path (Robinson 2002; Linsky 1986). However, during the OSFP 
debate, the Administration worked against the critical coverage, speeding up 
the demolition work. In these circumstances, the media-policy relation was 
more complex than the hypotheses and previous studies allow for.  
 
In order to provide a better account of media-policy relations, I 
examine other possible factors affecting policy changes and their relations 
with news coverage. I suggest that policy outcomes, including the actions 
and inactions of political actors, are the result of the co-existence of and 
interaction between these factors.   
 
5. Possible Causes of Policy Change  
5.1 Institutions  
The first influential factor is the institutions referring to formal rules, 
organisations and past decisions of political actors. The institutional 
approach provided an important insight into the period between the two 
peaks of critical coverage (the period between 14 November and 11 
December 2006) in which no policy change by the Administration was 
launched. This ‘gap period’ could be explained by bureaucratic procedures. 
It is reasonable to suggest that there is a series of discussions and a study of 
the feasibility, legality, fiscal and political costs of various alternatives 
before the Administration makes a decision on policy change. This process 
usually takes a certain time. Thus, the Administration’s inaction in the 
period between the two peaks of critical coverage can be explained by this 
type of institutional constraint.  
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In addition, there was evidence to show that both the Administration 
and the pro-democrat camp were constrained by past decisions. Throughout 
the debate, the Administration stressed the legality of the demolition plan, 
and the infeasibility of any adjustment of the plan. As the demolition plan 
had passed through all the statutory processes, including endorsements by 
the Town Planning Board (TPB), the AAB and the Legco, any adjustments 
would have to be re-considered by those statutory bodies. This would not 
only cause a delay in the demolition of the OSFP, but also would affect the 
schedules for all other related development projects, including the Central-
Wanchai Bypass (CWB). As Michael Suen said, ‘We (the government) have 
constructed the two ends of the highway (CWB). We should finish the rest 
of the project anyway.’ (Interview on 22 Jan 2008) Besides, as contracts for 
the project had been awarded, any amendments or delays to the plans might 
be costly in terms of compensation for contractors. In this sense, the 
Administration was bound by the existing policy as decided in the past.  
 
Moreover, after July 2006, conservation groups and pro-democrat 
legislators changed their positions while the media paid relatively high 
attention to the issue. Although all the key policy making institutes were 
still dominated by pro-government members, these members might have 
been influenced by the criticisms, including those by the media. Even the 
TPB member appointed by the Administration claimed that he tried to avoid 
being criticised by the media (interview with a TPB member requesting 
anonymity on 14 May 2007). In this circumstance, the reconsideration of the 
demolition plans would result in a high level of uncertainty of the policy. 
The fiscal and political costs of reconsidering the existing policy may be 
increased as a result of critical coverage, together with past decisions. 
 
Not only the Administration, but also pro-democrat legislators were 
bound by their past decisions. During the OSFP debate, the DP members 
played supportive roles, adopting a low profile approach. All the Legco 
agenda changes were initiated by the newly elected pro-democrat legislators, 
namely Kwok Ka-ki, Alan Leong and Fernando Cheung, who were not 
involved in approval of the demolition plan. According to the DP Vice-
Chairman, Sin Chung-Kai, at an early stage of scrutiny, the DP and other 
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parties in the Legco did not raise any objections to the demolition plans. Sin 
claimed that legislators, including those of the DP, changed their positions 
mainly because they had perceived public opinion to oppose the demolition 
plan (this point will be discussed later in this chapter). However, the DP did 
not want to overthrow its previous commitment. Thus, the party neither 
supported the Administration, nor played a leading role in the campaign. 
Rather, the DP supported the protesters in a low profile manner (interview 
on 11 November 2008).  
 
In short, the institutional approach explained the inactions of the pro-
government camp and the relatively low profile adopted by some pro-
democrat legislators. The institutions, together with pressure created by 
critical coverage, also increased the cost of policy changes, resulting in the 
continued demolition of the OSFP and QP. 
 
5.2 Ideas and Beliefs of Actors 
According to the Patsy Cheng, the campaign for the preservation of 
the OSFP was based on an idea. Carrying out research on the history of the 
OSFP, the Society realised the significance of the pier and the 
Administration’s ‘misinterpretation’ of history. Thus, the Society launched 
an on-line petition, urging the Administration to suspend the demolition 
plan (interview on 15 May 2007). From this perspective, the campaign was 
mainly triggered by the SEE Network’s new ideas.  
 
In this case, the media played an important role in reinforcing and 
disseminating the ideas. According to the framing analysis, on the day after 
the launch of the SEE Network’s online petition, both the MPDN and ADN 
ran only one relevant article, while the ODN completely ignored the issue. 
Neither was there any coverage of this issue in the three papers in the 
following month. Nevertheless, Cheng perceived a substantial quantity of 
news coverage of the online petition. This subjective perception made her 
feel that the issue was extremely significant. In the following week, the 
Society also received a few thousand email signatures supporting the 
campaign. Cheng’s confidence in the campaign was thus further reinforced 
(ibid). From this perspective, the media not only enhanced the Society’s 
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confidence in its ideas, but also functioned as a communicator, 
disseminating the Society’s ideas within the general public. Meanwhile, the 
actors’ ideas were reinforced not only through the perception of coverage, 
but also through public feedback.  
 
The other type of idea is political stance, which affects the liaison 
between political actors. According to Patsy Cheng, she had conversations 
with an Exco member and a senior official of the CE’s Office. Through the 
conversations, Cheng learnt that the Administration wondered whether the 
protestors were backed by some ‘unknown forces’, refusing to respond to 
the protesters. Thus, Cheng tried to clarify the fact that the protesters had no 
liaison with any political groups though some pro-democracy legislators 
showed up for the protests (ibid). Bernard Chan, the Exco member talking 
to Cheng and other protesters, also claimed that, through face-to face-
conservations, he had a relatively in-depth understanding of the protesters 
and their demands (interview on 6 November 2008).  
 
Two insights were identified in this circumstance. First, the 
Administration’s inaction at an early stage of the debate was based on the 
Administration’s consideration of political stance. As the Administration 
considered the protesters as members of the pro-democrat camp, the 
government officials refused to respond to the campaign. Second, although 
news media facilitate communication among policymakers and the public, 
news coverage is not an effective channel for in-depth communication 
among actors. Misunderstanding may result from news coverage. In this 
case, direct conservation provides a better channel for communication 
between actors.    
 
Political stance also prevented the pro-government camp from 
supporting the protesters. As mentioned in the case of the reclamation 
debate, because of the political stance of the party and its supporters, the 
DAB usually avoids supporting the people who are not from the pro-
government camp. The former Chairman of the DAB, Jasper Tsang claimed 
that the party had this consideration during the OSFP debate (interview on 
17 January 2008). In contrast, the pro-democrat camp, as the opposition, 
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was relatively free to cooperate with the opponents of the existing policy 
even though the SEE Network and other protesters had no political position. 
Thus, the democrats not only showed up in the protest, but also initiated 
Legco agenda change to put pressure on the Administration. It can be 
argued that the political stance of democrats was an important factor in these 
agenda changes while coverage was unlikely to be a necessary condition.  
 
In sum, the ideas played two roles during the OSFP debate. First, the 
campaign for preserving the OSFP was triggered by the new ideas of the 
SEE Network. In this case, news coverage not only disseminated new ideas 
among the general public, but also, together with public feedback, 
reinforced the ideas, encouraging the SEE Network to intensify its campaign. 
Second, the political stance affected relations among the actors. The 
political stance prohibited the Administration and the pro-government camp 
from liaising and supporting the protestors. In this case, the media did not 
provide an effective channel for the political actors.          
 
5.3 Short-term Public Mood 
During the debate on the OSFP, public opinion was relatively 
favourable both to the Administration and the demolition plan. As 
mentioned in the case of the GST debate, since Donald Tsang took over his 
position as CE in 2005, the Administration became relatively popular. The 
public mood was also relatively favourable to the demolition of the OSFP. 
Despite the substantial negative coverage, the surveys both by the 
Administration and the DAB showed that the proportion of people 
supporting the demolition of the OSFP was higher than that opposing the 
plan (off-the-record briefing on 22 January 2008; interview with Jasper 
Tsang on 17 January 2008). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
Administration, with the support of the public views perceived, worked 
against critical coverage, accelerating the demolition of the clock tower and 
persisting on the issue of the demolition of the OSFP and QP.  
 
However, the media’s pressure on the Administration was not 
simply weakened by public opinion. As mentioned in the case of Article 23, 
the Administration and some Exco members believed that coverage could 
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influence public views. It can be argued that the Administration tried to 
settle the debate before the public views had been changed by coverage. 
From this perspective, the acceleration of demolition work was based on the 
potential media effect on public opinion. In this case, the media functioned 
as a catalyst.   
 
5.4 Election Cycle 
The other influential factor is the election cycle. There was a CE 
election in February 2007, a few months prior to the OSFP debate. In 
addition, the CE is elected by an 800-member election committee returned 
by various functional constituencies. The election of this committee took 
place on 10 December 2006 when issues relating to the OSFP were under 
debate. Thus, any criticisms of the Administration, including those by the 
media, might have influenced the performance of the pro-government 
candidates. In this case, the Administration would become sensitive to 
critical coverage.  
 
Moreover, according to a government source quoted by the MPDN, 
the CE, Donald Tsang worried that the OSFP debate would become as huge 
as the controversy over Central reclamation in 2003, and that the pro-
democrat CE candidate, Alan Leong, together with other democrats, would 
highlight OSFP issues during the CE election. Thus, Tsang ordered the 
relevant policy bureaus to re-confirm the legality of the demolition plan, and 
to implement the demolition plan as soon as possible 39 . From this 
perspective, it is reasonable to suggest that election cycle was taken into 
account when the Administration decided to accelerate the demolition work 
and to launch subsequent policy changes, including the AAB reform, the 
adjustment of the QP demolition plan and the creation of a Development 
Bureau. In this case, election cycle not only put pressure on the 
Administration, but also increased media pressure, resulting in these policy 
changes.   
 
   
                                               
39 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A04 
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5.5 Mass Movements 
In the OSFP debate, mass movements played an important role. The 
first types of mass movements were the protests organised by the SEE 
Network and other groups. During the second peak of critical coverage, the 
protestors and their campaigns were two of the main focuses in media 
coverage. In addition, according to Patsy Cheng, she felt that the campaign 
was supported by the journalists during the controversy over the OSFP 
(interview on 15 May 2007). In other words, critical coverage reinforced the 
protestors’ confidence in the campaign, encouraging them to intensify their 
actions. From this perspective, there was a positive reinforcement relation 
between news coverage and the opposition’s actions.  
 
There was evidence to show that the Administration took the 
protests into account. During the second peak of critical coverage, the CE 
announced policy changes, including the adjustment of the QP demolition 
plan and the re-consultation on heritage policy in the day prior to the 
Heritage Watch’s candle-light vigil. It can be argued that the Administration 
intended to ease people’s discontents with the demolition plan in order to 
avoid triggering a large-scale protest. From this perspective, the protests 
were taken into account when the Administration decided the timing of 
announcing policy changes. 
 
The other type of critical mass movement was the aggregation of 
150 thousand people at Central during the closing ceremony of the OSFP on 
11 November 2006. Different from the SEE Network’s protests, this 
gathering was not organised. Neither were those people expressing their 
objections to demolition of the OSFP. According to the news coverage, 
most people merely flocked to Central to take a ride at the old pier for the 
last time and to photograph the clock tower40. Nevertheless, this gathering 
not only triggered sustained critical coverage, but also reinforced the 
opposition’s confidence in their campaigns. In fact, in the period before 
November 2006, although the SEE Network and other groups held several 
protests, coverage in the selected newspapers remained limited. Since the 
                                               
40 MPDN, 12 November 2006, page A03 
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closing ceremony, however, the newspapers started running the first peak of 
critical coverage, describing people’s attachments to the OSFP as the failure 
of heritage policy. Meanwhile, conservation groups and the pro-democrat 
camp intensified their voices against the demolition plan. From this 
perspective, this large-scale gathering was reinterpreted by the media and 
the opposition to legitimate and magnify the voices against the demolition 
plan, although the voices of the participants of the gathering were distorted. 
 
Taking all these factors into account, I suggest that mass movements 
played an important role in the OSFP debate. Through reinterpreting the 
large-scale gathering of people, both the media and the protestors 
legitimated and intensified their voices against the demolition plan. While 
the protests provided a focus of media coverage, the protestors sensed media 
support in the news coverage. From this perspective, there was a 
reinforcement relationship between the news coverage, the protestors and 
the pro-democrat camp.   
  
5.6 Strategies of Actors 
As the institutional rational choice approach suggests, political 
actors were not simply influenced by external factors. Rather, actors, within 
their own institutional positions, adopted a series of strategies to mediate 
with various factors in order to maximise their payoffs or minimise their 
losses. 
 
For the Administration with its constitutional powers, strategies were 
adopted to manipulate policy changes in order to retain control over heritage 
policy. Because of media pressure, the Administration also tried to address 
the issues highlighted by news coverage. However, as policy did not change 
in accordance with coverage, the media effect on policy was actually limited. 
This argument is supported by the following examples. Firstly, when the 
consultation on heritage was launched, the government claimed that 
people’s ‘collective memory’ would be taken into account. However, the 
Administration claimed that the application of ‘collective memory’ within 
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heritage policy depended on the results of consultation.41. In this case, there 
was still room for the Administration to manipulate the amendment of 
heritage policy. More importantly, the Administration did not change the 
standards of monuments when the debate on the OSFP had faded out. In 
other words, the consultation was merely a gesture rather than a concrete 
policy change.  
 
Secondly, although the CE claimed that the QP would be preserved, 
the Administration did not give up its demolition plan. Actually, what the 
CE promised was to reconstruct the pier at a suitable site only42. In other 
words, the QP demolition plan continued. Thirdly, despite the structural 
reform and personnel changes, the terms of reference of the AAB remained 
unchanged. Neither did the Administration take the AAB’s decision 
seriously. On 9 May 2007, the QP was assessed as a Grade I historic 
building (the highest status monument) by the new AAB43. On the same day, 
in response to the AAB’s decision, the Administration claimed that a Grade 
I building did not require preservation, repeatedly stressing that in-situ 
preservation of the QP was impossible44. Thus, the adjustment of the QP 
demolition plan did not really change the project. Neither was there any 
actual change to the AAB power of influence over heritage policy.      
 
The other strategy of the Administration was to create irreversible 
accomplished facts. While some legislators at a PLW Panel meeting urged 
the Administration to suspend the demolition work, the Administration 
dismantled the clock tower rapidly, bringing irreparable damage to the 
OSFP. Although the criticisms by the media became even stronger the 
following week, critical coverage gradually faded out. In this case, rapid 
demolition work could be considered as a strategy to remove the subject of 
debate before the Legco and the media placed further pressure on the 
Administration. Thus, it can be argued that there was potential media effect.  
                                               
41 MPDN, 9 May 2007, page A04. 
42 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
43 The Administration’s press release: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/09/P200705090272.htm 
44 Press release on the Speech by SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/09/P200705090294.htm 
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In addition to the policy outcomes, the timing of announcing new 
policies were also controlled by the Administration. As mentioned above, in 
the ‘gap period’ between the peaks of sustained critical coverage, no policy 
change was launched by the Administration. However, on 12 December 
2006, when the media questioned the government on covering up the survey 
report against the demolition of the OSFP, the demolition work commenced. 
On the same day, the Administration revealed to the press that the existing 
heritage policy was under review45 . It is reasonable to suggest that the 
Administration had prepared its change of policy before 12 December. 
When pressure was created by the media and other parties, the 
Administration disclosed the policy initiative in order to counteract the 
criticisms immediately. Similarly, in the day prior to the protest on 24 
December 2006, the AAB reform and changes to the QP demolition plan 
were announced. In this case, it can be argued that the Administration tried 
to counteract the opponents before the protest.  
 
Not only the Administration, but also pro-government legislators 
adopted strategies to protect their interests. As most coverage criticised the 
demolition plan, the pro-government camp adopted strategies to cover up 
their support of the demolition plan. At most of the Legco meetings 
concerning the OSFP, most pro-government legislators kept silent. Their 
silence could be considered as a strategy to avoid being criticised by the 
media. This argument was confirmed by Jasper Tsang (interview on 17 
January 2008). In this case, the media prohibited the actors’ expression of 
their opinions. 
 
The rejection of the funding request for the CKR also demonstrated 
the opposition’s strategy. As mentioned above, there was no formal channel 
for the legislators to change the demolition plan under implementation. 
What the democrats could change was the projects to be approved by the 
Legco. In this case, the pro-democrat legislators, together with Chan Yuen-
han, voted against the funding request for other similar development 
projects in order to put pressure on the Administration. As the news framing 
                                               
45 MPDN, 13 Dec 2006, page A02 
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remained negative at that time, it can be argued that the opponents’ 
confidence in rejecting funding requests was reinforced by the media. 
 
The other strategy adopted by the democrats was to combine their 
actions in the Legco with the protests in order to magnify pressure on the 
Administration. Thus, the democrats’ initiation of Legco agenda changes 
was based on their strategies. In these circumstances, critical coverage 
legitimised the democrats’ actions, reinforcing their confidence in their 
campaigns. 
 
In a nutshell, political actors, within their institutional positions, 
adopted strategies to maximise their payoffs. With its institutional 
advantage, the Administration manipulated and packaged policy change in 
order to persist on the demolition plan and to retain control over heritage 
policy. In the meantime, the pro-government camp concealed their positions 
to avoid being criticised by the media. Being legitimised through critical 
coverage, the democrats combined their action in the Legco with protests 
and rejected other development projects in order to place further pressure on 
the Administration.          
 
5.7 Long-term Policy Image 
As mentioned in the other three cases, the Administration’s 
sensitivity to the negative coverage might be associated with long-term 
public understanding of an issue. In the case of the OSFP, as mentioned 
above, there was extremely limited discussion on the demolition plans 
before July 2006. Moreover, the OSFP debate lasted only for around 6 
months. From this perspective, there was no long-term image of the OSFP. 
This factor was thus not taken into account.       
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, despite the high level of policy certainty measured by 
elite consensus and policy stage, process tracing showed that critical 
coverage was an influential factor for policy change during the OSFP debate. 
Since the hypotheses of this study were not supported, I examined other 
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possible factors for political actors’ actions and inactions in order to provide 
a better account of the policy outcomes. These factors included institutions, 
ideas, public mood, mass movements, election cycle and strategies of actors.  
 
The campaign for conservation was triggered by the SEE Network’s 
ideas, which were reinforced by the group’s perceptions of news coverage. 
However, news coverage was unlikely to have been an influence on the 
actors of the Administration and legislators’ action before the three selected 
newspaper started running the first peak of critical coverage in November 
2006. The two Legco agenda changes initiated by pro-democrat legislators 
in August and September 2006 were mainly influenced by their oppositional 
political stances and the strategy to put pressure on the Administration.     
 
Since the first peak of sustained critical coverage in November 2006, 
the media played a relatively significant role. Reinterpreting the large-scale 
gathering of the public at the OSFP closing ceremony, the coverage 
criticised the demolition plans and existing policy. The media also treated 
the protesters sympathetically and highlighted the voices against the 
demolition plan, consequently, placing high pressure on the Administration 
and reinforcing the opponents’ confidence in their campaigns. With the 
support of critical coverage, the democrats requested an adjournment debate 
on the OSFP and rejected the funding request for other projects to magnify 
pressure on the Administration.  
 
On the other hand, because of the critical coverage and the change in 
the democrats’ views, the fiscal and political costs for reconsidering the 
existing projects became high. In this circumstance, with its institutional 
advantage and favourable public attitudes, the Administration manipulated 
the policy changes in order to minimise its losses and to settle the 
controversy before the CE election. Thus, the Administration worked 
against critical coverage, rapidly dismantling the Star Ferry clock tower. 
Further initiatives, including changes to the QP demolition, AAB reform 
and re-consultations on heritage policy, were announced to counteract the 
protests against the demolition plans. During the CE election, the CE also 
proposed the creation of a new bureau to address heritage issues. 
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Nevertheless, as the changes in those policies were limited, the 
Administration in fact retained overwhelming control over heritage policy..  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, as summarised in Table 13.4, 
policy outcomes resulted from the co-existence and interaction of various 
factors. News coverage was only one of these factors, while its influence 
varied from different positions of political actors and different cases.     
 
Table 13.4: Factors affecting Policy Changes during the OSFP Debate 
Possible influential factors Date Policy change 
Institutional factors 
Ideas / B
eliefs 
Short term
 public m
ood 
M
ass M
ovem
ents 
E
lection C
ycles 
Strategies 
Media effect 
10/8/2006 KWOK Ka-ki’s request for 
the PLW Panel 
 √    √ Not necessary 
20/9//2006 The PLW Panel’s motion 
demanding the deferral of 
the demolition of the OSFP 
 √    √ Not necessary 
12/12/2006 AAB’s urgent meeting     √  Potential effect 
13/12/2006 Disclosure of the 
Administration’s review of 
heritage policy. 
    √ √ Potential effect 
13/12/2006 Legco’s adjournment 
debate on OSFP issues 
√ √  √  √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas 
16/12/2006 Acceleration of demolition 
of the clock tower 
√  √  √ √ Potential effect/ 
increasing cost 
of change 
19/12/2006 The Legco’s rejection of 
the funding request for the 
CKR 
√ √    √ Reinforcing 
opponents’ 
ideas 
19/12/2006 Disclosure of the plan of re-
consultation of heritage 
policy 
√    √ √ Potential effect 
23/12/2006 Disclosure of the plan to 
reform AAB 
√   √ √ √ Potential effect 
23/12/2006 Announcement of the 
change in the relocation of 
the QP 
√   √ √ √ Potential effect/ 
increasing cost 
of change 
3/2/2007 CE’s proposal to create a 
Development Bureau.  
√    √ √ Potential effect 
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Chapter 14 
Analysis of In-depth Interview Data 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter summarises the data derived from in-depth interviews 
with policymakers and journalists. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the objective 
of elite interviews is to explore the key actor’s mind-set (Richards, 
1996:199-200) and to understand the logic of an interviewee’s arguments 
that led them to particular conclusions (Devine, 1995:138). In order to 
explore the relations between news coverage and various factors, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with two government officials, 14 
policymakers and four journalists. The interviews mainly focused on a range 
of aspects, including considerations during policy making; policymakers’ 
channels to learn about public opinion; the understanding the relation 
between news coverage and public views and possible influences on 
policymakers’ decisions.  
 
In order to examine the difference in media influence on actors with 
different institutional positions, interviewees are basically divided into three 
groups, namely the Administration, including government officials and 
Exco members, legislators including those belonging to pro-government and 
pro-democrat camps, and journalists.   
 
2. Considerations during Policy Making  
2.1 The Administration 
As mentioned in the case of Central reclamation, when explaining 
his considerations in the case of the CRIII and SFP, Michael Suen, the 
Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands (2002-2007) emphasised the 
institutional constraints on the Administration, including the decision 
making processes, past decisions and existing policy. In addition, Suen 
stressed other institutional factors, i.e., the legal debate on the PHO. Suen 
stressed that the continuation of the reclamation project should be decided 
according to the court ruling. This was the reason why the Administration 
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resumed repairable work in the harbour only before the FCA delivered its 
judgment (interview on 22 January 2008).  
 
In addition to institutional factors, both the pro-government and pro-
democrat camps claimed that the Administration took people’s views into 
account, although the CE and the principle officials are not returned by 
universal suffrage. As mentioned in the case of the GST debate, the DAB 
Chairman and Exco member Jasper Tsang said that the Administration had 
to consider the popularity of the pro-government camp in order to maintain 
support of the Administration in the Legco in the DCs (interview on 17 
January 2008). In addition to the views of pro-government voters, those of 
floating voters are also important. According to the DP Vice-Chairman Sin 
Chung-kai, it is difficult for the government to lobby the core supporters of 
the pro-democrat camp. Thus, in his experience, the Administration usually 
tries to rope in floating voters to support government policy during a policy 
debate (interview on 11 November 2008).  
 
2. Legislators 
The considerations highlighted by politicians are different from 
those of the Administration. All the 12 members of the Legco and the Exco 
interviewed claimed that many factors were taken into account during policy 
making. These factors included overall interests within society and the 
feasibility of proposals. However, 10 of these politicians claimed that their 
chief considerations were associated with their belief systems. Belief 
systems may vary between individuals even in the same party. For example, 
Jasper Tsang said that the DAB was concerned about the interests of the 
grassroots population and those of disadvantaged groups (interview on 17 
January 2008), while another DAB member, Choy So-yuk, described her 
belief system as ‘something good and close to her heart’ which referred to 
environmental protection and heritage conservation (interview on 21 May 
2007). 
 
Nevertheless, politicians in the same political camp have similar 
beliefs. The pro-government politicians usually intend to support the PRC 
and SAR Governments. As President of the FTU, Cheng Yiu-tong said, 
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‘Fundamentally, the so-called political stance is the attitude towards China. 
In this case, we have a very clear position. We promote and support 
patriotism (interview on 2 January 2008).’ Jasper Tsang also claimed that 
the DAB’s beliefs included support for the principles of the Basic Law and 
the RPC Government’s policy on Hong Kong. This belief influences the 
party’s position during policy debate. He said:  
We are naturally born pro-establishment. We usually listen to 
the government’s explanations. There is a difference 
(between pro-government and the pro-democrat camps). The 
other side (the pro-democrat camp) is ‘presumes guilt’. They 
usually presume that there are problems with government 
proposals when they study policy. (Interview on 17 January 
2008) 
 
For the pro-democrat camp, the values of human rights and 
democracy are usually highlighted. Lee Wing-tat of the DP claimed that the 
‘public interest’ was the most important account. Public interests, according 
to the party’s belief, include the core values of democracy and rule of law, 
as well as the interests of the middle and lower classes (interview on 23 
January 2008). Alan Leong of the CP also emphasised that his beliefs in 
democracy, freedom and the rule of law were extremely important to his 
decisions during policy debates (interview on 28 November 2008). This 
finding is consistent with Sabatier’s (1998) argument that beliefs function as 
‘glue’ inside a coalition. 
 
The other important consideration highlighted by politicians is 
public opinion. Of the 12 politicians interviewed, seven ranked it as the 
second most important factor in policy making. A pro-democrat legislator, 
Kwok Ka-ki even ranked public views as his chief consideration (interview 
on 30 January 2008). Nevertheless, politicians are particularly concerned 
with their supporters’ views. For example, Jasper Tsang claimed that the 
DAB should consider the views of its loyal supporters, who were mainly 
people from the pro-government grassroots. Although sometimes the DAB 
tried to adjust its position in order to win the support of other people, the 
party usually worried that changes would be criticised by their existing 
supporters. He claimed: 
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We always claim that we support the Government’s right 
policy and criticise its faults, and that we do not support the 
Government in a blind way. In most circumstances, however, 
it is difficult to lift the constraints on us. We call it ‘20-80 
dilemma’. About 20% of people are our most loyal 
supporters. If we draw ourselves close to the other 80% of 
people, we may lose our existing 20%, while we are not sure 
if we can gain the support of those 80% of people. (Interview 
with on 17 January 2008) 
 
In addition, as mentioned in the case of the OSFP, the DAB’s 
supporters resisted the party’s cooperation with people from the other 
political camp (ibid.). In this sense, the voters’ views influence not only the 
DAB’s position on an issue, but also the party’s relations with other political 
actors.  
 
Pro-democrat politicians also paid particular attention to their 
supporters’ views. Lee Wing-tat of DP said that the interpretation of 
people’s views was associated with their understanding of the public interest. 
Since the DP mainly focuses on the interests of the middle and lower classes, 
the views of those groups are given relatively more importance (interview 
on 23 January 2008). The DP Vice-Chairman Sin Chung-kai also claimed 
that, as a political party, the DP ought to consider its supporters’ views. 
According to Sin, during elections, the DP has about 25% of supporters in 
each geographical constituency, while the DAB received around 20%. Of all 
the voters, about 30% are the core supporters of the pro-democrat camp, 
while 25% are pro-government supporters. The remaining 40% are floating 
voters whose positions vary from issue to issue. As it is difficult for the pro-
democrat camp to change the views of pro-government voters, the DP 
usually targets pro-democrat supporters and floating voters (interview on 11 
November 2008).  
 
However, the influence of politicians’ beliefs and people’s views 
vary from case to case. As Jasper Tsang stated, sometimes there were 
conflicts between the DAB’s beliefs and the supporters’ views. However, he 
could not decide which of these was the chief consideration, as it depended 
on the level of conflict (interview on 17 January 2008). For the DP, the 
weighting of the party’s beliefs and people’s views also varies from issue to 
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issue. According to Sin Chung-Kai, the party’s core value system is a 
crucial consideration in debates on political issues: He stated: 
In the debate on political issues relating to democracy, 
human rights and rule of law, the party’s value system is an 
overwhelming factor. For example, when the NCPSC 
interpreted the Basic Law1, we worked against public opinion. 
Our value system is overwhelmingly important regardless of 
public views in this case. By contrast, some social policy 
issues such as the demolition of the OSFP are irrelevant to 
our values. In these circumstances, we tactically take 
people’s views into account and compromise. However, we 
never compromise in issues concerning our value system 
(Interview with Sin Chung-Kai on 11 November 2008) 
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I suggest that the 
Administration mainly focuses on institutional factors while legislators 
consider their beliefs as the most important factor affecting policy making. 
Each of the political camps also pays particular attention to the views of its 
supporters in order to maintain their seats in the Legco and DCs. However, 
the relative weighting of these two factors varies from case to case. When 
the issue is directly associated with core values, politicians tend to insist on 
their ideas regardless of supporters’ views. By contrast, politicians can deal 
with people’s views tactically and adjust their positions on issues irrelevant 
to their core values.  
 
3. How do policymakers learn about people’s views?  
3.1 The Administration and the Pro-government Parties 
As public opinion is one of the considerations of politicians, it is 
worth studying how policymakers learn about the views of the public or 
their voters. According to an off-the-record briefing by a government 
                                               
1 The debate on the rights of abode started in July 1997 when some Hong Kong residents’ 
children born in mainland China claimed their rights of residency in Hong Kong according 
to Articles 22 and 24 of the Basic Law. In January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) 
delivered its ruling, entitling such people born outside of Hong Kong to the right of abode. 
In late April 1999, the SAR Government estimated the migration figure from the mainland 
to be 1.67 million, subsequently asking the NPCSC to re-interpret Articles 22 and 24 to 
overturn the CFA judgment. In June 1999, the NPCSC issued its interpretation, specifying 
that children born outside Hong Kong will only be eligible for the right of abode if at least 
one of their parents had already acquired permanent residence status at the time of their 
birth, and that such people are required to apply on the mainland for an exit permit. This 
interpretation was welcomed by the public generally as it revoked the abode rights for 
1.5million migrants from the mainland. However, the democrats, the Bar Association and 
some legal professionals criticised the fact that the interpretation undermined the rule of 
law and the autonomy of Hong Kong. 
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official, during a policy debate, the Administration usually carries out an 
opinion poll, studying general public views for reference (briefing by an 
official on 22 January 2008). Thus, it is believed that opinion polls are an 
important channel for the Administration to learn about public views.    
 
In addition, Exco members and their parties also help to collect 
public opinions. An Exco member and legislator Bernard Chan claimed that 
he gathers information on people’s views mainly from his personal network. 
He said:  
It is easy to see the people who oppose you. There are 
numerous email messages and people (groups) seeking 
appointments with you. However, it is difficult to hear the 
supportive voices of the silent mass. Fortunately, I have a big 
network. Thus, I can listen to various groups…I come from 
the business sector where I have many friends. As the 
Chairman of the Hong Kong Council of Social Service2, I 
can hear the voices of non-government organisations and the 
grassroots. I also serve as the Chairman of some foreign 
chambers of commerce from which I can get to know about 
views of foreign countries. (Interview with on 6 November 
2008). 
 
The other two Exco members stressed that they mainly rely on their 
parties’ community networks through which parties keep direct contacts 
with voters. According to Jasper Tsang, through the 120 offices in various 
regions, the DAB organised various activities in the communities, getting a 
sense of their supporters’ views through direct contact. Tsang also spends a 
great deal of time in his constituency, communicating with his voters via 
direct contact (interview on 17 January 2008). Selina Chow of the LP also 
highlighted the importance of her party’ community networks: She claimed: 
At community level, we have District Councilors and district 
officers. If they find people are concerned about an issue, 
they will report it to us. If we have some important proposals, 
our members in the communities can ‘take the pulse’ (test 
people’s response). (Interview on 16 January 2008). 
 
The other two pro-government legislators, Choy So-yuk of the DAB 
(interview on 21 May 2007) and Chan Yuen-han of the FTU also claimed 
that  direct contact with voters in the communities was the most important 
                                               
2 The Council is an umbrella organisation of over 350 non-governmental welfare agencies 
that provide over 90% of  social welfare services in Hong Kong    
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way to learn people’s views (interview on 23 May 2007). In this sense, the 
personal and party networks in the community were the main channels used 
by pro-government politicians.  
 
3.2 The Pro-democrat Camp 
The pro-democrat camp also learnt about people’s views the similar 
ways. Lee Wing-tat of the DP highlighted the role of opinion polls. 
According to Lee, the party has been conducting monthly tracking surveys 
for over 10 years, studying the general public’s views on the party and other 
issues. The party also pays attention to opinion polls conducted by other 
parties and academic institutes. Meanwhile, Lee claimed that the community 
network was also important to the party. Through various community 
activities, party members get a sense of its supporters’ views (interview on 
23 January 2008).     
 
Sin Chung-kai of the DP claimed that the party could sense its 
popularity directly when it raised funds in the street. However, it was 
relatively difficult to learn about people’s views on the DP’s position on a 
specific issue. In this case, the party could gauge its supporters’ views by 
gut feeling only. This was ‘qualitative judgment’ rather than a scientific and 
quantitative judgment, although opinion poll and the community network 
could help to some extent (interview on 11 November 2008). The other pro-
democrat legislator, Kwok Ka Ki, also said that public opinion was at times 
not clear.  In this case, he had to use guess work based on by common sense 
and experience (interview on 30 January 2008). 
 
The size of a constituency also influences how politicians learn 
about their voters’ views. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Legco in Hong 
Kong is composed of types of legislators. One is returned to power by 
geographical constituencies (GCs), each with a few hundred thousand voters. 
Another group of legislators is returned by various functional constituencies 
(FCs) which are mainly business and professional sectors with a limited 
number of voters. Before 2004, Selina Chow was returned by the FC for 
wholesale and retail, which consisted of about 4000 voters, mainly business 
owners. In 2004, she was returned by the GC of the New Territories West 
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with over 900 thousand of voters. In Chow’s experience, it is relatively easy 
for the FC legislators to reach their voters: 
As a directly elected legislator (legislator returned by the 
GC), I am relatively more anxious about media coverage. 
The media’s influence covers a majority of the public. The 
role of the media is important in this case. For FC, we focus 
on other aspects (the interests of the sector). We also have 
alternative ways to reach our voters. However, it is difficult 
to reach voters in the GC…We completely rely on the mass 
media in this case. But for FC, it is much easier to 
communicate with the voters, explaining your position 
(interview on 16 January 2008). 
 
Tam Yiu-chung of the DAB had similar views, claiming that the FC 
legislators usually have channels for maintaining contact with their voters 
(interview on 16 January 2008). In this sense, because of the limited 
numbers of voters, legislators returned by the FC can bypass the media and 
communicate with most of the voters directly.  
 
In short, regardless of institutional position, policymakers learn 
about people’s opinions in similar ways, namely opinion poll, community 
network and personal network. Of these, community network and personal 
network are particularly important. This is because, as mentioned above, 
politicians tend to pay high levels of attention to their supporters’ views. 
Through community and personal networks, politicians can identify their 
target voters, learning about their views. In this case, I suggest that the 
compact living environment in Hong Kong is important as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. Although there are a few hundred thousand voters in each GC, 
population density is extremely high. Because of this, politicians can have 
frequent direct contact with their voters in the community. For legislators 
returned by FCs, direct contact is even easier because of the limited number 
of voters.  
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4. Policymakers’ Understanding of Media-Public Opinion 
Relations  
4.1 The Administration  
Policymakers stress the importance of people’s views, while, as 
mentioned in the case of Article 23, they also believe that people’s views 
may be influenced by news coverage. Thus, this section explores 
policymakers’ understanding of the relations between news coverage and 
public opinion.   
 
In an off-the-record briefing, an official claimed that the 
Administration conducted an analysis of the all the newspapers during 
policy debates, counting the articles with various types of framing. However, 
government officials did not think that the news coverage represented public 
opinion. Neither did they believe that all the media could influence their 
readers. This official claimed that most readers of popular newspapers did 
not take news coverage seriously. Thus, the influential power of these 
papers was limited. By contrast, elitist papers were relatively influential as 
their readers were mainly intellectuals who took news coverage seriously. In 
this sense, for the Administration, the popular papers such as the ADN and 
ODN are less important than the elitist papers such as the MPDN (briefing 
by an official on 22 January 2008). 
 
This finding was further evidenced by interviews with journalists. 
Journalist A claimed that government officials usually made a great effort to 
lobby the MPDN as they believed it was an influential newspaper. On the 
contrary, Journalist A felt that government officials did not have great 
expectations of the ODN as the paper was grassroots (interview on 29 
January 2008). Journalist C also felt that some officials were reluctant to 
take criticisms by the ADN seriously. She claimed that because of the poor 
relationships between the owner of the ADN and the PRC Government, 
some Hong Kong officials even avoided having any contact with this paper 
(interview on 30 January 2008). From this perspective, I suggest that 
government officials consider news coverage as an influential factor in 
public views. Thus, the officials pay relatively high levels of attention to 
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and a great deal o f effort lobbying elitist papers, which are considered 
relatively influential. 
 
 The Exco members also highlighted the media’s influence on 
people’s views and expressed their doubts about the representative role of 
the media. When asked if media coverage was a channel to learn about 
people’s views, Jasper Tsang claimed that the DAB analysed the framing of 
news coverage of the party and its legislators. In his view, this analysis only 
helped the DAB understand the general public’s attitudes to the party and its 
members. However, this analysis could not help the party learn about its 
supporters’ views (interview on 17 January 2008).  
 
The other Exco member, Selina Chow, regarded the media as one of 
the channels for learning about public opinion. However, she did not think 
that media coverage reflected public views. Rather, she believed that only 
some of the public’s views were highlighted by the media, and that people’s 
views could be influenced by media coverage (interview on 16 January 
2008). The other Exco member, Cheng Yiu-tong, had the similar views, 
claiming that it was the media that overturned opinions during the debate on 
Article 23 legislation (interview on 2 January 2008).  
 
4.2 The Legislators 
The other pro-government legislators, Choy So-yuk of DAB 
(interview on 21 May 2007) and Chan Yuen-han of the FTU said that the 
media coverage was an important channel for them to get a sense of public 
views. However, both of them recognised the limitations of the media and 
emphasised the importance of direct contact with people. Chan also claimed 
that different newspapers reflected different sections within public opinion. 
Thus, she had to read all the newspapers in order to learn about all aspects 
of public opinion (interview on 23 May 2007).  
  
Despite the different institutional positions, the pro-democrat camp 
also doubted the representative role of the media. Being asked if the 
coverage reflected public opinion, Lee Wing-tat of DP said:  
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Each newspaper has its tendency which is reflected by photos, 
editorials and sidebar stories…If you read the news without 
an analytical mind, this will make you panic. Over some very 
controversial issues, the headline of the papers may be very 
critical of us. But we do not worry (interview on 23 January 
2008). 
 
In other words, Lee believed that the media expressed their own political 
views during policy debates. In this case, he did not tend to learn about 
public opinion from the media.  
 
While considering media coverage as a way of learning about public 
views, Alan Leong of the CP also stressed that direct contact with people is 
equally important:  
It is difficult to say which one is more important. They can 
help each other. If I read newspapers only, I have no sense of 
real life. When we meet up, we have face-to-face contact 
with people, hearing their voices, seeing their faces. They 
(media coverage and direct contact with people) confirm 
each other. I would confirm my experience based on the 
newspaper through face-to-face experience with people… I 
would not consider the message from the press as the whole 
of the fact. (Interview on 28 November 2008). 
 
Taking all of these aspects into account, most politicians and the 
Administration do not simply get a sense of public opinion from media 
coverage. This is because they all understand that news framing is 
influenced by the news organisation’s political views. However, media 
coverage is important to politicians because some of them believe that 
coverage may influence public views. The Administration has similar 
considerations. However, the officials believe that the power to influence 
varies from newspaper to newspaper. As the Administration believes that 
elitist newspapers are relatively more influential than popular newspapers, 
government officials pay relatively higher levels of attention to elitist papers.      
 
5. Media Influence on Policymakers 
5.1 The Administration 
As mentioned above, none of the interviewees consider news 
coverage as a major consideration during policy making. Neither do they 
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recognise the representative role of the media. Nevertheless, these findings 
do not completely exclude the role of news coverage during policy making.  
 
Being asked whether he had experienced of being influenced by the 
media, Michael Suen said: 
I will not say no. However, the media is not the only 
consideration. (Could you specify?) Sometimes, the media 
raise issues we ignore. If we agree with them, we will take 
this in into account. In some circumstances, I believe ‘all 
roads lead to Rome’. If the media suggest an alternative 
which will result in a better outcome, a smoother process and 
higher levels of acceptance by people, we will accept it. 
 
Nevertheless, Suen immediately added: ‘But in some cases, we have no 
choice. We either do it or not. There is no alternative in between’ (interview 
on 22 January 2008). 
 
From this perspective, although Suen did not deny the media’s 
influence on his decision, he tried to downplay the role of media. In his 
view, the media effect was limited for at least two reasons. First, numerous 
factors were taken into account during decision making with media 
coverage as only one of these considerations. Second, the nature of the 
policy limited the available alternatives. Although government officials 
became aware of opinions from media coverage, there is no room to adjust 
policy. 
 
Furthermore, according to an off-the-record briefing by an official, 
during the controversy over an issue, the Administration usually conducts a 
content analysis of all newspapers, counting all the supportive and critical 
coverage concerned. However, officials do not apply the data systematically 
during decision making. Rather, data is used for reference only. In this 
circumstance, the media’s influence on officials’ decisions is limited 
(briefing on 22 January 2008). 
 
Two Exco members, Cheng Yiu-Tong (interview on 2 January 2008) 
and Selina Chow also denied the media’s influence on themselves, saying 
that they never changed their ideas because of media coverage. Chow even 
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stressed that, to a certain extent, she tried her best to avoid being influenced 
by critical coverage although she acknowledged that the media could 
influence public views. Rather, Chow claimed that she always lobbied the 
media when there was conflict between media coverage and her ideas 
(interview on 16 January 2008).    
 
The other two Exco members admitted the possible influence of 
media coverage on their ideas. However, this influence was limited. Bernard 
Chan claimed that the media’s influence on his ideas was possible, but he 
never changed his position on a policy proposal because of news coverage 
(interview on 6 November 2008). Jasper Tsang also said that media pressure 
reflected public pressure, affecting the government in some circumstances. 
He believed that the deferral of the launch of some policy proposals was due 
to critical media coverage. However, Tsang could not find any examples of 
high cost policy change. Moreover, during the debates on the CRIII, SFP, 
Article 23 legislation, Tsang claimed that the DAB only adjusted their 
arguments and strategy under media pressure. However, the party never 
changed its positions on these issues (interview on 17 January 2008). 
 
5.2 The Legislators 
Not all pro-government legislators are reluctant to confirm media 
influence. As shown in the process tracing of the case studies, some non-
core members of the pro-government camp changed their positions after 
critical coverage was run even though they denied media effect on 
themselves. Chan Yuen-han of the FTU (interview on 23 May 2007) and 
Choy So-yuk of the DAB (interview on 21 May 2007) stated that they never 
changed their ideas because of media’s influence. However, process tracing 
showed that Choy had never expressed her objections to the CRIII and the 
demolition of the OSPF before there was negative coverage concerned. 
According to the minutes of the Legco, Chan changed her position from 
‘preserving the characteristics of the pier’ to ‘preserving the pier’ after 
substantial critical coverage was run. Thus, media influence on Chan and 
Choy’s positions was possible. In this sense, these two non-core members of 
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the pro-government camp are relatively less reluctant to be influenced by 
the media.      
 
Unlike the Administration and pro-government politicians, the pro-
democratic legislators highlighted the relations between media coverage and 
their actions, although they all denied immediate and drastic media effect on 
their own positions. The former DP Chairman Lee Wing-tat said that his 
party never changed its position because of the media because a political 
party needed to be consistent over its political stance. In his experience, the 
DP refined its position after being confronted by various factors including 
knowledge, world experience, views from academics and their friends, 
public opinions and the media. However, Lee stressed that it was long-term 
change which took place over years. In addition, the media was only one of 
the factors in such change (interview on 23 January 2008).     
 
However, according to Lee, the DP’s launch of a campaign was 
usually associated with news coverage. Proactively monitoring news 
coverage of all the newspapers everyday, Lee claimed that he had a scope in 
his mind. Sometimes an issue was ignored by his party but was on his 
‘radar’, which means that he was particularly sensitive to some issues. 
According to Lee, the party even had a well established mechanism for 
following the issue. Once he had become aware of some significant issues 
raised by the media, he would consider further actions, including discussion 
of strategy, objectives and the division of labour at the weekly meeting of 
the party’s legislators or urgent phone meeting, assigning the person in 
charge who monitors the development of the issue. Being asked what 
actions would be taken in these circumstances, Lee said: 
We would take actions both inside and outside the Legco. If 
we rely on the debate in the Legco only, we will lose. For 
example, during the debates on Article 23, we not only attend 
Legco meetings, but also organised other campaigns outside 
the Legco (interview on 23 January 2008). 
 
The other DP legislator, James To also claimed that dramatic 
changes in his position were unlikely to be the result of media coverage. 
However, his ideas might be adjusted gradually after being confronted by 
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the media. He described this process as a ‘continuous daily interaction 
between his ideas and the media’. For example, he opposed the 
Administration’s proposal for the development of a ‘super-scale prison’ at 
the beginning. However, when the media highlighted the economic 
efficiency and the safety of a large-scale prison, he adjusted his position, 
later, supporting a medium size prison. In his view, the media’s support was 
necessary to the promotion of an idea. Thus, he regarded some journalists as 
members of his ‘opinion system’, which was a personal network composed 
of a few dozen friends. Through direct discussion with these journalists at 
various levels, he not only refined his views, but also tested whether an idea 
was supported by the media (interview on 31 January 2008). 
 
Sin Chung-kai of the DP claimed that there was a ‘positive 
reinforcement’ or ‘trial and error’ relationship between media coverage and 
the party’s actions. According to Sin, when the media picked up an issue as 
a headline story, the party would monitor radio phone-in programmes. If the 
phone-in programmes also focused on the issue, the party would conduct a 
opinion poll. A petition or protest might be launched. Taking the issue of 
Lehman Brothers minibond3 as an example, Sin described the process of 
positive reinforcement: 
When those investors called us to seek for an appointment, 
we asked them to come to our office. Actually those people 
just wanted the legislators’ help. The next day, when we met 
the representatives of the Securities and Futures Commission, 
about 100 investors joined us. Meanwhile, all the TV stations 
came and used this meeting as a headline. This alerted us to 
the significance of this issue. That was a positive 
reinforcement. During the meeting, the investors made a lot 
of complaints (about the distributors of the minibond). When 
they demanded a protest, we organised it for them the next 
day. Subsequently, there was further substantial 
coverage…After the media had run substantial coverage for 
two days, we began to conduct an opinion poll. That was a 
process of trial and error (Interview on 11 November 2008).  
 
The other independent pro-democrat legislator, Kwok Ka-ki also 
emphasised the connection between media coverage and street campaigns. 
                                               
3 Minibond was a synthetic derivative product issued by Lehman Brothers Holdings Ltd. 
This product was sold through distributors, including banks, to individual investors. When 
Lehman went bankrupt in 2008, the value of minibonds dropped dramatically. 
Subsequently, minibond buyers complained about the mis-selling of the distributors.   
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As mentioned in the case of Central reclamation, he launched a series of 
anti-reclamation protests only when he perceived a substantial quantity of 
critical coverage (interview on 30 January 2008).  
 
In this sense, there was a positive reinforcement relation between 
news coverage and the pro-democrat camp’s campaigns. Democrats tend to 
intensify their voices and launch campaigns against government policy only 
when they perceive substantial critical coverage. At the same time, these 
campaigns provide an opportunity for the media to run further coverage of 
the issue, encouraging the democrats’ campaigns. In this process, democrats 
not only reinforce their ideas, but also adjust their strategy according to 
news coverage. 
 
5.3 Journalists  
All the four journalists interviewed claimed that they hope to 
‘resolve problems’ or ‘influence government policy’. Journalist A claimed 
that the MPDM had strong ‘sense of justice’. Thus, the newspaper usually 
uses many direct comments and opinions of professionals and academics, 
and expects that politicians and officials to take these into account. 
Journalist C also claims that when she uncovered a problem, she expected 
that the government considered the criticisms in the news articles and 
resolved the problem. Journalist B of the ODN made similar considerations, 
although he believed that the media’s influence on governments varied from 
case to case. Moreover, all four journalists said that they usually received 
verbal responses from legislators, which means that they pay attention to 
coverage. However, all four journalists did not know if legislators 
considered comments from news coverage during policy making. It was also 
unknown whether government officials paid attention to coverage as 
government officials’ direct response to all these three newspapers was rare 
(interview with Journalist A on 29 January 2008; Journalist B on 30 January 
2008; Journalist C on 30 January 2008; Journalist D on 10 February 2008). 
In this sense, although all the journalists aim to influence government policy, 
the actual influence remains unknown.   
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In short, comparing the various groups of key actors interviewed, I 
suggest the response to media coverage varies according to institutional 
position. Although journalists aim to influence government policy, the 
Administration and the core members (Exco members) of the pro-
government camp are relatively reluctant as regards media influence. 
Although some of them admit possible media influence on them, they only 
adjust their arguments or strategy under pressure of critical coverage. 
 
By contrast, the influence on some other politicians is relatively 
significant. There is evidence showing that the two non-core pro-
government legislators changed their positions after critical coverage was 
run. For the pro-democrat camp, there was also a positive reinforcement 
relation between critical coverage and actions taken against existing policy. 
When perceiving a substantial quantity of critical coverage, the pro-
democrat camp will take the opportunity, initiating agenda change in the 
Legco and launching social campaigns outside the Legco. This provides 
opportunities for the media to run further critical coverage. Pressure on the 
Administration is thus magnified.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In short, the data derived from in-depth interview shows that there 
are differences between the government officials and politicians during 
policy making. Government officials mainly focus on institutional factors, 
including past decisions, legal constraints and bureaucratic procedures in 
decision making, although the popularity of the pro-government parties is 
taken into account. On the other hand, regardless of political tendency, 
politicians highlighted their belief systems and the views of their supporters 
as being crucial. The weighting of these two factors varies from case to case. 
When an issue is related to politicians’ core value systems, they tend to 
persist with their beliefs regardless of people’s views. By contrast, 
politicians take people’s views on board in tactical ways and compromise if 
an issue is irrelevant to their core values.    
 
Since policymakers usually focus on their beliefs and supporter’s 
views during a policy debate, the media’s influence on policymakers is 
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weakened for four reasons. Firstly, media coverage is not a main 
consideration for policymakers. During policy making, there are some more 
important considerations, including beliefs and peoples’ views. Secondly, 
politicians get a sense of people’s views through many channels, including 
opinion polls, community and personal networks, and direct responses such 
as e-mail and phone calls from people. News coverage is only one of these 
channels. Thirdly, politicians mainly focus on their own supporters’ views 
rather than on general public opinion. The media cannot help politicians 
assess their supporters’ views. Rather, community and personal networks 
are relatively effective channels to reach their supporters, although 
assessment through these channels may be biased and unsystematic. Finally, 
although government officials and politicians take general public views as 
reference, they do not believe that news coverage represents public views. 
Rather, in the views of officials and politicians, news framing is associated 
with the newspaper’s political tendency.  
 
Despite all of this, the role of the media is not completely eliminated 
as news coverage is one consideration of policymakers during policy debate. 
Because of the different understandings of the media’s role, there are 
differences in policymakers’ strategies and different responses to coverage. 
Government officials and Exco members pay attention to news coverage 
mainly because they consider the media as an influential factor in public 
views. When news framing is unfavourable to the government and its 
policies, the Administration does not tend make dramatic changes to its 
policies. Rather, the Administration makes great efforts to lobby elitist 
newspapers such as the MPDN as government officials believe that those 
newspapers may influence people’s views. Although government officials 
and pro-democrat politicians do not deny the influence on their ideas, in 
their experience, only relatively low cost changes such as agenda change 
and adjustment of arguments can be triggered by news coverage.  
 
On the other hand, pro-democrat politicians considered news 
coverage as part of their ‘radar’. Proactively monitoring news coverage, 
democrats prepare further actions once they discover a significant issue. 
When substantial coverage was run, the democrats will intensify their voices 
 328 
and launch further campaigns against government policy, which provide an 
opportunity for the media to run further coverage, resulting in the positive 
reinforcement of the relationship between critical coverage and democrats’ 
actions. This finding provides a further explanation of Baumgartner and 
Jones’s (1993) argument that it is relatively easy for minor groups to 
magnify their voices and attack existing policy when the policy image 
measured by news framing becomes negative. 
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Chapter 15 
Comparative Analysis of the Four Cases 
 
1. Introduction 
According to my hypothesis, which is developed from Robinson’s 
(2002) CNN effect model, critical news coverage of government policies or 
proposals can place pressure on policymakers, consequently changing 
government actions or policies. However, media coverage can influence 
policymakers only under particular conditions, including a high level of 
media consensus over critical framing and a low level of policy certainty 
measured by elite consensus and policy stage. In order to examine these 
hypothesised conditions, it is necessary to apply a variable-oriented 
approach, which aims to examine the relationship between factors applied 
across a series of cases (Hague et al 1992:273). In this Chapter, I employ 
what Hague et al (1992:280-2) called ‘focused comparison’ which 
concentrates on the intensive analysis of some aspects across four selected 
cases.  
 
The comparative analysis in this chapter firstly focuses on policy 
changes, media framing, media consensus, elite consensus and policy stage. 
I argue that the analysis of media framing, media consensus and elite 
consensus does not provide a satisfactory explanation for policy change. 
Drawing insights from existing public policy theories and data derived from 
in-depth interviews, I further analyse several factors, namely policymakers’ 
ideas, long-term image of policy, short-term government popularity and 
public attitude towards government policy. The role of institutional factors, 
including institutional positions of policymakers and election cycle, are also 
discussed. I suggest that these factors not only influence policymakers’ 
sensitivity and response to news coverage, but also trigger policy change.  
 
2. Testing the Hypotheses  
2.1 Policy Change 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, policy changes were classified into two 
categories according to the fiscal and political costs involved. As shown in 
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Table 15.1, in all four cases, the pro-democrat camp initiated agenda 
changes in the Legco, such as the motions against existing polices, panel 
meetings and the hearings regarding issues in debates. The Administration 
also initiated agenda change, including urgent meetings and review of 
existing policy. The costs of these changes are considered to be relatively 
low.   
 
Table 15.1: Policy Changes in the Four Case Studies 
Cases Low cost change High cost change 
Article 23 
(before 
1/7/03) 
 Legco agenda 
changes 
 Amendments to proposals 
Article 23 
(after 
1/7/03) 
 Exco agenda changes  
 Legco agenda 
changes 
 PRC Government 
agenda changes 
 Amendments, deferral & 
withdrawal of proposals 
 Key personnel changes 
 Creation of a new structure in the 
PRC Government 
CRIII  Legco agenda 
changes 
 Administration 
agenda changes 
 Continuation of project per se 
 Temporary & partial suspension 
of project  
 Structural & operational change 
in the TPB 
 Creation of a new advisory body 
GST  Legco agenda 
changes 
 Withdrawal of proposal 
OSFP  Legco agenda 
changes 
 Administration 
agenda changes 
 Continuation of project per se 
 Acceleration of demolition work 
 Structural alternations of the 
AAB 
 Re-consultation on heritage 
policy 
 Revision or reconsideration of 
other  projects 
 
In addition, there are various high cost policy changes in the four 
cases. In the cases of the CRIII and OSFP, although the projects under 
debate continued, the Administration launched some initiatives such as 
temporary suspension and partial resumption of work on the CRIII, and the 
acceleration of demolition of the OSFP. Moreover, there were changes in 
the relevant policy areas. In the case of the CRIII, the Administration 
launched some changes in development policy, including the new 
appointment of TPB members, opening up some TPB meetings, and the 
creation of a Harbour-front Enhancement Committee (HEC). Following the 
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debate on the OSFP, the Administration also initiated a series of changes to 
their heritage policy, including reform of the Antiquities Advisory Board 
(AAB) and the launch of a new round of consultations on heritage 
conservation policy. Some demolition plans, including Queen’s Pier, 
Victoria Prison and Wanchai Market were also reconsidered. 
 
In the cases of Article 23 and the GST, the government proposals 
under debate were withdrawn. However, there is a major difference between 
these two cases. In the 4-month debate on the GST, the Administration did 
not suggest any important amendments to its proposals before ending its 
advocacy of the GST. By contrast, there were a series of changes to Article 
23 proposal before the withdrawal of the legislative plan in early September 
2003. During its consultation and scrutiny in the Legco, the Administration 
suggested some relatively minor changes to the Article 23 proposal. When 
elite consensus declined after a large-scale demonstration on 1 July 2003, 
there were even more significant changes, including critical amendments to 
the Article 23 proposal, James Tien’s resignation from the Exco, and the 
deferral of legislative work. Changes were also made in the relevant policy 
areas. Following the July 1 rally, the PRC government set up a high level 
Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs overlooking 
policy towards Hong Kong.  
 
In short, various high cost and low cost policy changes were 
identified in all the four case studies. While the CRIII and OSFP projects 
continued after the debates, the government proposals were withdrawn in 
the cases of Article 23 and the GST. The difference in policy outcomes 
between these two pairs of cases can be explained by elite consensus and 
policy stage, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, in the 
cases of Article 23, the CRIII and the OSFP, policy changes were made in 
the relevant policy areas. Thus, I suggest that the study of policy change 
should focus not only on the policy per se, but also on changes in the 
relevant policy area.  
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2.2 News Framing and Media Consensus 
According to the hypothesis of this study, media pressure on 
policymakers is high only when most of the media run substantial critical 
coverage of the policies simultaneously. By contrast, policy is unlikely to 
change when news framing is supportive or divided between different media 
outlets.  
 
The results of the framing analysis in the four case studies are 
summarised in Table 15.2. During the OSFP debate, all three selected 
newspapers carried substantial critical coverage. In the first few weeks 
subsequent to the launch of the GST consultation, the three newspapers also 
remained critically framed. From this perspective, media consensus on 
negative framing remained at a high level in these two cases. The pressures 
on policymakers were, therefore, considered to be relatively high. News 
articles also showed that the Administration perceived negative news 
framing and took it into account1 . In other words, the Administration’s 
perceptions were consistent with the high level of media consensus 
demonstrated by framing analysis.  
 
Table 15.2: Media Framing and Media Consensus of the Three Selected 
Newspapers 
Framing Cases 
MPDN ODN ADN 
Media 
Consensus 
Article 23  
(before 
1/7/03) 
Neg Mix Neg Medium 
Article 23 
(after 
1/7/03) 
Neg Mix Neg Medium 
CRIII Mix Mix Neg Low 
OSFP Neg Neg Neg High 
GST Neg 
Became Mix 
Subsequently 
Neg 
Became Mix 
Subsequently 
Neg 
Became Mix 
Subsequently 
High 
Became Low 
Subsequently 
 
By contrast, throughout the debate on Article 23, only the MPDN 
and ADN ran substantial negative coverage, while the framing of the ODN 
remained mixed. Thus, the media consensus level was considered to be 
                                               
1 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04; 14 December 2006, page A04; ODN; 5 September 2006, 
page A08 
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medium. In the case of CRIII, there was an even lower level of media 
consensus, as only the ADN’s framing remained critical. Thus, the pressure 
on policymakers was considered to be relatively low in these two cases. 
 
Nevertheless, according to the findings of interviews and textual 
analysis of officials’ statements, an Exco member believed that changes in 
public views were the result of negative coverage (interview with Cheng 
Yiu-tong on 2 January 2008). The Secretary of Security, Regina Ip, also 
claimed that it was media coverage that had changed public opinion2 . 
During an interview, Michael Suen, who managed the CRIII project, 
claimed that the news coverage was unfavourable to the Administration 
during the debate on the CRIII (interview on 22 January 2008). In addition, 
when the three newspapers became mixed framed in the later stages of the 
GST debate, the Administration’s perception of negative news framing 
persisted3. In other words, there was inconsistency between framing analysis 
results and policymakers’ perceptions of news framing when framing 
analysis demonstrated a low level of media consensus. More importantly, as 
most policy changes took place after the policymakers commented on news 
framing, it is believed that these subjective perceptions of news coverage 
could be an influential factor in policy change.  
 
This findings provide two important insights into the study of media 
effect on policy. Firstly, framing analysis by article count and keyword test 
is usually considered to be a systematic and objective method which can 
produce repeatable data. By contrast, the data produced by in-depth 
interview and textual analysis is relatively subjective and unsystematic. 
Thus, the reliability of this qualitative data may be questionable. However, 
as policy change usually results from the decisions of policymakers, their 
perceptions of news coverage are particularly important to the study of 
media-policy relations. As mentioned in Chapter 14, although the 
Administration conducts framing analysis which covers all the newspapers 
during policy debates, government officials do not apply the results of the 
analysis systematically. Rather, their accounts of the coverage are based on 
                                               
2 MPDN, 1 November 2002, page A07; 3 November 2002, page A04  
3 ODN, 5 September 2006, page A08; MPDN 10 October 2006, page A07 
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their perceptions (off-the-recoded briefing by an official on 22 January 
2008). Thus, in-depth interviews with policymakers and textual analysis of 
their statement are necessary.   
 
Moreover, a comparison across the four cases shows that the 
Administration’s perceptions are inconsistent with the framing analysis 
results when there is a low level of media consensus. When a high level 
media consensus over negative framing is demonstrated by framing analysis, 
the Administration perceives similar news framing. In this sense, I suggest 
that qualitative data derived from in-depth interviews and textual analysis 
are particularly necessary when framing analysis shows a low level of media 
consensus. 
 
Secondly, an explanation of the inconsistency between a 
policymaker’s perceptions and framing analysis provides another insight. It 
can be argued that policymakers’ perceptions are mainly due to officials 
paying particular attention to elitist newspapers. As government officials 
consider the MPDN as a relatively influential newspaper (off-the-record 
briefing on 22 January 2008), media consensus is not a necessary condition 
for media influence. However, this argument is only supported by the case 
of Article 23 in which the MPDN’s framing remained negative. During the 
CRIII debate, however, the overall framing of the MPDN remained mixed 
most of the time, whilst the Administration perceived negative framing. 
Therefore, this argument is unlikely to be valid. 
 
The other explanation is that policymakers’ perceptions of news 
framing, as a subjective feeling, may be affected by various factors. 
Moreover, news coverage is only one of the numerous factors that are taken 
into account during policymaking (interview with Michael Suen on 22 
January 2008). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that policymakers may 
become relatively sensitive to negative coverage in some circumstances. For 
example, when public views are unfavourable to the government and its 
policy, or in the period close to an election, limited quantity of critical 
coverage may create high levels of pressure on policymakers. In these cases, 
it is necessary to examine the factors influencing policymakers’ sensitivity 
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to critical coverage. The evidence for this argument will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
In a nutshell, in all the four selected cases, the Administration 
perceived that news framing was unfavourable to the government although 
the level of media consensus level varied from case to case. However, the 
cases of Article 23, the CRIII and the GST debates showed that 
policymakers’ perceptions of negative news framing could influence policy 
despite the low level of media consensus. From this perspective, the 
researcher should consider policymakers’ perceptions of news framing as 
the chief consideration when such perceptions are inconsistent with the 
results of framing analysis.. Moreover, as perceptions of news framing, as a 
subjective feeling can be affected by various factors, it is necessary to 
examine the factors influencing policymakers’ sensitivity to critical 
coverage.   
 
2.3 Policy Certainty Measured by Elite Consensus 
The second hypothesised condition for the media’s influence on 
policy is policy certainty measured by elite consensus. Following 
Robinson’s (2002) CNN effect model, this study hypothesises that the 
media may pick up and magnify the ideas of particular groups, criticising 
the ideas of the other side during an elite debate. Thus, news coverage is 
likely to influence policy only when there is a relatively high level of 
disagreement among policymakers. By contrast, when there is a high level 
of elite consensus over an issue, policymakers will try their best to promote 
their ideas. In this case, media coverage tends to follow official policy rather 
than criticise the government’s decisions. In other words, there is a two-way 
interaction in which the media and the policymakers may influence each 
other. In addition, elite consensus is considered to be a stronger variable 
compared with critical coverage. 
 
In the cases of the CRIII and the OSFP, as a majority of the pro-
government camp members supported the Administration throughout the 
debates, the level of elite consensus remained high. During the GST debate, 
on the other hand, the major pro-government parties strongly opposed the 
 336 
proposed tax, resulting in a high level of disagreement inside the pro-
government camp.  
 
In the three cases above, there was no significant change in the level 
of elite consensus in all three cases mentioned above. By contrast, during 
the controversy over the Article 23 legislation, the elite consensus level 
changed dramatically. Before the large-scale demonstration on 1 July 2003, 
the PRC Government and all the pro-government parties supported the 
Administration, moving forward the scrutiny of the NSB. The level of elite 
consensus was thus considered to be high at that time. After 1 July, however, 
the LP and other pro-government legislators refused to support the 
legislative plan. After the SAR Government had deferred the legislative 
work in early July, there was also a disagreement between the PRC and 
SAR Governments in the following months. In this sense, there was an elite 
debate in the period subsequent to 1 July 2003.   
 
In order to test the hypothesis of the two-way interaction between 
media framing and elite consensus, I summarise the news framing, media 
consensus, elite consensus and policy changes of the four cases in Table 
15.3. In the case of the CRIII, the level of elite consensus remained high. 
Although the government officials perceived a negative news framing, there 
was a low level of media consensus as the framing of two selected 
newspapers remained mixed. By contrast, there was disagreement inside the 
pro-government camp during the GST debate, while all the three selected 
newspapers ran substantial critical coverage. From this perspective, the 
hypothesis on the two-way interaction between the government and the 
media seems to be evidenced by the cases of the CRIII and GST.   
 
However, the hypothesis is not supported by the other two cases. 
During the OSFP debate, the framing of all the three selected newspapers 
remained negative despite the high level of elite consensus. In the case of 
Article 23, two of the selected newspapers ran critical coverage 
continuously although pro-government camp supported the government 
proposal before 1 July 2003. In these cases, despite the high level of elite 
consensus, negative coverage occurred.  
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Table 15.3: Variables of Hypotheses of the Four Selected Cases   
Cases Media 
Consensus over 
Neg. Framing 
Elite 
Consensus 
Policy 
Stage 
Policy Change 
Article 23  
(before 
1/7/03) 
Medium High 
 
Early  Minor 
amendments of 
proposal 
Article 23 
(after 
1/7/03) 
Medium Low Early  Major 
amendments of 
proposal 
 Deferral & 
withdrawal of 
proposal 
CRIII Low High 
 
Late  Temporary & 
partial suspension 
of project 
 Structural 
alternations  
 Project continued 
GST High 
Became Low 
Subsequently 
Low Early  Withdrawal of 
proposal 
OSFP High High 
 
Late  Acceleration of 
demolition work 
 Structural 
alternations  
 Project continued  
 
The second part of the hypothesis considers elite consensus as a 
stronger variable compared with critical coverage. This part of the 
hypothesis seems to be supported. During the GST debate, all the three 
selected newspapers ran substantial negative coverage, while most pro-
government parties opposed the government proposal. Subsequently, the 
Administration withdrew the GST proposal. On the contrary, in the cases of 
the CRIII and OSFP, elite consensus within the pro-government camp 
remained high throughout the controversies. Although the Administration 
perceived negative coverage, the government projects continued. In these 
circumstances, the hypothesis is supported. 
 
In addition, throughout the controversy over Article 23, two of the 
three selected newspapers criticised the government proposal. While the 
elite consensus within the pro-government camp remained at a high level 
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before the protest on 1 July 2003, only relatively minor amendments to the 
proposal were made by the Administration. After 1 July, the two 
newspapers’ framing remained negative, while the elite consensus declined 
dramatically. Subsequently, the Administration suggested critical 
amendments to the proposal, and then deferred and withdrew the legislative 
plan. From this perspective, all the four cases show that negative coverage 
can lead to high cost policy changes only if there is an elite disagreement.  
 
Nevertheless, those accounts show up at least two problems. First, as 
mentioned above, studying policy change should focus not only on the 
policy per se, but also on the relevant policy areas. In the cases of the CRIII 
and OSFP, despite the continuation of the government projects, there were 
some high cost changes, including structural and operational alterations, in 
the policy areas of town planning and heritage conservation. During the 
debate, there were also some temporary changes in the government projects, 
including temporary and partial suspension of the CRIII and the acceleration 
of the demolition of the OSFP. Furthermore, in the case of Article 23, 
despite the elite consensus before 1 July 2003, there were some low cost 
policy changes including a series of amendments to the proposed law. Thus, 
it can be argued that critical coverage can influence policy outcomes, 
regardless of the level of elite consensus.  
 
The second problem of the media-elite consensus account is that it 
considers news coverage as the major influential factor of policy change, 
downplaying the fact that elite consensus itself is crucial to the policy 
outcome. Since the pro-government camp is the majority in the Legco, a 
policy proposal cannot be endorsed without the support of the pro-
government legislators. As most of the pro-government parties strongly 
opposed the GST proposal, it was unlikely to be passed by the Legco even if 
the Administration persisted with the proposal. Thus, elite disagreement is 
considered to be a sufficient condition for the withdrawal of the GST 
proposal.   
 
The importance of elite consensus is further supported by the case of 
Article 23. Although the MPDN and ADN ran substantial critical coverage, 
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the pro-government camp supported the Administration’s proposal before 1 
July 2003. In this period, only relatively minor amendments to the 
legislative proposals were made by the Administration. After half a million 
people had joined the anti-government protest on 1 July, however, the LP 
insisted on deferring the legislative work. As the Article 23 proposal could 
not be passed by the Legco without the support of the LP, the 
Administration made significant policy changes including major 
amendments to the bill, deferral and withdrawal of the Article 23 proposal. 
From this perspective, news coverage can be an influential factor only for 
minor changes to the Article 23 proposal. The most crucial changes did not 
take place until after the decline of elite consensus.  
 
It can be argued that the elite debates in the cases of the GST and 
Article 23 might have been triggered by critical coverage. However, this 
argument is rejected by the findings of process tracing. In the case of the 
GST, the pro-government parties had expressed their objections to the 
introduction of the GST before the newspapers ran negative coverage. In 
other words, elite debate is prior to the critical coverage. Thus, news 
coverage is unlikely to change the level of elite consensus, although the 
existing ideas of the opponents can be reinforced by critical coverage. 
 
During the Article 23 controversy, in both periods before and after 1 
July 2003, the MPDN and ADN ran critical coverage while the framing of 
the ODN remained mixed. In other words, there was consistency of the level 
of media consensus over news framing throughout the controversy. The 
pressure created by the media coverage was thus considered to be consistent. 
However, the LP did not change its position until the large-scale protest on 
1 July 2003. Neither did the other independent pro-government legislators 
hesitate about the Article 23 proposal before 1 July. Thus, the decline of 
elite consensus was most likely to have been triggered by the July 1 protest 
rather than by critical coverage. 
 
It can be also argued that critical news coverage legitimised the 
voices against the government proposals, placing further pressure on the 
Administration in the cases of Article 23 and the GST. This argument is 
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supported by interview data suggesting that the pro-democrat legislators felt 
that they were supported by the news coverage highlighting their criticisms 
of the Article 23 proposal (interview with James To on 31 January 2008 and 
Alan Leong on 28 November 2008). Even if this argument is valid, the 
media coverage is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for change in 
policymakers’ positions.  
 
In short, the comparison across the four selected cases demonstrates 
that critical coverage occurs regardless of elite consensus. Moreover, despite 
the high level of elite consensus, there were policy changes subsequent to 
the negative coverage during the debates on Article 23 (before 1 July 2003), 
the CRIII and the OSFP. The cases of Article 23 and the GST also 
demonstrate that critical coverage is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for 
change in elite consensus and policy outcome. Rather, elite consensus itself 
is crucial to high cost policy changes. Taking all of these factors into 
account, I suggest that the hypothesis regarding news framing and elite 
consensus does not provide a satisfactory explanation of policy change.  
 
2.4 Policy Certainty Measured by Policy Stage 
The third hypothesised condition of the media’s influence on policy 
is policy certainty measured by policy stage. This study hypothesises that 
critical coverage can influence a relatively early-stage policy, such as those 
under consultation, legislation and evaluation. For the policy at a later stage, 
such as those being implemented, critical coverage is unlikely to be an 
influential factor. Among the four cases, one of the major differences is 
policy stage (see Table 15.3). Thus, comparison across these four cases can 
provide important insights into possible media influence at different policy 
stages.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 9 and 13, the CRIII and the demolition of 
OSFP were being implemented during the controversies. Thus, any 
amendments to these projects needed the re-scrutiny by statutory bodies and 
the Legco. This would result in a large amount of compensation to the 
contractors and delay some development plans. From this perspective, the 
Administration was bound by a series of institutional factors when the 
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policies were under implementation. Moreover, these constraints are 
particularly significant in the development of policy which involves a lot of 
infrastructures and a series of technical and statutory procedures. Thus, the 
CRIII and the demolition of the OSFP continued, despite the 
Administration’s perception of negative news framing.  
 
On the contrary, Article 23 legislation and the introduction of the 
GST were at a relatively early stage during the controversies. Thus, the 
Administration could adjust these proposals at a relatively low cost. In the 
case of Article 23, the Administration could propose amendments to the 
NSB during public consultation and scrutiny of the Bill in the Legco. In 
addition, since the Basic Law does not fix the schedule of Article 23 
legislation, the Administration had room to suspend the legislative plan. The 
introduction of the GST was at an even earlier stage. During the debate in 
2006, the proposed tax was merely under consultation. From these 
perspectives, the hypothesis of the media-policy stage relations seems to be 
supported by these four cases.  
 
Nevertheless, these accounts have the same problems as the media-
elite consensus hypothesis. Firstly, despite the persistence of the CRIII and 
OSFP projects, the Administration launched some low cost changes in the 
projects and other high cost changes in relevant policy areas, including 
structural and operational alterations. In this sense, despite the late-stage of 
the policy, media influence is possible. Secondly, focusing on media 
influence, the media-policy stage hypothesis neglected other possible factors, 
including the importance of elite consensus per se for policy change. In 
order to provide a better account of media effect on policy outcomes, I 
explore other factors in the following sections.  
 
3. Ideas of Policymakers 
The first factor to be discussed is ideas, which refers to the 
understanding of an issue, the belief or value system and the political 
tendency. As mentioned in Chapter 14, most policymakers described their 
ideas and beliefs as the chief consideration during policymaking. The four 
selected cases also show that political actors’ ideas and beliefs play at least 
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two roles during a policy debate. First, as mentioned in the analysis of the 
four cases, political actors’ actions and positions on issues are mainly based 
on their ideas and beliefs, including their values and understanding of the 
issue. Second, political stances of actors not only enable an alliance between 
some groups, but also inhibit the cooperation among actors with different 
political tendencies. 
 
However, as the interview data has shown, policymakers’ ideas are 
not always consistent. Rather, sometimes, politicians take people’s views 
and compromise tactically. The cross case comparison also shows that 
persistency of ideas also varies from group to group. In all four cases, there 
was no change in the ideas of the Administration and a majority of DAB 
members. Despite the withdrawal of the GST proposal and the NSB, the 
Administration and the DAB persisted with their ideas (interview with 
Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008).  
 
By contrast, the LP and other independent pro-government 
legislators were relatively less persistent with their ideas. They changed 
their supportive position, urging the Administration to defer the NSB after 
the 1 July rally, which was considered as the expression of strong people’s 
views against the Administration and the proposed law. The persistency of 
ideas of the pro-democrat camp and some non-core pro-government 
legislators were even lower. In the case of the CRIII and the OSFP, the pro-
government camp, Choy So-yuk of the DAB and Chan Yuen-han of the 
FTU started criticising the government projects after the controversies had 
began.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, policy debate can be 
triggered by conflicts between any policymakers’ ideas. However, the ideas 
of policymakers can be influenced by people’s views they perceived. The 
persistency of ideas also depends on the actors’ institutional positions. The 
pro-government camp and non-core members of the -pro-government camp 
tend to take people’s views into account, adjusting their ideas. The LP and 
other independent pro-government legislators did not change their positions 
until a strong voice had been demonstrated by a large-scale demonstration. 
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By contrast, the Administration and the DAB persisted with their ideas 
regardless of general public opinion. 
 
From this perspective, public views can be an influential factor for 
policymakers’ ideas. In addition, as the interview data has shown 
policymakers take people’s views into account during policy making. Thus, 
I examine three factors relating to public views in the following section.  
 
4. Policy Image and Short-term Public Opinion 
The first groups of hypothesised factors associated with 
policymaker’s sensitivity to critical news coverage are associated with the 
public understanding of the Administration and its policy. One is long-term 
policy image while the other is short-term public opinion. The idea of long-
term policy image is consistent with Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) 
concept of ‘policy image’, which refer to public understanding of policy and 
issues. According to Baumgartner and Jones, when there is a negative image 
of an existing policy, any criticisms may be easily magnified by the 
opponents. Following this argument, I hypothesise that government officials 
become particularly sensitive to negative news coverage when there is a 
long-term negative image of a policy or an issue. Otherwise, the opponents 
will take the opportunity to magnify their voices in order to attack 
government policy.   
 
The other two hypothesised conditions are two types of short-term 
public opinion during policy debate. The first one is government popularity, 
which refers to public attitudes towards the government. The second is 
public attitude towards a specific policy or issue. I hypothesise that 
policymakers become relatively sensitive to criticisms, including those by 
the media, when there are unfavourable public attitudes towards either the 
Government or its policy.. As mentioned in Chapter 14, in order to maintain 
their support in elections, policymakers usually focus on their own 
supporters’ views rather than on general public opinion. However, there are 
about 40% of floating voters, who are the targets of the Administration and 
all politicians (interview with Sin Chung-kai on 11 November 2008). Thus, 
it is reasonable to suggest that policymakers proactively monitor public 
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attitudes towards the government and its policy during policy debates. When 
any one of these views is unfavourable at a particular time, the 
Administration and the pro-government camp will become relatively 
sensitive to criticisms, including those by the media.     
 
4.1 Long-Term Policy Image 
As shown in Table 15.4, of the four case studies, three had long-term 
negative policy images, which were well established before the 
controversies. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the long-term 
negative policy image of Article 23, the CRIII and the GST were established 
before the controversies over these issues.  
 
Table 15.4: Hypothesised Conditions for Media Effect on Policy   
Short-term public 
attitudes 
Cases Media 
consensus 
over neg. 
framing 
Officials’ 
perception 
of framing 
Long-
term 
policy 
image 
Towards the 
Administration 
Towards 
policy 
Article 
23 
Medium Neg Neg Neg Neg 
CRIII Low Neg Neg Neg Neg 
OSFP High Neg Nil Pos Pos 
GST High Neg Neg Pos Neg 
 
During the Article 23 and CRIII debates, the media consensus 
remained at a medium and a low level, respectively. Nevertheless, the 
Administration perceived negative news framing. Although the CRIII 
project continued after the debate, the Administration temporarily and 
partially suspended  reclamation work during the debate. Before the July 1 
protest, the Administration also made some amendments to the Article 23 
proposal. At the later-stage of the GST, despite the decline of media 
consensus, the Administration perceived negative news framing, and 
subsequently withdrew the tax proposal. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that the Administration becomes relatively sensitive to critical 
coverage and pro-actively responds to the criticisms when there is negative 
policy image.     
 
By contrast, there was no such long-term negative image of the 
demolition of the OSFP, although the media and the protestors described the 
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pier as an icon of people’s collective memory. In fact, the media and the 
public had not been aware of the demolition project until the closing 
ceremony of the pier in October 2003. In addition, the controversy over the 
OSFP lasted for only a few months. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
image of the demolition project had not been well established when the 
Administration speeded up the demolition work. 
 
In a nutshell, according to the framing analysis, there was a high 
level of media consensus over critical framing during the OSFP and GST 
debates. Thus, it is not surprising that government officials and the pro-
government camp perceived negative news framing. In the cases of Article 
23 and the CRIII, the Administration’s perception of news framing 
remained negative, although media consensus over negative tone was not 
high. As the long-term negative image of Article 23 and the CRIII had been 
established before the controversies, it can be argued that the Administration 
and the pro-government politicians’ sensitivity to critical coverage was 
increased in these two cases. The hypothesis of policy image-politician’s 
sensitivity relations was supported. 
   
4.2 Short-term Public Attitudes 
As I mentioned in previous chapter, since the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997, the Hong Kong economy had begun to slide into recession, which 
caused financial difficulties for many people. Subsequently, there was a 
gradual decline in the SAR Government’s popularity, which was evidenced 
by the opinion polls. As mentioned in Chapter 7, there was evidence 
showing that the Administration and the pro-government camp had been 
aware of the unfavourable public mood before 20034. Thus, it is believed 
that the unpopularity was taken into account when the Administration 
proposed amendments to Article 23 before initiating the official legislative 
process in early 2003.  
 
In addition, during the scrutiny of the NSB in the Legco in 2003, 
there were several incidents that resulted in further discontentment in 
                                               
4 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
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society. These included the outbreak of SARS, the increase in the income 
tax rate5 and the Financial Secretary’s car-purchasing scandal. Consequently, 
in the period between January and July 2003, the satisfaction rate of the 
government remained at a low6. Finally, half a million people took to the 
streets on 1 July 2003. Moreover, the Administration was aware of a 
reversal in public opinion on the Article 23 proposal (interview with 
CHENG Yiu-tong on 2 January 2008). 
 
During the CRIII debate in the second half of 2003, the 
Administration still perceived an unfavourable public attitude towards the 
government. The Administration also perceived negative public mood and 
took it into account7. Although the media consensus over critical framing 
was not high in the cases of Article 23 and the CRIII, the Administration 
and pro-government camp were aware of negative news framing (interviews 
with Michael Suen on 22 January 2008, and Cheng Yiu-Tong on 2 January 
2008). It can be argued that when the public mood was unfavourable, the 
Administration and the pro-government camp became extremely sensitive to 
critical coverage. Thus, the Administration’s initiatives, including the 
amendments to the Article 23 proposals, the partial resumption of 
reclamation work, the creation of the HEC, and reform of the TPB, were to 
demonstrate its response as sincere intention to listen to the public8.  
 
By contrast, the Administration became relatively popular during the 
debates on the GST and the OSFP in the second half of 2006. Nevertheless, 
there was a significant difference in the public views on the policies under 
debate between these two cases. In 2006, the opinion polls conducted by 
both the pro-government and the pro-democrat camps showed that a 
majority of the public opposed the introduction of the GST9. When the GST 
proposal was withdrawn, the Administration also admitted that the majority 
                                               
5 Budget Speech 2003/04, paragraph 77-79: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2003/eng/budget.htm#Salaries%20Tax 
6 Press release on 5 August 2003, Website of Public Opinion Programme, the University of 
Hong Kong: http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release127.html 
7 MPDN, 7 October 2003, page A02 
8 MPDN, 7 October 2003, page A02 
9 DAB’s press release on 10 August 2006: 
http://www.dab.org.hk/tr/main.jsp?content=article-
content.jsp&articleId=5105&categoryId=1205 ; The Democratic Party’s press release on  
29 August 2006: http://www.dphk.org/2003/images/thumbphoto/060829press.doc 
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did not consider GST to be an appropriate option to solve the tax base 
problem 10 . It is thus believed that the public did not support the GST 
proposal. In addition, there was a high level of media consensus over the 
critical framing of the GST. In these circumstances, it was difficult for the 
Administration to promote its proposal.  
 
On the other hand, the public mood was relatively favourable to the 
demolition of the OSFP. Despite the high level of media consensus over 
negative framing, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the surveys by 
various parties showed that a majority of the public supported the 
demolition of the OSFP (off-the-record briefing on 22 January 2008, 
interview with Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008). Thus, it was relatively 
easy for the Administration, with the support of the public, to go against the 
critical coverage, accelerating the demolition work. 
 
In short, in the cases of Article 23, the CRIII and the GST, the public 
mood was unfavourable both to the Administration and to government 
policy. It can be argued that the Administration’s high sensitivity and the 
concessions in these three cases were based on considerations of the 
unfavourable public mood. On the contrary, the OSFP is the only case in 
which the public mood was supportive of both the Administration and 
government policy. In this case, despite the high level of media consensus 
over negative framing, the Administration, with the support of the public, 
could act against the news coverage.   
 
Taking both the short-term public mood and the long-term policy 
image into account, the Administration and the pro-government camp are 
likely to become relatively sensitive when either short-term public mood or 
long-term image is unfavourable to the Administration. This argument 
explains why the Administration perceived negative news framing even 
though there was media consensus over critical framing in the cases of 
Article 23 and the CRIII.  
 
                                               
10 The Administration’s press release on the speech by FS: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050115.htm 
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A comparison between the policy outcomes of the GST and OSFP 
debates provides further evidence. During the GST debate, despite the 
supportive public views on the government, there was negative policy image 
and unfavourable public attitudes towards the GST. Thus, the 
Administration withdrew the GST proposal. On the contrary, during the 
OSFP debate, without the effect of negative image, the Administration, with 
supportive public attitudes towards both the government and the demolition 
plan, could neglect critical coverage, speeding up demolition of the OSFP. 
 
5. Institutions  
The examination of policymakers’ ideas demonstrates that actors in 
different institutional positions give different response to people’s views. 
This section further explores the influence of institutional factors, which 
relate to formal rule and procedures, and government organisations in which 
political behaviour takes place. As most institutionalists suggest, political 
behaviour is influenced by institutional context. However, according to 
institutional rational choice theory, political actors are not simply 
constrained by institutions. Rather, actors adopt strategies in order to 
maximise their payoffs within their institutional positions.  
 
Thus, I suggest two hypotheses regarding institutions. First, the 
political actors in different institutional positions are under different 
constraints, enjoying different institutional powers. Thus, institutional 
position influences political actors’ strategies and responses to media 
coverage. Second, election cycle, as an institutional constraint, not only 
influences the time frame of a debate and the strategies of political actors, 
but also influences policymakers’ sensitivity to criticisms, including those 
by the media.     
 
5.1 Institutional Positions  
5.1.1 The Administration 
In all the four cases in this study, the Administration adopted similar 
strategies. During the debates, the Administration played a relatively passive 
role, responding to opponents’ criticisms of existing official policies or 
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proposals. This finding is consistent with Michael Suen’s claim that there 
was no room for the Administration to adjust its strategies during the debate 
on the OSFP, even though the officials had learnt to simplify their messages. 
According to Suen, the opponents could attack the existing policy in all 
aspects. What the Administration could do was defend its policy in these 
circumstances (interview on 22 January 2008). From this perspective, 
during the debate, the opponents of an existing policy are relatively free to 
shape their arguments, while the Administration was bound by its own 
policies or proposals. 
 
The constraints on the Administration can be explained by its 
institutional procedures of decision-making. When an official proposal or a 
policy change is announced, the Administration is usually supposed to 
propose a concrete and viable policy alternative. In order to prepare this 
type of concrete proposal, the Administration should go through a series of 
processes of decision-making, such as the study of various alternatives and 
discussion. For example, the consultation documents on Article 23 and the 
GST provided many concrete details on the proposal, together with analysis 
of foreign experience. The decisions on the CRIII project and the demolition 
of the OSFP were not only based on data regarding town planning and 
transportation, but also endorsed by the Exco, various government 
departments and consultative and statutory bodies. Thus, any changes in 
these policies or proposals were constrained by institutional procedures.    
 
However, the Administration is not simply bound by institutional 
constraints. Rather, the institution enables the Administration to initiate 
policy changes in order to respond to pressure created by the opponents and 
the media. Moreover, the Administration can also minimise the costs of 
such policy changes. In the cases of the CRIII and the OSFP, although the 
projects continued, the Administration launched many initiatives both in 
town planning and heritage conservation.. Despite structural changes, such 
as the creation of the HEC and reform of the AAB, the members of these 
bodies were all appointed by the Administration. More importantly, the 
terms of reference of these advisory bodies were limited. In other words, it 
is unlikely that the town planning and heritage conservation polices have 
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been influenced by these structural changes. Thus, the costs of the policy 
changes were in fact relatively low.              
 
In spite of personnel changes to the CE, the comparison across the 
four cases shows that the administration adopted similar strategies. The 
Administration on the one hand played a passive role defending its policy. 
On the other hand, it manipulated policy change in order to minimise the 
costs of change. In this sense, the strategies of the Administration are 
mainly based on its institutional position. 
 
From this perspective, the institutional dimension for the 
Administration is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is constrained 
by institutional factors. In this case, it is relatively difficult for the 
government to adjust its policy following criticisms. On the other hand, 
institutional power enables the Administration to manipulate policy change 
and minimise the costs of change. Thus, the Administration can launch 
some low cost initiatives in response the criticisms, including those by the 
media.    
 
5.1.2 The Pro-government Camp 
The pro-government camp played an even more passive role during 
the debates. As the close partners of the Administration, these parties are 
supposed to support the Administration in most cases. In fact, during the 
controversies over Article 23, the CRIII and the OSFP, most pro-
government parties were bound by their partnership with the Administration, 
in support of government policy.    
 
However, the pro-government parties did not simply express their 
support for the Administration. In the cases of the CRIII, the OSFP and 
Article 23, while the opposition strongly criticised the Administration in the 
Legco, most pro-government legislators neither agreed with the opposition 
nor defended the Administration. Instead, the pro-government legislators 
kept silent most of the time. According to Jasper Tsang, when the 
government was criticised, one of the DAB’s strategies was to keep silent in 
order to avoid further criticisms by the media (interview on 17 January 
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2008). In other words, despite the persistence of its position, the pro-
government camp took their own interests into account, trying to avoid 
being criticised by the media when news framing was not unfavourable to 
government policy.  
 
Moreover, when their interests were seriously affected, the pro-
government parties would express their objections to government policy or 
proposals. As the pro-business LP and the pro-grassroots DAB and FTU 
considered the GST proposal as a financial burden both on the business 
sector and the grassroots population, the pro-government parties, together 
with the democrats, opposed the proposed tax. In the case of Article 23, 
after the legislative plan had been deferred because of changes in the LP’s 
position, some Exco members, including Jasper Tsang, suggested 
suspending the legislative work. It is believed that the pro-government 
parties realised that legislative work could not be carried out before the DC 
election in November 2003. In order to avoid being affected by the 
controversy during the election, the pro-government parties urged the 
Administration to withdraw its proposal.     
 
From this perspective, under institutional constraints, the pro-
government parties play a relatively passive role in supporting the 
Administration. Nevertheless, they take their own interests into account, 
adopting some strategies to minimise their losses when public views and 
new framing are unfavourable. When their own interests are seriously 
affected, they even opposed government policy.   
 
5.13 Non-domestic Actors 
In the case of Article 23, two groups of non-domestic actors, namely 
the PRC Government and western governments played an active role. 
According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy11. In this case, the PRC Government is not supposed to officially 
interfere in the local policy making of Hong Kong in most cases, even 
though it is unknown whether there is any hidden interaction between the 
                                               
11 The HKSAR Basic Law, Article 2:  http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm 
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two governments. From this perspective, the PRC Government is 
constrained by institutional setting, and is not allowed to intervene in Hong 
Kong. Neither is there any official channel for western governments to 
intervene in domestic policy-making in Hong Kong. 
 
However, as mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, through informal 
channels, the PRC and western governments played important roles in the 
case of Article 23 legislation. While the PRC Government delivered public 
speeches, encouraged the Administration and pro-government camp and 
launched some economic initiatives, western governments criticised the 
proposed laws through press statements. There was also evidence showing 
the influence of the PRC and western governments on the SAR 
Administration’s decisions, including the adjustment, deferral and 
withdrawal of the NSB.   
 
From this perspective, although there was no official channel for the 
PRC and western governments to intervene in the legislation of Article 23, 
these non-domestic actors were able to bypass institutions, influencing 
policy through unofficial channels. This point will be discussed in Chapter 
16. 
 
5.1.4 The Opponents 
Despite their limited power of influence over the establishment, the 
pro-democrat camp and other opponents of government policy were 
relatively free from institutional constraints. Unlike the Administration and 
pro-government camp, the opposition neither needed to propose viable 
policy alternatives, nor to follow the Administration. In all four cases, the 
pro-democrat camp just initiated agenda change in the Legco, challenging 
government policies or proposals in all aspects.  
 
In addition, playing either a leading or supportive role, the pro-
democrat camp linked their campaigns with mass movements outside the 
establishment. In the case of Article 23, the pro-democrat camp collaborated 
with other pro-democrat groups, organising a series of protests against 
government proposals. This strategy was confirmed by the data derived 
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from interviews with pro-democrat legislators (interviews with Lee Wing-
tat on 23 January 2008, Kwok Ka-ki on 30 January 2008, and Sin Chung-kai 
on 11 November 2008). 
 
The use of this strategy can be explained by the institutional position 
of the opposition. The pro-democrat camp, as a minority in the Legco, has 
limited influence on this key policy making body. In order to place pressure 
on the Administration, they collaborate with other groups, launching social 
movements. In this process, according to pro-democrat legislators, critical 
coverage is particularly important. When politicians have perceived 
substantial critical coverage of government policy, their ideas are reinforced. 
In this case, politicians are encouraged to intensify their campaign against 
the government policy or proposal. This provides an opportunity for the 
media to run further critical coverage, further reinforcing politicians’ 
confidence in their campaigns (ibid). From this perspective, during policy 
debates, there is a positive reinforcement relation between critical coverage 
and opponents’ ideas and actions.           
 
The pro-government parties sometimes also adopt a similar strategy. 
During the debate on Article 23, the pro-government parties organised a 
serious of rallies backing the Administration. However, all these pro-Article 
23 campaigns were organised after the opposition announced their activities 
against Article 23. In other words, the pro-government camp only played a 
passive role, counteracting the pro-democrat camp’s campaign. The LP, 
together with the retail and wholesale sectors, organised an anti-GST 
campaign only when their interests were seriously affected by the 
government proposals. From this perspective, the pro-government camp 
links their campaign with the mass movements only on certain occasions. 
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I suggest that institutional 
position influences the strategies of political actors in various positions. The 
Administration, on the one hand, is constrained by institutional processes of 
policy making. On the other hand, with its institutional power, it can 
manipulate policy change in order to respond to criticisms, including those 
by the media. This account explains not only why government policy 
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persisted under media pressure, but also why the Administration could 
launch policy changes in the relevant policy areas in the cases of the CRIII 
and the OSFP.    
 
The pro-government camp is also bound by its institutional relations 
with the Administration. However, these parties take their own interests 
seriously, trying to minimise their losses when there are unfavourable public 
views and news framing. This is the reason why the pro-government 
legislators maintained silent most of the time during the debates on Article 
23, the CRIII and the OSFP. In addition, when their interests are affected 
seriously, the pro-government parties can disregard institutional constraints, 
opposing government policy.  
 
For the democrats and other opponents of government policy, the 
institutional constraints are relatively weak. Thus, they are relatively free to 
attack government policy. In addition, because of their limited power in key 
policy making institutes, the opposition tends to influence policy through 
mass movements. In this process, there is a positive reinforcement relation 
between critical coverage and the opponents’ ideas and campaigns.  
 
From this perspective, policymakers’ strategies are influenced by 
their own institutional positions. Moreover, policymakers in various 
institutional positions make different uses of, and have different responses 
to, media coverage. In other words, the media effects on policymakers are 
institutionally specific.   
 
5.2 Election Cycle 
The other institutional element is election cycle. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the political structure in Hong Kong has been challenged by the 
democrats since the drafting of the Basic Law in the 1980s. To avoid a 
further stirring up of discontentment in society, the PRC and SAR 
governments tried to settle all their controversies in the periods close to the 
CE election. In addition, in order to maintain its support in the Legco and 
the DCs, the Administration should consider the interests of the pro-
government camp during elections (interview with Jasper Tsang on 17 
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January 2008). During the period close to elections, any criticisms of the 
Administration and the pro-government camp are considered to be 
favourable to the opposition. Thus, it is sensible to suggest that 
policymakers are relatively sensitive to critical coverage of the 
Administration and its policy.   
 
As mentioned in the analysis of the four selected cases, the 
Administration and the pro-government camp adopt strategies to settle 
debates before elections. For example, the Administration planned to 
complete the Article 23 legislation in early July 2003, a few months before 
the DC election. In the case of Central Reclamation, the Administration 
launched a series of policy changes in response to criticisms before the 
Legco election in September 2004. In the cases of the GST and the OSFP, 
the Administration tried to settle the controversies before the CE election in 
February 2007. In addition, regardless of the results of framing analysis, in 
all four cases, the Administration perceived negative news framing and took 
it into account. For instance, during the GST debate, the Administration 
made a great effort to lobby journalists after media consensus had declined 
to a low level.     
 
Nevertheless, in all four cases of this study, controversies took place 
in the period close to elections. In other words, the possible influence of 
election cycle existed in all four cases. In order to provide a better 
examination of the influence of election cycle on policymakers’ sensitivity 
to news coverage, it is necessary to compare these cases with others without 
an election factor. This point will be discussed at the end of this thesis. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks: 
The hypothesis of this study is based on Robinson’s (2002) model, 
which focuses on news framing and elite consensus in relation to US foreign 
policy. This study of domestic policy shows that elite consensus itself is a 
crucial to policy change, while negative news coverage is also an important 
account of policymakers. However, the hypotheses of this study do not 
provide a satisfactory account of domestic policy changes.  
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Policymakers’ sensitivity to critical coverage is specific to people’s 
views. When short-term public mood and long-term image are unfavourable 
to the government or its policy, the Administration will become relatively 
sensitive to criticisms, including those by the media.  
 
Institutional contexts are also critical to media effects on policy. In 
order to maximise their interests, policymakers in different institutional 
positions adopt different strategies and give different responses to media 
coverage. The institutional contexts of policy also vary from stage to stage. 
Thus, it is relatively easy for critical coverage to influence a policy at an 
early stage. By contrast, the policy under implementation is unlikely to be 
changed by news coverage, even though coverage may trigger change in 
relevant policy areas. 
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I suggest that media effects 
on policy are specific to a series of conditions, including short-term public 
attitudes towards the government and its policies long-term policy image, 
institutional positions of policymakers and policy stage. In addition to the 
level of elite consensus and news framing, these conditions should be taken 
into account for media-policy relations.  
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Chapter 16 
Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
A comparison across four selected cases demonstrates that the 
media-policy relation is much more complex than my hypothetical 
framework suggested. In this chapter, I argue that media effects on policy 
are specific to policymakers’ institutional positions. Furthermore, as policy 
change is mainly based on policymakers’ decisions, policymakers’ 
perceptions of news framing may be influenced by various factors. 
Sensitivity to critical coverage is increased when any one of three factors 
associated with people’s views, namely long-term policy image, short-term 
government popularity and short-term public attitudes towards government 
policy, is unfavourable.  
 
Moreover, I suggest that studying policymakers’ understanding of 
media-public opinion relations can help identify power of different media 
outlets to exert an influence. I also raise three issues of research design 
concerning media-policy relations, namely the definition of policy change, 
methodology and the scope of news coverage analysis. Finally, I suggest 
two directions for future research.    
 
2. Institutional Position  
Recognising the importance of the internal dynamics of institutions 
during policy making, Robinson tries to explore the relations between media 
coverage and consensus level of the three central policy sub-systems of the 
US executive, namely the White House, the Pentagon and the State 
Department (Robinson 2002:133-6). However, there are at least two 
problems with Robinson’s model when we apply it to cases of domestic 
policy making.    
 
First, as the US foreign and defence policies may be tightly 
controlled by the federal government, Robinson can focus on the three sub-
systems of the executive. In the case of domestic policy making, however, 
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various actors, including the legislature (the parliament), also play a 
significant role. For this reason, I suggest that the study of elite consensus 
should be extended to include the relationship between the Administration 
and pro-government parties in the legislature.  
 
Second, if we consider elite consensus to be the agreement between 
the Administration and the legislature, it is unrealistic to assume that 
different political actors in different institutional positions adopt the same 
strategies during the debate. Thus, we need to discriminate between 
different groups of political actors, each with their own institutional position, 
strategy and response to media coverage. In other words, we need to explore 
the possibility that media influence on policymakers may vary from position 
to position. In this study, comparison across four selected cases 
demonstrates that political actors in different institutional positions adopt 
different strategies.    
 
2.1 Domestic Actors 
For the Administration, the institution serves as a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the Administration is constrained by the 
bureaucratic procedures of decision making and the high fiscal and political 
costs of policy changes. Thus, in all four cases, the Administration played a 
passive role, defending its policies or proposals. On the other hand, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, because of the design of the constitution in 
accordance with the ‘executive-led’ principles, the Administration enjoys 
overwhelming power in policy making. Thus, it can manipulate policy 
changes and minimise costs in response to criticisms by opponents and the 
media. In some cases, the Administration, together with the pro-government 
camp, may even ignore its opponents, acting against the criticisms, 
including those expressed by the media.           
 
Being bound by the partnership with the Administration, the pro-
government camp also plays a passive role in support of government 
policies and proposals. Nevertheless, the pro-government camp also takes 
its own interests into account, adopting some strategies to minimise its 
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losses when long-term and short-term public views are unfavourable. For 
example, pro-government legislators keep silent to avoid being criticised by 
the media. When their interests are seriously affected, they even oppose 
government policy.    
 
By contrast, the pro-democrat camp and other opponents of 
government policy are relatively free from institutional constraints. These 
groups can attack all aspects of government policies or proposals. In 
addition, they may play either a leading or supporting role, linking their 
campaigns with mass movements outside the Legco, as was found in all four 
cases. This strategy might be explained by the positions of the opposition 
and other minor groups. Because of their limited power in key policy 
making institutes, the opposition collaborates with other groups, launching 
social movements. Their perceptions of substantial critical coverage of 
government policy also reinforce their ideas, encouraging them to carry on 
or intensify their campaigns. From this perspective, during a policy debate, 
media coverage is particularly important to the opponents of government 
policy.           
 
This pro-democrat camp’s strategy can also be explained by the 
development of pressure groups in Hong Kong. Some pro-democrat 
politicians, such as Lee Wing-tat of the DP, were pressure groups leaders in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Tracing the development of media and political 
contexts in Hong Kong, Chan argues that in the 1970s such pressure groups, 
with limited organisational resources, had to rely on the media to achieve 
publicity to exert pressure on the government. In addition, through the 
media, the action of one group became the rallying point for other people to 
form their own groups and for other groups to join hands for the same cause 
(Chan 1992:116-7). Since then, leaders of pressure groups have learned to 
attract media attention through social movements, placing pressure on the 
government. In such cases, the media were crucial to the campaigns of 
pressure groups. 
 
At the same time, Chan argues that the media has to fulfil the 
requirement to provide balanced reporting, which became established as a 
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professional norm among Hong Kong journalists in the 1970s. Because of 
their outspokenness and availability to the media, leaders of pressure groups 
have become popular sources of reaction to government policies. Thus, 
journalists reflect the views both of pressure groups and the government 
(Chan 1992: 116). This concept of balanced reporting cannot explain 
occasional overwhelmingly critical coverage of government policy. 
However, this argument provides an important insight into the requirements 
of journalistic practice, which can be fulfilled by the oppositional positions 
of leaders of pressure groups’ outspokenness and availability. From this 
perspective, both the media and the pressure groups benefit from reporting 
voices against government policy.   
 
The strategy differences between the pro-government camp and the 
opposition can be further explained by their constituencies. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the legislators in Hong Kong are returned by three types of 
constituencies. The first is geographical constituency (GC) in which 
legislators are elected by a minimum of a few hundred thousand voters in 
various geographical districts. The second type of constituency is returned 
by functional constituency (FC), each with a few hundred or a few thousand 
voters from the business or professional sectors, trade unions or interest 
groups. Finally, before 2004, there were 6 legislators returned by an 800-
member Election Committee (EC) which were mainly elected by FC voters1. 
The pro-democrat camp dominates the GCs and some FCs such as for law, 
education, social services and information technology, whilst a majority of 
FC seats and all EC seats are occupied by the pro-government camp. 
 
Type of constituency can influence legislators’ strategies for two 
main reasons. The first is the interests of voters. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
since the 1980s, most chambers of commerce and professional institutes 
have become close to the PRC Government (Holliday el al 2004:206-1). 
Thus, the legislators returned by those groups tend to support the PRC and 
SAR governments in most cases. The second reason is the size of the 
constituency. Most pro-government legislators are returned by FC and EC. 
In most FCs, the number of voters is much lower than in GCs. As Selina 
                                               
1 The seats returned by the EC have been replaced by GC seats since 2004.  
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Chow of LP says, it is relatively easy for FC legislators to have a direct 
channel to their voters. In this case, media pressure can be avoided. 
However, GC legislators have to rely on the media as it is impossible to talk 
to all the voters (interview on 16 January 2008). Tam Yiu-chuen of DAB 
also claimed that, compared to FC legislators, those returned by GCs are 
more sensitive to media coverage (interview on 16 January 2008). 
 
From this perspective, the limited sizes of FCs and EC enable pro-
government legislators to bypass the media, communicating with their 
voters directly. This explains why pro-government legislators can persist 
with their positions even under media pressure. On the contrary, those 
returned by GCs rely more on the media because of the large number of 
voters. This also explains why the pro-democrat legislators, who are mainly 
returned by GCs, are relatively sensitive to media coverage.  
 
2.2 Non-domestic Actors 
In addition to domestic actors, the case of Article 23 demonstrates 
the influence of the PRC and western governments, even though they do not 
play any official role in domestic policy making of Hong Kong. The PRC 
Government is not supposed to officially intervene in domestic policy, 
which is the responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR, although it is unknown 
whether there is any hidden interaction between the two governments. From 
this perspective, the PRC Government is constrained by the institutional 
setting. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the PRC Government can 
exercise a great deal of control over decisions made by the SAR 
Government and the pro-government camp via various informal channels, 
including the key personnel appointments of the SAR Government and 
liaison with pro-government legislators and their parties.  
 
Although there was no evidence showing that the PRC Government 
was involved in the cases of CRIII, GST and OSFP, the PRC Government 
pro-actively supported legislative plans concerning Article 23 by mobilising 
the pro-government camp in Hong Kong, delivering public speeches and 
launching some economic initiatives settling the social discontent. The PRC 
Government’s role was also critical to the SAR Administration’s decisions. 
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The SAR Government did not announce the withdrawal of the NSB until the 
PRC Government agreed to do so. Moreover, after 1 July 2003, the PRC 
Government set up a new high-level leading group, pro-actively to monitor 
the social and political development of Hong Kong. In other words, despite 
a lack of official channels, the PRC Government was able to influence 
policy unofficially. 
 
Nevertheless, the PRC Government is located in a relatively 
detached position. During the Article 23 debate, negative coverage mainly 
focused on the SAR Government. Criticisms of the PRC Government were 
limited. More importantly, most Hong Kong newspapers are not allowed to 
circulate in Mainland China. In other words, the pressure from the Hong 
Kong press on the PRC Government was very limited. This detached 
position also resulted in the PRC Government’s insensitivity and delayed 
response to the domestic political environment in Hong Kong. Consequently, 
the PRC Government was the last actor to change its position during the 
debate. This case demonstrates the limited influence of the local media. 
Whilst central government plays a crucial role in local policy, it is relatively 
insensitive to the local political environment, including criticisms expressed 
by the local media.     
 
The other non-domestic actors are western governments. During the 
debate on Article 23, western governments, mainly those of the US and the 
UK, kept expressing their concerns about the proposed law. Like the PRC 
Government, western governments are relatively detached from the 
domestic political system and media pressure in Hong Kong. During the 
debate on Article 23, however, there was evidence showing that both the 
Administration and the opposition took western governments’ views 
seriously. For example, following the July 1 protest, the Administration also 
proposed to delete the whole section on the proscription of organisations, 
which was the focus of western countries’ main objections.   
 
In short, the case of Article 23 demonstrates the role of non-
domestic actors in policy making. On the one hand, via various informal 
channels, these non-domestic actors are able to influence local government’s 
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domestic policy making. On the other hand, the local media are unable to 
put pressure on non-domestic actors as they are relatively detached from the 
local political system. In other words, their detached position enables non-
domestic actors to avoid being influenced by the domestic media.    
 
Taking all of these factors into account, I suggest that the media 
effects on political actors are specific to institutional position. Actors, in 
different positions of the political structure, adopt different strategies in 
order to maximise payoffs. Domestic actors, especially the Administration 
and the pro-government camp, mainly act under the constraints set by 
official channels. It is difficult for the Administration and the pro-
government camp to adjust their positions as they are constrained by the 
bureaucratic process of policy making, and partnership with the 
Administration, respectively. However, small size FCs and EC and the 
specific interests of voters enable the CE and pro-government politicians to 
have direct contact with their voters, weakening the role of the media. Thus, 
media influence on the Administration and the pro-government camp is 
weakened. Moreover, the Administration, with its constitutional powers, can 
manipulate policy change in order to respond to criticisms and minimise the 
loss of policy change.  
 
On the contrary, the opposition is relatively free to attack 
government policy in all aspects. As a minority in the Legco, pro-
government politicians link their campaigns with mass movements outside 
the establishment. In this case, their perceptions of critical coverage of 
government policy not only reinforce their ideas, but also encourage them to 
intensify their campaigns in order to magnify pressure on the 
Administration. In this case, there is a positive reinforcement relationship 
between critical coverage and the opposition’s actions.  
 
Being detached from the political system of Hong Kong, non-
domestic actors can avoid being influenced by the domestic media. Despite 
their lack of an official role, such actors can intervene in domestic policy 
making via various informal channels in order to achieve their goals.  
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This finding provides two important insights. First, it is consistent 
with the arguments within institutional rational choice theory mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Second, the non-domestic actors’ influence demonstrates not 
only the limitations of traditional concepts of media-state relations, but also 
the complex relations between domestic policy making and supernational 
bodies. These two points will be discussed later.  
 
3. News Coverage and Public Opinion 
The other finding in this study is policymakers’ understanding of the 
relations between news coverage and public opinion. This issue is important 
because it can help explain why and how media coverage can influence 
policymakers’ decisions. From this, the influential powers of different 
media outlets can be assessed.    
 
Some previous studies suggest that policymakers usually get a sense 
of public attitudes from the media (e.g. Entman 2000:21-2, Kull and 
Ramsay 2000:105). However, the findings from interviews with officials, 
legislators and journalists show that there are various understandings of the 
relations between news coverage and public opinion. The hypothesis on 
media-public opinion relations is not supported for four reasons.  
 
First, most policymakers have doubts about the representative role of 
the media, although some of them agree that the media reflect public views. 
For the Administration and the pro-government camp, media coverage is 
important because it can influence public opinion. For example, the 
Administration and Exco members claimed that it was critical coverage that 
changed public attitudes towards the Article 23 proposal (interview with 
Cheng Yiu-tong on 2 January 2008). During the debate on GST, the 
Administration also complained that the news coverage did not lead the 
public to discuss the tax base problem2. Most legislators also claimed that 
they paid a great deal of attention to the press because they believed that 
coverage may influence their readers. In other words, for those 
policymakers, public opinion is considered to be a dependent variable which 
                                               
2 MPDN, 25 July 2006, page A04; ODN, 5 September 2006, page A08 
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can be influenced by news coverage. If the ideas of a particular group 
dominate news coverage, public attitudes are likely to become favourable to 
these ideas. This argument explains why the Administration tries to 
manipulate coverage by all means possible during the debates on issues. 
 
Second, although some policymakers claim that they can learn about 
public response to an issue through news coverage, this is just one of the 
channels through which public opinion can be assessed. In fact, the 
Administration and most political parties conduct opinion polls during 
policy debates. Policymakers also pay attention to surveys carried out by 
independent institutes, such as universities. As there are various channels to 
assess public views, policymakers sometimes realise the difference between 
news framing and public opinion. Even if survey data is not available, 
legislators claim that they can estimate the opinions of different sectors 
according to their own experience or gut feeling (interviews with Choy So-
yuk on 21 May 2007, Kwok Ka-ki on 31 January 2008 and Sin Chung-kai 
on 11 November 2008). In these circumstances, the influence of critical 
coverage depends on whether news framing matches data concerning other 
sources of opinion and policymakers’ judgments. For example, while all the 
three selected newspapers ran negative coverage during the OSFP debate, 
the opinion polls by various parties showed that a majority of the public 
supported the government project. Thus, media pressure on the 
Administration was weakened. This also explains why the Administration 
acted against news coverage, speeding up the demolition work. 
 
Thirdly, all the legislators interviewed believed that the media did 
not simply report the ‘facts’. Rather, they perceived that the media 
highlighted opinions according to news values, the organisations’ political 
stances and market positions. In this case, different media frame the same 
issue in different ways. Policymakers tend to interpret the implications of 
coverage according to their understanding of media organisations’ political 
stances. As Lee Wing-tat says, ‘If you read the news without an analytical 
mind, this will result in a panic.’ (Interview on 23 January 2008) From this 
perspective, pro-democrat politicians are not surprised when they are 
criticised by pro-government newspapers. Similarly, the critical coverage 
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run by pro-democrat newspapers have relatively little effect on the 
Administration and the pro-government camp.  
 
Nevertheless, policymakers claimed that through the press they can 
get the information they need, including the issues highlighted by the media 
(interview with Cheng Yiu-tong on 2 January 2008) and the latest 
arguments and tendencies of their opponents (interviews with Tam Yiu-
chung on 16 January 2008, Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008 and Lee Wing-
tat on 23 January 2008). In other words, although newspapers with clear 
tendencies exert a limited influence on policymakers, these newspapers 
function as communicators or information providers for policymakers.  
 
In addition to political stances, policymakers also take account of 
media market positions. The Administration believes that people seldom 
take the coverage of popular press seriously. Thus, the influence of those 
newspapers is limited. On the contrary, the reader profile of elitist papers 
mainly covers the middle class, intellectuals, professionals who pay 
relatively high attention to coverage (off the record briefing by an official on 
22 January 2008). In this case, the Administration is relatively sensitive to 
elitist papers’ coverage, spending much effort lobbying those journalists 
(interview with Journalist A on 29 January 2008). From this perspective, for 
the Administration, MPND as the best selling elitist newspaper is more 
influential than the two best selling popular newspapers, the ODN and ADN.  
 
Finally, perhaps most significantly, news coverage is only one 
channel via which general public attitudes can be assessed. For most of the 
legislators interviewed, the views of their own supporters are more 
important than general public opinion. For the legislators returned by FCs, 
the voters come from various business and professional sectors. For the GCs, 
most of the DAB’s voters are pro-government grassroots supporters, while 
the supporters of the pro-democrat camp mainly belong to the lower and 
middle classes. In order to hold their seats in the Legco, legislators have to 
consider their supporters’ views even though general public opinions are 
also taken into account (interview with Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008 
and Sin Chung-kai on 11 November 2008).  
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As the views of particular groups are unlikely to be reflected in the 
media, legislators usually prefer to assess their supporters’ views through 
direct contact and community networks, although such approaches are 
unsystematic and inefficient. In fact, direct contact and personnel networks 
are particularly important for the legislators of small-size FCs with a few 
hundred or a few thousand voters. Thus, media influence on such FC 
legislators and their voters is relatively limited. For the GCs with at least a 
few hundred thousand voters, legislators rely more on the media (interview 
with Selina Chow on 16 January 2008). However, thanks to the compact 
living environment in Hong Kong, GC legislators are also informed of their 
voters’ views through party networks and community activities organised by 
their district offices (interviews with Jasper Tsang on 17 January 2008 and 
Lee Wing-tat on 23 January 2008). In this case, media influence is 
weakened. 
 
In sum, this study finds that policymakers’ understanding of the 
media-public opinion relationship is much more complex than previous 
studies have suggested. Policymakers pro-actively monitor the news 
coverage of various newspapers for two reasons. First, policymakers believe 
that public views may be influenced by news coverage. This explains why 
all political actors try the best to promote their ideas in order to dominate 
news coverage during a debate. Second, the media serve as communicators 
to provide information, including the arguments and tendencies of their 
opponents. 
 
Nevertheless, policymakers are not simply informed about public 
opinion by news coverage. For policymakers, public opinions may be 
assessed via various channels. News coverage is only one of range of 
alternative information sources covering public views. Moreover, for 
legislators, their supporters’ views are more important than the general 
public’s attitudes. Thus, politicians intend to learn about their voters’ views 
through direct contact and the party’s community networks. The media 
influence on policymakers is weakened in these cases. In addition, 
policymakers assess the implications of coverage according to the media’s 
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political tendencies and market positions and try to avoid being influenced 
by the ‘biased’ coverage of newspapers with clear political stances. The 
Administration also believes that elitist newspapers are more influential than 
popular newspapers, and make a great deal of effort to lobby the journalists 
of elitist newspapers. In these circumstances, the influence of some media 
outlets is further weakened.  
 
In short, I argue that it is necessary to discriminate between different 
groups of policymakers, each with their own understanding of the 
implications of different kinds of media outlets. This study finds that 
policymakers in Hong Kong usually avoid being influenced by the coverage 
of newspapers with clear political stances. In addition, the Administration 
and the pro-government politicians consider elitist newspapers to be more 
influential than popular ones although legislators believe that both types of 
newspapers may influence people’s views. From this perspective, it is 
reasonable to argue that MPND as the best selling elitist and centrist 
newspaper is the most influential of the three selected newspapers although 
the policymakers also keep a close eye on the pro-democrat ADN and the 
pro-government ODN.  
 
4. Generalisability and Contribution of this Thesis 
Due to the uniqueness of each country and each policy area, it is 
difficult to make generalisations about media-policy relations from only one 
case study. However, I suggest that, because of the consistency between the 
findings of this study and some well-established studies, it is possible to 
generalise from some major arguments of this thesis to other policy areas 
and other countries, including both domestic and foreign policies in the US. 
Furthermore, I suggest that this thesis can make contributions to the field of 
the media-policy relation by supplementing these well-established models.  
 
First of all, the previous studies of media-policy relations quoted in 
this thesis are mainly based on the US experience. It is believed that news 
coverage is relatively likely to influence policy if the media such as those in 
the US play a relatively independent role, with freedom to criticise the 
government during a policy debate. In this circumstance, the features of the 
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media system are critical to the possibility of the media’s influence. As the 
media system in Hong Kong shares several important common features with 
those in liberal countries such as the US, the findings in Hong Kong can be 
generalised to the US situation to some extent. 
 
As Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggest, the media system in North 
America and Europe can be classified according to three models, namely, 
the democratic corporatist model represented by Northern continental 
Europe, the polarized pluralist model represented by Mediterranean 
countries in southern Europe, and the North Atlantic or liberal model 
including Britain, Ireland, Canada and the US. Despite substantial internal 
differences between the four liberal countries, the authors argue that there 
are important common features of the liberal media systems in these 
countries. First, there are the early development and overwhelming 
dominance of commercial newspapers with relatively little state 
involvement, while partisan papers are marginalised. Second, there is a 
tradition of political neutrality within journalism. Apart from the British 
case, the political parallelism between the media and political parties is 
weak. Third, there is a relative strongly developed journalistic 
professionalism which leans towards politically neutrality and the notion of 
‘objectivity’. Even in Britain, where political parallelism is strong, 
journalists have their own set criteria for the selection and presentation of 
news. In this circumstance, instrumentalisation of the media by their owners 
is diminished (ibid: 217-22). Finally, the autonomous legal system and the 
separation of the civil service from party politics not only establishes a 
culture with a notion and preference for neutral professionalism, but also 
provides an authoritative source of politically neutral information and 
reduces the tendency for media owners to form alliances with political 
parties (ibid: 243-6). 
 
The media system in Hong Kong is similar to those of liberal 
countries in several respects. First, as mentioned in Chapter 4, since the 
early 1970s, the media system in Hong Kong has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by commercial media, while the partisan newspapers controlled 
by the CCP and KMT have been marginalised. The government also plays a 
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minimal role in regulating the media, particularly in the press market. 
Although the ideology of the press system parallels the political spectrum, 
the connection between the major media outlets and political parties is weak 
and informal. As the cases of OSFP and GST demonstrate, even a pro-
government paper may criticise the administration at times. More 
importantly, centrist papers such as the MPDN, play a significant and 
independent role during political debates. Journalistic professionalism is 
also strongly developed. Since the 1970s, balanced reporting has been 
established as a professional norm among Hong Kong journalists (Chan 
1992: 116). Most journalists also emphasise the watchdog function of the 
media (Chan and So: 2003: 259-61, Chan and Lee, 2007:158-9). The 
independent legal system and politically neutral civil service in Hong Kong 
also favour the cultural context for the development of politically neutral 
professionalism. From this perspective, I suggest that this thesis’s findings 
concerning the media’s performance during policy debates can be 
generalised to the other liberal countries. 
 
Secondly, some well-established models of domestic and foreign 
policy are not only consistent with, but also supplemented by the major 
arguments of this thesis. These arguments are that, according to the 
institutional rational choice approach, the influence of the media varies 
among different actors in different positions with different power, working 
within different constraints and adopting different strategies. In addition, I 
suggest that policy outcomes result from the interaction between actors’ 
beliefs and short-term and long-term public views.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the institutional rational choice approach 
is deployed by some models of domestic policy in the US. According to 
Kingdon, political actors are motivated by a combination of their concern 
about certain problems, their self-interest and their policy values (Kingdon 
1984:129, 214). Key government decision makers have less need for media 
coverage, whilst advantaged actors might need media coverage more to 
exert an influence on policy (ibid:64). In other words, Kingdon recognises 
that relations between the media and political actors vary with different 
positions. Kingdon also highlights the role of public opinion, claiming that, 
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as a component of the political stream, it can set limits on and affect an 
agenda of subjects (ibid:152).  
 
The institutional rational choice approach and the concept of policy 
image are also key elements in Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated 
equilibrium model. According to this model, the stability of policy and 
institutions is maintained by two forces, namely policy venues (institutional 
policymaking locations) and policy image measured by long-term news 
framing (ibid: 15). Since a single policy may affect groups of people in 
different ways, different people, including proponents and opponents of a 
policy, can hold different images of that policy. Members of existing venues 
tend to manipulate policy image to their advantage, while disadvantaged 
interests often re-define events in order to attract the attention of 
government officials, the mass media and the public (ibid: 8-12, 25-9).  
 
However, Kingdon (1984) does not provide evidence of relations 
between media and institutional position. Neither does he further distinguish 
between different kinds of public views. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
focus mainly on long-term relations between policy image and policy 
change. However, the short-term influence of the media was not examined. 
The in-depth case study of this thesis not only supports Kingdon and 
Baumgartner and Jones’s arguments, but also explains how the actors in 
different positions adopt different strategies in response to short-term news 
coverage. 
 
Not only the models of domestic policy, but also the study of foreign 
policy, highlight the importance of the long-term image of issues and actors’ 
institutional positions, strategies and beliefs. For examples, according to his 
cascading activation model, Entman (2003) considers framing as a process 
of contestation in which government officials, political elites and journalists 
exercise political influence over each other and over the public (ibid: 417). 
He describes the framing process as cascading waterfalls operating on 
several levels, namely the administration (including the president and top 
officials), other elites (including Congress members and lobbyists), the 
national media (including journalists, producers and publishers), news 
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coverage and the public. The outcomes of frame contests can be explained 
by four variables, namely motivations (including economic pressure, 
incentives, norms and values), power and strategies as well as cultural 
congruence. Because of its public relation skills and powers over policy 
making, the administration at the top level enjoys the highest ability to 
promote their ideas. By contrast, public opinion at the bottom of the cascade 
is usually a dependent variable. However, the ease with which a news frame 
can spread through different levels is determined by cultural congruence 
(ibid: 420-3). Taking the post 9/11 war on terrorism as an example, Entman 
(2003) argues that the Bush administration was ultimately successful in 
dominating the framing as cultural congruence already considered Iraq and 
Hussein as enemies and a terrorist threat (ibid: 428-9). 
 
Wolfsfeld (1997) also recognises the importance of actors’ 
institutional positions and strategies. Wolfsfeld considers the relationship 
between the media and political actors as can be explained by the exchange 
of information for publicity. Thus, power on either side is determined by 
news values, which depend on four main factors. The first is the level of 
political and social status, which relates to the formal and informal standing 
of actors in the social and political system. The second factor is the level of 
organisation and resources, which refers to the ability to produce 
newsworthy information and events. The third factor is the ability to carry 
out exceptional behaviour. The final factor is the level of control over the 
political environment including events, information flow and elite support 
(ibid: 13-25). Despite the inherent advantages in status and resources to 
produce exceptional important events, advantaged actors are not always able 
to fully control the political environment. When disadvantaged actors adopt 
strategies to create exceptional deviant events, circumventing the control 
over information flow of those in positions of power, or mobilise members 
of elites, they will attract media attention and promote conflictual news 
framing, consequently leading to an even higher level of elite mobilisation 
(ibid:24-30).  
 
Both Entman (2003) and Wolfsfeld (1997) recognise the importance 
of motivations (including interests and values) and the power and strategy of 
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actors, and that these factors vary according to institutional position. In 
addition, despite its ambiguous definition, the cultural factors highlighted by 
Entman are consistent with Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and this thesis’s 
concept of long-term policy image measured by long-term news framing. 
From this perspective, the arguments of this thesis are consistent with 
Entman and Wolfsfeld’s studies. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
rational institutional choice approach and the concept of policy image can 
be applied to the study of media-foreign policy relations. 
 
However, both Entman and Wolfsfeld’s studies concentrate on the 
influence of political actors on the media. Entman focuses mainly on the 
administration’s influence on news framing, while Wolfsfeld explains how 
disadvantaged groups influence the media agenda. Thus, the causational link 
between news coverage and policy outcomes remains unknown. For 
example, studying the case of the Palestinian Intifada beginning in 1987 
against Israeli occupation, Wolfsfeld argues that the Israeli government’s 
failure to control the political environment is one of the reasons why the 
Israeli and international media gave an advantage to Palestinians over 
Israelis (Wolfsfeld 1997:167-8). Quoting other researchers’ interviews with 
US officials, Wolfsfeld claims that the media was a ‘key contributing factor’ 
of the US’s decision to intervene in the dispute (ibid: 208-9). Apart from 
this, however, Wolfsfeld does not provide further evidence of the media’s 
influence on policy outcomes. The contribution of this thesis is not only to 
examine the influence of news coverage and other elements of policy 
theories in order to explain policy outcomes, but also to elaborate these 
arguments in terms of public policy theories, linking the disciplines of 
public policy and media studies.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis also argues that news media can run critical 
coverage, influencing domestic policy, regardless of the level of consensus 
between the administration and the pro-government camp. Although this 
argument is not supported by Robinson’s CNN effect model and indexing 
theories which are based on US foreign policy, it is consistent with other 
well-established theories based on domestic policy.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, Robinson’s (2002) assumptions 
concerning elite consensus-news framing relations are based on previous 
studies of manufacturing consent and indexing theories based on US foreign 
policy. For example, Bennett’s study of US press coverage of Nicaragua 
showed that the news framing was consistent with the views expressed by 
prominent foreign policy elites (Bennett, 1990:106-7). Only when there was 
an important debate within the centres of power, journalists would highlight 
the problem of executive policy (ibid:110). Hallin’s (1986) study of news 
coverage of the Vietnam War not only supports the ideas of indexing theory, 
but also highlights the role of public views and social values. He suggests 
that the journalist’s world is divided into three concentric circles. The sphere 
of consensus in the central region encompasses social values supported by 
journalists and society. The sphere of legitimate controversy in the middle 
region is that relating to legislative debates and issues recognised by major 
political elites, including Congress members and government officials. 
Beyond the sphere of legitimate controversy lies the sphere of deviance, the 
region of actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream 
reject as unworthy of being heard (ibid: 16-7). Despite complaints about the 
damage done by news coverage during the Vietnam War, Hallin found that 
the behaviour of the media was mainly related to the unity of the 
government and consensus in society at large. Critical coverage of the war 
occurred only after elite consensus and public support for the war declined. 
In addition, Hallin argues that most coverage was run within the spheres of 
consensus and legitimate controversy. In other words, the media reflected a 
consensus and debates by the major policymakers and rarely challenged 
consensus-led values within society.  
 
However, some studies of US domestic policy demonstrate that 
critical news framing may precede elite debate, triggering policy changes. 
For example, Kingdon (1984: 63-4) claims that the media not only pick up 
on and magnify some policymakers’ ideas and movements, but also may 
affect public opinion agendas and policymakers’ attention, influencing 
policy agendas. Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 103) also consider the 
shifting attention of the media as a major source of instability in policy. 
Although the authors do not focus on the relation between elite consensus 
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and news framing, they found that media attention sometimes precedes and 
sometimes follows on from changes in attention by government agencies. 
Thus, they argue that media coverage and policy institutions can affect each 
other (ibid: 125). From this perspective, not only in Hong Kong, but also in 
the US, there is evidence of media influence on domestic policy, regardless 
of the level of elite consensus. In this sense, it can be argued that the 
inconsistency in elite-media relations between this thesis and Robinson’s 
(2002) model is due to the difference in policy area rather than regional 
difference. In other words, this thesis’s argument concerning the media-elite 
consensus relation is likely to be applicable to domestic policy debate rather 
than to debate on foreign policy.    
    
Fourthly, two arguments in this thesis are basically consistent with 
Robinson’s (2002) findings. The first is that critical coverage is able to 
trigger relatively low cost policy change, while high cost change is unlikely 
to be influenced by the media. The second argument is that it is relatively 
easy for critical coverage to influence the policy at an early stage, such as 
when policy is under consultation and legislation. For the later policy stage 
policy, including those being implemented, news coverage is unlikely to be 
an influential factor. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Robinson found that news 
coverage was able to trigger the deployment of air power in the two cases of 
Bosnia, but was unable to influence ground troop operations in the Somalia 
and Iraq cases (ibid:121-6). Since this idea of policy stage is also modified 
from Robinson’s definition of policy uncertain in sense of absence of policy 
or wavering of policy (ibid: 26-7; 135-6). Thus, it is sensible to suggest that 
these two arguments are applicable to US foreign policy. 
 
Finally, this thesis suggests the asymmetric relations between the 
domestic media and non-domestic actors. These actors are not only 
relatively free from local media pressure, but are also able to influence 
domestic policy through informal channels. Although the central-local 
relationship between the PRC and SAR governments is unique, the findings 
of this thesis are consistent with Linsky’s (1986) findings concerning the 
Social Security disability review in the US in the 1980s. The White House 
did not respond to the criticisms by the local press in 1980. Near the end of 
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1981, however, the White House became involved suddenly when this 
critical coverage began to move to Washington, and to television (Linsky 
1986:109-10).  
 
Moreover, the roles of western governments in the Article 23 debate 
provides important insights into the complexity of domestic policy making 
in the age of globalization, which implies a degree of functional integration 
between internationally dispersed political and economic activities, 
international organisations and international laws (Dicken 1992:1). In fact, 
although it is not new to suggest a global influence on domestic policy 
making (e.g. Peterson 1995; Held and McGrew 1993), previous studies of 
the media-policy model usually presume an autonomous state and neglect 
the role of non-domestic actors. However, in some cases, the autonomy of 
the domestic government is influenced by non-domestic actors, including 
supernational organisations (e.g. the EU) and international organisations 
(e.g. WTO, IMF) and even individual states (e.g. the US). In order to 
develop a sophisticated model for the media-policy relationship, it is 
necessary to examine the media’s influence and informal politics in cases 
that involve both domestic and non-domestic actors. In this sense, the 
findings concerning media-non-domestic actors may not only be generalised 
to cover central-local relations, but also provide significant insights for 
studying the media-policy relation in the age of globalisation.  
 
Despite the consistency of the findings between this thesis and 
previous studies, it should be noted that some unique features of the Hong 
Kong context may affect the generalisability of this study. The first one is 
the legitimacy of the Hong Kong Government. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
the political system of Hong Kong has become controversial since 1980s. 
The SAR CE is returned by an election committee and is appointed by the 
PRC Government. In addition, the pro-government camp dominates the 
Legco seats returned by this election committee and functional 
constituencies with only a limited number of voters. Thus, the legitimacy of 
the CE and pro-government legislators is always challenged by the 
opposition. By contrast, the Legco seats returned by geographical 
constituencies are dominated by the democrats. In this sense, a majority of 
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the public tends to support the pro-democrat camp. In other words, the pro-
democrat camp enjoys a high degree of legitimacy although it occupies a 
minority position in the Legco with limited power over policy making. As 
the media intend to provide coverage for legitimate voices, it is not 
surprising that democrats can trigger considerable critical coverage despite a 
consensus between the administration and the pro-government camp. From 
this perspective, the occurrence of critical coverage during elite consensus 
may be caused by the unique problem of the legitimacy of the Hong Kong 
Government. 
 
Second, as mentioned above, although news coverage is one of the 
channels through which to learn about general public opinion, politicians 
usually play high levels of attention to the views of their own voters in order 
to maintain their support. Because of the extremely compact living 
environment, politicians and their parties can establish community networks, 
communicating with their own voters directly. Most FC legislators are also 
able to have direct contact with their voters because of the small sizes of 
their constituencies. In these circumstances, politicians may ignore media 
coverage when they have a good understanding of their voters’ views. In 
other words, the media’s influence on policymakers is weakened by this 
compact environment and the size of some constituencies.   
 
Nevertheless, provided that these unique features of Hong Kong are 
kept in mind, the generalisability of the major arguments of this thesis is 
supported by consistency with well-established models of media-policy 
relations. Thus, it is appropriate to argue that, apart from the argument of the 
media-elite consensus relation which is applicable to domestic policy only, 
most of the arguments in this thesis can be generalised to cases of both 
foreign and domestic policies in the US. More importantly, this thesis not 
only supplements these models, but also incorporates the concepts of public 
policy theories into media-policy relations, linking the disciplines of public 
policy and media studies.    
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5. Problems of Research Design 
This thesis raises three problems of research design. The first one is 
the definition of policy change. As Robinson’s (2002) study mainly focuses 
on US military interventions, policy outcomes are considered either as 
action or inaction. This study shows that in the case of domestic policy 
making, there are various types of policy change, each with its fiscal and 
political costs and sensitivity to the media. Moreover, changes can be found 
not only in relation to policies under debate, but also from relevant policy 
areas. Thus, in the study of policy change, the changes in all relevant 
policies should be taken into account. Furthermore, it is necessary to define 
different types of change, each with its costs.   
 
The second problem is methodology. In most previous studies of 
media-policy relations, the analysis of news framing is usually based either 
on the study of policymakers’ perceptions (e.g. Linsky 1986; Davis 2007) or 
the quantitative analysis of news coverage (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Livingstone 1997; Robinson 2002). Both of these approaches have 
their advantages and limitations. Surveys and interviews with policymakers 
provide important insights into the key actors’ views on media coverage 
during decision making. Nevertheless, the findings are based on 
interviewees’ subjective interpretations and incomplete memory. The 
quantitative approaches provide a relatively systematic and reproducible 
analysis of news coverage. However, as Hansen et al (1998:95) argue, 
content analysis presumes that the frequency of specified characteristics of 
news coverage is associated with the intensity of the meaning or the impact 
of the text. However, there is no such simple relationship between media 
content and its reception and social implications. In other words, there is no 
simple causal relationship between critical news coverage and 
policymakers’ perceptions.  
 
This study demonstrates the possibility that policymakers’ 
perceptions on news framing are inconsistent with data derived from 
framing analysis. In the cases of GST and OSFP, the framing analysis 
shows that all the three selected newspapers ran substantial critical coverage, 
while policymakers perceived negative coverage. In the cases of CRIII and 
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Article 23, however, policymakers perceived negative framing even though 
media consensus over critical framing was low. In other words, the results 
of the framing analysis are consistent with policymakers’ perceptions when 
there is a high level of media consensus over critical framing. Nevertheless, 
sometimes policymakers may perceive negative news framing even though 
there is limited critical coverage. While these situations are open to 
interpretation, a comparison across the four cases provides an important 
insight into the relations between news framing and policymakers’ 
perceptions. When there is a high level of media consensus over negative 
framing, framing analysis is a valid method for studying policymakers’ 
perceptions. However, policymakers may perceive negative news framing 
despite the limited quantity of critical coverage. In this case, data derived 
from in-depth interviews should be taken as the chief reference, particularly 
when framing analysis demonstrates that media consensus is not high.  
 
Moreover, since policymakers’ perceptions on news framing are 
based on their own interpretations, it is difficult to determine the quantity of 
news coverage which can place pressure on policymakers. Moreover, media 
pressure is only one among many considerations of policymakers. In 
addition, policymakers’ sensitivity to media coverage and the weights of 
various considerations may vary from case to case. Thus, the qualitative 
analysis of policymakers’ perceptions is necessary when we study media 
effects on policy making. In this case, I suggest that quantitative analysis of 
news framing should be triangulated with other qualitative data such as 
those derived from in-depth interviews with policymakers or textual 
analysis of policymakers’ speeches. 
 
The third problem of research design is the scope of news coverage 
analysis. This study argues that policymakers become relatively sensitive to 
negative coverage in some circumstances. When there is long-term negative 
policy image or unfavourable short-term public attitudes towards the 
government and its policy, a limited amount of critical coverage may put 
high levels of pressure on government officials and the pro-government 
camp. However, people’s views are not independent variables. Neither are 
they affected only by the coverage of a particular issue. Rather, they can be 
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influenced by both long-term and short-term news coverage of various 
issues.  
 
Long term relations between media coverage and policy image are 
evidenced by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). However, their study mainly 
focuses on relations between policy change and the coverage of relevant 
policy areas. The influence of other coverage on public attitudes towards the 
government or policymakers is ignored. In the case of Article 23, several 
incidents, including the Asia Financial Crisis, the outbreak of SARS, the 
increase in salary tax and the Financial Secretary’s car purchase scandal, 
triggered considerable critical coverage of the government. The other study 
focusing on the July 1 protest also demonstrates that the discourse among 
selected papers, including the ODN, ADN and MPDN after 1 July, 
legitimated the protest and criticised the overall performance of the 
government (Chan and Lee, 2006). Although all this coverage was irrelevant 
to Article 23, high levels of pressure were placed on the Administration and 
the pro-government camp at that time. Thus, the Administration launched 
some initiatives, including amendments to Article 23 proposals, to ease 
media pressure. In other words, policy changes can be triggered, at least 
partially, by critical coverage of irrelevant issues. From this perspective, I 
suggest that the study of media effects on policy should take account both of 
short-term and long-term coverage looking at a wider scope. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Getting back to the core research question: ‘To what extent do the 
news media influence policy making?’  I conclude that it is possible for 
critical news coverage to create pressure on policymakers, influencing 
policy outcomes in some circumstances. However, news coverage cannot 
exert an influence all by itself. Rather, media effect is created by 
interactions between news coverage and various factors, including short-
term and long-term public views, and political actors’ ideas and strategies. 
Moreover, news coverage can only trigger relatively low cost changes such 
as minor amendments to government proposal. For high cost changes, 
including changes to policies under implementation and withdrawal of 
government proposals, media coverage is unlikely to be a sufficient 
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condition. In addition, the cost of policy change is not simply an 
independent variable. Rather, it is influenced by the policy stage. The early 
stage policy can be changed at a lower cost, while changes in later stage 
policy, such as those under implementation, usually involve high fiscal and 
political costs. From this perspective, media effects on policy are stage 
specific.  
 
Moreover, as political actors in different institutional positions face 
different institutional constraints and enjoy different institutional powers, 
they adopt different strategies, giving different responses to news coverage 
in order to maximise their payoffs. Thus, the media’s influence on 
policymakers varies between institutional positions. In other words, media 
effects on policymakers are institutionally position specific. This study also 
finds that policymakers become relatively sensitivity to news coverage 
when public views remain unfavourable both in the short-term and the long-
term. In this case, the media’s influence on policy is increased.  
 
Taking these arguments into account, I suggest that institutional 
rational choice theory provides a satisfactory explanation of media effects 
on policy. Being located in different institutional positions and facing 
different institutional contexts of policies at different stages and different 
public views, political actors follow different strategies to maximise their 
own interests or minimise their losses. The policy outcome results from the 
collective action of those individuals. 
 
In addition, this study raises the issues of research design. I argue 
that in addition to quantitative analysis of news coverage, qualitative 
analysis of policymakers’ interpretations on media implications is necessary, 
particularly when there is limited quantity of critical coverage. This 
qualitative analysis also helps assess the influence of different media outlets. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to take account of the wider scope of policy 
change, and the long-term coverage of wider scope which can influence the 
political environment.  
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7. Directions for Future Research 
Although I provide some insights into the media-policy relation, 
there are some limitations to this study. Thus, I suggest two possible 
directions for future research on the media influence on policy making. 
 
First, this thesis suggests that the media effects on policy may not 
only be caused by the short term coverage of a particular issue. The long 
term coverage of a wider scope may influence people’s attitudes towards the 
government and its policies, consequently putting pressure on policymakers, 
or increasing their sensitivity to other negative coverage. In order to further 
verify this argument and develop a sophisticated theoretical framework of 
the relation between policy outcomes and different sorts of news coverage, 
it is necessary to carry out larger scale research, including a wider scope of 
news coverage analysis and further analysis of different groups of 
policymakers’ perceptions on different types of news coverage.   
 
Second, this thesis argues that policymakers’ sensitivity to critical 
coverage may be influenced by various factors, including long term policy 
image and short-term government popularity and public attitudes towards 
the government policy. However, the relative weighting of these factors 
remain unknown. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
policymakers also become relatively sensitive to critical coverage in the 
time period close to elections. In all four cases, the Administration and the 
pro-government camp tried to settle the controversies before the election 
campaign period. Thus, it is difficult to isolate the influences of factors 
involving the public’s views from the election cycle.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the institutional contexts of 
policies vary between policy areas and policy stages. As Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993) argue, some policies are closely associated with particular 
levels of government or policy venues and that change is unlikely (ibid: 33). 
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that policies in different areas, with different 
potential and actual costs may show different levels of sensitivity to media 
pressure. In this study, the two cases involving later stage policy, namely 
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CRIII and OSFP are infrastructure projects which involved many high fiscal 
costs. Form this perspective, the persistence of CRIII and demolition of 
OSFP might be due the nature of development policy rather than policy 
stage.  
 
In order to address these problems, it is necessary to conduct a 
systematic comparison across the cases in the same policy area at different 
policy stages, and across the cases with similar long-term and short-term 
public views but at different stages in the election cycle. The weighting of 
the election cycle and the three elements of the people’s views can also be 
studied using a similar comparative approach. Of course, it is difficult to 
control all these variables in the real world. In this case, qualitative analysis, 
including in-depth interviews and textual analysis to study policymakers’ 
perceptions of various factors can provide supplementary information. 
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Appendix 1:  
Composition of the HKSAR Legislative Council 
 
Since the Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in 
the early 1980s, the colonial administration had developed representative 
government, holding district board elections. The first ever elections to the 
Legco were held in 1985. After the elections, there were 11 official 
members, and 46 unofficial members, of whom 22 were appointed by the 
Governor and 24 were elected by various functional constituencies. The 
Joint Declaration in 1984 also spelled out the agreement that both the 
British and Chinese governments would work together to resolve their 
differences in order to ensure a smooth transition - laying the groundwork 
for a ‘through train’, which meant that the pre-transfer Legco could remain 
in place throughout the transfer of sovereignty. Thus, the last colonial Legco 
elected in 1995 was considered to be the first Legco in the SAR according 
to the ordinary plan of the PRC Government.  
 
The Basic Law provides that the ultimate aim is the election of all 
legislators by universal suffrage. However, the composition of the Legco 
before 2007 was fixed by the Basic Law. Any changes to the composition of 
the Legco after 2007 should be made by a two-thirds majority of members 
of the SAR Legco along with the consent of the CE of the Hong Kong SAR. 
In addition, any such changes are to be reported to the NPCSC for record 
(Basic Law Annex II).   
 
However, the British Government changed its policy towards China 
after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. In 1991, the first ever direct 
elections to the Legco were held, with 18 (30%) of the Council’s members 
returned through direct election. In 1992, the last colonial Governor, Chris 
Pattern introduced his political reform proposal according to which nine of 
the functional constituencies (FCs) and the Election Committee (EC) 
constituency were redefined. The gist of this proposal is to secure a majority 
of pro-democrat groups in the legislature and thus control the legislature 
(Cheung 1997). In 1995, the last Legco under British rule became a fully 
elected legislature. Of its 60 members, 30 came from FCs, 20 were returned 
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by direct elections in geographical constituencies (GCs), and 10 were 
elected by the EC. The pro-democrat parties secured the majority of the 
seats.  
 
Due to an ongoing dispute between the British and Chinese over the 
proper interpretation of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law and other 
agreements, Beijing decided to establish its own Preliminary Working 
Committee, Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR which were composed 
of Chinese Officials, business people and pro-Beijing groups in Hong Kong. 
In addition, the ‘through train’ was replaced by establishing the Provisional 
Legislative Council (PLC) elected by the 400 members of the Selection 
Committee. Since the Selection Committee was elected by the appointed 
Preparatory Committee, membership of the PLC was thus tightly controlled 
by Beijing. As a result, most members of the PLC came from pro-Beijing 
groups. Only three pro-democrat members of the PLC were from the ADPL, 
which has a relatively mild attitude towards the PRC Government.  
 
In 1998, elections to the first Legco of the HKSAR were held. 
Although its composition was basically similar to that elected in 1995, nine 
FCs and ECs were refined to favour pro-government groups. As a result, the 
pro-Beijing camp secured a majority (see Table A1.1).  
 
Elections for the second term of the Legco were held in 2000. 
According to the Basic Law, 24 members were returned by GC through 
direct elections, six members by an EC, and 30 members by FCs. As the 
pro-government camp dominated the FCs and the EC, most legislators still 
came from pro-Beijing camp (see Table A1.2). In the third term of the 
Legco, elected in 2004, six seats returned by an EC were replaced by those 
from GC constituencies. Consequently, 30 legislators were returned GCs, 
while the remaining 30 were returned by FCs. Nevertheless, the pro-Beijing 
groups still maintained a majority in the Legco (see Table A1.3).  
 
In short, despite continual changes in the composition of the Legco, 
the pro-government camp maintained a majority in the Legco. In this case, 
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government proposals with the support of the pro-government legislators 
can be passed by the Legco. 
  
Table A1.1: Partisan distribution of the First Legco 
(Term of office from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2000) 
 Number of Seats 
 Pro-democrat 
Camp 
Pro-government Camp 
Constituency DP Others1 DAB FTU LP PA Others2 
Total 
GC 8 7 4 1 0 0 0 20 
FC 4 1 1 2 8 2 12 30 
EC 0 0 2 0 1 3 4 10 
Subtotal 12 8 7 3 9 5 16 60 
Total 20 40 60 
 
 
Table A1.2: Partisan distribution of the second Legco 
(Term of office from 1 July 2000 to 30 September 2004) 
 Number of Seats 
 Pro-democrat Camp Pro-government Camp 
Constituency DP ADPL Others3 DAB FTU LP PA Others4 
Total 
GC 9 1 7 5 1 0 1 0 24 
FC 4 0 2 2 2 8 1 12 30 
EC 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 6 
Subtotal 12 1 9 8 3 8 4 15 60 
Total 22 38 60 
 
 
Table A1.3: Partisan distribution of the Third Legco 
(Term of office from 1 October 2004 to 30 September 2008) 
 Number of Seats 
 Pro-democrat Camp Pro-government Camp 
Constituency DP ADPL CP5 Others6 DAB FTU LP Others7 
Total 
GC 6 1 3 8 8 1 2 1 30 
FC 2 0 3 2 2 2 8 11 30 
Subtotal 8 1 6 10 10 3 10 12 60 
Total 25 358 60 
 
                                               
1 Others included the Frontier, the CTU, the Citizens Party, the Neighbourhood & Worker’s 
Service Centre and other independent democrats 
2 Others included the Breakfast Group, the New Century Forum and other independent pro-
government legislators 
3 Others included the Frontier, the CTU, the Neighbourhood & Worker’s Service Centre 
and other independent democrats 
4 Others included the Breakfast Group, the New Century Forum and other independent pro-
government legislators 
5 The CP was found in 2006 
6 Others included the Frontier, the CTU, the Neighbourhood & Worker’s Service Centre 
and other independent democrats 
7 Others included the Alliance and other independent pro-government legislators. 
8 A DAB legislator, Ma Lik returned by GC died in August 2007. Subsequently, an 
independent democrat, Anson Chan was elected in the by-election in December 2007. Since 
then, the total number of pro-government legislators has decreased to 34, while that of the 
pro-democrat camp has increased to 26.  
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Appendix 2: 
Market Positions and Political Tendencies  
of the Major Newspapers in Hong Kong  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADN:  The Apple Daily News 
AM:   The AM 730 (Free paper) 
HD:   The Headline Daily News (Free paper) 
HKCD:  The Hong Kong Commercial Daily 
HKDN:  The Hong Kong Daily News 
HKEJ:  The Hong Kong Economic Journal 
HKET:  The Hong Kong Economic Times 
HKS:  The Hong Kong Standard (English paper) 
ODN:  The Oriental Daily News 
MPDN:  The Ming Pao Daily News 
SCMP:  The South China Morning Post (English paper) 
SP:   The Sing Pao 
STDN:  The Sing Tao Daily News 
TS:   The Sun 
TKP:  The Tai Kung Pao 
WWP:  The Wen Wei Po 
Pro-Beijing 
(Pro-Government) 
Pro-Democracy 
(Opposition) 
Popular 
Elitist 
 
WWP,TKP & 
HKCD 
HKET, HKS 
STDN 
SCMP 
HKEJ 
MPDN 
HKDN, SP & HD 
ODN & TS 
ADN 
AM 
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Appendix 3: 
The Guide for In-depth Interview with Policymakers 
 
 
Interviewee: 
Position:  
Date: 
Time: 
 
 
1. What do you consider when you study government policy? 
 
 
2. How do you decide to put an issue on agenda? 
 
 
3. How do you get to know the news coverage? 
 
 
4. Which media outlets, and which sort of coverage (local news, editorial, 
opinions and columns) do you use most? – select from the list attached.  
 
 
5. How do you describe your relations with the news media and 
journalists? 
 
 
6. In your experience, is there any case where you or your party’s decision 
was influenced by media coverage? 
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閣下最經常從那些媒體獲得本地新聞資訊？  
請在有關媒體旁加上ˇ號  (可選多項)  
     
電視：    電台：   
無綫電視 翡翠台    商業一台   
無綫電視 明珠台    商業二台   
亞洲電視 本港台    香港電台 第一台   
亞洲電視 國際台    香港電台 第二台   
有線電視    香港電台 第三台   
now 寛頻電視    香港電台 第四台   
香港寛頻    香港電台 普通話台   
其他 (請註明)：    新城 娛樂台   
   新城 財經台   
   其他 (請註明)：   
報章      
東方日報      
蘋果日報      
太陽報      
明報      
South China Morning Post      
香港經濟日報      
信報      
星島日報      
Hong Kong Standard      
成報      
新報      
文匯報      
大公報      
China Daily      
香港商報      
頭條日報      
AM730      
都市日報      
其他 (請註明)：      
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若報章是閣下其中一個獲得新聞資訊的渠道，  
請在閣下最經常閱讀的報章版面旁加上√ 號(可選多項)： 
     
     
版面      
要聞 / 頭條      
港聞      
國際新聞      
中國 / 兩岸新聞      
經濟 / 財經新聞      
社評      
論壇 / 評論文章      
副刊 / 專欄      
娛樂      
其他 (請註明)：      
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Appendix 4:  
The Guide for In-depth Interview with Journalists 
 
Interviewee: 
Position:  
Date: 
Time: 
 
 
1. How do you decide on the framing of a news story? 
 
 
2. To what extent do you consider your paper’s political stance when you 
prepare a news story? 
 
 
3. To what extent do you consider your paper’s market position when you 
prepare a news story? 
 
 
4. How do you describe your relations with the information sources? 
 
 
5. Did you get any official and politician’s response to the coverage?   
 
 
6.  Do you intend to influence policy outcome through the new coverage?   
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Appendix 5: Interview Consent Form 
 
Study on Policy Making and the News Media in Hong Kong 
 
Conducted by Bing-Kwan Chan,  
School of Political, Social and International Studies, 
University of East Anglia, UK 
 
Consent Form 
 
I, ____________ of ________________, hereby agree to 
participate in the study on policy making and the news media in 
Hong Kong conducted by Mr. Bing-Kwan Chan of School of 
Political, Social and International Studies of University of East 
Anglia. I agree to let Mr. Chan use the information I provided for 
research purposes. All information I provided should not be used 
for purposes other than what is stated above without my 
permission. 
 
I am free to terminate my participation in this research project. 
 
I *agree / disagree to let Mr. Chan acknowledge the participation 
of mine or my organization in his thesis. 
 
I understand and accept the above request. 
 
 
Signature of interviewee : ______________________ 
 
Date: __________________________ 
 
 
Signature of interviewer : ______________________ 
 
Date: __________________________ 
 
*Please delete as appropriate 
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香港公共政策制訂與新聞媒體的研究 
由 University of East Anglia, School of Political, Social and 
International Studies 研究生 陳炳坤先生負責 
 
同意書 
 
本人＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 為 ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ (機構
名稱)之 ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ (職位)，現同意參與由英國
University of East Anglia, School of Political, Social and 
International Studies的陳炳坤先生所進行有關香港公共政策
制訂與新聞傳體的研究。本人同意陳先生將個人訪問的內容
作學術研究用途。除上述用途外，若非得本人同意，所有訪
問內容均不得作其他用途。 
 
本人可隨時終止參與此項研究。 
 
本人 *同意 / 不同意 陳先生在研究報告及論文中鳴謝本人
或本人所代表的機構。 
 
本人明白以上內容，並簽署以作證明。 
 
受訪者簽署：＿＿＿＿＿ 訪問者簽署：__________________ 
日期：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 日期：_________________________ 
 
*請删除不適用的選擇。 
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Appendix 6: 
Chronology of Major Events in the Case of Article 23 
 
Time Events 
Early 2001 Some pro-government politicians suggested enacting Article 23 in 
order handle the Falun Gong issues in Hong Kong1 while some 
human rights groups and foreign governments expressed their 
concern about the freedom of Hong Kong2. 
8 Feb 2001 The CE claimed that Falun Gong members in Hong Kong had 
intensified their effort on the activities against the PRC 
Government, and that the sect bore some characteristics of an ‘evil 
cult’3. However, the CE stressed that the Administration would 
not expedite Article 23 legislation4. 
9 Feb 2001 The delegation of the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
claimed that it would keep a close eye on any move by the SAR 
Government to introduce anti-subversion and anti-sedition laws5. 
26 Feb 2001 The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor decided to ask the legal 
experts to study Article 236.  
27 Feb 2001 The US State Department and the British’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office also announced their reports on Hong 
Kong. Both governments expressed concerns over Article 23 
legislation7.  
19 Aug 2001 The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor urged the Administration 
to abolish Article 238. 
26 Feb 2002 The SAR Secretary for Security, Regina Ip claimed that it was the 
responsibility of the CE in his second term to enact the law 
against treason and subversion9.  
26 Feb 2002 DP and various pro-democrat groups urged the Administration to 
announce the details of the bill, claiming that there was no need to 
enact Article 2310. 
27 Feb 2002 The SAR Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung disclosed that Article 
23 was discussed in her meeting with LI Peng, the NPC Chairman 
of PRC. Meanwhile, the Vice-Chairman of the NPC's Legislative 
Affairs Commission, Qian Xiaoyang, stated that the SAR should 
introduce a subversion law as soon as possible11. 
28 Feb 2002 Tung Chee-hwa was elected uncontested in the second CE 
election12. 
                                               
1 MPDN, 1 February 2001, page A01; 4 February, 2001, page A02. 
2 MPDN, 5 February 2001, page A07; 8 February, 2001, page A01; 28 February 2001, 
page A04. 
3 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200102/08/0208139.htm 
4 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200102/08/0208178.htm 
5 MPDN 10 February 2001, page A10. 
6 MPDN, 27 February 2001, page A06. 
7 MPDN 28 February 2001, page A04. 
8 MPDN, 20 August 2001, page A13. 
9 MPDN, 27 February 2001, page A02. 
10 MPDN, 27 February 2002, page A02; Speech by the Chairman of Bar Association, Alan 
Leong: 
http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/chairman-corner/speeches/2002/chinese_speech_060402.d
oc 
11 MPDN, 28 February 2001, page A04. 
12 Result of CE election 2002: http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/chief/result.htm 
 395 
25 Jun 2002 The PRC Vice-Premier, Qian Qichen said that the laws against 
and treason and subversion were compulsory, and that he hoped 
the SAR Government would decide if Article 23 would be enacted 
as soon as possible13. 
1 Jul 2002 The PRC President, Jiang Zemin, said that Hong Kong people 
should continuously enhance their national consciousness, 
consciously ensured the national security and unity, and defended 
the national interest14.  
2 Jul 2002 The CE claimed that Article 23 should be enacted as it was the 
responsibility of Hong Kong15. 
18 Jul 2002 A pro-Taiwan trade union worried that the pro-Taiwan groups in 
Hong Kong would possibly offend the anti-secession law 
unwittingly in the future16. 
21 Jul 2002 A pro-democrat legislator first suggested that the Administration 
should publish a white bill for consultation before issuing the blue 
bill for legislation17.  
2 Aug 2002 The MPDN quoted a government source, claiming that the 
Administration had finished the study of Article 23, and that 
public consultation would be launched soon18. 
8 Sep 2002 About 30 pro-democrat groups set up a coalition, launching a 
campaign against the proposed anti-subversion laws19. 
13 Sep 2002 The MPDN disclosed that some expression in words might give 
rise to criminal liability according to the proposed anti-sedition 
law20.  
13 Sep 2002 Elise Leung claimed that sometimes people had to bear legal 
responsibility for their words21. 
24 Sep 2002 The Administration released a consultation paper on Article 23 
and launched a three-month public consultation22. 
24 Sep 2002 Various groups, including the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of 
the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, the HKJA and 
Falun Gong in Hong Kong and some pro-Taiwan groups, 
expressed their worries about the different aspects of the proposal 
laws23. 
25 Sep 2002 Regina Ip first disclosed that she hoped the proposed law would 
be passed by July 2003, and that she was happy with the positive 
feedback from the public and the relative mild comments and 
coverage of the media24.  
26 Sep 2002 Regina Ip, in a radio programme, resisted publishing a white bill 
for consultation25. 
 
                                               
13 MPDN, 26 June 2002, page A04. 
14 MPDN, 2 July 2002, page A12. 
15 MPDN, 3 July 2002, page A08. 
16 MPDN, 19 July 2002, page A14. 
17 ADN, 22 July 2002, page A13. 
18 MPDN, 2 August 2002, page A08. 
19 MPDN, 9 September 2002, page A08. 
20 MPDN, 13 September 2002, page A02. 
21 MPDN, 14 September 2002, page A04. 
22 Security Bureau of the HKSAR (2002) Consultation Document on the Proposals to 
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/consult/2002/bl23-e.pdf 
23 MPDN, 25 September 2002, page A01; The HKJA’s press release dated 24 September 
2002:  
http://www.hkja.org.hk/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1-574&lang=en-US 
24 MPDN, 26 September 2002, page A06. 
25 ADN, 27 September 2002, page A10 
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3 Oct 2002 The Hong Kong Catholic Church expressed its worries about the 
proposed laws26. 
12 Oct 2002 About 30 pro-democrat groups formed a coalition called Civil 
Human Rights Front, launching a campaign against the enactment 
of Article 2327. 
15 Oct 2002 The libraries of universities voiced their worries about some 
aspect of the proposed laws28. 
Oct – Nov 
2002 
DP legislators visited the US and Europe, lobbying the politicians 
and senior officials against Article 23 legislation29. 
25 Oct 2002 The PRC Vice-Premier, Qian Qichen in a television interview, 
supported the enactment of Article 23 and queried the voice 
against the proposed laws 2330. 
26 Oct 2002 After the meeting with the PRC President, the US President Bush 
expressed his concerns on the human rights in China and Hong 
Kong31. 
28 Oct 2002 70 pro-government groups formed a ‘Hong Kong Coalition for 
National Security Legislation’, launching a joint declaration and a 
series of activities supporting the enactment of Article 2332.   
06 Nov 2002 The Administration released a booklet ‘Myths and Facts’ to 
explain its proposals33.  
12 Nov 2002 15 Catholic and Protestant groups announced a joint statement, 
calling on the 700 thousand Christians in Hong Kong to sign the 
petition opposing the enactment of Article 2334. 
Nov 2002 The SAR Department of Justice took a tour to the US, explaining 
the Administration proposals to the media, politicians and officials 
there35. 
17 Nov 2002 Ten international human rights groups in Hong Kong announced a 
joint statement, urging the Hong Kong Government to withdraw 
the plan to enact Article 2336. 
24 Nov 2002 The HKJA claimed that about 900 journalists signed the petitions 
opposing the enactment of Article 2337. 
27 Nov 2002 In the British Parliament, the chairman of the Hong Kong 
committee called a debate on the implementation of Article 2338. 
8 Dec 2002 Some pro-democrat legal experts, formed an Article 23 Concern 
Group, distributing a series of booklets criticising the national 
security law proposals39.  
15 Dec 2002 60 thousand people joined the anti-Article 23 match organised by 
the Civil Human Rights Front40. 
 
 
                                               
26 MPDN, 4 October 2002, page A06. 
27 MPDN, 13 October 2002, page A08. 
28 MPDN, 16 October 2002, page A17. 
29 MPDN, 25 October 2002, page A10; 13 November 2002, page A08. 
30 MPDN, 26 October 2002, page A02. 
31 MPDN, 27 October 2002, page A02. 
32 MPDN, 29 October 2002, page A06. 
33 MPDN, 7 November 2002, page A10. 
34 MPDN, 13 November 2002, page A08. 
35 MPDN, 14 November 2002, page A16; 27 November 2002, page A12. 
36 MPDN, 18 November 2002, page A14. 
37 MPDN, 25 November 2002, page A10. 
38 Lords Hansard, Volume 641, Part 9, 27 November 2002:  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo021127/text/21127-02.htm
#21127-02_head0 
39 MPDN, 9 December 2002, page A17; 23 December 2002, page A06. 
40 MPDN, 16 December 2002, page A02. 
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17 Dec 2002 The Administration launched a new series of leaflets called 
‘Myths and the Truth’, retorting upon the Article 23 Concern 
Group41. 
2 Dec 2002 David Li, a legislator returned by the Financial Constituency, 
claimed that at least 10 foreign banks in Hong Kong42. 
19 Dec 2002 About 1500 pro-government groups advertised their statements 
backing Article 23 on the newspapers43. 
22 Dec 2002 About 40 thousand people from 200 pro-government groups 
jointed a rally to back the national security law proposals44. 
24 Dec 2002 The public consultation ended. The Administration received a 
record high 90,000 submissions and 300,000 signatures when45. 
14 Jan 2003 Regina Ip claimed that the opposition’s comments on the proposal 
laws misled the public46. 
15 Jan 2003 The pro-democrat legislators criticised Regina Ip’s attitude and 
queried whether she was suitable for conducting the consultation 
and analysis on the outcome of the consultation47.  
19 Jan 2003 The Civil Human Rights Front urged Regina Ip to step down48. 
28 Jan 2008 The Administration published a compendium of 
submissions, claiming that more than half of the 
submissions were categorized as supportive49.      
Meanwhile, Regina Ip announced several amendments to the 
government proposals50. 
29 Jan 2003 Some news coverage challenged the Administration’s 
classification of submissions51 while some academics raised some 
doubts about the Administration’s analysis of consultation 
results52. 
14 Feb 2003 The Administration gazetted the National Security (Legislative 
Provisions) Bill. The Administration also added some provisions 
about the proscribed organisations to the Bill53. 
14 Feb 2003 The US General Consul claimed that the Administration had taken 
the public views into account54. 
26 Feb 2003 The Bill was first read in the Legco. 
Mar-Jun 2003 Some pro-democrat legislators went to the US, the UK and 
Europe for lobbying the government officials and the delegates of 
European Parliament and European Union against the Article 23 
proposals55. 
                                               
41 MPDN, 18 December 2002, page A04. 
42 MPDN, 3 December 2002, page A04. 
43 MPDN, 19 December 2002, page A08. 
44 MPDN, 11 December 2002, page A05; 23 December 2002, page A03. 
45 MPDN, 25 December 2002, page A04. 
46 MPDN, 15 January 2003, page A06 
47 Minute of Legco Panel on Security on 15 January 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/panels/se/minutes/se030115.pdf 
48 MPDN, 20 January 2003, page A03 
49 MPDN 29 January 2003, page A03. 
50 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200301/28/0128198.htm  
51 MPDN, 29 January 2003, page A03. 
52 Chung, R. T.Y. and Choy, B, S.T. ‘Casting Doubts on the Compendium of Submissions’, 
POP column dated 29 January 2003, The Public Opinion Programme, the University of 
Hong Kong:  http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns2.html 
53 National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, Clause 154, Section 8E:  
http://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/download/s3200307077.pdf 
54 MPDN, 15 February 2003, page A06. 
55 MPDN, 27 March 2003, page A16; 7 June 2003, page A11; 9 June 2003, page A10; 26 
June 2003, page A11; 27 June 2003, page A14 
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Mar – Jun 
2003 
The Bills Committee held 29 meetings and public hearings 
intensively. 110 groups attended hearings, expressing their views. 
5 Mar 2003 Two pro-government legislators were elected as the Chairman and 
Deputy-Chairman of the Bills Committee56. 
17 Mar 2003 The UK Foreign Office Minister urged the Hong Kong 
Government to ensure the final legislation is consistent with the 
spirit of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law57. 
24 Mar 2003 The House Committee of the Legco decided to accord priority to 
the scrutiny of the Bill58. 
13 Apr 2003 The Civil Human Rights Front called on their members and the 
public to take on the street on 1 July59. 
16 May 2003 The US General Consul claimed that Article 23 legislation might 
affect the international community’s confidence to Hong Kong60. 
3 Jun 2003 The Administration announced to table 51 amendments to the 
Bill, including two proposed by the DAB and the LP61. 
4 Jun 2003 The PRC President Hu Jintao stated that worries about Article 23 
were unnecessary and that the legislation would have beneficial 
effects on both national security and stability in Hong Kong62. 
17 Jun 2003 The International Relations Committee of the US House of 
Representatives passed a resolution, expressing support for 
freedom in Hong Kong. The House Chairman described the 
implementation of Article 23 as the bell for the slow death of civil 
liberties, and claimed that it would erode the freedom in Hong 
Kong63. 
19 Jun 2003 The press secretary to US President Bush, issued a statement, 
urging the Legco to adopt amendments to the National Security 
Bill64. 
20 Jun 2003 More than 50 Christian leaders and Catholic churches signed a 
joint statement to call on their 600 thousand followers in Hong 
Kong to join the July 1 protest65. 
24 Jun 2003 FTU announced to hold a carnival on 1 July in the Victoria Part 
where July 1 protest started66. 
27 Jun 2003 The US House of Representatives passed a resolution, urging the 
PRC and Hong Kong Governments to withdraw their proposal 
implementing Article 2367. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 MPDN, 6 March 2003, page A18; 7 March 2003, A11. 
57 The press release on the statement by British Foreign Office Minister: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=2007317 
58 MPDN, 25 March 2003, page A12. 
59 MPDN, 14 April 2003, page A14; 25 June 2003, page A08, 30 June 2003, page A10. 
60 The US Consulate-General’s press release on the speech by the US Consul-General: 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/cg_jk2003051601.html 
61 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200306/03/0603276.htm 
62 MPDN, 5 June 2003, page A06.  
63 The US Consulate-Generals’ press release on the speech by Henry Hyde: 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk_article23_2003061701.html 
64 The Statement of the Press Secretary to the US Present: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030619-1.html 
65 MPDN, 21 June 2003, page A10 
66 MPDN, 25 June 2003, page A08. 
67 The US Consulate-General’s press release on the resolution passed by the House of 
Representatives: http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk_article23_2003062702.html 
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30 Jun 2003 The UK Foreign Office Minister claimed that the provisions on 
the proscription of organisations would blur the dividing line 
between the two autonomous legal systems by introducing into 
Hong Kong legislation linkages to mainland law68. 
1 Jul 2003 
(Morning) 
The PRC Premier Wen Jiabao stated that Article 23 legislation 
would not affect Hong Kong people from enjoying their various 
rights and freedoms under the law69. 
1 Jul 2003 
(Afternoon) 
A few hundred thousand people took part in the protest organised 
by the Civil Human Rights Front70. 
1 Jul 2003 
(Evening) 
The CE’s Office held an urgent meeting in that evening, 
subsequently releasing a statement persisting on Article 23 
legislation71. 
2 Jul 2003 The CE called a special meeting with some Principal Officials and 
the leaders of the pro-government parties. DAB proposed two 
amendments to the most controversial provisions of the National 
Security Bill72. 
3 Jul 2003 Some pro-government legislators returned by the functional 
constituencies decided to re-consult their voters before voting for 
the National Security Bill73 while some professional institutes 
urged their representatives in the Legco to vote against the Bill74. 
3-4 Jul 2003 The Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of 
China held a special meeting on Hong Kong, considering various 
concessions to make the legislation more palatable75. 
4 Jul 2003 The Legco debated an adjournment motion on ‘How Hong Kong 
should deal with the strong demands made by over 500000 people 
on 1 July’76. 
4 Jul 2003 James Tien, an Exco member and the LP Chairman proposed the 
deferral of the National Security Bill until December 200377. 
5 Jul 2003 The CE announced to resume the second and third reading of the 
Bill on July 9, as originally scheduled, and proposed three critical 
amendments to the Bill78. 
5 Jul 2003 The NPC Legislative Affairs Commission expressed that its 
support to the SAR Government's decision to legislate ‘as 
scheduled’79. 
6 Jul 2003 
(Evening) 
The LP announced that the party reiterated its request to 
Government to defer the second reading of the National Security 
Bill, and that James Tien had resigned from the Exco80. 
 
                                               
68 The press release on the statement by British Foreign Office Minister: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=2006763 
69 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A11. 
70 MPDN, 2 July 2003, page A03. 
71 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/01/0701204.htm 
72 MPDN, 3 July 2003, page A02. 
73 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A02. 
74 MPDN, 4 July 2003, page A04. 
75 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
76 Minute of council meeting of the Legco:   
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0704ti-translate-e.pdf 
77 MPDN, 5 July 2003, page A02. 
78 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/05/0705158.htm 
79 MPDN, 6 July 2003, page A01. 
80 The Liberal Party’s press release on its statement: 
http://www.liberal.org.hk/contents/modules/news/shownewsdetails.php?newsid=5739&pag
e=1&filtergroupid=9&panchor=news5739  
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6 Jul 2003 
(Night) 
The Administration called a special Exco meeting, subsequently 
announcing to defer the resumption of the second reading of the 
Bill81. 
7 Jul 2003 The pro-democrat camp urged Regina Ip to step down82. 
9 Jul 2003 The Civil Human Rights Front in the rally outside the Legco 
building demanded reform of the government.  
9 Jul 2003 DAB and other pro-government legislators claimed that Ip was no 
longer the suitable person to promote Article 2383.  
12 Jul 2003 The CE considered the reform of the Exco84. 
16 Jul 2003 Regina Ip issued a statement, announcing her resignation from the 
post of Secretary for Security due to personal reasons85. 
17 Jul 2003 The Administration also committed to meet the various sectors in 
order to open channels of discussion on political issues86, and to 
put forward the National Security Bill to the community for 
consultation again87. 
Jul –Sep 2003 The PRC Government set up a high level Central Leading Group 
on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs led by the PRC Vice-President 
Zeng Qinghong in order to strengthen the co-ordination of policy 
towards Hong Kong and Macau88. 
4 Aug 2003 Ambrose LEE was appointed as the Secretary for Security89. 
9 Aug 2003 Sheng Huaren, the NPC Vice-Chairman and Secretary urged the 
Hong Kong Delegates of NPC to ‘actively match up and help 
Article 23 legislation’90. 
18 Aug 2003 The China Daily ran a commentary article calling for early 
enactment of Article 2391. 
20-23 Aug 
2003 
Two Exco members suggested further deferral of Article 23 
legislation92. 
3 Sep 2003 The ODN disclosed that the PRC Government allowed further 
deferral of Article 23 legislation93.  
5 Sep 2003 The CE announced that the Administration had reported to the 
PRC Government the decision to withdraw the National Security 
Bill94. 
 
 
                                               
81 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/07/0707019.htm 
82 MPDN, 8 July 2003, page A04. 
83 MPDN, 10 July 2003, page A14. 
84 MPDN, 13 July 2003, page A12 
85 The Administration’s press release on the statement by the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/16/0716223.htm 
86 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/17/0717228.htm  
87 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the CE (Chinese portion): 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/17/0717219.htm 
88 MPDN, 19 July 2003, page A03; 28 September 2003, page A17. 
89 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of the Secretary for Security: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200308/04/0804252.htm 
90 MPDN, 10 August 2003, page A12. 
91 Cited in MPDN, 19 August 2003, page A09. 
92 MPDN, 21 August 2003, page A02; 24 August 2003, page A10. 
93 ODN 3 September 2003, page A23. 
94 The Administration’s press release on the statement of the CE’s Office: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/05/0905235.htm 
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Appendix 7A:  
Coding Frame and Keyword List  
for News Coverage of Article 23  
 
Coding Frame for News Coverage of Article 23 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
1 What voices were 
highlighted?  
Government officials 
and other supportive 
voices 
The opponents and 
other critical voices 
2 How the urgency and 
responsibility for Hong 
Kong to enact Article 23 
were described? 
Urgency and 
responsibility to 
enact Article 23 was 
highlighted 
Urgency and 
responsibility to 
enact Article 23 was 
downplayed 
3 How the potential 
threats to human rights 
and freedom were 
treated? 
The proposed laws 
are lenient while the 
potential threats 
were downplayed 
 
The proposed laws 
were severe while 
the possible threats 
were highlighted 
4 How the criticisms of 
the government 
proposals were 
considered? 
Exaggerating and 
untruthful 
 
Reasonable and 
truthful 
5 How the 
Administration’s 
defense and 
amendments to the 
proposal were 
considered?  
Reasonable and 
truthful, public 
views are taken into 
account 
Untruthful, public 
views are ignored 
6 How the opponents of 
the government 
proposals were 
considered? 
Radicals, 
opportunists, 
traitors 
 
Freedom fighters, 
law professionals 
and intellectuals 
7 How the proponents 
were considered? 
Patriots Leftist, royalist or 
blind supporters 
8 How the officials 
managing Article 23 
legislation were 
described?  
Rational, reasonable 
and professional 
Arrogant, 
unreasonable and 
unsuitable for 
promoting the bill 
9 How the public 
consultation on Article 
23 was described? 
Consultation was 
sufficient while the 
analysis was 
scientific and 
objective 
Consultation was 
insufficient while 
the analysis was 
unscientific and 
biased 
10 How the anti-Article 23 
protests were described?  
Disturbance of 
public peace and 
traffic 
Peaceful 
Table continued on next page. 
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Coding Frame for News Coverage of Article 23 (Cont.) 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
11 How the anti-Article 23 
matchers were 
considered? 
People are misled 
and under the 
bandwagon effect 
People have 
independent thought 
and high quality 
12 How the pro-Article 23 
rallies were considered? 
Rational and 
reasonable  
Blind support 
 
13 How the pro-Article 23 
matchers were 
described?  
Rational patriots Leftist or blind 
supporters 
14 How the white bill was 
considered?  
Unnecessary Necessary 
15 How the foreign 
governments and 
organisations’ 
comments on Article 23 
were considered? 
Interference with the 
internal affairs of 
China and Hong 
Kong 
Defense of the 
human rights and 
freedoms in Hong 
Kong 
16 How the pubic views 
were described?  
Supportive of 
enactment of Article 
23  
Critical of 
enactment of Article 
23 
17 Other issues in relations 
to the Administration 
and its proposal 
Supportive Critical 
 
 
Criteria for neutral framing: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article. 
 Neither supportive nor critical argument was highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues were described and explained.  
 
 
Keyword list for News Coverage of Article 23 
Framing 
Positive Negative 
 National Security (國家安全) 
 Duty (責任) 
 Moderate / Liberal (寬鬆) 
 Exaggerate (誇張/誇大) 
 Misunderstand / Myth (誤解) 
 Misgiving / Worry (疑慮/憂慮) 
 Draconian Law (惡法) 
 Royalist (保皇) 
 White Bill (白紙) 
 Ambiguous / Blurred (含糊/糢糊) 
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Appendix 7B: 
News Framing in the Five Analysis Periods 
in the Case of Article 23  
 
 
 
Period 1: 
Table A7B.1:  
News Framing of Article 23 
between 26 February and 23 September 2002 (210 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 20 5 8 
Negative / Critical  21 (1) 23 (5) 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 14 7 10 
Total 55 (1) 35 (5) 19 
Average No. of articles per day 0.26 1.17 0.09 
Framing decided by article count Mix Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
28 
12 
12 
0 
0 
15 
5 
2 
0 
0 
6 
3 
0 
0 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 52 22 10 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
19 
5 
4 
0 
0 
13 
5 
0 
1 
4 
3 
0 
0 
0 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 28 23 5 
Framing decided by keyword count Pos Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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Period 2: 
Table A7B.2:  
News Framing of Article 23  
between 24 September and 24 December 2002 (92 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 45 14 42 (2) 
Negative / Critical  187 (7) 313 (24) 38 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 76 35 39 
Total 303 (7) 362 (24) 119 (3) 
Average No. of articles per day 3.3 3.93 1.3 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
145 
11 
23 
5 
7 
178 
12 
40 
1 
4 
54 
14 
15 
3 
10 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 191 235 96 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
142 
10 
2 
219 
17 
249 
60 
8 
224 
35 
77 
3 
0 
91 
13 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 390 576 184 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 3: 
Table A7B.3:  
News Framing of Article 23 
between 25 December 2002 and 13 February 2003 (51 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 20 6 16 
Negative / Critical  70 (2) 121 (15) 14 
Neutral / Descriptive 27 15 19 
Total 117 142 (15) 49 
Average No. of articles per day 2.29 2.80 0.96 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
37 
3 
14 
17 
1 
23 
5 
5 
10 
1 
18 
2 
8 
10 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 72 44 40 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
57 
3 
2 
118 
1 
69 
17 
4 
80 
6 
33 
3 
3 
24 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 181 176 65 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 4: 
Table A7B.4:  
News Framing of Article 23 
between 14 February and 30 June 2003 (136 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 27 4 32 (3) 
Negative / Critical  136 (5) 375 (20) 21 
Neutral / Descriptive 50 35 15 (1) 
Total 213 (5) 414 (20) 68 (4) 
Average No. of articles per day 1.57 3.04 0.5 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
56 
11 
11 
2 
4 
78 
2 
18 
1 
3 
56 
14 
20 
0 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 84 102 92 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
44 
9 
18 
11 
5 
55 
153 
129 
10 
30 
22 
2 
3 
5 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 87 377 34 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 5: 
Table A7B.5:  
News Framing of Article 23 
between 1 July and 5 September 2003 (67 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 56 (1) 13 33 (3) 
Negative / Critical  181 (15) 283 (19) 46 (3) 
Neutral / Descriptive 81 72 (1) 59 (5) 
Total 318 (16) 368 (20) 138 (11) 
Average No. of articles per day 4.75 5.49 2.06 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
71 
16 
7 
0 
7 
50 
16 
2 
3 
7 
21 
15 
7 
0 
6 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 101 78 49 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
56 
11 
29 
70 
9 
61 
106 
56 
62 
12 
26 
0 
6 
8 
6 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 175 297 46 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Appendix 7C: 
News Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23  
 
1. Sustained Coverage Run by Individual Newspapers  
Table A7C.1: Framing Analysis of Sustained Coverage on the MPDN 
Article Count 
28-30/6/02 
(3 days) 
13-15/7/02 
(3 days) 
8/9/02-1/3-0
3 
1  
(175 days) 
6-14/3/03 
2 
(9 days) 
22-27/3/03 
(6 days) 
12-14/4/03 
(3 days) 
25-27/4/03 
(3 days) 
4--7/5/03 
(4 days) 
29/5-31/7/ 
03
3 
 (63 days) 
16/8-5/9/03
4 
(21 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive 3 2 74 2 0 1 0 1 55 10 (1) 
Negative  0 2 (1) 280 
(10) 
3 5 2 3 4 253 
(18) 
12 
Neutral 0 1 115 4 4 0 0 3 82 18 
Total 3 5 (1) 469 
(10) 
9 9 3 3 8 390 
(18) 
40 (1) 
Articles / day 1 1.7 2.7 1 1.5 1 1 2 6.2 1.9 
Framing by  
article count 
Pos Mix Neg Mix Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Mix 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
National 
Security 
Duty 
Moderate/ 
Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Myth/Mis-unde
rstand 
3 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
202 
 
12 
52 
 
22 
8 
2 
 
3 
0 
 
0 
1 
3 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
3 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
98 
 
25 
12 
 
2 
10 
3 
 
1 
2 
 
0 
0 
Positive 
Total 4 1 296 6 3 0 5 3 147 6 
Misgiving/ 
Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/ 
Blurred 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
7 
 
0 
 
2 
0 
0 
207 
 
19 
 
7 
328 
17 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
1 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
2 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
0 
1 
74 
 
15 
 
33 
122 
12 
3 
 
1 
 
4 
10 
0 
N
egative 
Total 0 9 578 1 6 2 1 2 256 18 
Framing by 
keyword count 
Pos Neg Neg Pos Neg Neg Pos Pos Neg Neg 
Combined Results 
Overall 
framing 
Pos Mix Neg Mix Neg Neg Mix Mix Neg Mix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Except 11/9/02, 12/9/02, 16/9/02, 15/10/02, 20/10/02, 6/11/02, 9/11/02, 2/12/02, 2/1/03, 10/1/03, 
12/1/03, 1/3/03 and 2/3/03 
2 Except 9/3/03 and 11/3/03 
3 Except 16/6/03 
4 Except 30/8/03 
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Table A7C.2: Framing Analysis of Sustained Coverage on the ADN 
Article Count 
13/9/02-8/3/
03
5 
 (165 days) 
23-30/3/03
6 
(8 days) 
9-17/4/03  
(9 days) 
26/4-14/5/0
3
7  
(19 days) 
23/5-27/8/0
3
8 (97days) 
3-5/9/03  
(3 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive  24 0 0 0 15 0 
Negative  479 
(44) 
8 14 22 
(3) 
563 
(33) 
4 
(1) 
Neutral  58 5 2 4 85 
(1) 
3 
Total 561 
(44) 
13 16 26 
(3) 
663 
(34) 
7 
(1) 
Articles per day 3.4 1.6 1.8 1.4 6.8 2.3 
Framing decided 
by article count 
Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/ 
Myth 
233 
17 
51 
11 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
16 
0 
2 
0 
0 
122 
18 
11 
5 
8 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive   
Total 318 1 2 18 164 2 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/ 
Blurred 
341 
101 
14 
291 
47 
0 
7 
7 
0 
0 
1 
2 
11 
3 
4 
4 
17 
29 
2 
6 
102 
210 
132 
57 
29 
2 
4 
0 
7 
0 
N
egative 
Total 794 14 21 58 530 13 
Framing decided 
by keyword count 
Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 Except 12/1/03, 21/1/03, 25/1/03, 1/2/03 and 2/2/03 
6 Except 27/3/03 
7 Except 3/5/03 
8 Except 4/8/03, 6/8/03 and 15/8/03 
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Table A7C.3: Framing Analysis of Sustained Coverage on the ODN 
Article Count 
23/9-10/10/02
9 
 (18 days) 
16-18/10/02  
(3 days) 
26/10-8/11/02
10  
(14 days) 
15/11-25/12/02
11  
(41 days) 
5-31/1/03
12  
(27 days) 
7-16/2/03
13  
(10 days) 
26/2-1/3/03 
 (4 days) 
5-9/6/03  
(5 days) 
18/6-27/7/03
14  
(40 days) 
5-13/8/03
15 
 (9 days) 
19-24/8/03  
(6 days) 
3-5/9/03  
(3 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive 7  
(1) 
1 7 21 
(1) 
9 5 2 1 38 
(5) 
4 2 1 
Negative  8  
(1) 
1 4 23 9 6 2 3 46 
(1) 
2 1 0 
Neutral 13 3 4 21 14 3 1 2 56 
(5) 
2 4 
(1) 
2 
Total 28 
(2) 
5 15 65 
(1) 
32 14 5 6 140 
(11) 
8 7 
(1) 
3 
Articles per 
day 
1.6 1.7 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 3.5 0.9 1.2 1 
Framing by 
article count 
Mix Neu Mix Mix Mix 
 
Mix Mix Neg Mix Pos Neu Neu 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
National 
Security 
Duty 
Moderate/ 
Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Myth/Mis- 
understand 
16 
 
5 
5 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
5 
 
1 
2 
 
2 
2 
32 
 
6 
2 
 
1 
8 
11 
 
3 
5 
 
10 
1 
20 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
1 
5 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
5 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
45 
 
20 
19 
 
3 
7 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
Positive   
Total 26 0 12 49 30 22 5 7 94 2 2 1 
Misgiving/ 
Worry 
Draconian 
Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/
Blurred 
9 
 
2 
 
0 
27 
2 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
2 
0 
13 
 
0 
 
0 
9 
7 
51 
 
1 
 
0 
51 
4 
21 
 
2 
 
3 
17 
2 
12 
 
0 
 
0 
6 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
30 
 
0 
 
9 
7 
5 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
3 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
2 
0 
N
egative 
Total 40 3 29 107 45 18 0 1 51 2 3 3 
Framing by 
keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Pos Pos Pos Pos Mix Neg Neg 
Combined Results 
Overall 
framing 
Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix 
 
                                               
9 Except 28/9/02, 3/10/02 and 5/10/02 
10 Except 29/10/02, 30/10/02 and 2/11/02 
11 Except 22/11/02 and 1/12/02 
12 Except 10/1/03, 10/1/03, 11/1/03, 12/1/03, 13/1/03, 21/1/03, 22/1/03, 23/1/03 and 27/1/02 
13 Except 10/2/02 
14 Except 21/7/03 and 23/7/03 
15 Except 9/8/03 and 10/8/03 
 411 
2. News Framing in the 11 Periods in which three Newspapers 
Ran Sustained Coverage Simultaneously     
 
 
Period 1 
Table A7C.4: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 23 September and 10 October 2002 (18 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 10 3 7 (1) 
Negative / Critical  43 (2) 45 (6) 8 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 20 10 13 
Total 73 58 (6) 28 (2) 
Average No. of articles per day 4.1 3.2 1.6 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
82 
4 
20 
0 
1 
54 
3 
26 
0 
0 
16 
5 
5 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 107 83 26 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
25 
0 
1 
52 
6 
13 
4 
3 
49 
6 
9 
2 
0 
27 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 84 75 40 
Framing decided by keyword count Pos Pos Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Mix Mix 
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Period 2 
Table A7C.5: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 16 and 18 October 2002 (3 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 0 1 1 
Negative / Critical  6 7 (1) 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 4 1 3 
Total 10 9 (1) 5 
Average No. of articles per day 3.3 3 1.7 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 1 4 0 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
3 
0 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
0 
5 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 6 8 3 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 3 
Table A7C.6: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 26 October and 8 November 2002 (14 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 5 1 7 
Negative / Critical  22 (1) 48 (1) 4 
Neutral / Descriptive 14 2 4 
Total 41 (1) 51 (1) 15 
Average No. of articles per day 2.9 3.6 1.1 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
3 
1 
0 
3 
1 
30 
0 
0 
1 
2 
5 
1 
2 
2 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 8 33 12 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
21 
2 
0 
30 
1 
24 
5 
3 
33 
3 
13 
0 
0 
9 
7 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 54 68 29 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 4  
Table A7C.7: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 15 November and 25 December 2002 (41 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 29 9 21 (1) 
Negative / Critical  89 (3) 173 (13) 23 
Neutral / Descriptive 25 15 21 
Total 143 (3) 197 (13) 65 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 3.4 4.8 1.6 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
57 
3 
7 
1 
5 
81 
5 
10 
0 
2 
32 
6 
2 
1 
8 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 73 98 49 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
77 
6 
1 
137 
5 
165 
44 
0 
121 
19 
51 
1 
0 
51 
4 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 226 349 107 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 5 
Table A7C.8: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 5 and 31 January 2003 (27 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 15 3 9 
Negative / Critical  44 (2) 63 (7) 9 
Neutral / Descriptive 14 7 14 
Total 73 (2) 73 (7) 32 
Average No. of articles per day 2.7 2.7 1.2 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
18 
2 
10 
17 
0 
14 
1 
3 
10 
1 
11 
3 
5 
10 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 47 29 30 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
37 
3 
2 
85 
1 
46 
11 
1 
38 
5 
21 
2 
3 
17 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 128 101 45 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 6 
Table A7C.9: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 7 and 16 February 2003 (10 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 4 2 5 
Negative / Critical  15 (1) 25 (3) 6 
Neutral / Descriptive 7 3 3 
Total 26 (1) 30 (3) 14 
Average No. of articles per day 2.6 3.0 1.4 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
14 
0 
1 
0 
1 
12 
0 
4 
0 
0 
20 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 16 16 22 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
15 
0 
0 
7 
0 
19 
1 
0 
25 
1 
12 
0 
0 
6 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 22 46 18 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 7 
Table A7C.10: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 26 February and 1 March 2003 (4 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 0 0 2 
Negative / Critical  3 4 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 2 0 1 
Total 5 4 5 
Average No. of articles per day 1.3 1 1.3 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 0 2 5 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 2 2 0 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Mix Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Mix Mix 
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Period 8 
Table A7C.11: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 5 and 9 June 2003 (5 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 3 0 1 
Negative / Critical  15 (1) 3 (1) 3 
Neutral / Descriptive 1 2 2 
Total 19 (1) 5 (1) 6 
Average No. of articles per day 3.8 1 1.2 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
6 
1 
1 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 8 6 7 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
10 
2 
3 
1 
0 
3 
20 
8 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 16 31 1 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 9 
Table A7C.12: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 18 June and 27 July 2003 (40 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 48 9 38 (5) 
Negative / Critical  202 (16) 436 (3) 46 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 74 53 56 (5) 
Total 324 (16) 498 (23) 140 (11) 
Average No. of articles per day 8.1 12.5 3.5 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
86 
21 
9 
1 
10 
66 
10 
6 
4 
6 
45 
20 
19 
3 
7 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 127 92 94 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
60 
11 
25 
58 
12 
73 
147 
96 
40 
25 
30 
0 
9 
7 
5 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 166 381 51 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 10 
Table A7C.13: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 19 and 24 August 2003 (6 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 5 2 2 
Negative / Critical  3 8 (1) 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 7 3 4 (1) 
Total 15 13 (1) 7 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 2.5 2.2 1.2 
Framing decided by article count Mix Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 4 4 2 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
1 
0 
1 
4 
0 
2 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 6 9 3 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 421 
 
 
 
 
Period 11 
Table A7C.14: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 3 and 5 September 2003 (3 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 1 0 1 
Negative / Critical  2 4 (1) 0 
Neutral / Descriptive 5 3 2 
Total 8 7 3 
Average No. of articles per day 2.6 2.3 1 
Framing decided by article count Neu Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 0 2 1 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
0 
0 
3 
6 
0 
2 
4 
0 
7 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 9 13 3 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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3. Framing of Sustained Coverage in 4 Sub-periods 
of Period 9 between 18 June and 27 June 2003   
 
 
Period 9A 
Table A7C.15: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 18 June and 1 July 2003 (14 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 10 2 16 (2) 
Negative / Critical  58 (4) 209 (10) 7 
Neutral / Descriptive 21 11 10 (1) 
Total 89 (4) 222 (10) 33 (3) 
Average No. of articles per day 6.3 15.9 2.4 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
26 
3 
4 
0 
3 
37 
1 
4 
1 
0 
27 
14 
15 
2 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 36 43 59 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
21 
1 
4 
0 
4 
30 
58 
31 
1 
13 
11 
0 
3 
1 
4 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 30 133 19 
Framing decided by keyword count Pos Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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Period 9B 
Table A7C.16: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 2 and 4 July 2003 (3 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 4 1 5 
Negative / Critical  36 (2) 55 (3) 13 
Neutral / Descriptive 9 6 8 (2) 
Total 49 (2) 62 (3) 26 (2) 
Average No. of articles per day 16.3 20.7 13.0 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
11 
2 
0 
0 
2 
7 
2 
0 
0 
1 
7 
3 
2 
0 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 15 10 14 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
13 
2 
5 
1 
2 
16 
42 
14 
0 
0 
6 
0 
2 
0 
1 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 23 72 9 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 9C 
Table A7C.17: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 5 and 6 July 2003 (2 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 14 0 4 (2) 
Negative / Critical  22 (2) 36 (1) 8 
Neutral / Descriptive 7 4 6 
Total 43 (2) 40 (1) 18 (2) 
Average No. of articles per day 21.5 20.0 9.0 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
28 
8 
1 
0 
1 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
1 
0 
3 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 38 8 8 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
14 
6 
5 
10 
2 
8 
10 
8 
4 
2 
8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 37 32 8 
Framing decided by keyword count Pos Neg Mix 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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Period 9D 
Table A7C.18: Framing of Sustained Coverage of Article 23 
between 7 and 27 July 2003 ( 21 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 20 6 13 (1) 
Negative / Critical  86 (8) 135 (9) 18 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 37 32 32 (2) 
Total 143 (8) 173 (9) 63 (4) 
Average No. of articles per day 6.8 8.2 3.0 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
National Security 
Duty 
Moderate/Liberal 
Exaggerate 
Misunderstand/Myth 
18 
10 
4 
0 
2 
25 
5 
2 
2 
4 
6 
3 
1 
0 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 34 38 11 
Misgiving/Worry 
Draconian Law 
Royalist 
White Bill 
Ambiguous/Blurred 
12 
2 
11 
47 
1 
19 
35 
33 
40 
8 
4 
0 
4 
6 
1 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 73 105 15 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Appendix 8: 
Chronology of Major Events  
in the Case of Central Reclamation 
 
Time Events 
Mar 1982 – 
Oct1983 
The need for reclamation in Central and Wanchai was first 
identified in a strategic planning study entitled ‘Study on Harbour 
Reclamation and Urban Growth’1. 
1984 The need was reconfirmed in various major planning development 
studies, including the Territorial Development Strategy2. 
1987 – 1989 The Central and Wanchai Reclamation Feasibility Study was 
carried out3. 
Sep 1991 The Exco endorsed the Metroplan Selected Strategy which 
recommended various reclamation projects in the Victoria 
Harbour4. 
1993 – 1998 Reclamation works for CRI and CRII and WDI were completed5. 
1996 The need for reclamation in Central and Wanchai was reconfirmed 
in the Territorial Development Strategy Review6. 
27 Jun 1997 The PHO was passed by the Legco7. 
29 May 
1998 
The draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/H24/1 covering 
38 hectares of reclamation was published in the Government 
gazette8. 
29 Jul 1998 By end of the 2-month exhibition period, 70 valid objections 
including one from the SPH were received9. 
23 Oct 1998 TPB gave preliminary consideration to the objections and agreed to 
request the Administration to undertake a further study to determine 
the minimum reclamation option10. 
Oct 1998 – 
Mar1999 
The Administration drew up the minimum reclamation option, 
which proposed to reduce the reclamation area to 23 hectares11. 
24 Feb 1999 The Public Works Subcommittee of Legco Financial Committee 
endorsed the funding proposal for the feasibility study of WDII12. 
5 Mar 1999 The TPB considered the minimum reclamation option13. 
30 Mar 
1999 
The TPB heard the objections at its meeting. Although SPH did not 
withdraw their objections to the OZP, they together with other 
objectors on the scene agreed that the minimum reclamation option 
                                               
1 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-1e.pdf 
2 Ibid  
3 Ibid  
4 Ibid  
5 Ibid  
6 Ibid  
7 Official record of the proceedings of Council meeting of the Legco: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/lc_sitg/hansard/970627fa.doc 
8 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
9 Hansard of Council meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/counmtg/hansard/980729fe.htm 
10 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
11 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
12 Minutes of the meeting of Public Works Subsommittee of Legco Financial Committee: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw240299.htm 
13 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
 427 
could be used as a blue print for CRIII works14. 
23 Apr 1999 The TPB gave deliberation to the objections and decided to propose 
amendments to the draft Central District (Extension) OZP No. 
S/H24/1 to meet/partially meet the objections by reducing the extent 
of the proposed reclamation to 23 hectares. 
10 Jun 1999 The minimum reclamation option was presented to the Legco PLW 
Panel and was generally accepted. The majority of the comments 
were concerned with land use, traffic, the design of roads and 
waterfront promenade15. After considering Members’ comments, 
TPB gazetted the amended Central District (Extension) OZP that 
covered the minimum reclamation option on 16 July 1999. 
16 Jul 1999 The amended Central District (Extension) OZP No. O/S/H24/1-A 
covering the minimum reclamation option of 23 hectares was 
gazetted. 18 original objections were subsequently withdrawn. 
Mid 1999 The Government presented the amended minimum reclamation 
option to the then Central and Western District Board and various 
professional bodies (e.g. Hong Kong Institute of Engineers, Hong 
Kong Institute of Planners, Hong Kong Institute of Architect, Hong 
Kong Institute of Surveyors (HKIS), Hong Kong Institute of 
Landscape Architect (HKILA), and Real Estate Developers 
Association of Hong Kong). They generally supported the revised 
reclamation scheme. 
1 Sep 1999 TPB considered the further objection and decided to propose further 
amendments to the draft Central District (Extension) OZP to 
partially meet the further objection. 
1 Feb 2000 The construction of the Harbour Park of WDII was first proposed 
by the Administration at a public consultation forum16. 
22 Feb 2000 The amended Central District (Extension) OZP No. S/H24/2 was 
approved by CE. 
24 Feb 2000 At the Legco PLW Panel meeting, the Harbour Park proposal was 
criticized by both the pro-democrat and pro-government camps17. 
3 Mar 2000 The approved OZP was gazetted for public inspection. 
Mid 2000 The feasibility of the minimum reclamation option was further 
confirmed by the Comprehensive Feasibility Study for the 
Minimum Reclamation. 
16, 21 Mar 
2000 
The Central and Western and Wanchai District Councils were 
consulted on the proposed CRIII works and there were no adverse 
comments. 
28 Apr 2000 Finance Committee of LegCo approved funding for the detailed 
design of CRIII18. 
30 Jun 2000 The CRIII reclamation and road works were gazetted under the 
Foreshore and Sea-bed (Reclamations) Ordinance and the Roads 
(Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance respectively. They 
received 3 and 2 objections respectively and SPH was not an 
                                                                                                                       
14 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
15 Legco Paper No. CB(1)1443/98-99(01):  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/panels/plw/papers/pl1006_4.htm 
Legco Paper No. CB(1)91/99-00:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl100699.pdf 
16 Information  cited in the judgement concerning an application for judicial review by the 
SPHL in respect of WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
17 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl240200.pdf 
18 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
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objector under either Ordinance. 
Jul 2000 – 
late 2002 
CRIII’s detailed design stage completed. 
27 Aug 
2001 
CRIII’s EIA report was endorsed by the Advisory Council on the 
Environment. 
31 Aug 
2001 
CRIII’s EIA report was approved by DEP under the EIA Ordinance. 
7 Dec 2001 The Administration informed the PLW Panel that the Harbour Park 
proposal had been withdrawn19. 
18 Dec 2001 CE authorized CRIII’s reclamation and road works. 
Jan 2002 The Government presented to Legco a brief informing Legco of the 
authorization of CRIII’s reclamation and road works and of the 
objections received20. 
1 Mar 2002 Legco Panel on Housing, Planning and Lands was briefed on the 
CRIII engineering works21. 
7 Mar 2002 EPD issued the Environment Permit for the construction of works22. 
22 Mar 
2002 
The TPB resolved to include the Harbour Park in the WDII OZP23. 
19 Apr 2002 The Administration gazetted the OZP of WDII24. 
29 Apr 2002 The SPH voiced out its objection to the Harbour Park proposal25.  
6 May 2002 DP and DAB started criticizing the Harbour Park proposal26. 
21 Jun 2002 Legco Finance Committee approved funding for the construction of 
CRIII under the minimum reclamation option27. 
12 Aug 
2002 
CRIII’s tenders were invited28. 
6 Sep 2002 The TPB claimed that there were over 770 submissions against the 
OZP of WDII during the 2-month exhibition period29. 
22 Nov CRIII’s tender invitation exercise closed30. 
                                               
19 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl011207.pdf 
20 Background information in or before January 2002 are quoted from Legco paper CB 
(1)58/03-04(01): 
  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
21 Legco paper No. CB(1)1134/01-02(03):  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0301-cb1-1134-3e.pdf 
Legco paper No. CB(1)1454/01-02:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl020301.pdf 
LC paper No. CB(1)1806/01-02: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0301cb1-1806-e.pdf 
22 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
23 The minutes of TPB meeting cited in the judgement concerning an application for 
judicial review by the SPHL in respect of WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
24 The Government of HKSAR Gazette, 19 April 2002, Vol.16, No.2272: 
http://www.gld.gov.hk/cgi-
bin/gld/egazette/gazettefiles.cgi?lang=e&extra=&year=2002&month=04&day=19&vol=06
&no=16&gn=2272&header=1&part=0&df=1&nt=gn&acurrentpage=12&agree=1&newfile
=1&gaz_type=mg 
25 MPDN, 30 April 2002, page A13 
26 MPDN, 7 May 2002, page A10; 9 May 2002, page A19 
27 Legco paper PWSC(2002-03)41: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/fc/pwsc/papers/p02-41e.pdf 
Legco paper FC21/02-03: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/fc/fc/minutes/fc020621.pdf 
28 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
29 MPDN, 7 September 2002, page B05 
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2002 
6 Dec 2002 The TPB announced the results of the WDII review. The Harbour 
Park proposal persisted. In the same day, the SHP decided to 
institute legal proceedings against the TPB’s decisions31. 
10 Feb 2003 CRIII’s contract was awarded to Leighton-China State-Van Oord 
Joint Venture32. 
27 Feb 2003 SPH initiated judicial review (JR) proceedings against TPB’s 
decision in respect of another OZP, i.e. the draft Wan Chai North 
OZP No. S/H25/133. 
28 Feb 2003 CRIII’s works commenced. The works require reclaiming land of 
18 hectares34. 
28 Feb 2003 The High Court granted leave to SPH’s application for JR35. 
14 Mar 
2003 
The High Court ordered the submission of the draft Wan Chai 
North OZP to CE in Exco be stayed. 
7 Apr 2003 The High Court’s hearing of the JR case commenced. 
6 May 2003 The CE in the Exco ordered that the first stage of amendment of 
TPO should be introduced into the Legco36.  
9 May 2003 ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’ was published in the 
Government gazette37. 
16 May 
2003 
The Legco Financial Committee approved the funding for the 
feasibility study of HLC prison development38. 
21 May 
2003 
First reading of ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’ took 
place in the Legco39. 
23 May 
2003 
The Legco Bills Committee on ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 
2003’ was formed40. 
8 Jul 2003 The Court of First Instance laid down the judgment on the JR of 
WDII41. The Administration initiated the reviewed of the 
judgment’s influence on reclamation projects42. 
18 July 
2003 
The TPB decided to withdraw the Harbour Park proposal, and to 
appeal to the CFA direct to seek a clarification of the legal 
principles behind the PHO43. 
19 Jul 2003 The TPB announced that its decision on applying for appeal against 
the Court’s judgment against WDII44. 
                                                                                                                       
30 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
31 MPDN, 7 December 2002, page A06 
32 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
33 MPDN, 8 April 2003, page A12 
34 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
35 Paper of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel on 13 October 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-58-1e.pdf 
36 The Administration’s press release on the ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200305/09/0509143.htm 
37 The Administration’s press release on the ‘Town Planning (Amendment) Bill 2003’: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200305/09/0509143.htm 
38 Minutes of Legco Financial Committee meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/fc/fc/minutes/fc030516.pdf 
39 Website of Legco: http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/bills/bill0304.htm 
40 Website of Legco: http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/bills/bill0304.htm 
41 Judgement concerning an application for judicial review by the SPHL in respect of WDII: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-3e-scan.pdf 
42 MPDN, 9 July 2003, page A06 
43 Legco paper for the joint meeting of EA Panel and PLW Panel on 27 November 2003: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1127cb1-403-7e.pdf 
44 The Administration’s press release on the statement of TPB: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/19/0719140.htm 
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26 Aug 
2003 
Department of Justice applied to CFA for leave for the appeal case. 
Sep 2003 – 
Jan 2004 
Members of Bills Committee on TPAB 2003 demanded the 
Administration to open up TPB meeting45. 
12 Sep 2003 The SPH urged the Administration to suspend all reclamation 
projects until the CFA settled disputes about their legality46.  
17 Sep 2003 The SPH issued a legal warning letter threatening to seek a High 
Court injunction against the Administration, and to pursue another 
judicial review seeking a declaration that all reclamation plans were 
flawed47. 
18 Sep 2003 At the meeting of the Bills Committee on TPAB 2003, the pro-
democrat legislators urged the Administration to open up the TPB 
meetings for public participation48. 
20 Sep 2003 The media quoted the government source that suspension of the 
reclamation works cost the government HK$ 1 million a day in 
compensation for the contractor49. 
22 Sep 2003 After the meeting with SHPL, Winston Chu decided to institute 
legal proceedings against CRIII project50. 
25 Sep 2003 The SPH applied to the High Court for a JR on the Administration’s 
decisions in relation to CRIII and demanded for an interim 
injunction over CRIII works51. 
26 Sep 2003 The Administration claimed that 2 consultancy studies of the SKR 
were terminated because of the Court’s judgment on WDII52. 
27 Sep 2003 The Administration announced to temporarily suspend all marine 
works under CRIII until a decision of the High Court was given on 
the interim injunction case53. 
28 Sep 2003 About 500 people attended the anti-reclamation rally organised by 
APH54. 
29 Sep 2003 The CFA granted leave for TPB to appeal against the High Court 
ruling on the draft WDII OZP. CFA proceedings have been 
scheduled for 9-16 December 2003. 
3 Oct 2003 The High Court heard SPH’s application for an interim injunction 
over CRIII works. 
6 Oct 2003 The High Court delivered its judgment over the interim injunction 
case, allowing the continuance of the CRIII works55. 
7 Oct 2003 The Administration decided to partially resume CRIII work56. 
                                               
45 Minutes of Bills Committee meetings on 18 Sep 2003, 24 Sep 2003, 4 Nov 2003, 3 Dec 
2003 and 6 Jan 2004: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120918.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120924.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/minutes/bc121104.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/minutes/bc121203.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120106.pdf 
46 MPDN, 13 September 2003, page A10 
47 MPDN, 18 September 2003, page A15 
48 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-
03/chinese/bc/bc12/minutes/bc120918.pdf 
49 MPDN, 20 September 2003, page A08 
50 MPDN, 23 September 2003, page A09 
51 MPDN, 26 September 2003, page A03 
52 MPDN, 27 September 2003, page A12 
53 The Administration’s press release on the statement of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200309/27/0927160.htm 
54 MPDN, 29 September 2003, page A08 
55High Court’s Judgement concerning an application from the SPH for interim injunction in 
respect of CRIII: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-
04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplw1013cb1-18-2e-scan.pdf 
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8 Oct 2003 Winston Chu, at the meeting with SHPL, urged the Administration 
to accept five demands in relations with reclamation projects57. 
9 Oct 2003 A DP legislator at the meeting of Legco PLW Panel requested a 
joint meeting with EA Panel to discuss the issues relating CRIII and 
WDII58. 
11 Oct 2003 Winston Chu claimed that he received a letter threatening his and 
his family’s personal safety. Thus, he resigned from the head of the 
SPH while Christine Loh took over his role.59 
13 Oct 2003 At the first joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel, the 
Administration proposed Legco public hearings to collect public 
views on CRIII and WDII60. 
26 Oct 2003 The Administration disclosed the delay of HLC prison plan61. 
31 Oct 2003 PLW Panel and EA Panel decided to hold public hearing on CRIII 
and WDII62. Meanwhile, The TPB officially requested the 
government to conduct a comprehensive review of WDII, and to 
draw up a minimum reclamation option for WDII that would 
comply with the PHO and minimise the extent of reclamation63. 
7 Nov 2003 The Administration announced the TPB’s request in relations to 
WDII64.  
13 Nov 
2003 
SHPL claimed that the government was considering legislation 
against further reclamation in Harbour after CRIII, WDII and 
SKR65. 
16 Nov 
2003 
A TPB member told the media that the TPB had started looking for 
alternatives to the problems of existing consultation mechanism. 
The Administration also claimed that proposals for opening up TPB 
meetings would be submitted to the Legco for consideration66. 
27 Nov & 
8 Dec 2003 
PLW Panel and EA Panel hold public hearing on CRIII and WDII67. 
1 Dec 2003 Through some newspapers, the SPH distributed a pamphlet 
criticising the Administration’s reclamation plans 68. 
18 Dec 2003 The Administration distributed its own leaflets in Central in order to 
explain the reclamation plans and their rationale69. 
19 Dec 2003 The Administration launched the first round of public consultation 
on the HLC prison development70. 
                                                                                                                       
56 The Administration’s press release on the speech of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200310/07/1007217.htm 
57 MPDN, 9 Oct 2003, page A15 
58 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl031009.pdf 
59 MPDN, 12 October 2003, page A01 
60 Minutes of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1013.pdf 
61 MPDN, 28 October 2003, page A11 
62 Minutes of the joint meeting of PLW Panel and EA Panel: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1031.pdf 
63 The Administration’s press release on the statement of TPB: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200311/07/1107205.htm 
64 The Administration’s press release on the statement of TPB: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200311/07/1107205.htm 
65 MPDN, 14 November 2003, page A15 
66 MPDN, 17 November 2003, page A10 
67 Minute of the joint meetings: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1127.pdf 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/eapl1208.pdf 
68 MPDN, 2 December 2003, page A18 
69 MPDN, 19 December 2003, page A15 
70 The Administration’s press release on the public consultation: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200312/19/1219271.htm 
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9 Jan 2004 The CFA handed down a ruling against the Administration over 
WDII71. 
The Administration instructed the TPB to review all the reclamation 
projects, including the CRIII and SKR, in order to satisfy the test as 
imposed by the CFA72. 
16 Jan 2004 The SPH issued an open letter to all the Exco members, urging the 
Administration to suspend CRIII works73. 
The Administration brought up the issue of openness to TPB. TPB 
members agreed that the public should be allowed to attend the 
hearing part of TPB meetings and other meetings74. 
27 Jan 2004 Pro-government legislators expressed their support of opening up 
TPB meetings75. 
9 Mar 2004 The High Court laid down a ruling confirming the legality of the 
CRIII project76.  
The Administration announced that the creation of that a new 
advisory body, HEC77 and the plan to resume CRIII work78.  
18 Mar 
2004 
The Administration disclosed that it had begun to re-design the 
SKR project, inviting tenders for consultancy studies79 
21 Mar 
2004 
In order to speed up the judicial process, the SPH requested the 
direct appeal against High Court’s judgment went to the CFA 
instead of the Court of Appeal80. Meanwhile, Over 20 thousand 
people jointed the anti-reclamation demonstration held by the 
APH81. 
26 Mar 
2004 
The Administration rejected the SPH’s request of direct appeal82. 
2 Apr 2004 The new composition of the TPB was gazetted83. 
15 Apr 2004 The SPH announced not to lodge any appeal against the judgement 
on CRIII84. 
28 Apr 2004 The Administration announced the appointment of the members 
serving HEC85.  
2 May 2004 The APH held a protest for harbour protection86. 
                                               
71 CFA’s judgement on WDII on 1 January 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ea/papers/eaplwcb1-761-1e.pdf 
72 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200401/09/0109278.htm ;  
Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl040115.pdf 
73 MPDN, 17 January 2004, page A16 
74 MPDN, 27 January 2004, page A08  
75 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl040127.pdf 
76 High Court’s judgment on CRIII on 9 March 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/plw/papers/eaplw1127cb1-1258-1e-
scan.pdf 
77 The Administration’s press release on feedback to High Court’s judgment: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200403/09/0309203.htm 
78 The Administration’s press release on the transcript of PSHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200403/09/0309199.htm 
79 MPDN, 19 March 2004, page A28 
80 MPDN, 22 March 2004, page A13 
81 MPDN, 22 March 2004, page A13 
82 MPDN, 27 March 2004, page A15 
83 The Administration’s press release on the appointment of TPB members: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200404/02/0402203.htm 
84 MPDN, 16 April 2004, page A18 
85 The Administration’s press release on the appointment of HEAC members: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200404/28/0428174.htm 
86 MPDN, 3 May 2004, page A06 
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4 May 2004 The Administration suggested, by administrative means, opening up 
the hearing part of TPB meetings except items involving 
confidential or premature release of sensitive information. 
However, the Bills Committee on TPAB 2003 insisted on 
stipulating the opening up of TPB meetings in law87. 
12 May 
2004 
In a letter to the Bills Committee of TPAB 2003, the Administration 
agreed to add a new section in to TPAB 2003 that all meetings of 
TPB would be open to the public, except for those involving 
sensitive and confidential information88. 
31 May 
2004 
The Administration launched the second round of public 
consultation on HLC prison development89. 
7 Jul 2004 The TPAB 2003 and its amendments were passed by the Legco90. 
13 Jul 2004 A news magazine uncovered a suspended sex scandal of Winston 
Chu91. 
27 Jul 2004 The Administration disclosed it plan of a new round of public 
consultation on SKR92 
31 Aug 
2004 
The SPH proposed an undersea tunnel for the replacement of 
reclamation93. 
11 Sep 2004 The Administration claimed that several development projects 
associated with SKP were re-considered94. 
16 Oct 2004 The Administration informed the Legco that the HLC prison 
development proposal was withdrawn95. 
 
                                               
87 Minutes of Bills Committee on 5 May 2004:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
88 Paper of the Bill Committee of TPAB 2003:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc120513cb1-1829-1e.pdf 
89 The Administration’s press release on the public consultation: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200405/31/0531192.htm 
90 Hansard of Council meeting on 7 July 2004: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0707ti-translate-e.pdf 
91 MPDN, 15 July 2004, page A19 
92 MPDN, 28 July 2004, page A09 
93 MPDN, 1 September 2004, page A20 
94 MPDN, 12 September 2004, page A15 
95 Paper for Legco Financial Committee 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/fc/fc/papers/fi04-15e.pdf 
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Appendix 9A: 
Coding Frame and Keyword List  
for News Coverage of Central Reclamation 
 
 
 
Coding Frame for Coverage of Central Reclamation 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
1 How was reclamation 
framed? 
Development issues 
which resolves 
traffic congestion 
and other problems 
Environmental issues 
in relations to the 
damage to the Harbour 
2 Whose voices were 
highlighted? 
Government officials 
or the supporters of 
the reclamation plans 
and existing town 
planning policy 
The people and groups 
criticising the 
reclamation plans and 
existing town planning 
policy 
3 Which issues were 
highlighted? 
Traffic congestion 
and other 
development issues 
Protection of the 
Harbour and the 
environment 
4 How were Winston 
CHU and SPH 
considered? 
The representatives 
of real estate 
developers 
Heroes who fight for 
people’s interests and 
Harbour protection 
5 How were the legal 
battles described? 
A waste of time and 
taxpayers’ money 
A fight for people’s 
interests and Harbour 
protection  
6 How was the 
information provided 
by SPH described? 
Outdated and 
misleading 
Updated and valid 
7 How were the anti-
reclamation protests 
described?  
Annoying or radical Peaceful and 
legitimate 
8 How were the 
protesters described?  
Radicals or a 
minority 
Fighters or 
environmentalists  
9 How was the existing 
town planning policy 
described? 
Effective and 
legitimate 
Inefficient and in 
favour of business 
sector. 
10 Was there any other 
issue in relations to 
the reclamation 
debate? 
Supportive of the 
Administration, its 
reclamation plans 
and existing town 
planning policy 
Critical of the 
Administration, its 
reclamation plans and 
existing town planning 
policy 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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Coding Frame for Coverage of Central Reclamation (Cont.) 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
11 How was the Harbour 
Park described? 
The Park could bring 
people to the 
Harbour 
The Park would 
damage the Harbour 
12 How was the 
objective of WDII 
considered?  
To resolve the traffic 
congestion and 
provide leisure areas 
to people 
To provide land to 
developers and to 
provide land premium 
to the government   
13 How the existing 
proposed extent of 
WDII was described? 
The existing extent 
was minimised 
The extent could be 
scaled down 
14 How was the 
adjustment of WDII 
considered? 
Infeasible and high 
cost 
Feasible and necessary 
15 How was the 
objective of CRIII 
considered?  
To resolve the traffic 
congestion and 
provide leisure areas 
to people 
To provide land to 
developers and to 
provide land premium 
to the government   
16 How the proposed 
extent of CRIII was 
described? 
The existing extent 
was minimised 
The extent could be 
scaled down 
17 How was the cost of 
suspending 
reclamation work 
considered? 
The cost was high 
and was paid by 
taxpayers 
The cost was limited 
and overstated by the 
Administration 
18 How was the partial 
resumption of CRIII 
work described? 
Dredging would not 
cause any irreparable 
damages to the 
Harbour  
Dredging would 
caused pollution in the 
Harbour 
19 How was the 
adjustment of CRIII 
considered? 
Infeasible and high 
cost 
Feasible and necessary 
20 How were the SEKR 
proposal and the 
associated 
development plans 
framed? 
Tourism and 
economy of Hong 
Kong would be 
benefited from the 
plans 
The plans would cause 
damage to the Harbour 
or provide interests to 
business sector 
21 How was HLC prison 
development plan 
framed? 
A relief to the 
overcrowding 
problem of prisons 
A damage to the 
environment 
22 How was the TPB 
described? 
A professional, 
legitimate body 
which is accountable 
to the public    
A closed body 
representing the 
interests of business 
and professional 
sectors  
23 How was the 
openness of the TPB 
described? 
Closed-door 
meetings are 
necessary  
All meetings should be 
open up to the public  
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Keyword List for Coverage of Central Reclamation 
Positive Negative 
 Traffic / Transport (交通) 
 Congestion (擠塞 / 塞車) 
 Cost (代價) 
 Compensation / Claim (賠償 / 
補償/ 索償) 
 Protect / Protection (保護) 
 Environment (環境) 
 Asset (資產) 
 Damage (破壞) 
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Appendix 9B: 
News Framing in the Six Analysis Periods 
in the Case of Central Reclamation  
 
 
Period 1 
Table A9B.1: News Framing of Central Reclamation  
between 22 March 2002 and 11 September 2003 (537 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 2 3 5 
Negative / Critical  7 8 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 10 1 3 
Total 19 12 10 
Average No. of articles per day 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Framing decided by article count Neutral Negative Positive 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
7 
5 
0 
1 
8 
5 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 13 13 3 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
1 
4 
1 
5 
7 
0 
3 
4 
6 
3 
2 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 11 14 11 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Mixed Negative Mixed 
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Period 2 
Table A9B.2: News Framing of Central Reclamation 
between 12 September and 5 October 2003 (23 days)   
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 14 0 7 (2) 
Negative / Critical  10 17 (1) 4 
Neutral / Descriptive 11 (2) 3 7 
Total 35 (2) 18 (1) 18 (2) 
Average No. of articles per day 1.52 0.78 0.78 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Mixed 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
9 
10 
3 
30 
11 
6 
3 
13 
21 
23 
0 
12 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 49 33 56 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
16 
6 
1 
3 
34 
8 
6 
9 
13 
5 
0 
3 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 26 57 21 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Negative Positive 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing    Mixed Negative Mixed 
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Period 3 
Table A9B.3: News Framing of Central Reclamation  
between 6 and 30 October 2003 (25 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 10 (1) 3 5 (1) 
Negative / Critical  12 16 (2) 5 
Neutral / Descriptive 18 (2) 10 (1) 12 (1) 
Total 40 (3) 29 (3) 22 (2) 
Average No. of articles per day 1.60 1.16 0.88 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Neutral 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
13 
15 
4 
9 
16 
15 
3 
12 
5 
5 
1 
6 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 41 46 17 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
25 
6 
0 
9 
47 
8 
3 
11 
19 
7 
0 
4 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 40 69 30 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing    Mixed Negative Mixed 
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Period 4 
Table A9B.4: News Framing of Central Reclamation 
between 31 October 2003 and 8 January 2004 (70 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 8 3 4 
Negative / Critical  6 7 5 
Neutral / Descriptive 11 4 3 
Total 25 14 12 
Average No. of articles per day 0.36 0.20 0.17 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Mixed 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing  Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
20 
25 
0 
2 
9 
8 
0 
0 
9 
4 
0 
3 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 47 17 16 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
9 
2 
1 
2 
17 
0 
0 
0 
8 
5 
0 
3 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 14 17 16 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Mixed Mixed 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing    Mixed Mixed Mixed 
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Period 5 
Table A9B.5: News Framing of Central Reclamation 
between 9 January and 8 March 2004 (59 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 4 (1) 2 2 
Negative / Critical  10 7 3 
Neutral / Descriptive 12 3 3 (1) 
Total 26 (1) 12 8 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 0.44 0.20 0.14 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Mixed 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequencies 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
8 
16 
2 
14 
2 
4 
1 
1 
18 
8 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 40 8 26 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
6 
5 
5 
1 
13 
5 
2 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 17 24 13 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Negative Positive 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing    Mixed Negative Mixed 
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Period 6 
Table A9B.6: News Framing of Central Reclamation 
between 9 March and 16 October 2004 (205 days) 
 
Article Count 
MPDN ADN ODN Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 25 3 22 (4) 
Negative / Critical  12 25 (1) 5 
Neutral / Descriptive 17 (1) 9 7 
Total 54 (1) 37 (1) 34 (4) 
Average No. of articles per day 0.26 0.18 0.17 
Framing decided by article count Mixed Negative Positive 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequencies 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
25 
12 
4 
53 
20 
18 
1 
14 
20 
14 
0 
26 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 94 53 60 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
17 
1 
4 
11 
46 
11 
3 
8 
23 
11 
1 
3 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 33 68 38 
Framing decided by keyword count Positive Negative Positive 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing    Mixed Negative Positive 
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Appendix 9C: 
News Framing of Sustained Coverage in the Case of  
Central Reclamation 
 
 
Table A9C.1: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the MPDN 
 
Article Count 
18-29/9/03 
(12 days) 
4-15/10/03 
(12 days) 
8-10/12/03 
(3 days) 
9-11/1/04 
(3 days) 
15-17/1/04 
(3 days) 
3-5/5/04 
(3 days) 
 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 12 8 (1) 1 1 (1) 0 3 
Negative / Critical  8 10 0 3 2 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 9 (2) 18 (2) 3 6 1 2 
Total 29 (2) 36 (3) 4 10 (1) 3  7 
Average No. of articles per 
day 
2.42 3.00 1.33 3.33 1.00 (2.33) 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Mix Neu Neu Neu Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
7 
10 
3 
25 
12 
14 
4 
15 
2 
1 
0 
0 
3 
13 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 45 45 3 19 0 2 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
18 
4 
1 
1 
18 
6 
0 
10 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 24 34 1 12 0 4 
Framing decided by 
keyword count 
Pos Pos Pos Pos Mix Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix Mix 
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Table A9C.2: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the ADN 
 
Article Count 
23/9-1/10/03 
(9 days) 
4-14/10/03 
(11 days) 
18-21/10/03 
(4 days) 
8-10/12/03 
(3 days) 
7-9/5/04 
(3 days) 
 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 3 0 1 1 
Negative / Critical  12 (1) 12 (1) 4 (1) 3 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 2 9 (1) 1 1 1 
Total 14 (1) 24 (2) 5 (1) 5 3 
Average No. of articles per day 1.56 2.18 1.25 1.67 1.00 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Neg Neg Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
4 
2 
2 
3 
15 
15 
4 
20 
6 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 11 54 10 1 3 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
29 
4 
5 
4 
39 
12 
3 
10 
7 
0 
0 
1 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 42 64 8 6 0 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Pos Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Neg Neg Mix Neg Mix 
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Table A9C.3: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the ODN 
 
Article Count 
4-14/10/03 (11 days)  
Framing Total No. of Article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 5 
Negative / Critical  5 
Neutral / Descriptive 9 
Total 19 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 1.73 
Framing decided by article count Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Keyword Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Congestion 
Cost 
Compensation 
6 
6 
1 
11 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 24 
Protect 
Environment 
Asset 
Damage 
19 
3 
0 
5 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 27 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Mix 
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Appendix 10: 
Chronology of Major Events in the Case of the GST 
 
Time Events 
1987 The Financial Secretary suggested introducing the sales tax in 
order to broaden the tax base. This proposal was withdrawn 
because of the objections by the legislature1 
8 Mar 2000 The Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, at his budget speech, 
announced to set up two committees. The first one, a Task Force 
would examine the viability of the existing tax regime while 
another independent committee would look into the suitability of 
introducing new taxes, including a consumption-based tax2. 
2 Jun 2000 The Administration announced to appointment of the Advisory 
Committee on New Broad-based Taxes (ACNBT)3. 
6 Aug 2001 The ACNBT announced a consultation paper, providing 13 
alternatives and highlighting GST4. 
6 Aug 2001 All the pro-democrat and pro-government parties, together with 
various business sectors, expressed the objections to the 
introduction of a GST5. 
1 Mar 2002 The ACNBT announced the Final Report to the Financial Secretary 
which concludes that GST is the best suited to the purpose of 
resolving the government’s structural deficit6.  
1 Mar 2002 Both the pro-democrat and the pro-government camps re-
emphasised the objection to the ACNBT’s suggestion7. 
10 Mar 2004 At the Budget Speech, the Financial Secretary announced to set up 
an internal committee to conduct a study on introduction of a GST. 
A proposed GST framework and an implementation timetable 
would be submitted at the end of 20048. 
11 Jul 2004 Vincent Fang of the LP and several chambers of commerce set up 
an “Anti-GST Alliance”9. 
16 Mar 2005 At the Budget Speech, Henry Tong claimed that internal 
committee finished the study of GST was finished, and that the 
Administration would conduct a public consultation on this 
subject10. 
22 Feb 2006 Henry Tong announced the plan of a 9-month public consultation 
on the detailed GST proposal in the middle of the year. Some 
details of the proposal were also disclosed11.  
18 Jul 2006 The Administration announced a Consultation Paper of “Public 
Consultation on Tax Reform”, and launched a 9-month public 
                                               
1 MPDN, 16 Dec 1999, page A01  
2 The 2000-01Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, 8 March 2000, paragraph 196-208: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2000/english/efile.htm#Review%20of%20Public%20Finances   
3 The Administration’s press release on the appointment of ACNBT 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200006/02/0602196.htm 
4 Consultation paper on "A Broader-based Tax System for Hong Hong?": 
http://www.info.gov.hk/archive/consult/2001/condoc-e.pdf 
5 MPDN, 7 August 2001, page A12. 
6 Final Report to the Financial Secretary by the Advisory Committee on New Broad-based 
Taxes, Paragraph 48: http://www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/acnbt/english/finalrpt/btreport.pdf 
7 MPDN, 2 March 2002, page A06. 
8 The 2004-05 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 113  
9 Website of Anti-GST Alliance: http://www.nogst.org.hk/as.htm 
10 The 2005-06 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 102-104: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2005/eng/budget41.htm 
11 The 2006-07 Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary, paragraph 70-72 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2006/eng/budget21.htm 
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consultation12. 
18 Jul 2006 Most parties in the Legco, and some business sectors, expressed 
their objections to the GST proposal13. 
20 Jul 2006 The DP, together with the other pro-democrat parties and trade 
unions, set up a “People’s livelihood Alliance”14. 
6 Aug 2006 The LP and the several chambers of commerce, held an anti-GST 
protest with the support of a few thousand people15. 
8 Aug 2006 The President of the FTU expressed the objection to the of GST16. 
10 Aug 2006 The DAB claimed that the party did not support the GST 
proposal17. 
13 Aug 2006 DP announced a plan to move a motion against GST in the 
Legco18. 
15 Aug 2006 The LP Chairman supported the termination of the GST 
consultation19. 
20 Aug 2006 The DP urged the Administration to terminate the GST 
consultation20. 
12 Sep 2006 The CE, Donald Tsang persisted on the GST proposal and urged 
the opponents of GST to provide sustainable alternatives to resolve 
the tax base problem21. 
14 Sep 2006 The LP legislators expressed the objection to the GST proposal to 
PRC Government senior officials in Beijing22. 
19 Oct 2006 The Legco passed a motion against the introduction of a GST23. 
22 Sep 2006 The Administration started the GST consultation in various 
regions24. 
24 Oct 2006 Henry Tong claimed that the government would explore the 
viability of other alternatives and would make an interim review 
before the end of the consultation25. 
Nov to Dec 
2006 
Fifteen out of eighteen District Councils in Hong Kong passed 
motions against the introduction of GST26. 
5 Dec  2006 Henry Tong announced that the Administration would not be 
advocating a GST for the remaining four months of consultation 
period27. 
 
                                                                                                                       
12 Consultation Paper of Public Consultation on Tax Reform, published on 18 July 2006: 
http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/doc_and_leaflet.htm 
13 MPDN, 19 July 2006, Page A04 
14 MPDN, 21 July 2006, Page A14 
15 MPDN, 1 August 2006, Page A12; 7 August 2006, Page A06 
16 MPDN, 9 August 2006, Page A15 
17 MPDN, 11 August 2006, Page A12 
18 MPDN, 14 August 2006, Page A10 
19 MPDN, 16 August 2006, Page A14  
20 MPDN, 21 August 2006, Page A10  
21 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Chief Executive: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200609/12/P200609120173.htm 
22 MPDN, 15 September 2006, Page A10  
23 Minutes of the Legco meeting, LC Paper No. CB(3) 188/06-07:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/counmtg/minutes/cm061018.pdf  
24 MPDN, 5 September 2006, page A14 
25 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200610/24/P200610240212.htm 
26 Public Consultation on Tax Reform Final Report, Appendix A, Published in June 2007: 
http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/pdf/finalreport.pdf 
27 The Administration’s press release on the speech by the Financial Secretary: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/05/P200612050115.htm  
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Appendix 11A: 
Coding Frame and Keyword List  
for News Coverage of the GST 
 
Coding Frame for the Coverage of GST 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
1 What voices were 
highlighted?  
Government officials’ 
and other supportive 
voices 
The opponents’ and 
other critical voices 
2 How the 
government fiscal 
status was 
described?  
The narrow tax base 
and other long term 
problems of public 
finance were 
highlighted 
The government  surplus 
and the advantages of 
existing tax system were 
highlighted 
3 What options to 
address the 
problems of 
public finance 
were highlighted? 
GST was considered the 
best and only viable 
option 
Other alternatives such 
as the introducing other 
taxes and reducing 
government expenditure 
were highlighted   
4 How fair was a 
GST? 
GST was considered a 
fair tax 
GST was considered 
unfair 
5 What possible 
impacts of the 
GST proposal 
were highlighted? 
The proposed tax relief, 
compensatory measures 
and the other possible 
benefits were 
highlighted 
The possible burdens on 
people and businesses as 
well as the 
administrative cost of 
GST were highlighted 
6 Should the GST 
consultation be 
continued? 
The GST consultation 
should be continued 
The GST consultation 
should be suspended. 
7 Was there any 
issues 
highlighted? 
Other issues favourable 
to the GST proposal 
Other issues 
unfavourable to the GST 
proposal 
 
Neutral framing: 
 Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article. 
 Neither supportive nor critical argument was highlighted. 
 Technical or procedural issues were described and explained.  
 
Keyword List for the Coverage of GST 
Positive frame Negative frame 
 Allowance (津貼 / 補貼) 
 Stable (穩定) 
 Long term (長遠) 
 Deficit (赤字) 
 Administrative fee (行政費) 
 Cost (成本) 
 Burden (負擔) 
 Surplus / Reserve (盈餘 / 儲
備) 
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Appendix 11B: 
News Framing in the Two Analysis Periods 
in the Case of the GST  
 
 
 
Period 1 
Table A11B.1: News Framing of the GST Debate 
between 22 February and 18 October 2006 (239 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 28 (1) 10 27 
Negative / Critical  101 (2) 145 (15) 62 (7) 
Neutral / Descriptive 54 33 27 
Total 183 (3) 188 (15) 116 (7) 
Average No. of articles per day 0.8 0.79 0.5 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Negative Negative Negative 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
34 
35 
37 
13 
25 
42 
20 
38 
20 
58 
32 
8 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 119 125 118 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
25 
20 
28 
47 
19 
35 
43 
75 
22 
50 
29 
69 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 120 172 170 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Negative Negative Negative 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Negative Negative Negative 
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Period 2 
Table 11B.2: News Framing of the GST Debate  
between 19 October and 5 December 2006 (48 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles (No. of 
editorials)   
Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 9 1 1 
Negative / Critical 20 9 (1) 15 (3) 
Neutral / Descriptive 10 (1) 5 2 
Total 39 (1) 15 (1) 18 (3) 
Average No. of articles per day 0.8 (0.3) 0.4 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Negative Negative Negative 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
4 
6 
3 
4 
8 
1 
1 
0 
6 
5 
9 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 17 10 20 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
1 
0 
10 
18 
0 
0 
3 
1 
0 
3 
2 
26 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 29 4 31 
Framing decided by article 
count 
Negative Positive Negative 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall Framing 
Negative Mixed Negative 
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Appendix 11C: 
News Framing of Sustained Coverage of the GST 
 
 
 
 
1. Sustained Coverage Run by Individual Newspapers 
 
Table A11C.1: Framing of Sustained Coverage  
on the MPDN in 2006 
 
Article Count 
7-25/7 1 
(19 days) 
30/7-6/9 2 
(39 days) 
12-28/9 3 
(17 days) 
9-12/10 
(4  days) 
16-20/10 
(5 days) 
24/10-8/11 4 
(16 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 10 8 2 0 4 8 
Negative / Critical  27 (2) 41 20 2 6 12 
Neutral / Descriptive 16 13 8 3 7 8 (1) 
Total 53 (2) 62 30 5 17 28 (1) 
Average No. of 
articles per day 
2.8 1.6 1.8 1.3 3.4  
Framing decided 
by article count 
Neg Neg Neg Mix Mix Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
21 
9 
9 
1 
4 
3 
8 
5 
6 
8 
4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
4 
4 
2 
1 
Positive   Total 40 20 19 1 3 11 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
14 
10 
12 
13 
3 
3 
8 
11 
3 
4 
4 
6 
3 
0 
0 
3 
3 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
6 
12 
N
egative 
Total 49 25 17 6 6 18 
Framing decided 
by keyword count 
Neg Neg Pos Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Neg Neg Mix Mix Mix Mix 
    
 
 
                                               
1 Except 10 and 15 July 
2 Except 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 27 August, 2 & 3 September 
3 Except 17 September 
4 Except 29 October, 4 & 5 November 
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Table A11C.2: Framing of Sustained Coverage  
on the ADN in 2006 
 
Article Count 
23-25/3 
(3 days) 
13/7-11/8 5 
(30 days) 
18-26/8 
(9 days) 
3-6/9 
(4 days) 
12-27/9 6 
(16 days) 
15-20/10 
(6 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 1 5 0 1 0 
Negative / Critical  2 79 (4) 12 (2) 3 17 (2) 10 (3) 
Neutral / Descriptive 1 12 1 3 6 2 
Total 3 92 (4) 18 (2) 6 24 (2) 12 (3) 
Average No. of articles 
per day 
1.0 3.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 2 
Framing decided by 
article count 
Neg Neg Neg Mix Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing  
Frequency 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18 
21 
4 
25 
0 
6 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
6 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
Positive 
Total 0 68 13 0 8 3 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17 
21 
15 
36 
0 
3 
5 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
5 
3 
0 
2 
0 
2 
N
egative 
Total 0 89 15 0 11 4 
Framing decided by 
keyword count 
Mix Neg Neg Mix Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Mix Neg Neg Mix Neg Neg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 Except 29 July and 4 August 
6 Except 21 September 
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Table A11C.3 : Framing of Sustained Coverage 
on the ODN in 2006 
 
Article Count 
8-28/7 7 
(21 d
ays) 
21-25/8 
(5 d
ays) 
29/8-6/9
8 
(9 d
ays) 
13-16/9 
(4 d
ays) 
16-20/10 
(5 d
ays) 
8-10/11 
(3 d
ays) 
Framing 
Total No. of Article (No. of editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 15 2 1 1 0 0 
Negative / Critical  22 (1) 2 4 3 (1) 7 (2) 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 7 2 6 4 2 1 
Total 44 (1) 6 11 8 (1) 9 3 
Average No. of 
articles per day 
2.1 1.2 1.2 2 1.8 1 
Framing decided 
by article count 
Neg Mix Neu Neu Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
16 
23 
13 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
4 
14 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Positive 
Total 53 0 5 5 18 1 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
14 
30 
15 
6 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
4 
1 
0 
0 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
11 
N
egative 
Total 65 4 6 6 6 11 
Framing decided 
by keyword count 
Neg Neg Neg Neg Pos Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall framing Neg Mix Mix Mix Mix Neg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Except 15 July  
8 Except 2 & 3 September 
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2. News Framing in the 5 Periods in which three Newspapers 
Ran Sustained Coverage Simultaneously     
 
 
Period 1 
Table A11C.4: Framing of Sustained Coverage of GST 
between 13 and 25 July 2006 (13 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 9 0 9 
Negative / Critical  22 (2) 61 (2) 17 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 10 7 3 
Total 41 (2) 68 (2) 29 
Average No. of articles per day 3.2 5.2 2.2 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
12 
7 
5 
1 
17 
17 
2 
5 
11 
8 
6 
1 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 25 41 26 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
8 
7 
8 
9 
17 
16 
11 
18 
9 
13 
5 
6 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 32 62 33 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Neg Neg 
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Period 2 
Table A11C.5: Framing of Sustained Coverage of GST 
between 21 and 25 August 2006 (5 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 3 0 2 
Negative / Critical  8 7 2 
Neutral / Descriptive 6 3 2 
Total 17 10 6 
Average No. of articles per day 3.4 2.0 1.2 
Framing decided by article count Mix Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
3 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 4 10 0 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
8 
1 
0 
2 
1 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 3 10 4 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Pos Mix Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Mix Mix 
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Period 3  
Table A11C.6: Framing of Sustained Coverage of GST 
between 4 and 6 September 2006 (3 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 1 0 1 
Negative / Critical  4 2 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 0 3 3 
Total 5 5 5 
Average No. of articles per day 1.7 1.7 2.7 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neu Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 1 0 3 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 2 0 4 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Mix Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Mix Mix 
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Period 4 
Table A11C.7: Framing of Sustained Coverage of GST 
between 13 and 16 September 2006 (4 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 1 0 1 
Negative / Critical  6 5 (1) 3 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 3 2 4 
Total 10 7 8 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 2.5 1.8 2 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neu 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 6 4 5 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
8 
1 
0 
0 
5 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 3 10 6 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Pos Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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Period 5 
Table A11C.8: Framing of Sustained Coverage of GST 
between 16 and 20 October 2006 (5 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 4 0 0 
Negative / Critical  6 9 (3) 7 (2) 
Neutral / Descriptive 7 2 2 
Total 17 11 9 
Average No. of articles per day 3.4 2.2 1.8 
Framing decided by article count Mix Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Allowance 
Stable 
Long term 
Deficit 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
4 
14 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 3 3 18 
Administrative fee 
Cost  
Burden 
Surplus / Reserve 
3 
2 
0 
1 
0 
2 
5 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 6 10 6 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Pos 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Mix Neg Mix 
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Appendix 12: 
Chronology of Major Events in the Case of the OSFP 
 
 
Date 
 
Event 
10 Jun 1999 The PLW Panel of Legco was consulted on the Draft Vision 
Statement for the Victoria Harbour and Central Reclamation Phase 
III (CRIII)1. 
12 Apr 2000 PWSC endorsed the proposal for upgrading of part of 343CL - 
“Central Reclamation Phrase III- consultants’ fee and site 
investigation”2. 
1 Mar 2002 PLW Panel discussed the proposal to implement CRP III including 
the refurbishment of the existing Ferry Pier No.7 and construction 
of a new Ferry Pier No. 8 and associated structures for 
reprovisioning of the affected “Star” Ferry Piers3. 
5 Jun 2002 PWSC endorsed the proposal for 343CL- Central Reclamation 
Phrase III – engineering works4.  
12 May 2006 SFCL announced the design of the new SFP in Central5. 
8 Jun 2006 Food, Environment, Hygiene and Works Committee of the CWDC 
discussed the design of the new SFP6. 
17 Jun 2006 The Conservancy Association staged a ceremony in Central to 
mark the end of the OSFP and QP7. 
22 Jun 2006 Traffic & Transport Committee of the CWDC discussed the traffic 
arrangements of the new SFP8. 
17 July 2006 See Network launched a petition to save the OSFP and its clock 
tower9. 
10 Aug 2006 Kwok Ka-ki requested the PLW Panel to discuss the issues related 
to the demolition of OSFP10.  
20 Aug 2006 About 100 activists held an art exhibition for the preservation of 
the OSFP and clock tower, and presented a petition with about 
7,000 signatures11. 
                                               
1 PLW Panel paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-
99/english/panels/plw/papers/pl1006_4.htm, and PLW Panel meeting minutes:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl100699.pdf 
2 Legco paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/fc/pwsc/papers/p00-1e.pdf, and  
Legco minutes of meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw120400.pdf 
3 PLW Panel paper:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0301-cb1-1134-3e.pdf, and  
minutes of meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-
02/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl020301.pdf 
4 PWSC paper: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/fc/pwsc/papers/p02-41e.pdf, and 
minutes of meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-
02/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw020605.pdf 
5 MPDN, 13 May 2006, page A08  
6 Minutes of the Committee meeting: 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/doc/FEHWC_3_2006_Min_Chinese.d
oc 
7 MPDN, 18 June 2006, page A19 
8 Minutes of the Committee meeting: 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/doc/3_TTC_MIN_CHIN_2006.doc 
9 MPDN, 17 July 2006, page A22 
10 PLW Panel paper CB(1)2129/05-06(02) (in Chinese):  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/chinese/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2129-2c.pdf  
11 MPDN, 21 August 2006, page A11 
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20 Sep 2006 Legco PLW Panel discussed the reprovisioning of the OSFP and 
passed a motion demanding the deferral of the demolition plan12.   
5 Oct 2006 The CWDC called on the Administration to preserve the OSFP and 
QP13. 
11 Oct 2006 The Administration provided a written response on the motion 
passed at the PLW Panel meeting on 20 September 200614. 
11 Nov 2006 The OSFP closed down at mid-night. 
One hundred fifty thousand people flocked to the OSFP in Central 
and Tsim Sha Tsui for farewell activities15.   
12 Nov 2006 The ferry service in Central moved to new pier. 
About 20 activists of SEE Network and Independent Media started 
a sit-in outside the OSFP. Some major environmental groups and 
pro-democracy parties also staged a protest march against 
reclamation and the demolition of the OSFP16. 
14 Nov 2006 Legco PLW Panel further discussed planning issues relating to the 
reprovisioning of the OSFP17. 
6 Dec 2006 In response to Choy So-yuk’s written question, the Administration 
claimed that, according to the built heritage impact assessment for 
CRIII conducted in 2001, and the AAB’s assessment report, the 
Administration would not re-consider declaring the OSFP as a 
monument18. 
11 Dec 2006 SEE Network and Alexander Hui claimed that the hyperlink to the 
AAB’s Survey Report on the relevant Government website had 
been missing, and doubted if the Administration concealed the 
report19. 
12 Dec 2006 The AAB held an urgent meeting to reaffirm no objection raised to 
Star Ferry Pier demolition plan in 200220. 
Some citizens organized by various minor groups staged a 
demonstration at the pier site while the demolition works of the 
OSFP commenced21. 
13 Dec 2006 The MPDN quoted an official source, claiming that the 
Administration had started the review of heritage policy22. 
Police officers cleared up the OSFP, arresting a demonstrator for 
“criminal damage” to property. Dozens demonstrators joined the 
protest from outside the fenced-off area.23 
With the permission of the Legco President, Fernando Cheung 
initiated a motion to debate the demolition of the clock tower at the 
OSFP24. 
The CE delivered a public speech, stressing the Government had 
                                               
12 PLW Panel paper:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-2208-2e.pdf,  
and minutes of meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-
06/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl060920.pdf 
13 Minutes of the Council meeting: 
http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central_d/chinese/Minutes/doc/DC/19.doc 
14 PLW Panel paper:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0920cb1-46-1-e.pdf 
15 MPDN, 12 November 2006, page A03 
16 MPDN, 13 November 2006, page A06 
17 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061114.pdf 
18 The Administration’s press release on the reply of the Secretary for Home Affairs: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/06/P200612060159.htm 
19 MPDN, 12 December 2006, pA02 and A04.  
20 The Administration’s press release:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-511-3-e.pdf 
21 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
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spent five year to satisfy all the statutory requirements and 
consultation procedures before deciding to demolish OSFP25. 
14 Dec 2006 PLW Panel held a special meeting to further discuss the subject 
matter and a motion was passed at the meeting26.     
16 Dec 2006 The clock tower of the OSFP was demolished in the morning27. 
20 protesters started a hunger strike to memorize the history of the 
OSFP28. 
18 Dec 2006 PLW Panel held a special meeting to discuss the demolition of the 
OSFP. The Administration, at the meeting, informed Panel 
members that the clock tower had been disposed of at the public 
fill reception facilities and mixed with other materials. 
At this meeting, Neil Brennan Wring denied the infeasibility of 
restoring the Star Ferry clock, telling the PLW Panel that the clock 
could continue to run29. 
19 Dec 2006 The amendment plan of existing heritage policy became concrete 
when the Administration disclosed that it would take account of 
peoples’ collective memory and social value of historical sites 
under the new standards of monuments30. 
The Legco Public Works Subcommittee of the Finance Committee 
rejected the government's request for an extra fund for proposed 
Central Kowloon Route which might affect Yau Ma Tei Police 
Station and Jade Market31.   
23 Dec 2006 The CE delivered a speech at the radio programme, announcing a 
series of heritage policy changes, including the adjustment of the 
demolition of the QP32.  
24 Dec 2006 Quoting a government source, the ODN disclosed the plan of AAB 
reform33. 
About 200 people joined Heritage Watch’s a candle-light vigil at 
the OSFP34. 
8 Jan 2007 The Administration launched a new series of consultations on built 
heritage conservation in which the current built heritage 
assessment criteria would be expanded, incorporating elements 
about collective memory35.  
                                                                                                                       
22 MPDN, 13 December 2006, page A02 
23 MPDN, 14 December 2006, page A03 
24 The Administration’s press release on the response of the SHPL: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/13/P200612130316.htm 
25 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the Chief Executive: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/13/P200612130248.htm 
26 Relevant papers for the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/agenda/plag1214.htm;  
Terms of the motion passed:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-534-1-e.pdf,  
and follow-up paper on the AAB meeting on 13 March 2002:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw1214cb1-575-1-e.pdf 
27 MPDN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
28 ODN, 17 December 2006, page A02 
29 Minutes of PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl061218.pdf 
30 MPDN, 20 December 2006, page A08 
31 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/fc/pwsc/minutes/pw061219.pdf 
32 The Administration's press release on the speech: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200612/23/P200612220271.htm 
33 ODN, 24 December 2006, page A19 
34 MPAN, 25 December 2006, page A04  
35 The Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080232.htm 
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The Administration also announced the reform of the AAB.36.  
23 Jan 2007 The Administration briefed the PLW Panel on the proposals 
to "relocate" the QP. Deputations of various professional and 
community bodies expressed their views at the same meeting. The 
Panel suggested that the Administration should discuss with the 
professionals on the arrangements for preserving the pier37. 
3 Feb 2007 Running for a second term, the CE, Donald Tsang announced the 
plan to create a Development Bureau to co-ordinate and balance 
the needs for development, and the needs for environmental 
protection and heritage conservation38. 
26 Mar 2007 The Administration proposed four alternatives for preserving QP39. 
3 May 2007 The CE announced the plan to reorganise the Government 
Secretariat, including the creation of the Development Bureau40. 
The Planning Department launched the first stage of Public 
Engagement for the Urban Design Study for the New Central 
Harbourfront, a public consultation on the urban design framework 
of the Central Harbourfront, including locations and design ideas 
for reconstructing the old Star Ferry Clock Tower and 
reassembling QP41.   
 
                                                                                                                       
36 Administration’s press release on the speech of the Secretary for Home Affairs:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200701/08/P200701080234.htm 
37 Minutes of the meeting: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/panels/plw/minutes/pl070123.pdf 
38 MPDN, 4 Mar 2007, page A01 
39 Relevant paper for the PLW Panel meeting:  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/plw/papers/plw0327cb1-1184-4-e.pdf 
40 The Administration’s press release on the CE’s statement: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/03/P200705030180.htm 
41 The Administration’s press release on the announcement of the Planning Department:  
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/03/P200705030197.htm 
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Appendix 13A: 
Coding Frame and Keyword List for  
News Coverage of the OSFP 
 
Coding Frame for Coverage of OSFP 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
1 How was the demolition 
plan framed? 
A development 
issue which resolves 
traffic congestion. 
A heritage issue 
which discards 
history and people’s 
memory 
2 Whose voices were 
highlighted? 
Government 
officials or the 
supporters of the 
demolition plan 
The opposition or 
people missing 
OSFP 
3 Which problem was 
considered to be more 
important? 
Traffic congestion People’s memory of 
the OSFP 
4 How were the 
preservation of the OSFP 
and its components 
described? 
Infeasible or 
unnecessary 
Viable and 
necessary. 
5 How was the adjustment 
of demolition considered?  
It was infeasible and 
too late to adjust the 
demolition plan. 
Adjustment was 
feasible and worth. 
6 How were the protests 
described?  
Disordered or 
radical 
Peaceful 
7 How were the protesters 
described?  
Radicals or 
minority. 
Fighters or 
intellectuals such as 
artists, students and 
university lecturers 
8 How was the legitimacy 
of the demolition plan 
described? 
It was a legitimate 
decision which has 
passed through all 
the consultation and 
statutory 
procedures. 
It was an outdated 
decision which 
mismatches the 
latest public views 
9 How was the missing 
hyperlink to the AAB’s 
Survey Report described? 
A technical mistake. The Administration  
concealed 
unfavourable 
information 
10 How were the existing 
heritage policy and its 
consultation mechanism 
described? 
Effective and 
legitimate. 
Inefficient and 
outdated. 
11 How the OSPF was 
described?  
A crude or old 
building 
An icon of history 
or people’s memory 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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Coding Frame for Coverage of OSFP (Cont.) 
Framing Category 
Positive Negative 
12 How were the demolition 
work and the removal of 
protestors described? 
Decisive or resolute Merciless 
13 Was there any other 
issues related to the 
demolition plan and 
existing heritage policy? 
Supportive of the 
Administration, its 
demolition plan and 
existing heritage 
policy. 
Critical of the 
Administration 
demolition plan and 
existing heritage 
policy 
 
Neutral Framing:  
• Supportive and critical voices were balanced in the same article 
• Neither supportive nor critical argument was highlighted. 
• Technical or procedural issues were described and explained.  
 
 
 
Keyword List for Coverage of OSFP 
Positive Frame Negative Frame 
 Traffic/Transport (交通) 
 Procedure (程序) 
 Contract (合約) 
 Conservation (保育) 
 Memory (回憶/記憶) 
 History (歷史) 
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Appendix 13B 
News Framing in the Five Analysis Periods 
in the Case of the OSFP 
 
 
Period 1 
Table A13B.1: Framing of Coverage of OSFP 
between 13 May and 9 August 2006 (101 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 1 1 2 
Negative / Critical  3 1 0 
Neutral / Descriptive 0 0 0 
Total 4 2 2 
Average No. of articles per day 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Framing decided by article count Neg Mix Pos 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Traffic 
Procedure 
Contract  
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 3 1 0 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
1 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 4 4 1 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall framing 
Neg Mix Mix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 466 
 
 
 
 
Period 2 
Table A13B.2: Framing of Coverage of OSFP 
between 10 August and 26 October 2006 (78 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles (No. of 
editorials)   
Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 3 1 1 
Negative / Critical 5 (1) 6 1 
Neutral / Descriptive 0 1 1 
Total 8 (1) 8 3 
Average No. of articles per day 0.1 0.1 0.04 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Traffic 
Procedure 
Contract 
3 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 3 3 0 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
4 
9 
18 
0 
6 
8 
0 
3 
4 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 31 14 7 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall Framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 3 
Table A13B.3: Framing of Coverage of OSFP 
between 27 October and 30 November 2006 (35 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles (No. of 
editorials)   
Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 3 0 0 
Negative / Critical  19 (3) 25 10 
Neutral / Descriptive 6 6 3 
Total 28 (3) 31 13 
Average No. of articles per day 0.8 0.89 0.37 
Framing decided by article count  Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Traffic 
Procedure 
Contract 
5 
5 
1 
6 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 11 6 5 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
3 
12 
17 
1 
18 
19 
1 
15 
13 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 32 38 29 
Framing decided by article count  Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall Framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 4 
Table A13B.4: Framing of Coverage of OSFP 
between 1 to 15 December 2006 (15 days) 
 
Article Count 
Total No. of articles (No. of 
editorials)   
Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 2 0 0 
Negative / Critical  15 (4) 15 (1) 8 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 5 2 4 
Total 22 (4) 17 (1) 12 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 1.47 1.13 0.80 
Framing decided by Article 
Count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Traffic 
Procedure 
Contract 
1 
10 
1 
0 
1 
4 
4 
1 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 12 5 5 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
3 
9 
34 
3 
6 
12 
0 
3 
13 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 46 21 16 
Framing decided by Article 
Count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall Framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Period 5 
Table A13B.5: Framing of Coverage of OSFP 
between 16 December 2006 to 3 February 2007 (50 days) 
Article Count  
Total No. of articles (No. of 
editorials)   
Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Positive / Supportive 4 2 2 
Negative / Critical  25 (2) 29 (1)  32 (6) 
Neutral / Descriptive 18 14 7 
Total 47 (2) 45 (1) 41 (6) 
Average No. of articles per day 0.94 0.9 0.82 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Frequency Framing 
MPDN ADN ODN 
Traffic 
Procedure 
Contract  
11 
7 
4 
2 
3 
1 
0 
5 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 22 6 7 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
31 
34 
94 
47 
35 
53 
37 
39 
79 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 159 135 155 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
MPDN ADN ODN Overall Framing 
Neg Neg Mix 
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Appendix 13C 
News Framing of Sustained Coverage of the OSFP  
 
 
 
Table A13C.1: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the MPDN 
 
Article Count 
10-
13/11/06 
(4 days) 
12-
25/12/06 
(14 days) 
7-
10/1/07 
(4 days) 
 
 
Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 4 1 
Negative / Critical  12 (1) 35 (5) 2 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 2 14 3 
Total 14 (1) 53 (5) 6 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 3.50 3.79 1.50 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Neutral 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Procedure 
Contract  
0 
4 
0 
12 
15 
5 
0 
1 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 4 32 1 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
1 
9 
12 
24 
34 
81 
0 
5 
6 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 22 139 11 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Neg Neg Mix 
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Table A13C.2: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the ADN 
 
Article Count 
10-
17/11/06 
(8 days) 
11-
26/12/06 
(16 days) 
8-11/1/07 
(4 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 1 0 
Negative / Critical  18 30 (1) 3 (1) 
Neutral / Descriptive 5 11 3 
Total 23 42 (1) 6 (1) 
Average No. of articles per day 2.88 2.63 1.50 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg Mix 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Procedure 
Contract  
4 
0 
0 
2 
3 
5 
0 
0 
0 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 4 10 0 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
0 
9 
13 
37 
25 
31 
6 
2 
10 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 22 93 18 
Framing decided by keyword 
count 
Neg Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Neg Neg Mix 
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Table A13C.3: Framing of Sustained Coverage on the ODN 
 
Article Count 
10-13/11/06 
(4 days) 
12-25/12/06 
(14 days) 
Framing 
Total No. of article (No. of 
editorial) 
Positive / Supportive 0 2 
Negative / Critical  7 32 (5) 
Neutral / Descriptive 1 8 
Total 8 42 (5) 
Average No. of articles per day 2 3 
Framing decided by article count Neg Neg 
 
Keyword Count 
Framing Frequency 
Traffic/Transport 
Procedure 
Contract  
1 
0 
0 
4 
5 
2 
Positive / 
Supportive 
Total 1 11 
Conservation 
Memory 
History 
1 
9 
9 
27 
22 
62 
Negative / 
Critical 
Total 19 111 
Framing decided by keyword count Neg Neg 
 
Combined Results 
Overall Framing Neg Neg 
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